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North Korea Chemical and Biological Weapon Milestones – 1969-2005

1961: Dr. Yi Sung-ki oversees construction of the February 8 Vinalon Factory in Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province. Dr. Yi also assumes the position of director of the Chemistry Institute at the Academy of Science’s Hamhung Branch. He is later referred to by Japanese and South Korean sources as the “godfather” of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical and nuclear weapons.

1980: North Korea succeeds with experiments in bacteria and virus cultivation for biological weapons and by the late 1980s completes live experiments with such weapons, according to a 1999 white paper by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense.

March 1987: North Korea accedes to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

1990-1995: North Korea’s chemical warfare effort is “intensified and expanded,” according to the U.S. Department of Defense. By the late 1980s, North Korea was already “able to produce large quantities of chemical agents and munitions independently.”

November 1991: South Korean President Roh Tae Woo declares that his country will renounce the manufacture, possession, and use of nuclear and chemical weapons and calls upon North Korea to do the same.

February 1992: Kim Il-sung issues a directive that North Korea must provide gas masks to the entire population, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense. Military and paramilitary personnel as well as civilians are to participate in regular nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defense drills.

January 1993: A representative of North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that North Korea “has never had any chemical weapons” and accuses South Korea of deploying chemical weapons along the demilitarized zone.

May 1993: North Korea conducts tests of a Scud-type missile, which is thought to be capable of carrying a chemical weapon payload.

April 1994: A North Korean defector, Yi Chong-kok, who was a Sergeant in the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau of the Korean People’s Army General Staff, declares that North Korea is capable of delivering chemical weapons with Scud missiles.

April 1996: Japanese police begin investigation and raids of the company Toa Gijutsu Kogyo after one of its employees, Tanetoshi Ri, was arrested on suspicion of smuggling sodium fluoride and hydrofluoric acid from Japan to North Korea without export approval.

October 1999: South Korean President Kim Dae-jung is quoted as saying “If war breaks out, North Korea is likely to use biochemical weapons of mass destruction in an attempt to inflict an initial major blow against us.”

August 2002: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John R. Bolton, says that in regard to chemical weapons “there is little doubt that North Korea has an active program.” He also asserts that “The U.S. government believes that North Korea has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth.”

2003: South Korea’s defense ministry reports that North Korea is “believed to possess 13 types of bacteria including anthrax, small pox and cholera.” The report also states that North Korea has “produced over ten kinds of lethal chemicals that include nerve, blister, and blood agents,” and that “some 2,500 to 5,000 tons of these chemical agents are estimated to be stored in six separate facilities.”

May 2003: The German government intercepts a 30 metric ton shipment of sodium cyanide, which is the approximate amount necessary to help manufacture 100 tons of the nerve agent tabun. The shipment was officially headed from Germany to Singapore, but was believed by the U.S. government to be bound for North Korea.

January 2004: North Korean defector Kwon Hyok tells BBC news that in 1993 he was head of security at prison camp 22 in Haengyong and witnessed chemical experiments carried out on political prisoners in gas chambers.

February 2004: A South Korean activist shows reporters a document he claims was smuggled by defector and senior electrician, Kang Byong-sop, out of the Vinalon Unified Factory in Hamhung, North Korea. The activist describes this as one of North Korea’s largest chemical weapons plants. A translation of the document states that the prisoner had been transported “for the purpose of human experimentation of liquid gas of chemical weapon [sic.].”

March 2004: After detention in China and his return to North Korea, Kang Byong-sop announces that his son falsified the document alleging North Korean chemical experimentation on prisoners.

November 2004: The CIA releases its semi-annual report for late 2003 and states that North Korea continues its acquisition of dual-use chemicals that could be used in its “long-standing CW program.” The report says that North Korea has the ability to produce large quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. It also remarks that while North Korea’s chemical industry is “sizable,” it is “aging.”

May 2005: U.S. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, states that among the eleven successes over nine months of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, one case of bilateral cooperation prevented North Korea from “receiving materials used in making chemical weapons.”

North Korea Chemical and Biological Weapon Update – 2005

In October 2002, North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu, during a meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, declared “North Korea does not have just nuclear arms. It has bio [biological arms] and all other things.”

This boast, whether true or not, refers to a biological and chemical industry that has been over forty years in the making. Testimony from defectors and reports from the South Korean and U.S. government indicate that North Korea possesses the ability to produce both chemical and biological weapons. The extent to which it has actually done so, however, remains unclear. North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Chemical Industry

North Korea began to develop its chemical industry following the Korean War. According to a study by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), North Korea did not embark upon the pursuit of chemical weapons until after 1961, when Kim Il-sung issued his “Declaration of Chemicalization.” The U.S. Department of Defense, in an April 1996 report, concluded that Pyongyang was able to produce large quantities of chemical agent by the late 1980s.

According to the Pentagon, North Korea’s chemical warfare effort was “intensified and expanded” from 1990-1995. A 1999 MND report found that the North Korean government began providing its population with gas masks in 1992. The government also required regular nuclear, biological, and chemical defense drills for military and paramilitary personnel, as well as for the civilian population. According to the Pentagon, the protective military gear included suits, detectors, and decontamination systems.

In its recent unclassified reports to Congress, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has asserted that North Korea possesses a “long-standing chemical warfare program” and the “ability to produce bulk quantities” of agent, but the reports do not claim that North Korea has actually manufactured chemical warfare agent. Yet, in 1997, the U.S. State Department, in response to questions posed by U.S. Senator Thad Cochran, stated that North Korea was, in fact, “believed to have a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons.” The MND has been more specific. It claimed in 2003 that North Korea had produced “over ten kinds of lethal chemicals that include nerve, blister, and blood agents” and had a stockpile of “some 2,500 to 5,000 tons of these chemical agents.”

According to maps provided in several MND white papers, North Korea has eight chemical research institutions spread throughout the country. Some of these institutions are in proximity to three chemical production facilities. These maps also indicate that North Korea possesses six chemical storage facilities concentrated near the border with South Korea. In 2002, an unconfirmed report in the Japanese media claimed that North Korea was producing the nerve agent VX at a plant in Ch’ongsu near its border with China.

