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Testimony: The Export Administration Act of 2000

March 23, 2000April 4, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services

March 23, 2000

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished committee to testify on the Export Administration Act. I would like to begin by submitting three items for the record. The first is an article on supercomputer export controls that I published in the Outlook section of the Washington Post on March 12, the second is an article on Iraqi procurement efforts that I published in the New Yorker magazine on December 13, 1999 and the third is a report entitled “25 Myths about Export Control” that my organization prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today.

I will direct my remarks to S. 1712, the bill recently reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. In my judgment, if this bill were enacted it would overturn and to a great extent nullify the system of export controls that the United States has built up over the past half-century. Our present export law attempts to strike a balance between national security and freedom of trade. S. 1712 clearly does not. Instead, it is a list of provisions advocated by commercial interests that have long opposed any form of export control. It would be more accurate to call the bill in its present form the “Export Decontrol Act.”

S. 1712 decontrols items used to make nuclear weapons and long-range missiles

1. Nuclear weapon triggers

For at least twenty years, the United States has controlled for export the high-precision electronic switches needed to detonate nuclear weapons. These are key components in a nuclear weapon’s firing circuit and are popularly known as nuclear weapon “triggers.” In 1998, Iraq tried to provide itself with a supply of these switches under the guise of medical equipment. Iraq is allowed to import medical equipment despite the U.N. embargo, so Iraq bought a half dozen machines-called “lithotripters”-to rid its citizens of kidney stones. The lithotripter pulverizes kidney stones inside the body-without surgery. But each machine must be triggered by the same high-precision switch that triggers a nuclear weapon. Iraq tried to buy 120 extra switches as “spare parts.”

Iraq ordered the machines and switches from Siemens, in Germany, which sold the machines but passed the “spare parts” order to Thomson in France. The French government barred the sale. Siemens says that Iraq did get one switch with each machine and two more as spares, but to get any additional switches, Iraq will have to turn in a used switch for each new one and will have to allow the United Nations to inspect the use of the machines. The switches were controlled for export because they are on the control list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international regime to which France, Germany and the United States belong.

These switches, however, appear to have “mass market status” under S. 1712, and would be removed from the National Security Control List. The switches meet all the criteria listed in Section 211 of the bill, and the bill says that the Secretary of Commerce shall remove them if they meet the criteria. They meet the criteria as follows:

They are “available for sale in a large volume to multiple purchasers,” because they are used in radar, lasers and rockets as well as lithotripter machines and are advertised on the Internet by manufacturers in a number of different countries;
They are “widely distributed through normal commercial channels,” because they are sold by the thousands each year, including the hundreds sent to hospitals to keep lithotripter machines running;
They are “conducive to shipment and delivery by generally accepted commercial means of transport,” because they are small and easy to handle;
They “may be used for their normal intended purpose without substantial and specialized service provided by the manufacturer,” because they need only to be connected into an electrical circuit by attaching the appropriate wires.

Any bill that decontrols nuclear weapon triggers must be seen as seriously flawed.

Despite the fact that these items are available in great volume inside the countries that produce them, they are not easily available to countries that are trying to make nuclear weapons. The reason is export controls. If the United States were suddenly to decontrol them, it would dismay our allies and destroy our credibility on nuclear nonproliferation.

There are a number of other nuclear and missile items that would have “mass market status” under this bill, despite the fact that they have long been controlled for export and are extremely useful for making nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

2. Glass and carbon fibers

Glass and carbon fibers are used widely in ballistic and cruise missiles. They are used in solid rocket motor cases, interstages, wings, inlets, nozzles, heat shields, nosetips, structural members, and frames. Composites reinforced by carbon or glass fibers can also be used to form the high speed rotors of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Fiber parts are often lighter, stronger, and more durable than parts made of metal. They are used in skis, tennis racquets, boats and golf clubs. They are produced in China, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. They have been controlled for export since January 1981.

They also meet all the criteria for “mass market status” under Section 211:

They are “available for sale in a large volume to multiple purchasers,” because they are advertised on the Internet and can be ordered in large quantities by anyone;
They are “widely distributed through normal commercial channels,” because they are shipped in large quantities to manufacturers of sporting goods;
They are “conducive to shipment and delivery by generally accepted commercial means of transport,” because they do not require special handling except for refrigeration in some cases;
They “may be used for their normal intended purpose without substantial and specialized service provided by the manufacturer,” because they can be incorporated in manufacturing processes in the form received.

In 1988, a California rocket scientist was arrested in Baltimore as he tried to illegally load 420 pounds of carbon fibers on a military transport plane bound for Cairo. The material was intended for the ballistic missile that Egypt was developing with Argentina and Iraq. The scientist was sentenced in June 1989 to 46 months in prison. It would be a big surprise to the world if the United States now decontrolled this material.

3. Maraging steel

Maraging steel is a high-strength steel used to make solid rocket motor cases, propellant tanks, and interstages for missiles. It is also used to make the high-speed rotors in gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In 1986, a Pakistani-born Canadian businessman tried to smuggle 25 tons of this steel out of the United States to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. He was sentenced to prison as a result. Maraging steel has been controlled for export since January 1981.

This steel is produced by companies in France, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States and it meets all the criteria for “mass market status.” Several steel companies list maraging steel on the Internet and can produce maraging steel in multi-ton quantities. Over the telephone, two American companies and one British company explained to my staff how to order 25 ton quantities with delivery in less than a month. Maraging steel is bundled and shipped much like stainless steel, which it closely resembles.

4. Corrosion resistant valves

These special valves are essential components in plants that enrich uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Both Iraq and Iran are hoping to build such plants, and will need these valves in great numbers. The valves are able to resist the corrosive gas used in the enrichment process.

These same valves are also used in the chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas, fossil power, pulp and paper, and cryogenic industries. Their size can range from very large gate valves down to tiny globe valves used in instrument and control lines. They are manufactured by companies in Australia, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Smaller corrosion resistant valves have been controlled for export since October 1994, and larger valves have been controlled since October 1981.

These valves fit all of the criteria for “mass market status.” They are advertised on the Internet and are widely available to American buyers. A quick survey this week by my organization revealed that dozens of companies make them and sell them in the hundreds per year. They would therefore be decontrolled under Section 211, to the great delight of Iraq and Iran.

These are only four of the sensitive items that would meet the “mass market” definition of the bill. There are surely many others.

Many of these sensitive items would also have “foreign availability status” under Section 211 because they are manufactured and sold by a number of foreign companies. In fact, the definition of this term is so sweeping that it appears to cover anything that a controlled country can manage to buy from any supplier in the world. If Iran or Pakistan or Syria can buy a nuclear weapon component or a missile component or a piece of sensitive equipment from China, Russia or North Korea, then this bill says that our industry must be free to sell the same thing.

Indeed, when one reads Section 211 carefully, it would seem that even rocket motors would have “foreign availability status.” Under the bill’s criteria, North Korean rocket motors:

Are “available to controlled countries from sources outside the United States;”
“Can be acquired at a price that is not excessive;”
Are “available in sufficient quantity so that the requirement of a license or other authorization with respect to the export of such item is or would be ineffective.”

Today, Egypt, Iran, Syria and Pakistan are importing these rocket motors in “sufficient quantities” without any trouble. Requiring a U.S. license for their sale would obviously be “ineffective.” Under the literal terms of the bill, they appear to have “foreign availability status.” One could argue that a rocket motor is not a “dual-use” item, but these motors can be used for civilian space launchers as well as missiles. Unfortunately the bill, whose main object is to control the export of “dual-use” items, does not define the term.

Any bill that decontrols rocket motors should be viewed with suspicion.

S. 1712 would end American leadership on export controls

Many of the provisions of S. 1712 are based on the same principle that children use to excuse their misbehavior: “other people are doing it.” Industry has managed to persuade the Banking Committee that if another country sells something, so should we. What would happen if this idea were put into practice?

First, we should remember the Scud missiles that Iraq launched against Israel during the Gulf War. Those missiles were supplied by Russia and enhanced by Germany. There were German logos on missile parts found in Tel Aviv. Would our industry be happier if there had been American logos on those parts?

Second, we should remember that the same enhanced Scuds killed American troops sleeping in their barracks in Saudi Arabia. Would our industry be proud of providing the parts that enhanced the range of those missiles?

Third, we should remember that Germany sold entire, turn-key poison gas plants to Libya and Iraq in the 1980s. These were “dual-use” facilities for making pesticides-but they turned out to be for “two-legged flies.” Would our companies be happier if they had supplied those plants?

Fourth, we should consider that China is now selling missile equipment to Pakistan and selling poison gas equipment to Iran. These items have “foreign availability” written all over them. Does our industry believe it should share in these sales?

By tying U.S. law to that of other countries, U.S. export controls could be no stronger than those of the most lax foreign supplier. It would then be impossible for the United States to play its leadership role. We would be following the lowest common denominator. The effect would be to reverse a foreign policy stance the United States has maintained for over forty years. It would be an historic abandonment of America’s moral leadership.

It is essential for the United States to be able to adopt strong controls first, and then persuade other countries to follow its example-the method by which every export control agreement since World War II has been created. U.S. diplomats are using this strategy today to help create export controls in the former East Bloc.

Congress should give the President broad authority to control the export of any dual-use item that is judged relevant to the national security of the United States. The national security should be taken to include combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maintaining the military advantage that the United States now enjoys. The President should not be limited to controlling only what other countries control.

