News

India’s Proliferation Record: Nuclear and Missile Diversion

This collection of articles and testimony describes India’s diversion of civilian foreign assistance to its missile and nuclear weapon programs.

Analysis

Seventeen Myths about the Indian Nuclear Deal

Timelines

India Nuclear Milestones: 1945-2009

India Missile Milestones: 1947-2012

Testimony

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006)

Written response to questions submitted by Senator Biden (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2006)

Cooperation in Space and Missiles (House Committee on Science 1998)

Nuclear Diversion

India: Nuclear Helpers (The Risk Report 1995)

India’s Big Emerging Market Poses Nuclear Risk (The Risk Report 1995)

India Moves from Smuggling to Exporting Heavy Water (The Risk Report 1995)

Soviet Nuclear Breakup – Promise or Peril? (International Affairs 1992)

Asia’s Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection (The Washington Post 1990)

Heavy Water Cheaters (Foreign Policy 1987-1988)

Stopping the Indian Bomb (The American Journal of International Law 1987)

India’s Back Door to the Atomic Club (The Philadelphia Inquirer 1987)

Dateline New Delhi: India’s Nuclear Cover-up (Foreign Policy 1986)

Is India Dodging Nuclear Controls? (The New York Times 1986)

Missile Diversion

India: Missile Helpers (The Risk Report 1995)

Made in America? How US Exports Helped Fuel the South Asian Arms Race (The Washington Post 1998)

India’s Missiles – With a Little Help from Our Friends (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 1991)

Iran Watch Roundtable: The Impact of U.S.-India Nuclear and Missile Cooperation on Iran – 2005

Panelists:
John Larrabee
William Lowell
Richard Speier
Sharon Squassoni
Leonard Weiss

Moderators:
Valerie Lincy
Gary Milhollin
Lora Saalman

Introduction

In July 2005, the Bush administration announced an agreement for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, which would have the effect of recognizing India as a de facto nuclear weapon state. The deal, which would also include sharing U.S. space technology with India, is perceived by some as harmful to the battle against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and long-range missiles. Critics of the deal see it as rewarding a country that developed nuclear weapons secretly by using its civilian energy program as a cover. They worry that the world’s ongoing effort to prevent Iran from doing the same will suffer as a result. The timing of the agreement—which comes as the U.N. Security Council prepares to act on Iran’s nuclear violations—naturally raises questions about consequences for Iran.

To judge the impact of the U.S.-India agreement on Iran, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control hosted a roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C. on November 30, 2005. Five panelists took up the following questions:

  • Could U.S. cooperation with India, a state that has rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), undermine efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy? Could it influence the way Iran perceives the West’s commitment to enforcing nonproliferation rules?
  • Will U.S. efforts to exempt India from international export controls weaken those controls?
  • If so, will Iran have an easier time procuring what it needs to make mass destruction weapons?
  • Could the U.S.-India deal be altered so as to mitigate damage to the world’s nonproliferation efforts?

The panelists judged that U.S. willingness to change longstanding policy in order to allow nuclear and space cooperation with India weakens nonproliferation norms and export controls at a critical time—as the world attempts to reinforce both vis-à-vis Iran. Such a change in policy is likely to make it easier for Iran to resist international pressure to limit its nuclear effort, and easier for it to import what it needs to improve both its missile and nuclear programs. The risk is high that bending international rules in order to make an exception for India will prompt other countries to seek their own exceptions for countries like Iran. In order to avoid these negative consequences, the panelists judged that the United States should shelve the India deal, at least for now. The panelists also found that there are many ways in which the United States can deepen its relationship with India without sharing sensitive nuclear and space technology.

The five panelists were chosen on the basis of their long experience with export controls and nonproliferation policy. They are John Larrabee, who led missile inspections in Iraq and is a specialist on ballistic missile technology, William Lowell, former director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls, who currently works on nonproliferation and export controls for the House International Relations Committee, Richard Speier, an expert in missile technology controls who served more than 20 years in the U.S. government, Sharon Squassoni, a specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service, who worked previously as an expert in nuclear proliferation at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Leonard Weiss, former Democratic staff director of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, who was the principal architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

The following findings are the moderators’ summary of the discussion. The findings are a composite of the panelists’ individual views; no finding should be attributed to any single panelist, or be seen as an official statement of policy of any government.

Finding 1:  The U.S.-India deal makes it more difficult to restrain Iran through diplomacy: it weakens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthens the hand of those in Iran who support nuclear weapons, and hurts U.S. efforts to punish Iran for its nuclear transgressions.

The panelists found that by granting India “full nuclear cooperation,” the United States will undermine the basic bargain offered to non-weapon states by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: only states that sign the Treaty, agree to forgo nuclear weapons and accept international inspection receive nuclear assistance. Under the India deal, however, the United States will be treating a country outside the NPT—India—as if it had joined the Treaty. India has developed nuclear weapons secretly and is one of only three states, along with Israel and Pakistan, never to have signed the NPT. Despite this rejectionist posture, India will be allowed to maintain, and even to expand its nuclear arsenal, while receiving nuclear cooperation, lucrative trade deals and military assistance from the United States.

The lesson will not be lost on Iran. Indeed, India is a natural model for Iran. Both are large, culturally significant countries with resources important to the world; both have felt ostracized by the international community; both see themselves as victims of political discrimination; and both have major geostrategic rivals. For these reasons, Iran can look to India as a model for its own behavior.

If the India deal goes through, that model will teach an unfortunate lesson. It is that the United States will eventually tire of punishment and seek engagement, even with a determined proliferator. Once a country succeeds in getting the bomb, the United States will give up on diplomatic isolation and sanctions and instead pursue its interest in trade. This preference for trade over punishment is precisely the preference that Russia and China are showing with respect to Iran, and the preference the United States is trying to get these countries to change. The U.S. posture on India makes this task more difficult.

The U.S.-India deal also bolsters hardliners in Iran who favor nuclear weapons. This group believes that such weapons are in the country’s interest, and that developing them would have only limited, short-term penalties. They can argue that the India deal proves them right.

The deal will also stir Iranian nationalism. In rewarding one proliferant country (India) while seeking to punish another (Iran), the United States is reinforcing the conviction in Iran that the United States is seeking to punish the Iranian regime selectively, and not simply trying to enforce global nonproliferation rules. This claim of being the victim of discrimination increases popular support for the expansion of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, if not for nuclear weapons.

The timing of the deal’s announcement, in July 2005, has further increased its negative impact. The announcement came just as debate was escalating in the IAEA over referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council. With the United States blessing India’s nuclear conduct, other countries are less inclined to view Iran’s behavior as grounds for punishment. In particular, countries in the non-aligned movement, already sympathetic to Iran’s call not to be discriminated against, will be more willing to support Iran’s claim that it has a right to produce its own nuclear fuel.

The loosening of U.S. export controls toward India also comes as the United States is asking the rest of the world to strengthen its own controls in order to combat proliferation. Giving India a free pass for proliferation is bound to dilute the impact of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, which requires states to enact and enforce effective export control laws. It could also weaken the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, aimed at interdicting shipments of mass destruction weapon technology. With the United States busily trading with India, a country that has declined to join the Initiative, other countries will be less likely to cooperate in thwarting Iran’s nuclear and missile procurement.

Finding 2:  The U.S.-India deal will weaken international restraints on the sale of sensitive technology to countries like Iran.

The panelists found that U.S.-India nuclear and space cooperation will undermine the relevant nonproliferation regimes—at a time when strong regimes are needed to slow Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Countries that participate in these regimes are likely to follow the U.S. example and loosen their own export controls.

The primary international restraint on Iran’s missile effort has been—and still is—the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The regime is a voluntary pact among supplier countries to restrict the sale of missiles, their components, and the equipment needed to make them. Similarly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a pact in which supplier countries agree to control nuclear exports—an arrangement that has helped prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear technology. Unfortunately, the U.S.-India deal may weaken both of these regimes.

A cardinal principle of both the MTCR and the NSG is that they are non-discriminatory, or “country neutral.” The MTCR uses objective criteria to target “projects of concern,” rather than specific countries. The NSG requires all countries importing items that it designates “especially designed or prepared for nuclear use” to accept comprehensive inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear material must be accounted for. In this way, the regimes have avoided making politically-motivated decisions. However, in seeking a specific NSG exception for India, which has not accepted such comprehensive inspections, and in selectively lifting trade restrictions on Indian entities involved in missile work, the United States is overturning this principle. The United States will be easing restraints for a “friend,” and doing so only for subjective, political reasons. If the United States is willing to put aside the rules for its friend, countries that supply Iran will want a similar exception. The India deal will thus function as a template for carving out exceptions within multilateral regimes that have long sought to operate beyond the political agendas of member countries.