More detailed allegations have come from North Korean defectors. In 1997, Choi Ju-hwal, a former official in the North Korean Ministry of the People’s Army, testified before the U.S. Senate that North Korea’s Fifth General Bureau leads its chemical weapons development. Under this superstructure, according to Choi, the Second Natural Science Academy heads the Hamhung Branch and three other institutes responsible for chemical weapons research and production. Choi also cited the following factories as involved in nerve and blister agent production: the Kangye Chemical Factory, the Sakju Chemical Factory (possibly the Saku Chemical Facility ), the “February 8” Vinalon Factory, the Ilyong Branch of the Sunchon Vinalon Factory, and Factory No. 297.

An unconfirmed South Korean media report has also suggested that the Aoji Chemical Depot, the Hamhung 28 Vynalon Factory, and the Ch’ongjin Chemical Depot produce chemical weapons. Chemical factories listed by the German government as risky end users in warnings supplied to its exporters include the Chungsoo Chemical Factory, the Manpo Chemical Complex, the Sariwon Potassic Fertilizer Complex, the Sinuiju Chemical Fiber Complex, and the Sinhung Chemical Complex.

In addition to listing facilities, North Korean defectors have made other allegations regarding North Korea’s chemical-related activities. In January 2004, the BBC issued a series of reports suggesting that North Korea had been testing chemical weapons on prison inmates. Defector Kwon Hyok told BBC News that he was the head of security at “prison camp 22” in Haengyong in 1993 and had witnessed chemical experiments carried out on political prisoners in gas chambers.

Biological Industry

North Korea has also pursued an interest in biological weapons, which the CIA and the Pentagon assert goes back to the 1960s. In 1999, the MND reported that by 1980 North Korea had succeeded with experiments in bacteria and virus cultivation for biological weapons. By the late 1980s, according to the MND, North Korea had “completed live experiments with such weapons.” Also during the 1980’s, according to the MND, Kim Il-sung made the statement that “poisonous gas and bacteria can be used effectively in war.”

In 2001, the Pentagon issued a report calling the North Korean biological industry “rudimentary (by Western standards),” but nonetheless found it “could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents and toxins such as anthrax, cholera, and plague.” During a speech in August 2002, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John R. Bolton, made an even stronger allegation. He stated that “the U.S. Government believes that North Korea has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth.” He added that North Korea “has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention.”

According to the MND, North Korea is suspected of possessing thirteen types of bacteria, including anthrax, small pox, and cholera. Choi Ju-hwal’s testimony before the U.S. Senate suggested that the Germ Research Institute in the General Logistic Bureau of the Armed Forces Ministry is responsible for developing biological weapons. A South Korean media report in 2001 cited North Korea’s Biological Research Institute, overseen by the Second Natural Science Academy, as playing a “leading role” in biological weapons development. Other facilities with equipment reportedly capable of biological weapon manufacture include Chongju No. 225 Factory and the Military Prevention Medical Unit.

Deployment

North Korea has fielded a variety of munitions that could deliver a chemical payload. These include 170 mm and 240 mm long-range artillery guns, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs, and FROG rockets of over 100 mm caliber, as well as Scud-type missiles, fighters, bombers, and AN-2s. According to the MND, this configuration would allow North Korea to simultaneously launch chemical munitions into the front and rear theaters of battle in a war against the South. The CIA reported in 2003 that North Korea was “believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents.” The CIA also stated that North Korea “may have some such weapons available for use.”

A Japanese media report in June of 2000 indicated the potential connection between chemical production, weaponization, and deployment facilities. According to the report, Yi Chun-song, former Vice Director of the Operation Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, claimed that the “102 plant” in North Hamgyong Province manufactures chemical agents, which are then transferred to the “108 plant” of the bomb manufacturing facility in Jagang Province. Completed chemical weapons, according to Yi, are then deployed at the 425th, 806th, and 815th training facilities and at one bomber division.

Foreign Suppliers

There have been several recent reports of chemical precursors and equipment en route to North Korea. In April 1996, Japanese police began investigating the Japan-based company Toa Gijutsu Kogyo after one of its employees, Tanetoshi Ri, was arrested on suspicion of smuggling sodium fluoride and hydrofluoric acid from Japan to North Korea without export approval. The sodium fluoride in question could be used to manufacture the nerve agent sarin.

In May 2003, Der Spiegel reported that the German government had intercepted a 30 metric ton shipment of sodium cyanide, which is the approximate amount needed to manufacture 100 tons of the nerve agent tabun. The shipment was officially headed from Germany to Singapore, but was believed by the U.S. government to be bound for North Korea.

In May 2005, U.S. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, stated that among the eleven successes over nine months of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, one case of bilateral cooperation prevented North Korea from “receiving materials used in making chemical weapons.”

Testimony: Iran, Weapons Proliferation, Terrorism and Democracy

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

May 19, 2005

I am pleased to appear today before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, an organization here in Washington that maintains a web site specifically devoted to monitoring Iran’s mass destruction weapon efforts, www.IranWatch.org, to which I would like to refer the committee for additional information and analysis on Iran. In accordance with the Committee’s request, I will concentrate my remarks upon the present negotiations Iran is conducting with Britain, France and Germany.

First, I would like to point out that the deal struck among these countries in November should be seen as a tactical step. It was intended to buy time, and to provide an opening for continued talks. It should not be seen as a answer to the overall strategic question posed by Iran’s nuclear effort. The aim of the Europeans was to get Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment and plutonium processing work while negotiations went forward. The Europeans saw this as the best chance of working toward a long-term solution. That solution would be some arrangement in which Iran received economic and security benefits in exchange for giving up its plans to enrich uranium and produce plutonium. Both enriched uranium and plutonium are used to fuel nuclear weapons, and Iran does not need to produce either domestically to run its civilian nuclear energy program.

The parties to these negotiations still seem far apart. In March, Iran proposed that it be allowed to resume processing uranium at its conversion plant by July, be allowed to install and operate 3,000 centrifuge machines, and be allowed to manufacture thousands more while receiving benefits such as additional nuclear reactors that the Europeans would supply. This is directly opposed to the stated European position, which is that Iran would have to give up uranium enrichment as part of any overall solution.