S. 1712 reduces the power of the national security agencies

Under Section 202 of this bill, the Secretary of Defense would lose his existing power to put an item on the National Security Control List. Only the Secretary of Commerce would have that power. The Secretary of Defense has the right to be consulted, but that could only allow the Pentagon to keep an item off the list that the Commerce Department wants to put on it. Since Commerce has always wanted to control as few items as possible, this is a meaningless concession.

Section 211 also allows the Secretary of Commerce to take an item off the list after consulting with the Secretary of Defense, but does not allow the Secretary of Defense to prevent an item from being deleted.

The effect of these provisions is to give the Commerce Department sole power to decide what is controlled for export and what is not. The Secretary of Commerce can-and no doubt will-rewrite the entire National Security Control List without any real restraint by the national security agencies. This is the exact reverse of what the process should be.

The Defense, Energy and State Departments house the experts who understand how dual-use equipment operates and what the risks are if such equipment is diverted for military purposes. They also know which countries and companies in the world are most likely to divert it. These experts are not at the Commerce Department. In order to bring the maximum amount of government expertise to bear upon export control decisions, the qualified personnel at the national security agencies must be able to decide what is controlled and who is allowed to buy it.

But this bill gives the Commerce Department more influence than any other agency. In addition to deciding what will be controlled, Commerce will chair the most important export control committees and will use its administrative preeminence to influence the outcome of licensing decisions.

I hope that this subcommittee will examine carefully the testimony given last June by Dr. Peter Leitner before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Dr. Leitner, who is a Senior Strategic Trade Advisor at the Department of Defense, explained how the influence of technical experts from the national security agencies has been diluted by making them subordinate to a committee of non-specialists chaired by the Department of Commerce.

Congress should ensure that no license application is approved unless all the national security agencies concur. It makes no sense to allow cases to be escalated to the political level where the judgments of national security experts can be reversed by political considerations. If a national security agency takes a stand in opposition to an export application at the expert level, the case should end there.

Instead of being like poor relatives invited to dinner, the national security agencies should be put at the head of the table. Each interagency committee should be chaired by a national security agency. There is no reason to give this function to the Commerce Department, which has the least expertise in the subject matter. And the power to decide what to put on the control list should also be given to the national security agencies. Either the State or the Defense Department should be given the lead in formulating the export control list, with help from the Department of Energy for nuclear items. If export control is going to be a strategic question, instead of a trade question, then the strategic experts should be put in charge of it. This is the only division of labor that makes sense.

Let us also not forget that the Commerce Department is burdened by a conflict of interests-it must promote exports as well as regulate them. The promotion function has always dominated, and has always caused the Commerce Department to champion the exporters’ point of view. As long as the Commerce Department is in charge of administering the export control laws, national security will take a back seat to trade interests.

Congress should consider transferring jurisdiction over all dual-use licensing to the State Department, for essentially the same reasons that it just transferred jurisdiction over satellites. The Commerce Department is simply not a trustworthy guardian of U.S. national security.

The State Department already handles munitions licenses with the help of the Department of Defense. In the most recent fiscal year, State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls reviewed more than 44,000 licenses with a staff of about 55 persons. State could be provided additional staff to handle the 10,000 applications that now go to the Commerce Department.

S. 1712 effectively prevents the President from setting aside a decision to decontrol

S. 1712 effectively takes away the President’s ability to keep controls in place. The bill provides that the Secretary of Commerce shall determine that an item has mass market or foreign availability status if the item meets the criteria in Section 211. The Secretary must then decontrol the item.

The only way to retain control is for the President to make a special finding within 30 days that exporting the item “would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.” That finding would be impossible to make unless the President could foresee which country would buy the decontrolled item and how the country would use it against the United States. No President can foresee that. And even if the President could foresee it, he could still not stop the export unless there were a “high probability” that foreign supply of the item could be cut off. Is there a “high probability” that North Korea can be persuaded to stop exporting rocket motors?

When one combines the “foreign availability” and “mass market” criteria in this bill, it is hard to see what would be left on the control list.

These defects are not cured by Section 201(c), which allows controls on items that could “materially” contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This section, in fact, would appear to put the United States in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Article one of the treaty obliges the United States “not in any way” to assist a non-nuclear-weapon state in acquiring nuclear weapons. There is no “materiality” exception in the treaty. A series of U.S. exports, each of which standing alone would not be “material,” would violate the treaty if the exports “in any way” assisted a nuclear weapon effort. The term “material” is so vague that the Commerce Department could interpret it quite broadly.

S. 1712 would have no significant impact on American jobs

It is important to recognize that export control is not a jobs issue. Export controls do not have a significant-or measurable-effect on employment. Less than two tenths of one percent of the American economy is affected by dual-use export controls. And more than 90% of licensing applications are approved. Only a few hundred million dollars worth of applications are denied each year-which amounts to less than one hundredth of one percent of the U.S. economy. Reducing export controls will not stimulate the U.S. economy; it will only stimulate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It is also important to realize that export controls are only a shadow of what they were during the cold war. Since 1989, applications to the Commerce Department have dropped by roughly 90%. Cases have fallen from nearly 100,000 in 1989 to about 10,000 in 1998. The reason is simple: fewer items are controlled, so fewer applications are required. Nor does export licensing take much time. The Commerce Department is meeting its licensing deadlines for 97% of its applications.

Instead of trying to cut export controls further, we now need to strengthen controls to combat proliferation, the main threat of the post-cold war era. The spread of weapons of mass destruction, rather than competition with the Soviet Union, is now the foremost strategic threat to the United States. Because mass destruction weapons are built mainly with dual-use equipment, the control of dual-use exports is of vital military and strategic importance. Rather than being viewed as commercial transactions with a military aspect, as they were during the cold war, dual-use exports must now be regarded as deeply affecting U.S. national security. It is illogical to say that the cold war is over and therefore proliferation is the main international threat, and at the same time say that export controls, which are essential to contain that threat, should be reduced.

Testimony: The Situation in Iraq

March 22, 2000April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

March 22, 2000

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished subcommittee to discuss the situation in Iraq. I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and slowing the spread of nuclear weapons.

I will begin by describing a recent Iraqi procurement attempt, and then try to assess the inspection system created under U.N. Resolution 1284. I will also try to provide an overview of the threat posed by Iraq to international security.

I would like to submit three items for the record. The first is an article I recently published in the New Yorker detailing Iraq’s use of the oil-for-food program to buy components that can trigger nuclear weapons. The second is a table my organization prepared after the inspectors left Iraq in 1998, which lists what remains unaccounted for in Iraq’s mass destruction weapon programs. The third is a chart on Saddam Hussein’s procurement network that my organization prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today.

What Has Saddam Hussein been doing recently?

More than one year has passed since U.N. inspectors left Iraq, and the world is wondering what Saddam Hussein is up to. The short answer is: he has been shopping for A-bomb components in Europe. Iraq is allowed to import medical equipment as an exception to the U.N. embargo, so in 1998 Iraq ordered a half-dozen “lithotripter” machines, ostensibly to rid its citizens of kidney stones, which the lithotripter pulverizes inside the body without surgery.

But each machine requires a high-precision electronic switch that has a second use: it triggers atomic bombs. Iraq wanted to buy 120 extra switches as “spare parts.” Iraq placed the order with the Siemens company in Germany, which supplied the machines but forwarded the switches order to its supplier, Thomson-C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. The French government promptly barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, claims that Siemens provided only eight switches, one in each machine and two spares. Sources at the United Nations and in the U.S. government believe that the number supplied is higher.

The lesson from this episode is that Iraq is still trying to import what it needs to fuel its nuclear weapon program.

And Iraq is closer to getting the bomb than most people think. The U.N. inspectors have learned that Iraq’s first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was a full meter in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. From discussions with the Iraqis, the inspectors deduced that the new design weighs only about 600 kilograms and measures only 600 to 650 millimeters in diameter. That makes it small enough to fit on a 680 millimeter Scud-type missile. The inspectors believe that Iraq may still have nine Scuds hidden somewhere.

The inspectors have also determined that Iraq’s bomb design will work. Iraq has mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb’s nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The inspectors have learned that the new Iraqi design also uses a “flying tamper,” a refinement that “hammers” the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force.

How did Iraq progress so far so quickly? The inspectors found an Iraqi document describing an offer of design help from an agent of Pakistan. Iraq says it didn’t accept the offer, but the inspectors think it did. Pakistan’s latest design also uses a flying tamper. Regardless of how the Iraqis managed to do it, Saddam Hussein now possesses an efficient nuclear bomb design. The only thing he lacks is enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel it – about sixteen kilograms per warhead.

Resolution 1284 and the new inspection system

The lithotripter episode exposes one of the key weaknesses of the U.N. oil-for-food program. While its humanitarian objectives are laudable, the truth is that oil-for-food is really “oil-for-arms” as viewed from the Iraqi side. Iraq has been allowed to purchase humanitarian items such as medical equipment with money earned from oil exports so long as the funds were administered by the U.N. sanctions committee. But Iraq was able to disguise its purchase of the nuclear weapon triggers as medical equipment and the sanctions committee approved the export. The sale was restricted only by the national export controls applied by the supplier countries.

Under U.N. Resolution 1284, the sanctions committee loophole will now be expanded. The resolution lifts the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports, and it authorizes the committee to draw up lists of items including food, medical equipment, medical supplies, and agricultural equipment that will not have to go through the sanctions committee for approval. In January, the U.N. Secretary General was able to report that these lists had already been drawn up. In addition, the resolution sets up a group of experts charged with speedily approving contracts for parts and equipment necessary to enable Iraq to increase its oil exports.