International regimes also rely on coordination and consensus for effective operation. The United States, however, acted unilaterally in making its deal with India. There was no reported notification or coordination with members of the MTCR or the NSG before the deal was concluded. This affront will be made more grievous if the United States goes forward with the India deal without NSG approval. By violating the consensus norm of these regimes, the United States will invite other supplier countries to act unilaterally as well, and to make deals with Iran without first consulting the United States or other regime members.

Another strength of the regimes has been enforcement. Countries that belong to the regimes go to considerable lengths to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports by their own companies. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been asking many countries to do even more. After the U.S.-India deal, however, regime members are going to question whether they should continue to expend their resources to thwart illicit exports to Iran if those exports cannot be distinguished from licit exports to India. The same kind of technology will be going to the same kind of projects. In light of Iran’s able use of illicit supplier networks to fuel nuclear and missile efforts, this possibility is particularly worrisome.

Regime cohesion could erode quickly. The panelists observed that the United States has always set the standard for nonproliferation rules. Although it has usually taken a long time for countries to follow the United States when it has strengthened these rules, it has taken only an instant to follow any loosening of them. Russia, France and Britain, for example, have already expressed interest in nuclear cooperation with India. In a political climate where rules are being loosened for a proliferant country like India, the easing of exports to other proliferators such as Iran is likely to follow.

Finally, the U.S.-India deal ignores the lesson of India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion: that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes can easily be used for weapons in the absence of comprehensive inspections. Ironically, the United States has long championed the necessity of such inspections. By allowing India to separate its civilian and military facilities, with only the former submitting to inspection, the deal gives credence to the false notion that partial inspections are sufficient to prevent proliferation.

The panelists believe that such a separation, whether in India or elsewhere, is essentially meaningless, because infrastructure, materials and expertise used in peaceful nuclear and space work can also help make warheads and missiles. History teaches that it will be impossible to verify that U.S. nuclear and space technology will not be used in India’s nuclear weapon or missile programs. The availability of new fuel imports for India’s civil nuclear sector, for example, could allow India to turn more of its indigenous productive capacity to making fuel for bombs—an outcome that is particularly troubling in the absence of any Indian commitment to stop producing such fuel. In fact, it will be easier to detect a diversion of nuclear material in Iran than in India, for the simple reason that all of Iran’s nuclear material is subject to inspection, while only some of India’s will be. Countries wishing to sell to Iran may cite this difference in defense of their sales.

Finding 3:  The weakening of export controls will make it easier for Iran to acquire the means to make mass destruction weapons, particularly missiles.

In July, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to cooperate in “space exploration,” including “satellite navigation and launch.” This language, unfortunately, is broad enough to allow missile-useable components and related technical assistance to be exported to India under the label of space cooperation. The United States, in fact, appears ready to authorize such sales. The U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped legal restraints on American exports of missile-useable equipment to three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite the fact that all three are active in Indian missile development. This appears to be only the first step in a general loosening of U.S. missile controls for India.

Once American firms begin to sell such items to India, eager companies in Russia, China and Europe may consider that it is safe to sell the same things to Iran. Iran recently announced plans to expand its infant satellite and space programs, both of which will need imports. Those imports, by their nature, may be useful for making missiles.

Iran is now trying to boost the range and refine the accuracy of its Shahab-3 missile, which flies approximately 1,300 km and is big enough to carry a nuclear warhead. To do so, Iran needs high-technology materials such as carbon composites and specialty steels, as well as high-performance machine tools for component manufacture. Iran’s missile effort would also benefit from help with rocket guidance, weight efficient engineering, radiation hardening, ruggedizing, tracking and telemetry, and thrust vectoring and flight simulation software. All of these items, and the technical know-how that goes with them, can be obtained under the guise of space exploration and all of them will be easier for Iran to acquire in the wake of the U.S.-India deal. Iran could also use its increased access to satellite technology to improve its response to Israeli and U.S. missile defenses.

Once space cooperation begins, and aerospace suppliers enter a country, there is a natural tendency to make expensive satellite and space projects succeed, even if that means supplying information, advice, or assistance officially banned from the original deal. It is difficult to erect a wall between the civilian and military benefits of a single export project. And it is difficult to separate civilian from military facilities. For example, India can use the same sites, equipment and personnel to track both satellite and ballistic missile launches. India, ironically, was the first country to develop a ballistic missile from a civilian space-launch program. The Agni missile tested in 1989 was adapted from U.S. and German space launch technology. It will not be possible for the United States to help India improve its space launch vehicles without helping it improve its missiles. The same will be true when other countries help Iran.

The scope of space cooperation being discussed for India is particularly worrisome given the history of U.S.-China space cooperation in the 1990s. The panelists note that China was able to obtain crucial technical assistance and data from the United States under the rubric of satellite launch cooperation, which helped China resolve problems of missile design, guidance, launch operations and payload integration. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have freely helped Iran’s missile effort—and the United States has sanctioned them repeatedly for doing so.

The India deal will also make it more difficult to convince countries like Russia not to sell nuclear items to Iran. This will be especially true of dual-use equipment and of items imported for nuclear safety. Neither will be caught by an NSG export ban triggered by Iran’s failure to comply with inspections. However, the panelists found it likely that such an export ban would prevent Iran from receiving other new nuclear assistance until it has answered the IAEA’s outstanding questions.

It is also reasonable to worry that U.S. technology sent to India might ultimately make its way to Iran. Such technology, delivered today, may be impossible to control or recall in the future. Although India has enacted export control laws, implementation has been poor because of the lack of corresponding regulations. Though India recently passed a new law to implement U.N. Security Council resolution 1540, assertions that its national export control system is stringent—even after these reforms—are dubious. In September 2004, two Indian nuclear scientists, both former senior officials of the Indian government’s Nuclear Power Corporation, were caught helping Iran and sanctioned by the U.S. government under the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And as recently as December 30, 2005, the United States sanctioned two Indian chemical firms for dangerous transfers to Iran.

Iran and India continue to have friendly relations. In 2003 they signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. India is also proceeding with a $7 billion gas pipeline project with Iran—despite strong U.S. objections—which will give Iran hard currency that could help fuel its nuclear and missile programs. And although India voted in favor of the February 2006 IAEA resolution reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council, India publicly supports Iran’s claim that it has a right to conduct peaceful nuclear work.

Finding 4:  The proposal in its current form should not be pursued. There are ways for the United States to deepen relations with India that do not have negative consequences for proliferation to Iran.

Although the India deal could be improved, the panelists judged that it is not in the United States’ best interest to pursue it. The deal could be improved if India agreed to stop producing fuel for nuclear weapons, agreed to a stronger nuclear test moratorium, agreed to place all its civilian nuclear plants under inspection, and agreed to strengthen its enforcement of export controls. But such changes would only reduce rather than eliminate the damage to global nonproliferation efforts. India would still be exempt from rules that NPT members like Iran are being asked to obey.

The panelists see no reason to provide India with nuclear technology for the production of electricity, when it would be more economical and safer to help India generate electricity in other ways. Helping India build nuclear reactors only reinforces the perceived prestige of nuclear technology for developing countries—a point of view that the world is currently trying to persuade Iran to abandon.

The panelists also believe that there are better ways than the proposed deal to support India’s space effort—ways that would not boost its missile work. For instance, the United States could offer to launch Indian astronauts and satellites and to share satellite observation data with Indian analysts. It is both unnecessary and dangerous to provide India with technology that can be converted to missilery.

At a minimum, the United States should not pursue the deal with India at the present time, just as the U.N. Security Council prepares to debate Iran’s nuclear violations. If the deal moves forward now, it will undermine the credibility of the U.S. position on Iran. The deal is often cited by Iran and by those sympathetic to Iran’s position when arguing that the United States cares less about proliferation than about using proliferation rules to support its friends and punish its adversaries. Shelving the deal would send a message to Iran, and to the world, that this is not so.

Yushchenko’s Scorecard: Peace without Security?