If Iran could operate 3,000 centrifuge machines, it would allow Iran to master the enrichment process, bringing it a step closer to being able to produce nuclear weapons. In addition, the machines themselves might be able to produce enough enriched uranium for two or three nuclear weapons per year if configured to do so. Iran asserts that it will only produce low enriched uranium and will immediately make it into fuel for its reactor at Bushehr. Iran, however, has already contracted with Russia to supply this reactor’s fuel. Thus, it is hard to see what peaceful purpose the enrichment process would serve. Iran itself has admitted that its enrichment effort “cannot be justified on economic grounds,” according to a leaked European summary of the negotiations.

Since the talks began last December, Iran has been threatening to resume enrichment. Britain, France and Germany have replied that if Iran does so, they will support the U.S. effort to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council. They made this clear in a March letter to the European Union. At the present moment, it is difficult to predict how the standoff will end. If the Europeans are steadfast in their opposition to enrichment, Iran will have to decide how long to abide by the present suspension.

If the suspension continues, it could begin to resemble the one that existed after the “Agreed Framework” was reached between the United States and North Korea in 1994. Like Iran, North Korea agreed to freeze its production of fissile material, while retaining the ability to restart production at any time. The question was how long North Korea would decide to keep the freeze in place. That same question is now facing Iran. The answer may depend on two things: how much the suspension is slowing Iran’s nuclear progress, and how much Iran thinks it will suffer by being referred to the Security Council.

To push forward its enrichment effort, Iran must finish converting its existing supply of natural uranium to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), suitable for feeding into centrifuges. It must also manufacture, install, test and operate a centrifuge cascade in order to produce enriched uranium. Is Iran technically ready to do that? If not, then extending the present suspension is not costly. If Iran is ready, then the pressure will build to end the talks unless they produce substantial benefits. Iran has already produced several tons of UF6 and has tested a ten centrifuge cascade using UF6. Judging from the insistence of the Iranians on finishing the conversion process, it appears that the delay is beginning to pinch.

But to end the talks means facing the Security Council. The United States and Europe can be expected to push for a resolution calling on Iran to reinstate the suspension. There already appears to be widespread support for such a resolution. If the resolution passes and Iran does not comply, then a subsequent resolution might require Iran to suspend. Failing to suspend at that point would put Iran in defiance of the Security Council, a position Iran would not relish. Defiance might lead to the imposition of sanctions, mild at first, but then possibly more severe. It is a progression that Iran would have to consider carefully before deciding to trigger it.

There are also risks for the United States and Europe. It could be counter-productive to send Iran to the Security Council without a good prospect that effective action will be taken. If the council does little or nothing, it would show that states in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty do not bear any real cost. That could be the lesson Iran has already learned from North Korea’s recent referral. The Council endorsed six-party talks with North Korea but has not voted any punitive measures. A repeat performance with Iran would deal a major blow to the treaty.

An oil embargo or other trade sanctions would impose the most severe burden on Iran, but there is little chance that such measures would be adopted unless Iran does something to provoke worldwide outrage, such as conducting more secret nuclear work, or producing nuclear weapon components, or dropping out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Absent such a provocative act, the political will to vote strong sanctions probably does not exist, especially on the part of veto-wielding members such as Russia and China.

Therefore, it is time to ask where this chain of events is likely to take us. First, there seems to be little doubt that Iran has a nuclear weapon in mind. All of its actions so far point in that direction. For eighteen years it has been deceiving the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to run a secret and illegal effort to produce nuclear material that is not needed for Iran’s civilian energy program, but is needed for atomic bombs. If this activity were only for peaceful purposes, as Iran says, why break the rules and do it secretly? And why spend money for something that is not needed for civilian energy? The activity includes building a 40 megawatt heavy water reactor, which happens to be larger than needed for research, but too small to make electricity, and just right for producing bomb-quality plutonium. Indeed, most countries with this sort of reactor are using it to make bombs, including India, Israel and Pakistan. The IAEA has also documented Iran’s experiments with polonium, a specialized material that can serve as a neutron initiator in fission bombs, and Iran has been observed shopping for the high-precision switches that can trigger a nuclear explosion. And finally, Iran is building a 1,300 kilometer range missile called the Shahab-3, the most practical use for which is to carry a nuclear warhead. When one puts all of these activities together, they add up to a nuclear weapon effort.

Unfortunately, international inspections are not likely to prevent Iran from achieving this goal. Last November, my organization convened a roundtable discussion that included two senior veterans of the U.N. inspection effort in Iraq, during which this point was raised. The results can be found on www.IranWatch.org. The roundtable concluded that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify that Iran was not secretly making nuclear weapons under any deal that allowed Iran to enrich uranium. The inspection burden would either be unacceptable to Iran or provide inadequate assurance for the rest of the world. Only an intrusive, specialized inspection regime—perhaps modeled on the U.N. special inspections organized in Iraq—in which inspectors were allowed anyplace, anytime access would offer a robust guarantee against cheating. This would require access to sensitive military sites with no declared relation to Iran’s civilian nuclear infrastructure. Iran is unlikely to agree to such a regime, which it would see as a grave infringement on its national sovereignty.

The IAEA should not be asked to do more than it is capable of achieving. The agency can verify a suspension of activity at known facilities and it can track nuclear material at these facilities. But agency inspectors, under any inspection regime, are limited in their ability to detect secret nuclear processing at undeclared sites. Further, the IAEA is not equipped to detect any work that deals with the manufacture and testing of weapon components. Over nearly two decades, Iran has conducted secret nuclear processing at a number of sites. Some of these sites were known to the IAEA, others were never declared. Iran’s experience in duplicity will make it doubly difficult to catch any illicit nuclear work in the future.

If, therefore, inspections won’t stop Iran, and effective action is not likely to be endorsed by the Security Council, and we accept the statements by relevant governments that military strikes are not in the offing, it is logical to assume that Iran may actually succeed in getting nuclear weapons. That poses a question: how would we live with an Iranian bomb? What would be the main effect on the United States?