The result of the liberalization is this: Iraqi oil revenues will rise, large quantities of goods will be imported without U.N. approval, and the sheer volume will overwhelm the tracking system that is currently in place, even if monitors do return to Iraq. Iraq is now slated to receive $3.5 billion in authorized imports in the current phase of the oil-for-food plan, more than any small committee can keep tabs on.

Our chart in the New York Times, Week in Review from 1993 gives a good idea of who Iraq’s suppliers were before the Gulf War. Most of these companies still exist, and Iraq still wants to buy what they produce. The pie chart illustrates the scope of the problem. U.N. inspectors never managed to fully expose or eradicate this procurement network, despite valiant efforts. There is every reason to think that this network is swinging back into action in the absence of inspections.

Resolution 1284 also promises in paragraph 33 the early lifting of sanctions if Iraq cooperates with U.N. inspectors for 120 days on the monitoring and disarmament tasks specified in the inspectors’ work programs. Gone is the requirement for full disarmament. Instead there is the “checklist” approach that Iraq has been urging for years. The U.N. inspectors must provide Iraq with a list of things to do, and Iraq need only show some progress toward doing them in order to suspend the existing embargo. Iraq will not have to answer all the remaining questions about its weapon programs; it will only have to show that it “has cooperated in all respects” with the work program. What it means to “cooperate in all respects” is not defined by the resolution. It is clear, however, that “cooperation” does not mean “achieving disarmament.”

Another weakness of the new resolution is its silence on who the new inspectors will be. The resolution never addressed the question whether former UNSCOM inspectors would serve in the new inspection body, called the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In January, Dr. Hans Blix was chosen to head UNMOVIC. After assuming his post earlier this month, Dr. Blix said that he would demand “unrestricted access” to Iraqi sites but would not “humiliate” Iraqi leaders with a procession of surprise inspections. He made it clear that the new agency would seek a more cordial relationship with Iraq. Dr. Blix also noted that he would rely on former UNSCOM inspectors in a transition period, but made no promise to give them permanent posts. Lastly, he said that the new inspectors would have to be full-time employees of the United Nations, rather than come on loan from their governments.

The United States should keep the pressure on Mr. Blix to retain the former UNSCOM inspectors on staff. These dedicated men and women not only undertook personal risk to carry out a hazardous duty, but in the process they developed a body of knowledge and experience that will be lacking in a new group of inspectors. Losing the UNSCOM inspectors will mean losing their invaluable familiarity with Iraq’s weapon programs. The former inspectors should not be thrown over the side just to please Saddam Hussein.

Dr. Blix has a checkered history in Iraq. While Dr. Blix was head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq ran an ambitious nuclear weapon program under his inspectors’ very noses. This activity included a breach of the international safeguards obligations that his agency was supposed to be enforcing. And after the Gulf War, Iraq was nearly given a clean nuclear bill of health by his timid inspectors in 1991. The IAEA and Dr. Blix were saved from humiliation only by an Iraqi defector, who provided the lead that caused the discovery of Iraq’s giant uranium enrichment program. The record shows that Dr. Blix’s agency made repeated errors in Iraq, and meekly relied on Iraqi disclosures when more assertiveness was clearly called for. Unless Dr. Blix is more effective at UNMOVIC than he was at the IAEA, the inspectors – whoever they will be – are unlikely to find anything in Iraq.

Threat and Response

Present U.S. efforts won’t stop the Iraqi bomb. American jets are patrolling Iraq’s no-fly zones and blowing up its air defenses, but these pinpricks won’t hinder bomb-making at secret sites. The Iraqis have learned the art of camouflage very well. The United States and Britain are also trying to maintain the international trade embargo, but it is eroding because key countries don’t support it and there are no inspectors to check on what comes into Iraqi ports. The United States has threatened to overthrow Saddam, but this threat is viewed as empty in the absence of a credible means to carry it out.

In effect, the world is reverting to the position it was in before the Gulf War. With no inspectors inside Iraq, Western intelligence agencies must try to sniff out Saddam Hussein’s purchases from abroad, and to divine what his hidden arms factories are making with them. That method failed in the 1980’s. Western intelligence never discovered the key component of Iraq’s nuclear manufacturing effort: a string of giant magnets that would have turned out critical masses of bomb fuel by 1995 if Saddam had not invaded Kuwait.

The world can ill afford another such debacle. An Iraqi bomb, or even the imminent threat of one, removes any hope of coaxing Iran off the nuclear weapon path. With Saddam building bombs next door, Iran can only speed up its drive for weapons of mass destruction. And once Iraq and Iran are able to target Israel with nuclear warheads, how can Israel feel secure enough to make the concessions necessary for peace in the Middle East?

The best chance of containing Saddam is still the same: to disarm him. And the best way to do that is to unite the U.N. Security Council behind meaningful inspections. But international cooperation in dealing with Iraq has practically ceased, despite the negotiation of Resolution 1284.

The cost of paralysis could be high. It is only a matter of time until Iraq’s bomb factories start producing again, if they haven’t already. The U.N. inspectors believe that Iraq is withholding drawings showing the latest stage of its nuclear weapon design, blueprints of individual nuclear weapon components, and drawings showing how to mate Iraq’s nuclear warhead with a missile. Iraq claims that these things either do not exist or are no longer in its possession. In addition, Iraq has failed to turn over documents revealing how far it got in developing centrifuges to process uranium to weapon-grade, and has failed to provide 170 technical reports it received showing how to produce and operate the centrifuges. Iraq claims that all these documents were secretly destroyed. Nor has Iraq accounted for materials and equipment belonging to its most advanced nuclear weapon design team.

And the nuclear threat is not the only worry. Iraq is also hiding key parts of its chemical weapon program. Iraq has refused to account for at least 3.9 tons of VX, the deadliest form of nerve gas, and at least 600 tons of ingredients to make it. Iraq produced the gas but claims it was of low quality and that all of the ingredients to make it were either destroyed or consumed during production attempts. Also missing are up to 3,000 tons of other poison gas agents that Iraq admitted producing but said were used, destroyed or thrown away, and several hundred additional tons of agents the Iraqis could have produced with the 4,000 tons of missing ingredients they admit they had at their disposal. Iraq also admits producing or possessing 500 bombs with parachutes to deliver gas or germ payloads, roughly 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, 107,500 casings prepared for various chemical munitions, and 31,658 filled and empty chemical munitions – all of which Iraq claims to have destroyed or lost, a fact which inspectors have been unable to verify. Many key records are also missing. These include an Iraqi Air Force document showing how much poison gas was used against Iran, and thus how much Iraq had left after the Iran-Iraq war, as well as “cookbooks” showing how Iraq operated its poison gas plants.

The uncertainties surrounding Iraq’s biological weapon program are greatest of all. The total amount of germ agent Iraq produced (anthrax, botulinum, gas gangrene, aflatoxin) has never been revealed to the inspectors, who know only that Iraq’s production capacity far exceeded what it admitted producing. Iraq has simply alleged that its production facilities were not run at full capacity, a claim directly contradicted by its all-out drive to mass-produce germ warfare agents. Inspectors believe that Iraq retains at least 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads filled with germ agents, retains spraying equipment to deliver germ agents by helicopter, and possessed enough growth media to generate three or four times the amount of anthrax it admits producing. Iraq either claims that these items were destroyed unilaterally, claims they were used for civilian purposes or simply refuses to explain what happened to them. Nor can inspectors account for the results of a known project to deliver germ agents by drop tanks or account for much of the equipment Iraq used to produce germ agents. Finally, Iraq contends that many essential records of its biological weapon program, such as log books of materials purchased, lists of imported ingredients, and lists of stored ingredients, simply “cannot be found.”

Iraq also retains some of its delivery capability. Up to nine ballistic missiles, plus imported guidance components, remain unaccounted for. Iraq claims they were all secretly destroyed, but their remains were not found in the sites where Iraq claimed it dumped them. In addition, the inspectors cannot account for up to 150 tons of missile production materials, or for Iraq’s stockpile of liquid rocket fuel. Because Iraq has been allowed to produce short-range missiles (less than 150 kilometers in range) under U.N. monitoring, it has manufacturing capability that it can convert to longer-range missiles now that monitoring has ceased.

Saddam Hussein has not been idle since December 1998. U.S. officials have been cited in the media as saying satellite photographs and U.S. intelligence reports have shown that Iraq has in the last year rebuilt many of the 100 military and industrial sites damaged or destroyed by American and British air strikes in December 1998. Of those targets, 12 were reportedly missile factories or industrial sites involved in Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, at which officials said significant reconstruction had been seen – including the Al Taji missile complex.

For the moment, our government seems content to live with inaction. The present U.S. policy is to isolate Saddam diplomatically, maintain the existing trade sanctions, and give at least some help to Iraqi opposition forces – a strategy known as “containment plus.”

Unless U.S. foreign policy makers once again place a high priority on disarming Iraq and lead the international community in that direction, Saddam Hussein will achieve his mass destruction weapon aspirations in the relatively short-term. Despite a seven-year international effort to rid Iraq of these weapons, Iraq today retains a great potential for producing them. Experts have estimated that Iraq could resume manufacture of chemical and biological agents within months of a decision to do so. Similarly, Iraq could probably assemble a nuclear weapon within weeks of importing the fissile material necessary to fuel it. Five years is a reasonable estimate if Iraq itself is obliged to produce the fissile material. By refusing to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, and by foregoing billions of dollars in oil revenue rather than choosing to disarm, Iraq has shown that building mass destruction weapons remains one of its primary goals. Therefore, the United States should revisit its own Iraq policy before it is too late.