By Nealadri Pal

Today’s anniversary of the Orange Revolution is being marked in Ukraine as Freedom Day. One year on, the West continues to wish that Ukraine’s new sense of liberty will be exported to other former Soviet Republics, but is the region any safer now? To ask this seems frivolous, judging by the number of peace prizes recently awarded to President Viktor Yushchenko. Assessments of Yushchenko’s presidency instead focus on domestic issues such as reprivatization, for, the assumption goes, the international picture is rosy.

But this is no trick question. Yushchenko has not tackled one of Ukraine’s most frightening problems: its nonchalant tendency to lose missiles – some of them nuclear-capable – that threaten world security.

In March, Ukraine admitted that twelve Kh-55 cruise missiles were sold illegally to Iran in 2001, with six more sold to China. Fake export certificates provided to Ukrspetsexport, the state arms exporter, claimed the weapons were being sold to Russia. However Ukraine’s nonproliferation agreements prohibit it from transferring these long-range nuclear-capable missiles.

Although no warheads were exported, the transfer is highly disturbing – in addition to being launched, missiles can be taken apart, copied and mass-produced. Reverse-engineering the Kh-55s will dramatically improve Iran and China’s missile programs, further destabilizing the Middle East and the East China Sea. Indeed the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran claims that Iran has already used two missiles for copying.

Yushchenko is not to blame for the sales – in fact, details of the clandestine deal could only have emerged under his presidency. The previous regime specialized in covering up such shenanigans. But the prosecutor’s probe is skin deep, with no details on who did what. Without a comprehensive and open investigation, there is no guarantee that illicit weapons transfers will not occur during Yushchenko’s administration as well.

This is a definite risk, given the involvement of high ranking officials in the deal. Aspects of the initial inquiry by Ukraine’s security service, the SBU, became public in February. Those incriminated included the then-director of Ukrspetsexport and even a former member of the SBU. But this is scarcely shocking, for many officials at Ukrspetsexport are members of the SBU, which is also the agency consulted in contentious export license applications. This is more than a conflict of interest; it is an invitation to under-the-table arms trade.

Public outrage at such abuse elected Yushchenko. But allegations of corruption persisted, compelling him to dismiss the entire cabinet in September. The sacked head and deputy head of the State Customs Service repeatedly accused each other of fraud. Meanwhile, the SBU reportedly started a criminal investigation into officials at Customs, which responded by saying it would sue the former SBU chief. In short, rival officials have been too busy pointing their fingers at each other to do their job of scrutinizing documents, inspecting shipments, and securing military facilities.

The urgent need to boost the security of Ukraine’s weapons was reiterated in February with the theft of two Strela-3M surface-to-air missiles, weapons favored by terrorists. The Ukrainian missiles were fortunately recovered in August, but there is little assurance that the rest of these weapons are secure. The navy’s commander in chief has admitted that he may be unable to locate all the shoulder-launched weapons transferred from Russia.

It is hard to decide which is worse – losing missiles with the active connivance of officials, or losing missiles because the authorities were unaware they even existed. Last year a former defense minister admitted that several hundred SA-2 missiles were unaccounted for, while the Kh-55 cruise missiles were believed to have all been destroyed by 2001 under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Ukraine has made great strides since the Soviet Union’s collapse, but dangerous legacies remain. Massive reform of top-heavy institutions, which have changed little since 1991, is needed to prevent and deter covert arms deals. The recent infighting within the State Customs Service indicates that July’s dismissal of all 50 regional chiefs was more dramatic than effective.

Ukraine must also account for all its advanced weapons, ensuring that none are prone to theft. On this, last week’s endorsement of a draft agreement with NATO to destroy man-portable missiles is encouraging.

Finally, Ukraine must conduct effective investigations into known cases of arms trafficking – still an illusory goal following last week’s court reinstatement of Ukraine’s listless prosecutor-general, whom Yushchenko had earlier sacked. But if Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is serious, it must show it can control military exports.

President Yushchenko deserves his recognition for presiding over last year’s peaceful Orange Revolution, but his mission is far from finished. His statesmanlike response to September’s political infighting indicates his commitment to economic progress, constitutional change, and national harmony. But international security depends on his willingness to defeat the arms smugglers. If he does not, there may be few Freedom Days left to celebrate.

Nealadri Pal is a research associate at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Israel Missile Update – 2005

Israel continues to maintain a powerful arsenal of “Jericho” ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to any point in the Middle East. Israel is also pursuing a military satellite program and has deployed several batteries of the Arrow missile defense system to shield against the missiles of its neighbors. Israel is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and has been identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce as a possible supplier of missile technology.

Ballistic Missiles

Israel maintains a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles that would enable it to deliver an offensive or retaliatory nuclear strike against any potential regional target. The core of Israel’s arsenal is its fleet of two-stage “Jericho” missiles. Israel’s Jericho-I missile is estimated to be capable of carrying a 450 to 650-kilogram payload up to 500 kilometers, and the Jericho-II of carrying a 750 to 1,000-kilogram payload considerably more than 1,500 kilometers. The three-stage Jericho-III missile, reportedly under development, is believed to have a range of 4,800 kilometers. Israel’s NEXT space launch vehicle, also under development, may consist of a bipropellant fourth stage (consisting of liquid fuel plus a liquid oxidizer) added to the three solid fuel stages of the Jericho-III missile.

Israel is also reportedly developing a new Long-Range Artillery (LORA) missile-which is said to be a precision-guided missile to strike stationary or semi-fixed targets. Defense News has described the IAI-produced LORA as capable of delivering a 570-kilogram warhead within a 200-kilometer range. According to Defense News, the LORA flew 120 kilometers in its March 2003 maiden developmental test flight before hitting its target in the Mediterranean Sea. Defense News also reported that the missile failed in a test in November 2003, but then succeeded in March 2005 when it hit a target some 200 kilometers from the launch site.

Israel also possesses the U.S.-supplied Lance missile. The Lance is a liquid-fueled, short-range, mobile, nuclear-capable missile with a range of 130 kilometers and a payload capacity of at least 210 kilograms.

According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, Israel had deployed, by the year 2000, fifty Jericho-I missiles on mobile launchers and one hundred Jericho-II missiles on underground wheeled transporter-erector-launchers or railroad flat cars.

In October 2003, the Los Angeles Times, citing Israeli and U.S. officials, reported that Israel had modified the American-supplied submarine-based Harpoon anti-ship missile to carry nuclear warheads. However, some defense experts dismissed this report, claiming that it is impossible to make a Harpoon nuclear-capable without limiting its range and accuracy.

Satellites

In May 2002, Israel placed its Ofeq-5 spy satellite into orbit by means of a Shavit launcher. Developed and produced by the MLM division of Israel Aircraft Industries, the Shavit is a three-stage satellite launcher powered by solid fuel rocket motors. As previously reported in the Risk Report, the first two stages of the Shavit consist of Israel’s two-stage Jericho-II ballistic missile.

Israel’s satellite-based intelligence capabilities suffered a major setback in September 2004 when the country’s Ofeq-6 spy satellite was lost during launch. Imagery from Ofeq-6 was supposed to have supplemented coverage by the less sophisticated Ofeq-5, whose four-year lifespan is scheduled to end in 2006. The launch attempt failed when the third stage of the Shavit rocket carrying the satellite into orbit malfunctioned. This does not indicate any problems with the Jericho-II missile, however, as the first two stages of the Shavit rocket functioned properly during the launch.

Before the loss of Ofeq-6, Israel had reportedly planned to launch a next-generation spy satellite, the Ofeq-7, by 2008, and to launch the TechSAR, a synthetic aperture radar satellite, by 2006.In July 2005, Israel Aircraft Industries and Israel Military Industries conducted a successful test of a new launcher capable of putting satellites into orbit. The new launcher is intended to launch satellites that are heavier than the Ofeq spy satellites previously launched by the Shavit rocket. The launcher is reportedly 28 meters long and will be capable of placing a 700-kilogram satellite into low-earth orbit. Officials did not release any details from the test, so the specifics of the launcher improvements remain unclear.

Arrow Anti-ballistic Missile Defense System

Israel continues to dedicate substantial effort to improving its ability to defend against foreign missile attacks. The core of Israel’s missile defense, the Arrow program, is a joint U.S.-Israel effort begun in 1988 to develop a system for destroying ballistic missiles launched from other countries by intercepting them before they enter Israeli airspace. During the past several years, Israel and the United States have been implementing the Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP) in order to enhance the Arrow’s ability to defeat longer-range ballistic missile threats emerging in the Middle East.