As in the Cold War, the United States would face an overtly hostile nuclear power. It would therefore be in America’s interest to weaken that power as much as possible without resorting to force. To do so, we would probably embark on a new policy of containment. America would use its resources and influence to undermine Iran on every front.

The United States would be forced to consider extending its nuclear or conventional umbrella to additional states, as a way of restricting Iran’s influence and persuading these states not to get nuclear weapons themselves. The most likely candidates would be Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It would also be natural to expect a period of “testing the waters,” in which Iran explores the boundaries of its new power. As in the Cold War, there would be a risk that someone could miscalculate. To reduce that risk, the United States would have to work out and then announce some clear “red lines” that Iran would be told not to cross.

The United States would also have to deal with Iran as a proliferation threat. After getting the bomb Iran could pass it to others. We have learned that Pakistan was a giant source of proliferation during the years when we were only worrying about Pakistan itself becoming a nuclear power. Iran might present the same problem. Its technology could spread through corruption, or its government could decide to spread the technology as a way of extending its influence. In addition, we would have to worry about Iran’s ties to terrorist groups, which take on an entirely new meaning in the context of nuclear weapons.

It would, of course, be better if the United States never had to face such issues. What is the best chance now for not having to do so?

Negotiations seem to offer the only realistic hope. The United States has little choice but to join the Europeans in their talks with Iran. A package of economic, political and security benefits could be offered for Iran’s cooperation, while at the same time punitive measures threatened in the event of non-cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s endorsement of the talks on March 11 was a good first step. She also said that the United States would no longer block Iran’s application to be considered for the World Trade Organization or the purchase of spare parts for its ageing civilian aircraft. These two decisions were also positive. They helped convince the Europeans that the United States was behind a negotiated solution, if one could be reached. To have a chance of success, however, the process must have help from Russia, China and Iran’s neighbors. All parties would have to work together to induce Iran to roll back its nuclear effort. If that were to happen, Iran might eventually decide that nuclear weapons would have a negative impact on its security, its economy, and its standing in the world.

The Europeans have a great deal to offer Iran economically. Europe, unlike the United States, has active commercial ties to Iran and had been negotiating a trade agreement with Iran before the present nuclear crisis erupted in 2003. The promise of future benefits in exchange for cooperation is the main thing Europe has to offer; their denial is Europe’s primary threat.

While economics are important, Iran’s nuclear program remains motivated by security concerns—which Europe is less capable of addressing—and by Iran’s desire to increase its military and diplomatic power in the region. Only the United States is capable of providing Iran with adequate security assurances. It should start thinking about how to do so.

It would also be useful if Russia and China could approach Iran and underscore the importance of maintaining the current enrichment freeze. In particular, Russia and China could warn Iran that it should not try to back out of the freeze by accusing the Europeans of not delivering on their promises. Iran must understand that it currently lives under a suspended sentence, thanks to the deal it struck with the Europeans. If Iran decides to renege, then the sentence—notification to the U.N. Security Council of its previous inspections violations—would be applied.

Even with these steps, however, it is difficult to be optimistic. At the least, negotiations could increase awareness of the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran among key states in Europe, as well as in Russia and China, and therefore help to consolidate support for sanctions or the use of force should either be required. Before resorting to such measures, Europe and the United States would have to convince the rest of the world that all other options for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran had been exhausted.

Testimony: The Sanctions Charade

By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

March 10, 2005

I am pleased to appear today before the U.S.-China Commission. The Commission has asked me to comment on U.S. policy towards China, especially concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Commission has asked me to discuss the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions against Chinese entities, and Beijing’s ability to police the exports of those entities.

As the Commission well knows, China’s exports continue to be a serious proliferation threat. Since 1980, China has supplied billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear weapon, chemical weapon, and missile technology to South Asia and the Middle East. It has done so in the face of U.S. protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on, and while they do, they make it impossible for the United States and its allies to halt the spread of mass destruction weapons.

China’s official stance on proliferation has improved over the past few decades. China has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and is a member of the treaty’s Zangger Committee. Last year, China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and is moving toward joining the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department continues to announce sanctions against Chinese companies for their dangerous exports, usually because the exports are found to be contributing to the spread of mass destruction weapons. Over the past four years, the State Department has sanctioned more than twenty Chinese organizations, some of them more than once. Given the fact that these sales continue, and that some of these Chinese organizations are “serial proliferators,” it appears that our sanctions policy is not working very well. Or at least, it is not stopping these organizations from doing as they wish.

Today, I would like to discuss some of the reasons why I think that our sanctions policy must be improved. The reasons are, first, that parent companies are not punished for proliferating through their subsidiaries. This is a giant loophole, through which virtually any company can pass without touching the edges. The second reason is that the penalties imposed under U.S. sanctions laws are not strong enough to affect the profitability of the offending companies. Put simply, our sanctions do not have any real teeth.

To elaborate on the first reason, I’d like to draw the Commission’s attention to an article that my colleague Matthew Godsey and I wrote recently for the New York Times. Perhaps this article could be included in the record of this hearing. In the article, Mr. Godsey and I drew attention to the Sinopec Group, a large oil, gas, and chemical conglomerate owned by the Chinese government. The Commission has voiced its concern over this company in the past, both for its failure to disclose its operations in Sudan, and for its oil and natural gas projects in Iran.

Among Sinopec’s many subsidiaries are two that have been sanctioned a total of four times since 1997 for selling chemical weapons equipment and technology to Iran. These companies, Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import/Export Corporation, are fully-owned subsidiaries of the Sinopec Group, which holds decision-making authority over them. However, the Sinopec Group has never been sanctioned or even mentioned in sanctions announcements.

In fact, Sinopec has been doing quite well while its subsidiaries have been under sanctions. Many of its most dramatic successes have been in Iran. In 1997, the same year that Nanjing Chemical and Jiangsu Yongli were first sanctioned, China and Iran signed an agreement whereby Iran promised to increase its oil exports to China by 40% by the year 2000. In October 1998, Sinopec beat out competing bids from a host of European companies for the renovation of oil refineries in Tehran and Tabriz and the construction of an oil terminal port near Neka on the Caspian Sea. In 2001, Jiangsu Yongli was sanctioned again, while Sinopec won the right to explore Iran’s Zavareh-Kashan oilfield. And last year, Sinopec signed a $70 billion natural gas deal with Iran.