The Link Between Space Launch and Missile Technology

March 16, 2000April 5, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Presentation at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Honolulu, Hawaii

Introduction – History

The nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia is getting a lot of attention since the test explosions in 1998. The history of missile development there illustrates the close connection between space launch and missile technology.

In 1963, NASA began the Indian rocket program. NASA launched a U.S. sounding rocket from India’s first test range, which the United States helped design. We also trained the first groups of Indian rocket scientists. NASA invited them to NASA’s Wallops Island test site located southeast of Washington, DC in Virginia.

While at NASA, Mr. A.P. Kalam, a member of the Indian delegation, learned about the U.S. Scout rocket, which was being flown at Wallops Island. The Scout was the only four-stage, solid-fueled, small payload space launcher in the world. Indian engineers saw the Scout’s blueprints during their visit. Two years later, the head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission asked NASA for design information about the Scout. Mr. Kalam then proceeded to build India’s first big rocket, the SLV-3, which became the only other four-stage, solid-fueled, small payload space launcher in the world. It was an exact copy of the Scout. The first stage of the Scout then became the first stage of India’s first large ballistic missile, the Agni-I. The Agni-I’s second stage was liquid-fueled, and was based on a surface-to-air missile called the SA-2 that India bought from Russia.

France also helped India master liquid-fuel technology by selling India the technology used to build the “Viking” engine used on the Ariane space launcher. India calls its version the “Vikas.” The Agni also needed a guidance system. The German Space Agency obliged with a long tutorial in rocket guidance, which allowed India to develop a guidance system and learn how to produce its components (gyroscopes, accelerometers and so forth). The German Space Agency also tested a model of the first stage of the SLV-3 in one of its wind tunnels in Cologne and helped India build its own rocket test facilities. Germany also trained Indians in how to make composite materials.

Thus, India’s biggest nuclear-capable missile is an international product. Under the mantle of peaceful space cooperation, the United States, France and Germany all helped create the most advanced nuclear missile in South Asia.

The story in Pakistan is similar. NASA launched Pakistan’s first rocket in 1962. Pakistan’s project was also led by the head of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission. We must wonder what was going through NASA’s mind at this time – it keeps getting requests for space cooperation from the heads of atomic energy commissions. Apparently NASA thought this was normal. NASA also trained Pakistani rocket scientists at Wallops Island, and launched rockets in Pakistan until 1970.

Interchangeability: launchers being turned into missiles and missiles being turned into launchers

What did India learn from its foreign helpers?

– Manufacture of rocket propellant (solid and liquid);
– Manufacture of rocket engines (solid and liquid);
– Manufacture of air frames, motor cases, liners, and insulation;
– Manufacture of thrust vector control systems;
– Manufacture of exhaust nozzles;
– Manufacture of staging mechanisms;
– Manufacture of payload separation mechanisms;
– Manufacture of strap-on boosters;
– Manufacture of ground support and launch equipment;
– How to conduct system integration;
– How to conduct failure analysis and testing of components.

All of this is identical to the knowledge needed for building a missile. The same technology is used in both. In effect, the West taught India how to do just about everything necessary to build a big rocket and put a payload into orbit. It has been said that an ICBM is a space launcher whose orbit intersects the earth. Once a country is able to deploy a large satellite in a precise orbit, it has mastered the technologies needed to hit a major city with a ballistic missile.

Guidance is the main difference, but even here there are great similarities. According to the study on U.S. high-tech assistance to China published last year by the Cox Committee, most launcher guidance systems would be accurate enough to deliver a nuclear weapon to a large city. The committee noted that:

– the guidance system used on China’s Long March 2 and 3 space rockets is also used on China’s CSS-4 (DF-5) ballistic missile, which is targeted on the United States;
– the guidance system used on China’s “Smart Dispenser” to deploy two Iridium communication satellites is also used on the M-9 (CSS-6) and M-11 (CSS-X-7) missiles targeted on Taiwan;

– the lessons China has learned in improving the guidance of its space launchers will also help it improve the guidance of its next generation of ballistic missiles. The same people design both systems. The speed, direction, and altitude at which you release a ballistic warhead determines where it lands. The same factors determine the orbit in which you insert a satellite.

Re-entry is also a challenge. You must, of course, design and produce a re-entry vehicle capable of surviving the stress of passing through the atmosphere.

U.S. assistance to China

It might be worthwhile to consider the question of U.S. aid to China’s launch program.

This aid has two aspects – technical and financial. The Cox Committee took a hard look at the question, and so did the Defense Department. It may be useful to remind everyone of the main conclusions.

In 1995, a Chinese rocket (LM-2E) carrying a satellite manufactured by Hughes Space and Communications Company blew up. After the failure, Hughes performed an investigation to find out what went wrong. The failure was apparently caused by excessive loads on the fairing (or shroud). This crushed the satellite and caused its burning fuel to leak into the engines, which exploded.

Hughes determined that the Chinese method of analyzing loads on the fairing was deficient. The Chinese did not understand how to analyze these loads sufficiently. Also, Hughes identified flaws in the fairing and other components that had caused this and a previous launch in 1992 to fail, and also identified Chinese deficiencies in accident analysis and the interpretation of telemetry.

Hughes communicated its findings to the Chinese, with the result that, according to the Committee, China gained a “significant improvement” in its space launch program. The committee also found that what China learned would inevitably benefit its missile program.

The Pentagon found that the help Hughes gave China was a “defense service” under U.S. export laws (the ITAR) and required an export licence from the State Department. According to the Pentagon’s report on the subject, there was “no reasonable basis to conclude” that an export licence from State was not required. The Cox Committee found that the export was unlawful.

The case has been before a grand jury for almost two years, and the Justice Department still has not indicted anybody. We will probably have to wait for a new attorney general before anything happens.

Money

In June 1998, the House Science Committee held an interesting hearing on China and dual-use missile technology. A representative of Alliant Techsystems, Mr. Paul Ross, testified that his company, one of the two main makers of solid rocket motors, had shifted mainly from being dependent on defense for its propulsion business to having 80% of its propulsion business devoted now to commercial satellite launches. Those launches are sustaining the engineering staffs that must build new solid rocket motors for the nations defense.

Also at the hearing was Mr. Oren Phillips of Thiokol Propulsion, the other principal maker of solid rocket motors. His testimony was similar. Three quarters of Thiokol’s propulsion business is now commercial. As he put it, “every dollar of profit [that our former adversaries gain from launching U.S. satellites] is one less dollar they would have to spend on their defense program.” He argued that by launching U.S. satellites in non-market economies, we are “indirectly strengthening their strategic missile capability while damaging our own.”

It is always difficult to accept industry claims at face value, but these witnesses had two valid points. U.S. launch contracts are undoubtedly sustaining China’s rocket industry, and that industry is producing missiles aimed at the United States.

Chinese proliferation

The same companies that benefit from U.S. launch contracts are proliferating missile technology to countries we are worried about. China Aerospace Corporation and its various subsidiaries are still supplying missile gear and technology to Iran and Pakistan – the latter more than the former. The State Department has basically given up trying to stop this activity. Our diplomacy has hit a dead end.

By continuing our space cooperation however, we are putting money directly into the pockets of the Chinese companies that are undermining our non-proliferation policies.

As a matter of principle we should restrict space cooperation to countries that share our commitment to non-proliferation and our general values. That now excludes China, India, Israel, and Pakistan and may soon include Russia. We can see that our cooperation with India and Pakistan was a mistake. Both countries are now making nuclear missiles.

We may one day decide that we made the same mistake with Russia and China. It is becoming more difficult every day to see what benefit there is from our cooperation. U.S. space cooperation should be a reward for countries that share our foreign policy objectives and countries that are a part of the solution to the proliferation problem. Cooperation should not be a bribe to countries that are a part of the problem.

The Future: What can we expect?

South Korea plans to spend $500 million to $1 billion to develop a small satellite launcher over the next five years. This will be a way around the existing agreement with the U.S. not to develop long-range missiles. South Korea’s program bears watching because South Korea will someday inherit North Korea’s nuclear weapon experience, materials, and facilities.

North Korea will continue to outfit Iran, Syria, Egypt, and probably Libya.

Russia and China will continue to proliferate missile technology to Iran and Pakistan and probably Iraq as well (as the embargo against Iraq weakens). U.S. efforts to halt this assistance have failed and will no doubt continue to fail during the Clinton administration.

India and Israel probably will not become new suppliers. India’s program is all about prestige, not making money; Israel’s best potential customers are the Islamic countries, which are arrayed against it.

The Middle East

If we look out five to ten years into the future, it seems likely that at least hundreds and probably thousands of missiles will be targeted on civilian populations in the Middle East. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel will all be a part of this missile stand-off. The missiles could carry non-conventional warheads as well as high explosives. This would put many civilians lives at risk if war broke out.

Exporting Trouble

March 12, 2000April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

The Washington Post
Outlook
March 12, 2000, p. B3

With Looser Computer Controls, We’re Selling Our Safety Short

HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS aren’t like most other products that U.S. companies sell abroad. They’re more like weapons, the author argues.

Israel has begun to outfit Chinese planes with a powerful new radar, one reportedly able to see targets and help direct air battles as far as 250 miles away. The Clinton administration has been trying to stop this deal, but it is facing a formidable barrier: its own desire to promote U.S. exports.

In fact, the deal is getting a boost from Uncle Sam. The Commerce Department has allowed Israel’s premier maker of military radar, Elta Electronics Industries, to buy two high-performance computers from Sun Microsystems Inc. of Palo Alto, Calif. Elta will be able to use them to outfit the Chinese planes cheaper, faster and better.