As part of ASIP, Israel conducted the tenth test of the Arrow missile in January 2003 by firing four interceptor missiles at four simulated incoming rockets. The test, described as a success by Israel Defense Forces, was the fifth for the integrated Arrow Weapon System, which includes the “Green Pine” fire control radar, the “Yellow Citron” fire management system, the “Brown Nut” launch control center, and the Arrow launchers and missiles.

Israel conducted another successful test of the Arrow missile in December 2003 by intercepting a “Black Sparrow” missile. The test was the sixth of the complete Arrow Weapon System. In July 2004, the Arrow intercepted a live Scud missile in flight; the previous tests had been with simulated Scud missiles.

After this string of successful tests, the Arrow System Improvement Program suffered an apparent setback in August 2004. During a test in California, an Arrow missile identified but failed to intercept its target, which was characterized as an “unreal threat” representing “an extreme condition.” The target missile reportedly simulated an Iranian Shahab-3 or a Scud-D. Despite this failure, an Israeli defense official reportedly claimed that the Arrow was capable of intercepting a Shahab-3 missile.

In addition to the testing and development done under the Arrow System Improvement Program, Israel has also sought U.S. cooperation in producing the Arrow. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Boeing signed an agreement in February 2003 to manufacture part of the Arrow missile in the United States. Boeing will be responsible for producing at least 35 percent of Arrow missile components, while IAI will be responsible for integration and final assembly of the Arrow missile in Israel. In March 2004, IAI awarded Boeing a $78 million contract under which Boeing will assemble several sections of the Arrow II interceptor and will produce the canister that holds the interceptor in the launcher.

Other Missile Defense Systems

Israel is also collaborating with the United States in the development of another missile defense system, the Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser (MTHEL). Built by Northrop Grumman for the U.S. Army and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the MTHEL underwent a successful test in May 2004 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. During the test, the MTHEL shot down a large-caliber rocket carrying a live warhead. According to Northrop Grumman, the MTHEL will be “the first tactical and mobile directed-energy weapon capable of shooting down rockets and other tactical targets in flight.”

After failed attempts to interest the United States in a joint development effort, Israel is reportedly developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that can detect and destroy mobile ballistic missile launchers, including Scud-type launchers. The program is called the Sniper Sensor-to-Shooter System.

Israel as a Missile Supplier

In addition to enhancing its own missile capability in recent years, Israel has shown that it is willing to share missile technology with other countries.

In January 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce identified Israel, a non-member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as a possible supplier of missile technology. The report did note, however, that Israel abides by MTCR Guidelines, which aim to limit the proliferation of missile delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

In recent years, Israel has become one of the main suppliers of arms to India. In June 2002, India’s defense secretary confirmed that India had acquired a Green Pine fire-control radar from Israel after several years of discussions. The Green Pine radar, which is part of the Arrow missile defense system, is a mobile phased-array radar capable of detecting and tracking incoming missiles from around 500 kilometers away. Also, in August 2004, India’s chief military scientist reportedly announced that India was holding talks with Israel about the possible joint production of a long-range missile.

North Korea Missile Update – 2005

Since 2003, when the Risk Report last looked at North Korea’s missile efforts, Pyongyang has made steady progress, and has continued to rely on missile sales to finance its program. This is true despite the fact that it has maintained a moratorium on long-range testing.

North Korea’s fleet of 1,300 km Nodong missiles continue to threaten Japanese cities, and its hundreds of shorter range SCUD B and C missiles menace South Korea. In 2004, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that North Korea had become “nearly self sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles,” and in 2005, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency added that North Korea is now believed capable not only of deploying a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile, but of arming its missiles with nuclear warheads.

To acquire the funds to keep its missile program growing, North Korea maintains a robust business in missile exports. There has been a steady flow of reports describing sales or attempted sales, usually to Iran and Pakistan, but also to places like Myanmar and Nigeria.

Testing and technology

Since it test-fired its long-range Taepodong-I missile through Japanese air space in 1998, North Korea has been content with short-range missile tests. These usually have been timed to make a political statement. In June 2004, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported a short-range missile launch into the Sea of Japan, just before the third round of Six Party Talks. In May 2005, another test was reported, this time in the midst of North Korea’s refusal to return to the Six Party Talks.

Recent news about longer range missiles has been sparse. In 2004, the CIA reported that the nuclear-capable Taepodong-II, which is “potentially capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload” may be ready for flight testing. Then in July 2004, the press cited South Korea’s defense minister as saying that North Korea was deploying a new intermediate-range missile with a range of up to 2,500 miles, and that it was testing a new primary engine for the Taepodong-II. By December 2004, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, was warning that the Taepodong-II could be flight tested at “any time.” In January 2005, North Korea threatened to end the testing moratorium.

Trade

North Korea continues to rely on missile exports to make money. According to the CIA, Pyongyang has succeeded recently in shipping “ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.” While Iran and Pakistan remain top customers, countries like Myanmar and Nigeria have also come within the orbit of Pyongyang’s sales efforts.

Iran

In December 2004, the United States once again slapped trade sanctions on North Korea’s most notorious missile exporter, the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation. It was the fifth time since 2000 that it had violated the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which forbids missile-related sales by foreign companies to Iran. The sanctions make it clear that the missile trade still flourishes between Tehran and Pyongyang. A recent stream of media reports reinforces the point. In May 2003, a North Korean expert in missile guidance, who had worked at a plant in Chagang Province prior to defecting to South Korea in 1997, claimed in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee that he helped test-fire a missile in Iran during the summer of 1989. In August 2004, the Associated Press reported that North Korea was using Iran as a test site for new nuclear-capable missiles. And in February 2005, Time Magazine claimed that Iran may have given North Korea telemetry and other missile test data in exchange for engineering help on Iranian missile tests.

Pakistan

Although Iran occupies the top rung among North Korea’s missile customers, Pakistan has also been active. In July 2004, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto validated years of allegations by admitting that Pakistan had obtained missiles from North Korea following her visit to Pyongyang in 1993. Then in February 2005, the tendentious Indian periodical The Statesman claimed that Indian intelligence agencies had acquired satellite photos showing a Pakistani C-130 cargo plane loading North Korean missiles in Pyongyang in 2004.

Myanmar

In March 2004, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Matthew Daley said that the United States had “reason to believe” that North Korea offered to sell surface-to-surface missiles to Myanmar, but that Myanmar’s officials claimed to have not accepted. In spite of Myanmar’s denials, Daley asserted that the two countries already possessed a “significant military and trade relationship.”

Nigeria

In January 2004, reports emerged that the Nigerian government announced that North Korea had agreed to sell it missile technology under a deal between Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar and North Korea’s Vice President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Yang Hyong-sop. In February 2004, the Panafrican News Agency issued a report detailing U.S. warnings over the agreement and quoting Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, an aide of Nigerian Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, as stating that “They (North Korea) were just trying to get us interested. There hasn’t been any interest shown on our side.”

Trying to stop the flow

Recognizing the persistence of this ever expanding sales network, U.S. President George W. Bush took a new step against it in June 2005. He announced that the United States would henceforth block the assets of anyone who contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He began by targeting three North Korean companies, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (a.k.a. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation), the Tanchon Commercial Bank (a.k.a. Korea Changgwang Credit Bank), and the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (f.k.a. Lyongaksan General Trading Corporation), all of which had longstanding ties to North Korea’s missile program. On October 21, 2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated eight more North Korean entities that are subsidiaries of or have acted on behalf of the aforementioned Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation and Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Additional companies are sure to be added in the future.

Japan joined the crackdown. Its ethnic North Korean population, mostly acting through the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan or Chosen Soren, has long been suspected of helping North Korea build weapons. In May 2003, Japanese officials began to crack down after the Japanese company Meishin attempted to ship North Korea three specialized power supply devices, useful in either uranium enrichment or missile launcher development. Japan also imposed new restrictions on North Korean vessels entering Japan, which had the important effect of causing North Korea to halt its only passenger ferry to Japan in June 2003. For many years, the ferry had been suspected of smuggling missile parts from Japan to North Korea. In another move, Japan began to require in March 2005 that foreign ships over 100 tons be insured against spills, losses, and other damages. Japan implemented the law in the wake of a North Korean freighter accident. The Japan Times reported that the law would operate as a de facto sanction against North Korea, few of whose ships meet the insurance requirement.