I am not aware of any direct evidence connecting Sinopec’s oil deals to the unsavory sales of its subsidiaries. However, it is not hard to imagine that Iran might be grateful for help with its chemical weapon effort-help it would have a hard time getting from Sinopec’s competitors-and that such help could result in a competitive advantage for Sinopec.

Sinopec has also benefited from joint ventures with American companies and access to the U.S. economy and capital markets. In 2000, 15 percent of the company was sold on the New York stock exchange, raising about $3.5 billion. Major U.S. companies such as Exxon Mobil, Dow Chemicals, Conoco-Phillips, Anderson Consulting, Halliburton and others have cooperated with Sinopec on a variety of projects.

Perhaps the most astonishing benefit conferred upon Sinopec has been by the United States government. In 2002, while its subsidiary Jiangsu Yongli was under its third set of sanctions, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency came up with a $429,000 grant to help another Sinopec subsidiary, Sinopec International Corp., establish an “e-procurement system.” This latter subsidiary, which did $10.8 billion in trade that year, is Sinopec’s import-export body. Sinopec itself has been listed as one of the world’s 100 richest companies by Fortune magazine. Even if its subsidiaries had not been involved in nefarious dealings, it is hard to explain why U.S. taxpayer dollars should be used to help this rich company get richer.

The root of this problem lies in the weakness of our sanctions laws. The few laws that include a provision for sanctioning parent companies, like the Arms Export Control Act, stipulate that the parent must have “knowingly assisted in the activities which were the basis” of the sanctions. That burden of proof is simply too high for our intelligence agencies to meet. Other laws, like the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, make no mention of parent companies. And to make matters worse, insufficient information is given when sanctions notices are posted. The notice names the offending company, but does not name its subsidiaries, although the sanctions notice clearly says that the subsidiaries are sanctioned as well. Investors, exporters, and potential partners in joint ventures should be told whom they are dealing with.

Sanctioning parent companies in China is particularly important because of the structure of most large Chinese corporations. These companies are usually composed of an over-arching “group company” which oversees dozens of manufacturing, research, and import-export subsidiaries, one or more of which may be publicly listed on a Chinese or foreign stock exchange. When one of these subsidiaries is sanctioned (usually an import-export firm), the group company and the rest of its offshoots are untouched. Before the sanctions, the management of the group company may or may not have been involved in or aware of what its subsidiary was doing. It is possible, for example, that Sinopec was unaware in 1997 that its subsidiaries were building a factory in Iran for making glass-lined equipment. But after the sanctions were announced, and after Jiangsu Yongli and Nanjing Chemical wrote a letter angrily denying the charges, Sinopec must have known what was going on. Yet, it appears to have done nothing in response.

As subsequent events have shown, Sinopec was correct to conclude that it had no reason to be concerned. It could keep doing business with the United States through its other import/export branches, and keep proliferating through its subsidiaries, without suffering any harm itself. This is the pattern that we see today with many of China’s serial proliferators.

The most notorious of China’s serial proliferators is probably Norinco (China North Industries Corporation), a state-owned company that was sanctioned three times last year alone. Although Norinco may have actually lost some money due to sanctions, Norinco officials must have decided years ago that the profits they would receive from continuing to sell missile and other technology to Iran would more than compensate for any American business they lost due to sanctions. This decision seems to be paying off. In addition to weapons sales, Norinco has just won a recent $836 million deal to expand the Tehran subway.

While the United States has sanctioned Norinco repeatedly, its parent company, China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC) has never been touched. CNGC owns eight other trading companies in addition to Norinco, some of which export to the United States. Sanctioning the parent would reach all of these firms, as well many other research and manufacturing subsidiaries (there are more than 120 of these, according to company literature). If we want to change Norinco’s behavior, we should try reaching its parent.

From what I have said here, it is fairly clear what the answer is to the Commission’s question about China’s ability to police its companies. Sinopec and Norinco are both owned by the Chinese government. The government could police them if it wanted to. The fact that these companies are still proliferating after numerous sanctions citations tells us that the government doesn’t want to.

A second reason why sanctions aren’t working is that the penalties are too weak. The punishment meted out to an offending company is usually limited to barring it from selling goods to the U.S. government, barring it from importing controlled American commodities (munitions and dual-use items), or receiving American foreign aid. This has virtually no effect, because sanctioned Chinese companies (which are always subsidiaries) do little or no business with the United States. Occasionally, the sanctions ban the importation into the United States of goods produced by the company, but this is more the exception than the rule.

We need to ask ourselves a simple question: what do we want sanctions to do? Do we want them to be anything more than symbolic? If so, we have to be prepared to restrict access to our economy in order to increase our security. China itself is good at this. It is deftly offering access to its civilian market as a lever to pry the Europeans loose from the present arms embargo. But we stubbornly refuse to use the American economy in this way, despite the fact that it is the most powerful tool we have to fight proliferation. Our sanctions laws have been written painstakingly to ensure that American companies never lose a dollar because of them. As a result, they are harmless to Chinese companies as well.

This is a great mistake, because the big Chinese conglomerates are rapidly becoming more vulnerable to economic pressure. Due to changes in the Chinese government and the Chinese economy, even state-owned firms in China are now motivated by profit. Like their peers elsewhere, companies that lose money face forcible re-structuring, or are assigned new management. Thus, one can get the attention of these firms by threatening their profitability. Unfortunately, our current sanctions system is incapable of doing that.

We need to amend our sanctions laws so they have some bite. The United States should sanction parent companies along with their subsidiaries, whether or not one can prove they “knowingly assisted” in the proliferation. The parent profits from the sale and is in a position to stop it. That is enough.

The penalties should also be severe. They should include a ban on imports to and exports from the United States, and should prohibit joint ventures or other forms of cooperation with American firms. They should also bar access to American capital markets. Such laws would provide a powerful financial incentive for companies like Sinopec to change their ways.