This means that if the United States ever has to defend Taiwan, American pilots could be targeted by radar built with American equipment.

Unfortunately, this alarming sale is just a drop in the flood of computers the administration has decided to let American companies sell abroad. On Jan. 23, President Clinton lowered export controls that had blocked scores of American high-performance computers from being shipped to nuclear and missile programs in countries including China, India and Russia.

The truth is, high-performance computers aren’t like most other exports–they’re more like weapons. They are essential to develop the software and hardware that make things like advanced military radar work. And one of the driving forces behind the development of “supercomputers” has always been the desire to design better nuclear weapons and the missiles that deliver them.

That is why Congress has required a control process for international sales. A U.S. manufacturer must notify the government if it wants to sell a high-performance computer to a buyer in a “proliferant” country like China or Israel; then it must wait 10 days. If any federal agency is suspicious of the buyer, the exporter must request a formal license. In practice, roughly 90 percent of the sales meet with no objection. The process, therefore, does not seriously impede exports.

Before Jan. 23, any computer capable of more than 2 billion operations per second fell under those rules. After that date, the bar rose to 6.5 billion operations per second. The administration also plans to decontrol computers performing up to 12.5 billion operations per second later this year. (By comparison, the most popular new desktop PCs perform 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion operations per second.)

These new rules will, for the first time, allow a string of foreign weapons makers to buy powerful American computers that had been specifically denied to them.

Consider some of the buyers who were blocked by the old rules from purchasing high-performance computers from Digital Equipment Corp.: China’s Harbin Institute of Technology, which makes rocket casings and other components for China’s long-range nuclear missiles; the Weizman Institute in Israel, which researches high-energy physics and was the birthplace of Israel’s nuclear weapons effort; the Nanjing (China) Public Security Bureau, whose mandate includes tracking political dissidents.

All those proposed sales involved computers operating between 2 billion and 6.5 billion operations per second. Under the loosened rules, the sales will be able to take place without government interference. Whether they happen or not is up to Compaq Computer Corp., which owns Digital.

And Compaq is not the only company that could profit from the looser rules. IBM was turned down when it tried to supply three computers to China’s Northwest Polytechnical University, which develops engines and guidance systems for large rockets and trains China’s missile forces.

And, of course, there is Sun Microsystems: The two computers it is selling to the Israeli radar maker, Elta Electronics, slip beneath the new control level. So does the computer Sun had previously tried to sell to the Rafael Armament Development Authority, which played a major role in developing Israel’s largest nuclear-tipped missile.

What will these countries do with such computers? Could China use them to make better atomic bombs? Yes. In a study released in 1998, the Department of Energy found that for countries such as China or India to improve their nuclear weapon designs, they will need computers able to perform about 4 billion operations per second. That performance level is right in the middle of the range that Clinton just decontrolled.

How many computers will be exported? According to the General Accounting Office, the old rules have blocked at least 85 high-speed computers from going to potentially dangerous buyers since 1998. These buyers included Chinese organizations “reportedly engaged in military or proliferation activities” and Indian companies “engaged in missile proliferation. . . .”

Astonishingly little money is at stake in these transactions. According to the export license applications, the sale to China’s Harbin Institute was valued at $348,000; the sale to Weizmann at $41,000; and Sun’s sale to Rafael at $25,000. Put this in context: Compaq, for example, has an annual revenue of roughly $31 billion. Why would such a wealthy company want to outfit nuclear plants in sensitive regions of the world for a few hundred thousand dollars? With so much risk to reputation, what is the motivation?

The companies don’t have a convincing answer. Dan Hoydysh of the Unisys Corp., who acts as spokesman for the big computer exporters, comes closest to providing one. “These computers are going to be available from any number of foreign manufacturers, so it makes no sense to control them,” Hoydysh told me. He argues that if U.S. controls weren’t loosened, foreign competitors would step in and make the sales that American companies can’t. The White House accepts this argument. It is contradicted, however, by the independent evidence.

American makers of high-speed computers have almost no foreign competition. Virtually all the computer chips in the world are made by American companies. In 1998, the GAO found that “U.S. companies and their international business partners overwhelmingly dominate the international market for supercomputers.” Only three firms in Japan provided competition, the GAO said, and Japanese export controls are at least as stringent as those in the United States. The GAO reiterated its findings as recently as last November. Another 1998 study, by the Commerce and Defense departments, reached the same conclusions.

Perhaps the most understandable argument against export controls is the astonishing proliferation of increasingly powerful computer chips. Yesterday’s supercomputer is today’s student laptop. Just as it is impossible to stem the spread of information in the age of the Internet, the companies say, the number of powerful computer chips is outstripping the government’s ability to regulate them. “Controlling these machines is simply not feasible,” Hoydysh contends.

He cites IBM’s Aptiva line of personal computers, sold with a chip rated at 2.1 billion operations per second, and Apple’s G4 personal computer, which can perform 2.7 billion. Both exceed the previous control level of 2 billion. Apple, in fact, began a TV ad for the G4 with the words, “For the first time in history, a personal computer has been classified as a weapon by the U.S. government. . . .”

Hoydysh is right that things are changing, and that computers once considered dangerous have become commonplace. That doesn’t mean we should put them into unreliable hands. A machine performing 2, 4 or 6 billion operations per second is still a threat in the hands of an arms maker, however many such machines already exist–just as the prevalence of handguns doesn’t make the one pointed at you any less lethal. The real question is whether it is still feasible to prevent fast computers from going to foreign weapon sites, where they will clearly do harm.

It is feasible, to a great extent, if the government has the will. It would be simple for the United States to publish a comprehensive list of dangerous buyers–in addition to the present list of risky countries. Before selling any computer to an entity on the buyers list, an exporter would have to get a license. This would allow the government to turn down dangerous sales without impeding innocent ones, and enable American industry to keep its competitive edge without arming the world. There will always be the buyer who smuggles, or uses a front company, but it won’t get the parts and service needed to keep a high-tech enterprise going.

The administration did come out with a list of 150 dangerous buyers in India and Pakistan after the two countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. But so far, it has refused to publish such a worldwide list, saying it would reveal intelligence sources and set off diplomatic conflicts. That is ridiculous: Hundreds of firms in China and Russia are active in nuclear, missile and military production. Their names are well-known. It is fatuous to pretend we don’t know they exist.

The computer industry, indeed, would welcome such a list. “We would support any government effort to identify entities engaged in dangerous activities,” Hoydysh says. “If the government tells us who the bad guys are, we won’t sell to them.” This makes perfect economic sense. Industry wants to concentrate on buyers that don’t present problems.

The industry’s true motive seems to be a desire to be forever first–first in the buyer’s door with the highest processing speed. “Market access” is the term Hoydysh uses. By maintaining that advantage, American firms hope to prevent foreign firms from ever gaining a foothold. Any restriction on the freedom to sell–such as export controls–is seen as a risk. The price of the strategy, of course, is that bomb and missile makers around the world will achieve their goals faster and more efficiently with American equipment.

It is time for the administration to understand that there is more to foreign policy than promoting trade. It is easier, safer and more economical to stop dangerous exports than to defend against the weapons they produce. The revenue isn’t worth the risk. And it is time for the computer industry, which sees itself as forever young, to grow up and accept responsibility for the nation’s security.

Gary Milhollin is executive director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

What Goes Where

To manage the export of high-performance computers, the U.S. government has divided the world into four “tiers” and set standards for what U.S. manufacturers may legally sell there. They are:

TIER I: Western Europe, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. Any computer can be exported to these countries, with no prior review required.

TIER II: Central and South America (except Brazil), South Korea, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Slovenia and most of Africa. Computers capable of up to 20 billion operations per second can be sold with no prior review. For faster computers, the seller must obtain a license.

TIER III: India, Pakistan, the Middle East and Northwest Africa, the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and most of Central Europe. Computers capable of up to 6.5 billion operations per second can be sold to any user with no prior review. Between 6.5 billion and 12.3 billion operations per second, military users require licenses. Above 12.3 billion operations per second, all users require licenses.

TIER IV: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan and Syria. The United States maintains an embargo on computer exports to these countries.

Source: National Security Council

The Proliferation Threat Today

February 1, 2000April 5, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Presentation at the International Law Enforcement Academy

Budapest, Hungary

I. Introduction

I am pleased to be able to speak to you this morning. I am a lawyer and a university professor who has been doing research and publishing articles on the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction for about 15 years. My organization publishes a database on this subject that lists the names of approximately 2,200 companies around the world that are linked to the spread of these weapons. The database is used by the U.S. Customs service and the U.S. Commerce Department to help enforce export control laws. A number of foreign countries also use the database. These include England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway Sweden, Switzerland, and others.

The Pentagon and the FBI have asked me to describe, in one hour, the proliferation threat today. The threat has been building for half a century, so trying to describe it in one hour may be a little presumptuous. I hope you will give me the benefit of the doubt if I leave something out that you think is important.

First, I will discuss the threats I find most serious; then I will discuss the rest.

II. Iraq

A. I have distributed an article from the New York Times that my organization prepared about one year ago. You can see the weapon capability that the United Nations inspectors believe Iraq is still hiding. It includes:

Nerve gas, nerve gas ingredients, and nerve gas munitions.
Biological agents, growth media for producing these agents, and munitions to deliver them.
Nuclear weapons components, designs, technical reports and production equipment.
Ballistic missiles, missile components, missile warheads, missile fuel and missile drawings.