Syria Missile Milestones – 1972-2005

1972: Syria obtains FROG-7 missiles, launchers and reload vehicles from the Soviet Union.

1973: Syria launches FROG-7 missiles at Israeli airbases during the October war, with little success.

1976: The Soviet Union supplies Syria with a dozen Scud-B launchers.

1983: The Soviet Union supplies Syria with the 120-kilometer range, single-stage SS-21 Scarab missile.

1988: Syria attempts to import the Soviet-made SS-23 missile, which the Soviets designed to replace the aging Scud-B, but the Soviets deny the request.

1991: China reportedly agrees to sell Syria medium-range M-9 missiles, while North Korea reportedly ships two dozen Scud missiles and 20 mobile launchers to Syria.

1991: Syria’s chief of staff reportedly visits Teheran to conclude negotiations between the two countries on building a factory in Syria for joint development and production of surface-to-surface missiles.

1992: China reportedly ships 30 tons of ammonium perchlorate, used to make solid-fuel rocket propellant, to Syria.

1992: A second shipment of North Korean Scud-C missiles and missile components are delivered to Syria via Iran.

1992: Israeli intelligence reports that Syria tested two North Korean Scud-C missiles.

1992: U.S. State Department sanctions two North Korean and two Syrian entities, including the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS) for engaging in “missile technology proliferation activities.”

1993: U.S. officials confirm that a private Russian airline company transported special truck chassis that are frequently used as mobile missile launchers from North Korea to Syria. The U.S. asks Moscow to stop the shipments but is rebuffed.

1994: Syria flight tests North Korean Scud-Cs.

1996: According to a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) report, Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) sold Syria equipment to develop solid propellant rocket motors, probably for its solid-fuel missile program. Iran and Syria were also said to be cooperating on a program to convert Syrian Scud-Bs to longer range Scud-Cs; Syria reportedly tests a 600-km range upgraded version of the Scud-C.

January 1997: It is reported that U.S. Navy Aegis-equipped cruisers have monitored Scud missile test launches into the eastern Syrian desert.

April 1997: Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai reportedly claims that Syria is producing VX nerve agent with Russian assistance and is in the initial stages of preparing missile warheads for delivery.

September 1997: U.S. officials believe Syria will begin producing chemical bomblets for Scud-C ballistic missiles “within months.” It is also believed that the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) is close to completing an underground facility, modified with Russian assistance, to build Scud missiles.

April 1999: The United States imposes sanctions on three Russian companies – Tula Design Bureau, Volsk Mechanical Plant, and Tsniitochmash – for supplying anti-tank weapons to Syria. The Russian government was also determined to have been involved, but was not sanctioned.

October 1999: The Syrian military reportedly conducts a live chemical weapon bombing test, possibly demonstrating that Syria can use chemical munitions on both aircraft bombs and ballistic missiles.

May 2000: According to the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, Syria has received Scud-D missiles from North Korea. The missile has a range of 400 miles, which would enable Syria to target Israel from deep inside Syrian territory.

June 2000: Ha’aretz reports that China is helping Syria and Iran build a factory to make missile engines, guidance systems and solid propellant.

September 2000: The Israeli media reports that Syria successfully test-fired a Scud-D missile.

December 2001: The U.S. National Intelligence Council reports that Syria has achieved Scud-type missile production using locally manufactured components and has developed chemical warheads to arm these missiles.

June 2002: Syria is preparing to begin serial production of an extended-range version of the Scud-C short-range ballistic missile, according to a media report citing U.S. and Israeli defense officials. The report cites Israeli defense officials as saying that Syria could produce as many as 30 new extended range missiles per year.

October 2002: Israel’s Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, announces before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Russia has halted plans to sell Igla (SA-18) surface-to-air missile systems to Syria “at Israel’s request.” He says that Israel voiced concerns to Russia that the missiles might be obtained by Hezbollah militants.

July 2003: An Israeli defense official claims that Syria has at least 100 long-range ballistic missiles equipped with VX nerve gas aimed at Israel, according to Ha’aretz.

September 2003: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, testifies that Syria has several hundred Scud-type and SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles and is “believed” to have chemical warheads. He states that Syria is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile programs and that North Korea and Iran have been “prominent” in supplying Syria’s “recent” ballistic missile efforts. He also states that Syria can deliver the nerve agent sarin by ballistic missile.

January 2004: Syrian planes flying humanitarian aid to earthquake-stricken Iran returned to Damascus with missiles and other weapons destined for the Lebanese group Hezbollah, according to unidentified Israeli sources.

November 2004: The CIA releases its semi-annual report on arms proliferation, which states that Syria continues to depend on North Korean entities to help its liquid-propellant missile program and continues to manufacture liquid-propelled Scuds. The report also notes that Syria is developing longer-range missiles with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

January 2005: The Russian periodical Kommersant reports that Russia has plans to sell Syria the Iskander-E tactical missile system, which has a striking accuracy of “an order of magnitude less” than the 2 m accuracy of the Iskander-M. The solid-fuel 280 km-range, 480 kg-payload Iskander-E missile is equipped with autonomous inertial guidance and an optical seeker and can deliver cluster, blast fragmentation, and penetration warheads, according to its manufacturer KB Mashynostroyeniya.

January 2005: Syrian President Bashar Assad denies reports that Russia intends to sell Syria Iskander-E and SA-18 missiles.

January 2005: Following Syrian President Bashar Assad’s visit to Moscow, Russia forgives 73% of Syria’s debt, reducing the amount owed to $3.616 billion, and enters into a military cooperation agreement.

March 2005: It is reported that Russia has agreed to sell Syria Igla (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles in the vehicle-mounted Strelets configuration.

April 2005: Russian President Vladimir Putin is quoted in a translation of the Russian periodical Itar-Tass as saying that “Our military intended to supply Syria with the Iskander missiles with the range of over 900 km. I banned deliveries of these missiles.” He also emphasizes that Russian short-range missiles sold to Syria “will not fall into terrorist hands.”

May 2005: Israeli officials reveal that Syria has test-fired three Scud-type missiles, one of which broke up over Turkey. Israelis suggest that the missile tests were part of a program using North Korean technology and designed to deliver air-burst chemical weapons.

Israel Missile Milestones – 1953-2005

1953: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), developer of the Shavit rocket, is established.

1965: France contracts to supply Jericho missiles to Israel.

1968: U.S. intelligence reports say Israel has made nuclear weapons.

1973: Israel deploys Jericho missiles, probably with nuclear warheads, during the October Arab-Israeli war.

1975: United States supplies Israel with nuclear-capable Lance missiles.

1983: Israel Space Agency is founded in Tel Aviv.

May 1986: The United States and Israel sign a memorandum of understanding on joint development of the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system.

1987: Test flight of an extended range Jericho-II missile.

1988: First flight of the Shavit space launcher puts Ofeq-1 satellite in low earth orbit.

1989: Reports say Israel is helping South Africa develop and test Jericho-II missile.

1989: Second Shavit launch puts Ofeq-2 satellite in orbit.

August 1990: The first Arrow-1 test is unsuccessful.

1991: Israel promises to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

1992: Israel is accused of transferring U.S. Patriot missile technology to China.

February 1993: After several failures, Israel’s fifth test of the Arrow-1 proves the Arrow can locate and intercept an incoming missile.

Summer 1994: An Arrow interceptor missile destroys its target for the first time, serving as a proof-of-concept for the Arrow missile defense system.

1995: Third Shavit launch puts Ofeq-3 spy satellite in orbit.

July 1995: The first test of the Arrow-2, an operational version of the Arrow-1, is described as successful. The test is designed to evaluate the performance of the missile’s guidance systems and rocket engines.

February 1996: Israel conducts the second test of the Arrow-2. The test is designed to demonstrate the missile’s ability to intercept a simulated missile, and to evaluate the integration of the Green Pine Fire Control radar system, manufactured by Elta Electronics Industries, with the missile.

August 1996: The Arrow-2 successfully intercepts and destroys another missile, modified to simulate a Scud, in its inaugural intercept and third overall test.

March 1997: In another test, the Arrow-2 successfully intercepts and destroys its target despite a warhead failure.

April 1997: The United States agrees to increase its annual $200 million contribution to the Arrow program. It also agrees to continue working with Israel on the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) designed to destroy Katyusha rockets.