A Shell Game in the Arms Race

By Matthew Godsey and Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
February 25, 2005

Washington – President Bush has enjoyed a surprisingly jovial reception in Europe this week, but there has been a serious point of contention: the desire of European countries to lift the 15-year ban on arms sales to China. Given concerns that the Chinese are willing to sell military, and perhaps even nuclear, technology to the highest bidder, Mr. Bush’s stance seems admirable. Unfortunately, his reasonable skepticism about China’s intentions hasn’t translated into a solid commitment.

For example, earlier this month Under Secretary of State John Bolton scolded China for allowing its companies to spread weapons technology, saying the embargo was just as important “today as it was in 1989.” Yet such talk is undermined by the State Department’s own failure to check Chinese companies’ reckless sales, and by weaknesses in American trade laws. In the end, China knows it has little to fear from Washington.

Case in point: Sinopec, China’s state-owned oil and gas giant, has subsidiaries that the State Department has hit with sanctions four times since 1997 for selling to Iran materials that could be used to make chemical weapons. However, because these subsidiaries do little or no business with the United States, the punishments – curbs on trade with America – were purely symbolic.

Sinopec itself has extensive ties with American companies, dealings Washington could block. Yet we refuse to punish it for anything its offshoots do. The reason is simple: American sanctions laws were written so that the government can hold a parent company responsible only if it “knowingly” assists a sale by its subsidiary, a burden of proof our intelligence agencies can rarely meet. Why? Because our government is largely unwilling to hurt the financial interests of American firms that do business with companies like Sinopec.

This laxity on our part leaves Sinopec free to sell whatever it likes to Tehran. In 1997, the same year the State Department first cited subsidiaries of Sinopec for “knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s chemical weapon program,” Iran promised to increase oil exports to China by 40 percent. The following year, Iran chose the Chinese company over a host of European rivals to renovate oil refineries in Tehran and Tabriz, and to construct an oil terminal on the Caspian Sea. In 2001, when the State Department again censured a subsidiary for continuing sales to Iran of products useful for poison gas production, Sinopec won the right to explore Iran’s Zavareh-Kashan oilfield.

Then, last October, Sinopec pulled off its biggest coup: a $70 billion deal in which the Chinese company will buy hundreds of millions of tons of liquefied natural gas and will help Iran develop its Yadavaran oil field.

The fact is, the United States could lower the boom on Sinopec by cutting its ties to the American economy. In 2000, Sinopec raised some $3.5 billion by selling shares on the New York Stock Exchange, with Exxon-Mobil buying a large stake. Halliburton has since provided Sinopec a design for a new chemical plant; Bechtel has helped it build a petrochemical complex in China; and ConocoPhillips has aided it in oil and gas exploration.

And, believe it or not, in 2002 Sinopec received a $429,000 grant from the United States Trade and Development Agency. The purpose was to help an import-export subsidiary to develop an electronic procurement system. No matter that another Sinopec subsidiary, the awkwardly named Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import/Export Corporation, was under sanctions for sales to Iran, or that Sinopec ranked among the 100 richest firms in the world according to Fortune magazine. Uncle Sam still wanted to help it market its products.

Sinopec is hardly the only beneficiary of American kindliness. Our weak laws have spared Sinosteel, China Aviation Industry Corporation I and II, and China North Industries Group Corporation, even though subsidiaries of these state-owned conglomerates have been sanctioned for selling missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. In large part, we can lay the blame for this charade on a compliant government and on political pressure from American companies, whose lobbyists work to ensure that federal sanctions laws are written to protect their corporate interests. This is a travesty, because cutting off access to our economy is the most powerful leverage we have, and our failure to use it shows we aren’t serious about punishing rogue states and their corporations.

Our laws need to be rewritten so that Sinopec and other companies that abet the spread of weaponry through their subsidiaries are kicked out of American capital markets, forbidden to deal with our companies and denied access to American goods and technology. Only then will they have an incentive to change their ways, and only then can our government honestly claim that it is trying to shut down the global arms bazaar.

Matthew Godsey and Gary Milhollin are, respectively, a research associate and the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which produces iranwatch.org.

China’s Rockets and Missiles

Chinese Missiles

Dong Feng-3 or -3A (DF-3/3A) (US: CSS-2)

The CSS-2/DF-3 is a single-stage, liquid fueled missile fitted with a thermonuclear warhead. It has a range of 2,800 kilometers and was the first indigenously designed Chinese ballistic missile. Several CSS-2 missiles were exported to Saudi Arabia in 1988.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 2800
Payload (kg): 2150
Diameter (m): 2.25
Weight (tons): 64
Length (m): 24
Stages: 1
Propellant: UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide
Mission: Nuclear-armed; mobile launcher
Status: First flight, December 1966; now deployed.

Dong Feng-4 (DF-4) (US: CSS-3)

The DF-4 is a two-stage, liquid fueled ballistic missile with a range of 4,750 kilometers. It can reach targets throughout European Russia, including Moscow.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 4750
Payload (kg): 2200
Diameter (m): 2.25
Weight (tons): 80
Length (m): 28
Stages: 2
Propellant: UDMH
Mission: Nuclear-armed; ground-based
Status: First flight, September 1971; deployed.

Dong Feng-5 (DF-5, DF-5A) (US: CSS-4)

The DF-5 is China’s only true intercontinental ballistic missile, with a range of over 13,000 kilometers. It is a two-stage, liquid-fueled missile that is virtually identical to the Long March-2 rocket. According to a report by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, China is replacing its approximately twenty DF-5 missiles with the CSS-4 Mod 2, an upgraded version which has greater range.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 13,000
Payload (kg): 3,200
Diameter (m): 3.35
Weight (tons): 183
Length (m): 32.6
Stages: 2
Propellant: UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide
Mission: Nuclear-armed; silo-based
Status: First flight September 1971; approximately 20 deployed.