B. U.N. inspectors have discovered that Iraq can now produce:

The most potent form of nerve gas.
Potent biological agents (anthrax, botulinum, aflatoxin).
Scud-type missiles capable of reaching Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A functional nuclear warhead that lacks only the fissile material fuel to produce a chain reaction.

C. International support for the embargo is disappearing

The new U.N. resolution creates big loopholes, through which Iraq will import prohibited items. They will be disguised as humanitarian goods or oil- producing equipment. This is already happening.
I discovered recently that Iraq imported special electronic switches capable of detonating nuclear weapons by labeling them as medical equipment. The switches were in machines to treat kidney stones.
U.S. officials at the State Department overlooked the case and did not object when they were consulted by the United Nations.
A large amount of goods will no longer be reported to the U.N. under the new resolution.

D. Iraq has continued its procurement activities

Since the Gulf War, Iraq has repeatedly attempted to import prohibited items.
Most of the attempts have been in the countries of the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. I know of attempts through Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. I don’t know of any from Lithuania. Some of the attempts appear to have succeeded.
In the future, Iraq’s efforts will increase as it gets more money from oil sales. This will be a major new challenge for export control.
Jordan is the main re-transfer point, so you should watch exports to Jordan.
Saddam Hussein will not allow Mr. Blix to find anything important.

III. Iran

A. Iran and Iraq are now in an undeclared nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile arms race.

B. What does Iran face in its neighborhood?

A nuclear armed Israel.
A nuclear armed Pakistan.
An Iraq which is trying to get nuclear arms.

C. Is Iran going for the bomb?

U.S. intelligence thinks so. According to a senior U.S. official who has tracked Iran for a decade, “there are Iranians who have been given the task to get or make fissile material for a weapon.”

D. What does Iran have?

No apparent ability to manufacture fissile material.
But buying it on the black market is possible.

E. Iran’s procurement efforts?

Tried to buy a centrifuge plant from Russia.
Tried to buy a fluorine plant from France.
Tried to buy uranium from Russia.
Got help in uranium mining from China.
Tried to buy 25-30MW research reactors from Russia and China.
Tried to buy a plant to make uranium hexaflouride from China.
Tried to buy heavy water and graphite production technology from Russia.
Iran is also building long-range missiles, which are used primarily to deliver nuclear warheads.
Iran is also building the Bushehr reactors.
Iran procures through the U.A.E., Dubai in particular.
Dubai does not have effective export controls. (The Risk Report lists Iranian companies in Dubai.)

F. Iran’s missiles

Iran has tested a 1200 km missile (Shahab-3) that can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It is an improved version of the North Korean Nodong missile, which North Korea developed from the Russian Scud missile based, in turn, on the German V-2 rocket used in WWII. The Shahab-3 is now operational.
Iran is developing a 2000 km missile (Shahab-4) based on the Russian SS-4, and an even more powerful Shahab-5 with a range of 5000km.
All these missiles have benefitted from Russian assistance, which is continuing today. Russia is providing training, testing and components.
If the assistance continues, Iran will be able to build an ICBM. Perhaps within five years.
U.S. diplomacy has failed-some in Congress are calling for an end to U.S. space cooperation with Russia.
China has also helped Iran, principally with solid-fuel technology.

G. Iran’s chemical and biological programs

Iran has an active chemical weapon program.
China has been its principal outside supplier. China has provided precursors and specialized equipment for many years. The United States has sanctioned a few Chinese front companies for this activity, but the sanctions have come too little and too late.
Iran also has a biological weapons program, which according to the CIA, has received help from Russia.
Iran has also recruited Russian germ warfare specialists to work in Iran- some may have agreed to go.

H. Prediction

Iran’s missile program will continue to progress unless Russia and China end their aid. Iran will be able to deliver any nuclear warheads that it produces.
Iran’s nuclear effort will progress also and its success will depend on how much help Iran gets from Russia and China. I see an Iranian bomb within ten years, possibly less, assuming local production of fissile material. If the material is imported, then much faster than that.
The United States has no successful diplomatic mechanism for preventing Iran’s success.

IV. North Korea

A. Exports

North Korea is supplying missile technology to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Egypt
Pakistan
Syria
U.S. diplomacy has failed

B. North Korea’s own missiles

North Korea has an aggressive missile program, based on liquid-fuel technology. It can reach Japan today and may be able to reach the United States within the next five years. North Korea knows how to produce multi- stage missiles. The accuracy of these missiles becomes questionable at longer ranges. North Korea might hit North America but not a city.
North Korea has received help from outside.a. There are reports of assistance from China in guidance equipment, special steel, and precision equipment.b. From 30 to 40% of the semiconductors in North Korean missiles came from Japan, according to Japanese legislators.
North Korea will export whatever it makes.a. Its missile industry is an export industry.b. Its tests are advertisements for sales.c. It functions as an off-shore production site for countries that want missiles.

C. North Korea’s nuclear program

North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two warheads, possibly more.
A great weakness of the U.S.- North Korea framework accord is that we don’t know exactly how many nuclear warheads North Korea has.
The purpose of North Korean nuclear weapons are assumed to be to hold Japan, Seoul or U.S. troops hostage in the event of a war. That is, North Korea could threaten to attack Japan with nuclear weapons if the United States reinforced South Korea.
There is a report that North Korea is also working on uranium enrichment technology to make nuclear weapons, with assistance from Pakistan.
Prediction:

D. North Korea’s chemical weapons

North Korea has an aggressive chemical weapon effort. Thousands of tons of chemical agents are believed to be stockpiled.
North Korea can deliver chemical warheads by SCUD to any point in South Korea. If war began, and North Korea used chemical warheads against U.S. troops, who were dying on U.S. television, there would be pressure to use U.S. nuclear weapons to cut U.S. losses.

V. India

A. India tested a series of nuclear weapons in 1998

Plutonium came from Canadian-designed reactors using heavy water supplied by Russia, China and Norway through a German broker. China was the largest supplier.
India’s next step is to make its warheads smaller and lighter to fit on ICBMs. To do so, India will need advanced machine tools and supercomputers, which it is trying to import. The U.S. has supplied supercomputers already.
India has announced that it will build a triad of nuclear forces: aircraft, missiles and sea-based systems.
India’s tests may not have been as successful as India has said they were. Many analysts in the U.S. think India exaggerated the yields. India could probably benefit from more tests.
Warhead material: India now has sufficient nuclear weapon material to hit every major urban area in Pakistan and probably in China. A reasonable estimate is that India has enough material for 100 or so warheads.
India has announced that it has “weaponized” the material- that it is ready to be delivered in the form of warheads. India can deliver bombs by nuclear- capable aircraft and probably by surface-to-surface missiles.

B. Indian missiles

India has a short-range liquid-fuel missile capable of delivering nuclear warheads to cities in Pakistan-called the Prithvi. It is based on a Russian surface-to-air missile. The missile is in serial production and is mobile (250 km reaches Pakistani cities).
India has an intermediate range, two-stage missile, called the Agni-II, capable of delivering nuclear warheads to Pakistan and China. It will fly from 2,000 to 2,500 km, not quite far enough to reach Beijing. The first stage of the missile was copied from a U.S. space launcher and the guidance system was developed with help from the German Space Agency. About 20 missiles are planned by the end 2001.
India announced in 1999 that it will develop an ICBM within two years. It could do so by using the large rockets developed for its space launch vehicles, which have been launched successfully. In May 1999 India put a 1.2 ton satellite into orbit. If a country can do that, it can send a nuclear payload anywhere in the world. Accuracy, however, is another matter. India will have to shoot missiles half-way around the world in plain view to perfect a guidance system. Everyone will be watching.

C. Submarines and bombers

India is developing the capability to deliver nuclear weapons by surface ships, submarines and long-range bombers. India is negotiating with Russia on the supply of these. If these efforts are successful, India can be expected to develop the ability to hit any coastal city in the world with nuclear weapons based at sea.
India will be following the lead of other small nuclear powers such as England and France, which have taken their nuclear arsenals to sea.

D. Outside help

India’s entire nuclear and missile infrastructure has either been imported, or based on imported designs. This includes India’s reactors, its heavy water plants, its liquid- and solid-fuel missile technology, and its missile guidance systems.

E. The future

India will continue to need precision machine tools and high-speed computers to refine and modernize its arsenal. I expect these to be provided by Western countries, including the United States.

VI. Pakistan

A. Pakistan has been making nuclear weapons since the mid-1980’s and tested some in 1998. We should assume that Pakistan has enough warheads (up to 50) to hit every major city in India. The warheads use a Chinese design and are made using high-enriched uranium using European equipment.

Pakistan has a new Chinese-designed reactor that will make plutonium and also tritium for more efficient warheads.
If you subtracted Chinese assistance from Pakistan’s nuclear program, there would not be a nuclear program.
Pakistan has a small efficient fission bomb design that is probably superior to India’s.
One must assume that Pakistan can now deliver nuclear warheads to India’s major cities with the F-16 aircraft that were supplied to Pakistan by the United States. Pakistan may also be able to deliver warheads with ballistic missiles.
Pakistan will continue to produce uranium, plutonium and probably tritium to fuel a growing nuclear arsenal. Like India, Pakistan will need precision machine tools and high-performance computers to make its warheads more efficient.

B. Pakistan has solid-fuel missile technology imported form China. The M-11 (Hatf III) missile has a range of about 300 km with a nuclear warhead. China sold Pakistan at least 30 missiles, probably in 1992.

In addition, Pakistan has a longer-range version called the Shaheen, which has been tested to a range of about 700 km.
China also supplied the design of a production plant for making solid-fuel missiles, so Pakistan can make its own solid-fuel missiles now.