January 1998: The Ofeq-4 spy satellite fails to reach its proper orbit after being launched by a Shavit rocket.

May 1998: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) announces an agreement with the Coleman Research Corporation to collaborate on the manufacture of small expendable satellite launch vehicles using technology developed for the Shavit.

September 1998: The Arrow-2 is successfully launched. It is the first time its three components – the missile, radar and fire-control systems – are tested together.

November 1998: The Oren Yaroq radar, capable of detecting missile launches from neighboring countries, becomes operational.

November 1998: In a special rollout ceremony, the head of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) hands over the Arrow missile system to Israeli’s Defense Ministry.

November 1999: The first intercept test of the fully integrated Arrow-2 system is successful.

March 2000: Israel agrees with the Russian Space Agency to launch eight Earth Resources Observation Satellites (EROS) from the Svobodnyy cosmodrome in Russia.

March 2000: The Israeli Air Force is reported to take command of its first Arrow-2 unit, located about 30 miles south of Tel Aviv.

April 2000: A Jericho-I missile is test-fired off the Israeli coast. The missile lands approximately 40 miles from a U.S. warship, which had not been notified about the missile test.

May 2000: At the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, THEL is successfully tested for the first time, hitting a stationary target.May 2000: The London Sunday Times reports that Israeli defense sources claim Israel carried out test launches of cruise missiles from its newly acquired Dolphin-class submarines.

June 2000: The THEL system tracks and destroys a Russian Katyusha rocket in its first live-fire test.

August 2000: The THEL system shoots down two Katyusha rockets simultaneously during a test of the system’s ability to destroy multiple rocket launches.

September 2000: In its eighth test, the Arrow hits and destroys a rocket simulating a Scud. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) declares that the system is ready for use.

September 2000: Israel’s Green Pine radar, part of the Arrow missile defense system, reportedly detects a test launch of a Scud D missile by Syria.

September 2000: The United States reportedly gives tacit agreement to the sale of Israel Aircraft Industries’ (IAI) Green Pine fire control radar to India. The radar, a component of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, reportedly would be used as a stand-alone system by India.

October 2000: Israel’s Arrow missile is declared operational.

August 2001: In its ninth test, the Arrow missile defense system shoots down a live “Black Sparrow” missile. According to officials cited in the Jerusalem Post, the Arrow strikes its target farther and higher than in any previous test.

January 2002: A U.S. Department of Commerce report identifies Israel, a non-member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as a possible supplier of missile technology but notes that Israel abides by MTCR Guidelines, which aim to limit the proliferation of missile delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

January 2002: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Boeing sign a strategic teaming agreement for the manufacture of the Arrow missile defense system.

May 2002: Israel puts Ofeq-5 spy satellite into orbit using a Shavit launcher.

June 2002: India’s defense secretary confirms in the press that India has acquired a Green Pine radar, which is part of the Arrow missile defense system, from Israel.

December 2002: Israel Defense Forces conduct an exercise to test a new system to identify missiles and determine their projected strike locations while the missiles are still in the air.

January 2003: In the tenth test of Israel’s Arrow missile, Israel fires four interceptor missiles at four simulated incoming rockets. The test, described as a success by Israel Defense Forces, is the fifth for the integrated Arrow Weapon System, which includes the “Green Pine” fire control radar, the “Yellow Citron” fire management system, the “Brown Nut” launch control center, and the Arrow launchers and missiles.

February 2003: Following up on their January 2002 strategic teaming agreement, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Boeing sign an agreement to establish production infrastructure to manufacture components of the Arrow missile in the United States.

October 2003: The Los Angeles Times, citing Israeli and U.S. officials, reports that Israel has modified the American-supplied submarine-based Harpoon anti-ship missile to carry nuclear warheads. However, some defense experts dismiss this report, claiming that it is impossible to make a Harpoon nuclear-capable without limiting its range and accuracy.

November 2003: A test of Israel’s new IAI-produced Long-Range Artillery (LORA) missile fails. Defense News describes the LORA as capable of delivering a 570-kg warhead within a 200-km range.

December 2003: Israel successfully conducts the eleventh test of its Arrow ballistic missile interceptor, intercepting a targeted “Black Sparrow” missile. The test also represents the sixth test of the complete Arrow Weapon System.

March 2004: IAI awards Boeing a $78 million contract to produce Arrow interceptor components.

May 2004: In a successful test at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser (MTHEL), developed for the U.S. Army and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, shoots down a large-caliber rocket carrying a live warhead.

May 2004: The Israel Air Force (IAF) conducts successful test launches of Patriot and Hawk missiles at an IAF base in central Israel.

July 2004: During the twelfth test of the Arrow missile and the seventh test of the complete Arrow weapon system, an Israeli Arrow anti-ballistic missile interceptor successfully destroys its target. The test is the first in which the Arrow intercepts a live Scud missile in flight; the previous eleven tests were with simulated Scud missiles.

August 2004: In a test, an Israeli Arrow missile fails to intercept its target, characterized as an “unreal threat that represents an extreme condition.” The target missile reportedly simulated an Iranian Shahab-3 or a Scud-D.

September 2004: Israel’s Ofeq-6 spy satellite is destroyed when the Shavit rocket carrying the satellite into orbit malfunctions on its third and final stage.

March 2005: Israel successfully tests its Long-Range Artillery (LORA) missile in the Mediterranean Sea, hitting a target some 200 kilometers from the launch site.

July 2005: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Israel Military Industries (IMI) conduct a successful test of a new launcher capable of putting satellites into a low Earth orbit. The new launcher is intended to launch satellites that are heavier than the Ofeq spy satellites previously launched by the Shavit rocket.

Don’t Underestimate the Mullahs

By Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
August 23, 2005

Valletta, Malta

Earlier this month Bush administration officials leaked to the press what they said was a new official estimate of when Iran might be able to build a nuclear weapon. Speaking anonymously, they told reporters that American intelligence agencies now believe it would take at least 6 and maybe as many as 10 years before that fateful day arrives.

Whew! Instead of worrying over the previous estimate of only five years, we can relax. And if this administration can’t figure out how to stop the Iranian bomb, there will be plenty of time for someone else to do it. Right?

Actually, no. We should be alarmed rather than comforted by this latest prediction. Consider this: American intelligence agencies completely missed Saddam Hussein’s giant machines for processing uranium to weapons grade before the Persian Gulf war in 1991. Then, overreacting to that mistake, these agencies wrongly reported that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the 2003 invasion. Now, they appear to be overreacting to their last overreaction by underestimating the threat from Iran.

What must Iran do to make a bomb? This month it started an essential part of the process. It resumed the conversion of about 37 tons of natural uranium into the gaseous form that can be fed into centrifuges. Those machines, by spinning the gas at high speed, enrich its potency – either to a low level for fueling a reactor, or to a high level for fueling a bomb. These 37 tons, which should be ready for enrichment in a month or so, would be sufficient for six to nine weapons.

Why does the administration think it will take up to 10 years to process this material? The intelligence estimate is secret, but foreign and American officials involved in monitoring Iran’s efforts tell me that Washington assumes Iran’s centrifuges are of poor quality and that Iranian scientists may have trouble connecting them into what is called a cascade, in which the uranium must flow from one machine to the next.

This prediction, however, discounts an overwhelming amount of countervailing evidence. First, an official at the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors Iran’s nuclear progress in detail, told me that his agency is confident that the Iranians can produce high-quality centrifuges. Officials at the agency also know that Iran has built a string of workshops as part of a plan to produce some 50,000 centrifuges, with an assumed production rate of many thousand per year. It also has thousands of components for the centrifuges on hand, some it made itself and others imported, likely from Pakistan.

It is unreasonable to assume that Iran could not, after deciding to begin a concerted effort, assemble a 2,000-machine cascade in a year. In 2002, Iranian scientists enriched a small amount of uranium in an experimental cascade at the Kalaye Electric Company, a secret operation in Tehran that the International Atomic Energy Agency didn’t discover until 2003.

After a year’s operation of such a cascade, Iran would have one bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium, and could have built and started running 2,000 more centrifuges. Continuing at this pace would yield three bombs’ worth of enriched material in three years, and about six bombs’ worth in four. This is the sort of calculation that experts at American government laboratories have been doing for a long time, and one such scientist told me he was stunned by the administration’s 6-to-10-year estimate.