Dong Feng-21 (DF-21) (US: CSS-5)

The DF-21 is the land-based version of the Julang-1 (JL-1) submarine launched missile (SLBM), with the same technical characteristics but deployed on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle. It can carry a 600 kilogram payload about 1800 kilometers.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 1800 km
Payload (kg): 600 kg
Diameter (m): 1.4
Weight (tons): 14.7
Length (m): 10.7 m
Stages: 2
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Nuclear-capable; mobile launcher
Status: First flight, May 1985; deployed.

Dong Feng-15 (DF-15) (US: CSS-6 or M-9)

The DF-15 (M-9) is a short-range, mobile, solid-fueled missile, that can carry a 950 kilogram payload 600 kilometers. It is marketed abroad by the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC).

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 600
Payload (kg): 950
Diameter (m): 1
Weight (tons): 6.2
Length (m): 9.1
Stages: 1
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Short-range; mobile; nuclear-capable
Status: First flight, June 1989; widely deployed.

Dong Feng-11 (DF-11) (US: CSS-7 or M-11)

The DF-11 is a short-range ballistic missile that can carry a 800 kilogram payload 300 kilometers. The DF-11 is believed to be deployed largely in the Nanjing Military Region, opposite Taiwan. The M-11, an export version of the DF-11, has been exported to Pakistan. The DF-11A (DF-11 Mod 2), an improved version of the DF-11, reportedly was displayed at a military parade in 1999, and may now be in service.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 300
Payload (kg): 800
Diameter (m):
Weight (tons):
Length (m):
Stages: 2
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Short-range; mobile; conventionally-armed; nuclear-capable
Status: First flight, mid-1990; widely deployed.

Dong Feng-31 (DF-31)

The DF-31 is a long-range, mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missile estimated to have a range of 8,000 kilometers. Deployment of the DF-31 is expected by the end of the decade. The DF-31A, a longer-range follow-on version of the DF-31, reportedly is also under development. The DF-31A is expected to have a range of approximately 12,000 kilometers.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 8000
Payload (kg): 700
Diameter (m):
Weight (tons):
Length (m):
Stages: 3
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Nuclear-capable; mobile
Status: Under development

Submarine Launched Missiles (SLBMs)

Julang-1 (JL-1) (US: CSS-N-3)

The JL-1 is a single-warhead, two-stage submarine launched ballistic missile. It is the first Chinese missile to use only solid fuel and China’s only deployed SLBM.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 1700
Payload (kg): 600
Diameter (m): 1.4
Weight (tons): 14.7
Length (m): 10.7
Stages: 2
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Submarine-launched; nuclear-capable
Status: First flight, October 1982; 12 deployed on Xia-class submarines.

Julang-2 (JL-2) (US: CSS-N-4)

The JL-2 is a three-stage, submarine-launched ballistic missile currently under development. It is based upon the DF-31, a land-based long-range ballistic missile also still being developed. The JL-2 is expected to have a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers, far greater than the 1,700 km range of the JL-1. The JL-2 would be deployed on the Project 094 SSBN, currently under construction.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 8000
Payload (kg): 700
Diameter (m):
Weight (tons):
Length (m):
Stages: 3
Propellant: Solid
Mission: Submarine-launched; nuclear-capable
Status: Under development

Note: According to a report in July 2003 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, China has approximately twenty ICBMs capable of targeting the United States. The report says that this number could increase to about 30 by 2005 and could reach 60 by 2010.

Chinese Launch Vehicles

Long March 2C/SD Launch Vehicle (LM-2C/SD or CZ-2C/SD)

The LM-2C/SD is a two-stage launch vehicle with a smart dispenser and a payload capacity of 2,500-2,800 kilograms. It is used to deploy recoverable satellites in low earth orbit (LEO). The original model, the LM-2, was renamed the LM-2C after a successful test flight in 1975. The LM-2C’s design was derived directly from China’s DF-5 (CSS-4) ballistic missile. It was renamed the LM-2C/SD in 1999, after being modified in preparation to launch Motorola’s Iridium communications satellites. The modifications included upgrades to the first two stages and the addition of a smart dispenser (SD) as a third stage. The LM-2C/SD is capable of placing multiple satellites into different Low Earth Orbits (LEO).

Technical Specifications
1st Stage 2nd Stage Smart Dispenser
Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.7
Mass of Propellant (t): 162.7 54.7 12.5/50
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH HTPB
Engine Type: DaYF6-2 DaYF20-1 (Main) Solid motor
YF21-1 (Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 157
11.8×4 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 213
Overall Length (m): 40.4
Fairing Diameter (m): 3.35

Long March 2D Launch Vehicle (LM-2D or CZ-2D)

The LM-2D is a two-stage launch vehicle adapted from the first and second stages of the Long March 4. The LM-2D can deploy a payload of 3700 kilograms into low earth orbit (LEO). The LM-2D is launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.

Technical Specifications
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35
Mass of Propellant (t): 182.07 35.408
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH
Engine Type: DaYF-21B YF-22B (Main)
Engine Thrust (kN): 2250 742 (Main) 46.1 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 232.7
Overall Length (m): 37.73
Fairing Diameter (m): 2.90/3.35

Long March 2E Launch Vehicle (LM-2E or CZ-2E)

The LM-2E is a two-stage launch vehicle using stages similar to those of the LM-2C. The LM-2E has four 15 meter strap-on boosters. It is used to deploy payloads up to 9,500 kilograms in low earth orbit (LEO). When equipped with a perigee kick motor (EPKM) as a third stage, the LM-2E can deploy a payload of 3,500 kilograms in geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). Kick motors for the LM-2E were originally supplied by foreign companies; however, China now has the ability to produce its own kick motors.

Technical Specifications
Boosters 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35
Mass of Propellant (t): 148 (4 x 37) 181 37
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH
Engine Type: 4 x YF-20 YF-21 YF-22 (Main)
YF-23 (Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 4 x 740 2961 742 (Main)
47 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 460
Overall Length (m): 49.7
Fairing Diameter (m): 4.20

Long March 2F Launch Vehicle (LM-2F or CZ-2F)

The LM-2F, China’s largest launch vehicle, was developed on the basis of the LM-2E. The LM-2F has four boosters, two stages, and an escape tower. On October 15, 2003, an LM-2F launch vehicle carrying a Shenzhou V spacecraft launched China’s first astronaut into space.