C. Pakistan has also acquired a longer-range liquid-fuel missile from North Korea. In 1998 Pakistan tested a version similar to the Nodong (called the Ghauri, a.k.a. Hatf V), which flies about 1,200 km.

In 1999 Pakistan tested a longer-range version called the Ghauri II, which flies about 2000 km.
Both are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Pakistan has also conducted static engine tests of the Ghauri III, which will fly 2,700 to 3,000 km and bring all of India within range.

D. In July 1999, the CIA reported that North Korea and China continued to supply Pakistan’s missile programs. We must assume that the supply is continuing today.

E. The future

In the near future, we must expect Pakistan to be able to cover all of India with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Pakistan’s warhead is small enough to fit on the Ghauri and probably on the Shaheen as well. One must assume that Pakistan will succeed soon in mounting its warheads on these missiles, if it has not done so already.

VII. Conclusion

This brings me to the end of my presentation

A. You can see that Egypt, Syria and Iran can all target Israel with chemical warheads on missiles and can also target Israel with conventional warheads. Probably one thousand missiles can be targeted on Israel.

B. Israel can target each of these countries with the same, and in addition, with nuclear warheads.

C. India and Pakistan can target each other with nuclear warheads on aircraft and probably soon on missiles- if not already.

D. India’s expanding nuclear capability will cover China soon and may cover the entire world with the next decade.

E. Iran and Iraq will continue their mass destruction arms race and Iraq’s progress will increase as the embargo diminishes. Iran’s missiles will soon fly far enough to reach Europe.

F. Virtually all of this capability has been imported, and will continue to rely on imports for its improvement.

G. Export control will continue to be an important way to slow this development down by making these programs more difficult, more expensive, and more time-consuming.

H. If there is a war between countries armed with mass destruction weapons, the principal challenge will be to conduct the war in such a way that these weapons will not be used. Whether that will be possible, no one knows.

I. What we do know is that the consequences of warfare are becoming more severe, and that the lives of more and more civilians are being placed in jeopardy by the spread of mass destruction weapons.

Perspective on Weapons: Outfitting China’s Military – Again

January 23, 2000March 24, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Los Angeles Times
January 23, 2000, p. M5

Commerce Dept. Works to Allow the Export of a Tool
Like the Ones that Prompted a Justice Dept. Indictment.

Just over two months ago, CATIC, the Chinese military and aviation giant, was indicted for diverting American machine tools to a Chinese cruise missile and military aircraft plant. The powerful machines had produced parts for the B-1 strategic bomber and the MX nuclear missile, and CATIC was charged with lying to get the machines out of the U.S. in 1995 by promising to restrict them to civilian use.

Yet with the ink barely dry on the indictment, the Clinton administration has begun to undermine it. According to U.S. officials, the Commerce Department wants to allow one of CATIC’s sister companies to buy the same kind of American machine tool that CATIC is accused of diverting. “Even in the face of an indictment,” said one government official familiar with the case, “there is no behavior change. It is still business as usual.” If the deal goes through, it will show that there are no real limits on high-tech exports to China.

The export in question is a five-axis milling machine, a computer-controlled marvel similar to the machines listed in CATIC’s indictment. It is capable of making high-precision parts for China’s next generation of fighters, bombers and missiles.

A company in Milford, Mass., named Bostomatic has requested permission to sell the machine to China’s Xian Aero Engine Co., which makes engines for China’s military aircraft, including the nuclear-capable H-6 strategic bomber. Bostomatic was purchased last year by the Agie Charmilles Group, a Swiss concern. According to U.N. inspectors, 11 of Agie’s machine tools were found at five of Saddam Hussein’s leading nuclear weapon and missile sites in 1992. And in January 1999, Gen. Alexander Zdanovich, a spokesman for Russia’s foreign intelligence services, said that Agie also had supplied Iran with equipment for making liquid-fueled ballistic missiles.

Why does the Commerce Department want to allow a suspect Swiss conglomerate to sell a sensitive American product to a Chinese military aircraft plant? The Commerce Department is supposed to protect the American public from such risks but, instead, is trying to promote trade no matter what the cost to national security.

The Pentagon is fighting the export license. The same officials who tried to block the export of the machines that CATIC diverted in 1995 are objecting to this one. The officials were right the last time, but got overruled. Xian Aero Engine is pledging to use the milling machine only to make civilian aircraft. That is what CATIC promised. Since Xian and CATIC are part of the same state-owned organization, no one should be fooled.

Nor should anyone be fooled by the CATIC indictment. It took more than four years for the Justice Department to get around to it, and Justice is dragging its feet in a string of other apparently illegal exports of U.S. high technology.

In 1996, Silicon Graphics Inc. of Mountain View, Calif., sold four supercomputers to one of Russia’s leading nuclear weapon laboratories without the required export license. The U.S. computers were 10 times more powerful than anything the Russians had. After the deal was done, Russia’s nuclear chief told the press that Russia would start designing its warheads with simulated explosions using the American computers. There is considerable evidence that Silicon Graphics broke the law. It knew it needed a U.S. export license and did not get one. The case was sent to a a federal grand jury in 1997, where it has languished.

Also in 1996, Silicon Graphics sold a powerful supercomputer to China’s Academy of Sciences, which develops nuclear warheads and long-range missiles, and IBM sold an equally powerful supercomputer in 1997 to the Indian Institute of Science, India’s leading missile research site. Neither Silicon Graphics nor IBM bothered to obtain the required export licenses.

The Cox committee on Chinese spying found that Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications, two big American satellite makers, “deliberately acted without the legally required licenses and violated U.S. export control laws” when they helped China improve its rockets in 1995 and 1996. To boost their profits, these U.S. firms gave China technology that could, in the committee’s words, increase “the reliability of all PRC ballistic missiles.” A federal grand jury has had these cases for more than a year and a half.

The message from these cases is the same: Get the exports out, and don’t worry about the law. The Justice Department probably won’t indict you, and even if it does, the Commerce Department will help you get what you need.

Dept. of Mass Destruction: Saddam’s nuclear shopping spree

December 13, 1999March 29, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

The New Yorker
The Talk of the Town
December 13, 1999, p. 44

Ever since the United Nations weapons inspectors were shut out of Iraq, a year ago, the world has been left to wonder what Saddam Hussein is up to. Well, now it can be told: he has been secretly trying to transform his desert dictatorship into a world-class center for the treatment of kidney stones.

Or so it would seem, to judge from his latest purchases on the international medical-equipment market. Although Iraq remains under a strict United Nations embargo, the embargo does not cover medical supplies. Last year, the Iraqi government ordered half a dozen lithotripters, which are state-of-the-art machines for getting rid of kidney stones. (The word “lithotripter” comes from the Greek for “stone breaker.”) A lithotripter uses a shock wave to pulverize these painful objects without surgery. Machines like the ones Iraq bought require a high-precision electronic switch that triggers a powerful burst of electricity. In addition to the lithotripters, Iraq wanted to buy a hundred and twenty extra switches. That is at least a hundred more than the machines would ever need.

Iraq’s strange hankering for this particular “spare part” becomes less mysterious when one reflects that the switch in question has another use: it can trigger an atomic bomb. According to a knowledgeable U.N. inspector, each bomb of the type that Iraq is trying to build requires thirty-two switches. Thus, a hundred of them would outfit three bombs. It is hardly a coincidence that, as the former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter testified at a Senate hearing last year, the inspectors had “intelligence information which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist” in Iraq. Saddam Hussein has been shopping for what he needs to make sure they work.

Iraq went to Siemens, the German electronics giant, to place the order. Before the Gulf War, Iraq acquired Siemens computers and other equipment useful for processing uranium to nuclear-weapons grade, and the company provided electrical equipment for one of Iraq’s main missile sites. (Siemens has denied helping Iraq advance its nuclear program.) In this instance, Siemens forwarded the switches order to its supplier, Thomson-C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. The French government promptly barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, refuses to say whether Siemens nevertheless filled the switch order, or even whether the order was placed. If Siemens made the deal, Iraq got a powerful nuclear boost.

The Clinton Administration has been relatively quiet on Iraq lately. Although it maintains that it remains suspicious of Saddam, it claims to have no specific evidence that he has resumed his efforts to build weapons of mass destruction. The kidney-stone affair suggests otherwise.

The U.N. inspectors have learned that Iraq’s first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was just over a yard in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. The inspectors have deduced that the new design weighs only about one thousand three hundred pounds and measures about twenty-five inches in diameter. That makes it small enough to fit on a Scud-type missile. The inspectors believe that Iraq may still have nine such missiles hidden somewhere.

The inspectors have also concluded that Iraq’s bomb design will work. Iraq, they believe, has mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb’s nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The new design also uses a “flying tamper,” a refinement that “hammers” the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force.

How did Iraq progress so far so quickly? The inspectors found an Iraqi document describing an offer of design help-in exchange for money-from an agent of Pakistan. Iraq says it didn’t accept the offer, but the inspectors think it did. Pakistan’s latest design also uses a flying tamper. Regardless of how the Iraqis managed to do it, Saddam Hussein now possesses an efficient nuclear-bomb design. And, if he did succeed in getting hold of the necessary switches, then the only thing he lacks is enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel the warheads.