And then there is the problem of what we don’t know. Inspectors from the atomic energy agency frequently complain that Iran has never explained how far it got in its efforts to build a more advanced model of centrifuge that could save lots of production time. Iran got the blueprints for this machine around 1995 from the notorious Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, and imported hard-to-find components like specialized magnets.

This raises the possibility that Iran may have centrifuges or laboratories we still don’t know about, a risk that seems quite high given that for almost two decades Iran managed to hide work on uranium enrichment that international inspectors found out about only after visiting the site at Natanz in 2003.

And the concealment continues: last year Iran razed a building at one suspected nuclear site and scraped away the underlying soil to prevent analysis (hiding evidence in this way was a favorite ploy of Saddam Hussein’s in the 1990’s). Iran is also barring inspectors from following up their work at another site, the Parchin military complex near Tehran, which many suspect is being used for work on the non-nuclear parts of a nuclear weapon.

This latter activity – the making of bomb parts other than the uranium or plutonium metal that explodes – is easily hidden because it would most likely occur in parallel at laboratories not involved in creating the nuclear fuel. And it seems very possible that Iran received a complete bomb design, plus blueprints showing how to manufacture it, from Mr. Khan. In the 1990’s he sold both Iran and Libya packages of centrifuge technology; we know that in the case of Libya he threw in the bomb design for good measure. Why would he not have given the plans to his other good customer, Iran, as well?

Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency lullaby. Given the dismal performance of our spies and analysts in recent years, why should we think they have suddenly wised up? Iran is determined to get the bomb – all the agencies agree on that – and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for the next administration.

Gary Milhollin is the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington and the publisher of IranWatch.org.

Keeping Watch on Iran Nukes; Web Site Provides Data

By Meghan Doughty

The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin)
August 9, 2005, p. 3A

From her office window in Paris, Valerie Lincy keeps her eye on Iran and checks in frequently with her boss, a Wisconsin emeritus law professor based not in Madison, but in the District of Columbia.

This global tetrahedron, while baffling at first, converges logically on the issue of nuclear weapons. Lincy is an employee of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington research center founded in 1986 by University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor Gary Milhollin.

Lincy is the editor and principal investigator for Iran Watch (www.iranwatch.org), the Wisconsin Project’s latest watchdog Web site that monitors a country widely believed to be a serious nuclear threat.

“The Web site just tries to provide useful research tools for journalists, people in government and regular people who just want to find out more about what they’re hearing in the media,” Lincy said. “We try to make it really simple.”

Iran Watch was launched in September 2004 and now has more than 7,000 searchable pages of information about Iran’s nuclear activities, pulled together from a vast array of sources, from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the U.S. government.

Along with regular status reports on Iran’s latest activities, one of the site’s main features is a comprehensive list of “suspect entities.” For example, a browser interested in Natanz – a nuclear production plant in Iran – can conduct a search and pull up a detailed profile of the facility. The synopsis explains why Milhollin and Lincy identified Natanz as the most troubling Iranian entity: because, if fully developed, it could produce substantial amounts of enriched uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons technology.

The Web site’s format was based on its highly successful predecessor Iraq Watch, which Milhollin said received more than 1 million hits during one week at the height of the 2003 weapons investigation in Iraq.

The American public may develop a similar interest in Iraq’s neighbor to the east, Milhollin said, as Iran appears headed down the same path as North Korea, India and Pakistan, which are already major nuclear weapons concerns in the international community.

“We started the Web site because we were convinced that Iran would be a big strategic challenge for the U.S.,” Milhollin said. “We have been watching Iran for a while, and Iran has been doing things that can only be explained by a desire for nuclear weapons. Otherwise, their programs wouldn’t make much sense.”

Late last week, several European leaders offered economic incentives for Iran to curtail its uranium enrichment programs and other activities that point to a possible interest in weapons of mass destruction. As Milhollin predicted, Iran unofficially rejected this proposal on Saturday, continuing to argue that their nuclear facilities are entirely fuel-related and that they would not respond to international threats.

“We have a pattern in the world of countries saying that these projects are for peaceful purposes,” Milhollin said, “and then you see a mushroom-shaped cloud.”

In addition to informing the public, Milhollin and Lincy said they hope Iran Watch will help shape the U.S. government’s strategy for negotiating with Iran. They said that may have already taken place last fall, when the Wisconsin Project suggested that the United States take a more active role in dealing with Iran.

“The findings from a roundtable that we held last November suggested that if the United States did not get on board, they would miss the boat on Iran,” Lincy said. “Our voice sort of added to the many voices saying that the U.S. should try to do something.”

But the question of exactly what to do about Iran’s weapons program is very complex, Lincy said, and the answer won’t be found on any Web site. She said the European proposal may have been, from a Western perspective, “the best deal Iran was going to get.”

Now that the proposal has been rejected, however, Iran could face economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. But an embargo on Iran’s most valuable and influential commodity – oil – would of course have international consequences.

“It would certainly be a big stick that we could threaten them with,” Lincy said. “But it would be costly for the West, costly for everyone.” And most Americans, said Milhollin, are not ready to make the sacrifices that would come along with cutting ties with the world’s second-biggest oil producer.

“If the average American wants to drive his SUV at a low price,” Milhollin said, “one of the costs may be an Iranian bomb.”

Another function of Iran Watch is to identify countries like Russia and China that have funded certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, usually motivated by “greed,” Milhollin said.

“Iran has oil, and Iran wants weapons of mass destruction,” Milhollin said. “So if you want to do better in the oil business in Iran, it’s obvious what the Iranians would like you to do for them.”

Lincy said pulling together all the relevant statistics and intelligence on Iran has been a challenge.

“It’s been a real moving target,” Lincy said. “In the last couple of years a lot of new info has come out. Between trying to trace through all of the secret expansions that took place over the past two decades, and dealing with a tremendous amount of diplomatic activity, it’s been hard to keep on top of things.”

She said she hopes that through her efforts, keeping an eye on Iran has become a more user-friendly process.

A History of Iran’s Chemical Weapon-Related Efforts

This is a brief history of Iran’s efforts to develop chemical weapons. The emphasis is on Iran’s technical achievements rather than its motives, and the essay relies primarily on statements and reports produced by government agencies and international organizations. The essay describes the origins of Iran’s chemical weapon program during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran’s more recent efforts to acquire chemicals and technology in order to establish an indigenous production capability. Despite Iran’s adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Iran maintains a chemical arsenal that probably includes blister, blood and choking agents and possibly nerve agents. Iran’s primary foreign suppliers of chemical weapon precursors and expertise have included China, Russia and India.

Early Development during the Iran-Iraq War

In September 1980, Iraqi troops invaded Iran, triggering a war that would last until August 1988. During the early years of the conflict, Iran refrained from using chemical weapons against Iraq, reportedly because spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini objected to their use. However, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iran initiated a chemical weapon development program in 1983 “in response to Iraqi use of riot control and toxic chemical agents” during the war. By 1998, the Iranian government had publicly acknowledged that it began a chemical weapon program during the war. According to the DIA, the program began under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with the role of the Ministry of Defense increasing over time. The IRGC, or Pasdaran, is separate from Iran’s regular army. It was established by the revolutionary government to handle internal security functions. U.S. officials credit Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, a part of the Ministry of Defense, with assembling the various elements of Iran’s chemical arms effort.

In April 1984, the Iranian delegate to the United Nations, Rajai Khorassani, admitted at a London news conference that Iran was “capable of manufacturing chemical weapons … [and would] consider using them.” In 1987, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, Iran was able to deploy limited quantities of mustard gas and cyanide against Iraqi troops. The change in Iran’s policy with regard to chemical warfare was publicly announced in December 1987, when Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi was reported to have told parliament that Iran was producing “sophisticated offensive chemical weapons.”

As Iran’s chemical warfare capabilities grew, it became more difficult to determine which side was responsible for chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1988, the Kurdish town of Halabja in northern Iraq, sandwiched between Iranian and Iraqi forces, was caught in chemical weapon crossfire that left thousands of civilians dead. A 1990 U.S. Department of Defense reconstruction of the Halabja incident reportedly concluded that both Iran and Iraq used chemical weapons in Halabja. Iran allegedly attacked the town with cyanide gas bombs and artillery, and Iraqi forces allegedly used a mixture of mustard gas and nerve agents. In total, the Defense Department study estimated that Iranian forces used more than 50 chemical bombs and artillery shells during the offensive. The Pentagon analysis of the Halabja incident is corroborated by a 1990 report co-written by Stephen Pelletiere, the CIA’s senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. In his report, Pelletiere stated that there was “no evidence whatsoever that the Iraqis have ever employed blood gasses such as cyanogen chloride or hydrogen cyanide.” Because “blood agents were allegedly responsible for the killing of Kurds at Halabjah,” Pelletiere concluded that “the Iranians perpetrated this attack.”

According to some reports, Iran may have used still other chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq war. In April 1988, a U.N. medical specialist examined several dozen Iraqi soldiers and concluded that they could all have been exposed to mustard gas. In addition, the specialist observed symptoms in a number of patients that indicated possible exposure to “an acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting chemical in small concentrations,” which could suggest the use of a nerve agent. A 1990 DIA study also reported the allegation that Iran used sulfur mustard in some attacks, and concluded that Iran had either purchased the sulfur mustard or produced it on its own. The DIA report added that a “U.N. team that examined Iraqi casualties from Iranian chemical attacks found that some of them displayed the effects of exposure to a choking agent…believed to have been phosgene.” Despite these findings, Iran has yet to acknowledge that it used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war.

Post-War Developments and Intelligence Assessments

Although Iran claims that it terminated its chemical weapon program after the Iran-Iraq war, the United States believes that Tehran has continued-and perhaps accelerated-its drive to develop, stockpile and weaponize chemical agents after the 1988 cease-fire. In February 1997, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Iran as one of about twenty countries that either had or were developing chemical and biological weapons. Tenet characterized Iran’s chemical weapon program at the time as “increasingly active.”

In an assessment of Iran’s chemical weapon development released in November 2004, the CIA concluded that Iran “may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possible nerve agents-and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them.” Earlier assessments put Iran’s stockpile of chemical agents at anywhere from several hundred to several thousand metric tons. In March 2001, General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, testified before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee that Iran was “the holder of the largest chemical weapons stockpile” in his area of responsibility.

In September 2000, the CIA assessed that Iran’s chemical weapon program still relied upon external suppliers for technology, equipment and precursor chemicals, but that Tehran was “rapidly approaching self-sufficiency and could become a supplier of CW-related materials to other nations.” Since then, the CIA has reported that Iran was seeking “production technology, training and expertise” that could help it “achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents.”

One of the most recent assessments of Iran’s chemical weapon capabilities was revealed in a February 2005 report by the German news agency ddp, citing findings by Germany’s Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA). The ZKA reportedly believes that Iran has secretly carried out chemical weapon research and development in small, well-guarded university laboratories. The ZKA further alleges that Iran probably possesses sulfur mustard, tabun, and prussic acid (hydrogen cyanide), and may possess sarin and VX.

Iran and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Iran became a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on December 3, 1997. As a member, Iran is prohibited from developing, producing or stockpiling chemical weapons. Since ratification of the CWC, Iran has maintained a high profile in the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency responsible for promoting and administering the CWC. In December 2000, José Maurício Bustani, the OPCW Director-General, publicly stated that the OPCW had “no reason whatsoever to question Iran’s full compliance with the CWC,” and that verification measures in Iran were “strictly in accordance with the Convention.”

During its participation in the OPCW, Iran has frequently asserted its commitment to the CWC. For example, in April 2003, the Iranian delegate to the OPCW acknowledged that Iran had developed “chemical capabilities” during the last phase of the Iran-Iraq war but claimed that Iran never used these weapons and dismantled them after the cease-fire. In addition, the delegate stated that Iran destroyed its chemical weapon facilities under the supervision of OPCW inspectors and received certification of destruction. He cited these actions as “clear proof of [Iran’s] full commitment and compliance” to the CWC. In October 2003, Iran reiterated that it was “fully committed to the implementation of the Convention and total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction” and had “submitted all required declarations.”

Despite Iran’s assertions, a number of states have questioned the sincerity of Iran’s CWC compliance, as well as its motives for participating in the CWC.

A 2001 report by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Verification and Compliance judged that Iran had not submitted “a complete and accurate declaration” of its chemical weapons program and was, in fact, “acting to retain and modernize key elements” of the program. The State Department accused Iran of maintaining “an offensive R&D CW program, an undeclared stockpile and an offensive production capability.” In April 2003, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker reiterated concerns that Iran “continues to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from abroad,” and he restated the U.S. government’s view that Iran “already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents.”

Israel has expressed the opinion that Iran is using its membership in the OPCW as a means to mask its efforts to acquire chemical weapon materials and technology. In June 2002, the director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service was quoted as saying that Iran’s adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention was only “a cover for the construction of a dual-purpose civilian infrastructure which could be converted very speedily into production capabilities of large quantities of VX [gas].”

Foreign Suppliers

Foreign assistance has been vital to Iran’s chemical weapon effort. China, Russia and India have been Iran’s primary suppliers of chemical equipment and precursor chemicals. Companies in Germany, Israel and the United States have also been involved.

China

According to the CIA, Chinese entities have been among the most active suppliers of CW-related equipment and technology. Iran has obtained precursor chemicals, glass-lined vessels and special air filtration equipment-all of which can be used in the production of chemical agents-from Chinese firms. Iran has also purchased Chinese technology that would enable it to manufacture such chemical weapon production equipment on its own.

In many cases, these Chinese firms have been repeatedly singled out for punishment by the U.S. State Department. In May 1997, the State Department sanctioned one Hong Kong company, two Chinese companies and five Chinese individuals for “knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s chemical weapons program.” These entities and persons were “involved in the export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production equipment and technology.” One of the Chinese companies, Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, reportedly helped Iran build a plant for manufacturing dual-use chemical weapon equipment. Jiangsu Yongli was sanctioned again in June 2001, reportedly for enabling the Iranians to get the facility “up and running.” One of the Chinese individuals sanctioned in May 1997 was Q.C. Chen. In a March 2005 address, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker expressed concern that “the Chinese authorities have been unable to halt the proliferation activities of Q.C. Chen…who has repeatedly provided material support to the Iranian chemical weapons program.” Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, one of the only firms in China capable of manufacturing large-size glass-lined chemical equipment, has been sanctioned three times since May 2002 for proliferation activities with Iran.

Russia

According to the CIA, Russian entities have also been active suppliers to Iran of CW-related equipment and technology. In October 2000, a senior CIA official reported that “numerous Russian entities have been providing Iran with dual-use industrial chemicals, equipment, and chemical production technology that could be diverted to Tehran’s offensive CW program.” The official specifically mentioned that in 1999 “Russian entities provided production technology, training, and expertise that Iran could use to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.”

India

Indian firms have also helped Iran build its chemical weapon infrastructure. In March 1989, the State Trading Corporation, an Indian government trading company, reportedly sold Iran 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a precursor chemical that can be used to produce mustard gas. The State Trading Company may have purchased the chemicals from Transpek, a private Indian chemical company. According to a classified German intelligence report cited by the Washington Times in 1995, at least three Indian companies aided Iran in the construction of a secret poison-gas complex. The report projected that Iran was only months away from completing the plant, which the Indian companies claimed was a pesticide factory. The CIA last identified India as one of Iran’s primary suppliers of CW-related material during the second half of 1996; India has not been singled out as a country of concern for chemical proliferation to Iran since that time.

Other Countries

Firms in other countries have also assisted Iran with the acquisition of precursor chemicals and CW-related equipment and expertise. For example, during 1987 and 1988, an Iranian diplomat reportedly arranged for a West German company to purchase 210 tons of thiodiglycol-a mustard gas precursor- from a supplier in the United States and then ship it to Iran in three installments, routing the shipments through Greece and Singapore to conceal their true destination. Reportedly, two shipments totaling 90 tons successfully made it to Iran, while the third 120-ton shipment was intercepted by U.S. Customs agents. Alcolac International, the U.S. firm, pleaded guilty to selling the thiodiglycol “with knowledge or reason to know” that the chemical was not intended for its designated destination, Singapore.

In 1998, a court in Israel convicted Nahum Manbar, an Israeli citizen, of selling 150 tons of chemical weapon materials to Iran between 1990 and 1995. Manbar reportedly also provided Iran with know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build factories to produce mustard gas and the nerve gases tabun, sarin and soman.