The fuel, unfortunately, is getting easier to find. United States officials report that on May 29th Bulgaria seized approximately a third of an ounce of weapons-grade uranium at its border. The hot cargo, accompanied by documents in Russian, was concealed in a lead container in a pump stowed in a car. A third of an ounce is not enough for a bomb (Iraq’s design, for example, needs thirty-five pounds), but this seizure and others like it show that weapons-grade fuel is beginning to circulate in the black market. Unless the U.N. Security Council can agree on a plan to reinstate meaningful inspections, Saddam may be able to complete his nuclear shopping sooner rather than later.

Russia: Transfer of Chemical/Biological Warfare Equipment Reported by the Press – 1990-1999

November 1, 1999March 27, 2017

Importing Country: Iraq
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1995
Activity: Agrees to sell sophisticated fermentation equipment, including a 5,000 liter fermentation vessel

Russia: Transfer of Russian Nuclear Technology Reported by the Press – 1990-1999

November 1, 1999March 27, 2017

Importing Country: Brazil
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1994
Activity: Signs cooperation agreement in applied basic research, controlled thermonuclear fusion, research reactors, and radioisotope production

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1993
Activity: Agrees to construct a three-module centrifuge enrichment plant in Chengdu, Sichuan province

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Finishes first module of a 200,000 SWU/yr centrifuge enrichment plant in Shaanxi province

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Completes first module of a 200,000 SWU/yr centrifuge enrichment plant in Chengdu

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1996
Activity: Completes first stage of centrifuge enrichment plant in Lanzhou, Gansu province

Importing Country: Cuba
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport
Date: 1999
Activity: Agrees to continue construction of two 440 VVERS at Juragua nuclear power plant

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport
Date: 1998 (original contract in 1988)
Activity: Begins work on design of two VVER-1000 light-water reactors to be installed in Kudankulam

Importing Country: Indonesia
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1997
Activity: Offers package deal to help with development of the nuclear power industry, including fuel supply, personnel training and thermonuclear synthesis

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995
Activity: Agrees to complete work on nuclear power plant at Iranian port of Bushehr

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995
Activity: Extends $800 million Bushehr contract to cover nuclear fuel supplies from 2001 to 2011

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1995?
Activity: Concludes deal for transfer of reactor equipment and technology for desalinization, a research reactor for University of Tehran, and equipment for gas centrifuge enrichment of uranium (deal later canceled)

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Novovoronezh training centre
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Trains 30-40 Iranian for operations at Bushehr

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Trains Iranian physicists and mathematicians at Institute of Engineering and Physics in Moscow

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Late 1990s
Activity: Plans to triple number of specialists working on Bushehr project from 300 to 1000

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1998
Activity: Russian nuclear scientists secretly advise on how to produce heavy water and nuclear grade graphite, believed by U.S. officials to be intended for the manufacture of plutonium

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: Mid- to late 1990s
Activity: Sells tritium gas and discusses a second sale of tritium

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1998
Activity: Negotiates to sell a 40 MW heavy water reactor

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Minatom
Date: 1999
Activity: Prepares proposal on the sale of three additional power reactors

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET)
Date: 1999
Activity: Sells sensitive heavy water production technology, nuclear-grade graphite production technology, and research reactor design, triggering U.S. trade sanctions

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Izhorskiye Zavod
Date: 1999
Activity: Produces equipment for Bushehr plant including equipment for reactor’s primary circuit, the reactor vessel, the steam generator casing, the head for unit 1, and internals

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Electrosila
Date: 1999
Activity: Agrees to provide two nuclear generators worth approximately $20 million to Bushehr

Importing Country: Libya
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian government
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to rehabilitate Tajura nuclear research center near Tripoli

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1995
Activity: Ships undisclosed amount of zirconium through Cyprus

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Atomstroiexport and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET)
Date: 1998
Activity: Agrees to construct nuclear research center including a 25 MW light water pool-type reactor

Russia: Transfer of Missiles, Missile Technology and Submarines Reported by the Press – 1990-1999

November 1, 1999March 27, 2017

Importing Country: Brazil
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1993
Activity: Twelve Russian scientists work on a project to develop fuel for three stages of Brazil’s Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS) at the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA)

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1991
Activity: Sells (in conjunction with Ukraine) rocket engine(s) used on the Zenit space launcher

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian weapon complexes
Date: 1993
Activity: Allows as many as a thousand weapon technicians, scientists, and engineers to be recruited

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian weapon complexes
Date: 1993
Activity: Provides weapon designs and mathematical modeling work from defense laboratories

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Fakel Engineering Design Bureau
Date: 1994 to 1995
Activity: Sells six to eight S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft missile systems

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1994
Activity: Sells four Kilo-class diesel submarines; delivery completed by January 1999

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1996
Activity: Sells two Sovremeny-class destroyers equipped with SS-N-22 anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Antey Scientific Industrial Organization and Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant
Date: 1997
Activity: Sells 15 SA-15 (Tor-M1) air defense missile systems and trains 50 Chinese in operations

Importing Country: China
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Antey Scientific Industrial Organization and Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant
Date: 1998
Activity: Sells 20 additional SA-15 (Tor M1) air defense missile systems

Importing Country: Cyprus
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Rosvoorouzhenie and Almaz
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to sells S-300 (SA-10 “Grumble”) air defense missile systems

Importing Country: Cyprus
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1998
Activity: Ships seven missile launchers possibly destined for Cyprus; intercepted in Turkey

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Mid-1990s to present
Activity: Helps develop Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Glavkosmos
Date: 1991
Activity: Agrees to provide two cryogenic rocket engines and associated technology for the GSLV

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Glavkosmos, Salyut Design Bureau of the Khrunichev Space Research and Production Center, and Energomash
Date: 1993-1994
Activity: Renegotiates a 1991 contract with the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) to deliver up to nine cryogenic rocket engines

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Rosvoorouzhenie
Date: 1998
Activity: Signs 10-year defense cooperation agreement worth nearly $1 billion to include jointly developing military hardware including six S-300V anti-tactical ballistic missile systems

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Severnoye Design Bureau and Novator
Date: 1998
Activity: Agrees to sell variants of the Biryuza (SS-NX-27) supersonic cruise missile for the Indian Navy (part of weapons package for three 11356-class Russian frigates)

Importing Country: India
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Admiralteiskiye Verfi and Rubin Central Marine Technology Design Bureau
Date: 1999
Activity: Completing tenth Kilo-class submarine to be armed with Biryuza anti-ship cruise missile system for the Indian Navy

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1992 to 1997
Activity: Delivers three Kilo-class diesel submarines

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Mid-1990s
Activity: Transfers technology for the SS-4 medium-range missile including instructions on production and guidance components

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) and Rosvoorouzhenie
Date: 1996
Activity: Contracts with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to construct a wind tunnel, manufacture model missiles and to create related software

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1996
Activity: Contracts with Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to provide raw materials used in making missiles

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1996
Activity: Brokers deals to supply Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group with laser equipment, special mirrors, maraging steel, and composite graphite-tungsten material for use in Iran’s liquid-fuel missile program

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Polyus Research Institute, Kutznetzov (NPO Trud), Moscow Bauman State University of Technology and Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI)
Date: 1997
Activity: Helps develop the guidance system and rocket propulsion systems for the Shahab-3 and -4 ballistic missiles

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor)
Date: 1997
Activity: Agrees to supply the Instrumentation Factories Plant, part of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), with 240 kg of heat treated steel alloy (“21HKMT”) and special foil (“49K2F,” “CUBE2,” and “50N”) to shield missile guidance equipment

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Baltic State Technical University
Date: 1998
Activity: Creates in Persepolis, Iran, a missile training and education center in conjunction with Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO)

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Baltic State Technical University, Europalace 2000, Glavkosmos, State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite (NIIGRAFIT), Russian Scientific and Production Center (Inor), MOSO Company, and Polyus Scientific Production Association
Date: 1998
Activity: Sanctioned by the United States for engaging in missile proliferation.

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Federal Security Service (FSB)
Date: 1998
Activity: Recruits experts to teach missile technology in Iran

Importing Country: Iran
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Europalace 2000 (front company)
Date: 1998
Activity: Sells twenty-two tons of steel suitable for making missiles; shipment intercepted in Azerbaijan

Importing Country: Iraq
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Research and Testing Institute of Chemical and Building Machines (NIIKhSM)
Date: 1995
Activity: Sells 810 gyroscopes, most of which are intercepted in Amman, Jordan

Importing Country: Libya
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Pavoks
Date: 1993
Activity: Ships 80 tons of ammonium perchlorate, which is used to make rocket fuel; seized by Ukraine

Importing Country: Pakistan
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: 1997
Activity: Provides maraging steel for Pakistan’s missile program via North Korea

Importing Country: South Korea
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Unknown
Date: Early to mid-1990s
Activity: Provides anti-aircraft missiles as partial payment for debt

Importing Country: Syria
Russian Developer, Exporter or Manufacturer: Tula Design Bureau, Volsk Mechanical Plant and TSNIITochmash
Date: 1999
Activity: Sanctioned by the United States for the sale of anti-tank guided missiles

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Presentation at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

The Washington Post Outlook March 12, 2000, p. B3

Presentation at the International Law Enforcement Academy

Los Angeles Times January 23, 2000, p. M5

Commerce Dept. Works to Allow the Export of a Tool Like the Ones that Prompted a Justice Dept. Indictment.

The New Yorker The Talk of the Town December 13, 1999, p. 44

The Washington Post
Outlook
March 12, 2000, p. B3

Los Angeles Times
January 23, 2000, p. M5

Commerce Dept. Works to Allow the Export of a Tool
Like the Ones that Prompted a Justice Dept. Indictment.

The New Yorker
The Talk of the Town
December 13, 1999, p. 44