Long March 3 Launch Vehicle (LM-3 or CZ-3)

The LM-3 is a three-stage launch vehicle with a cryogenic third stage. The liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen third-stage engines were developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). The LM-3 can deploy satellites up to 1,500 kilograms into a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). It was first launched in January 1984.

Technical Specifications
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.25
Mass of Propellant (t): 144 36 8.7
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LH
Engine Type: 4 x YF-20 YF-22 (Main) YF-73
(YF-21) YF-23 (Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 2911 (Main) 44.4
2834 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 204
Overall Length (m): 44.56

Long March 3A Launch Vehicle (LM-3A CZ-3A)

Designed and developed using LM-3 technology, the LM-3A uses a more powerful cryogenic third stage engine, a more capable control system, and greater flexibility in the attitude control system. It can deploy a 2,600 kilogram payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit and can be used for low earth orbit and polar orbit missions as well. It was first launched in February 1994.

Technical Specifications
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 3.0
Mass of Propellant (t): 171.8 30.8 18.2
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LH2
Engine Type: DaYF6-2 DaYF20-1 (Main) YF-75
(4 x YF-20) DaYF21-1 (Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 157
11.8×4 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 241
Overall Length (m): 52.52
Fairing Diameter (m): 3.35

Long March 3B Launch Vehicle (LM-3B or CZ-3B)

The LM-3B launch vehicle was designed with a LM-3A vehicle as its core with four strap-on liquid propellent boosters. The core stage of the LM-3B is identical to the -3A except that the stage tanks have been extended and reinforced, the fairing has been enlarged, and the control and telemetry systems have been modified to accommodate the strap-on boosters. The LM-3B can deploy a payload of 5,200 kilograms into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). The LM-3B can also perform payload attitude adjustments and dual or multiple launch requirements. The LM-3B is launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC) in Sichuan Province.

Technical Specifications

Boosters 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00
Mass of Propellant (t): 171.8 49.6 18.2
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LH2
Engine Type: DaFY5-1 DaFY6-2 DaFY20-1 (Main) YF-75
DaFY21-1 (Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 740.4×4 2961.6 742 (Main) 78.5×2
11.8×4 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 426
Overall Length (m): 54.838
Fairing Diameter (m): 4.00

Long March 3C Launch Vehicle (LM-3C or CZ-3C)

The LM-3C is a three-stage launch vehicle. It differs from the LM-3B in its use of two strap-on boosters in its first stage rather than four. The LM-3C is launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC). The LM-3C can be used to deploy payloads into GTO.

Technical Specifications

Boosters 1st Stage 2st Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00
Mass of Propellant (t):
Propellant: N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH LOX/LH2
Engine Type: DaFY5-1 DaFY6-2 DaFY20-1(main) YF-75
DaFY-21-1(Vernier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 740.4×2 2961.6 742 (Main) 78.5×2
11.8×4 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 345
Overall Length (m): 54.838
Fairing Diameter (m) 4.00

Long March 4 Launch Vehicle (LM-4 or CZ-4)

The LM-4 is a three-stage launch vehicle. The first and second stages are adapted from the LM-3, with a liquid propellant third stage. The LM-4 can deploy a 2,790 kilogram payload into sun synchronous orbit (SSO), a 1,419 kilogram payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), or a 4,595 kilogram payload into low earth orbit (LEO). The LM-4 is launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. It was first launched in September 1988.

Technical Specifications

1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.90
Mass of Propellant (t): 182.07 35.408 14.3
Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH
Engine Type: DaYF-21B YF-22B (Main) YF-40A
YF-23 (Vermier)
Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 100.8
46.1 (Vernier)
Lift-off Mass (t): 249.2
Overall Length (m): 45.8
Fairing Diameter (m): 2.90/3.35

Small Launch Vehicle J-1

Small Launch Vehicle J-1 is a small three-stage launch vehicle with an orbit-maneuver motor. It is used to launch small satellites into LEO or SSO. The Small Launch Vehicle conducted its first test flight in 1997.

Technical Specifications

1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage OM Motor
Diameter (m) 2.25 2.25 2.05
Mass of Propellant (t):
Propellant: N2O4/HNO3 N2O4/HNO3 HTPB HTPB
Engine Type: YF-2A YF-3 SPAB-14B OM-1
Engine Thrust (kN): 1101.29 320.19 161.5 7.93
Lift-off Mass (t): 85.42
Overall Length (m): 31.28

Brazil’s Nuclear Milestones – 1955-2004

1955: The U.S. and Brazil sign an Atoms for Peace agreement for nuclear cooperation.

1956: The National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEN) is created.

1957: Brazil’s first research reactor, the IEA-R1, a pool light water reactor, goes critical.

1960: A second research reactor, the IPR-RI, a Triga Mark I light water reactor, goes critical.

1965: A third research reactor, the Argonauta, an Argonaut light water reactor, goes critical.

1971: Brazil orders a light-water power reactor from Westinghouse.

1975: West Germany agrees to provide Brazil with 8 nuclear power plants and facilities for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. In fact, only one reactor is supplied under the agreement.

Late 1970s: A secret “parallel” program intended to develop an atomic bomb begins. The program seeks to develop a graphite reactor to produce plutonium, and both laser and gas centrifuge technology to enrich uranium.

1980: Brazil and Argentina agree to cooperate in developing the nuclear fuel cycle.

1984: Angra I, the Westinghouse reactor, begins commercial operations.

1985: Joint Declaration of Nuclear Policy with Argentina.

1987: Brazil announces that researchers have succeeded in enriching uranium.

1987: A West German intelligence report says equipment from Brazil’s safeguarded nuclear program is leaking into the secret parallel program.

1988: Brazil adopts a new constitution restricting nuclear activities to peaceful uses and giving congress authority over nuclear affairs.

1988: A fourth research reactor, the IPEN / MB-01, a light water critical assembly, goes critical.

1990: Secret parallel nuclear bomb program is formally exposed.

1990: Secret shaft apparently intended for testing nuclear weapons in the Cachimbo mountains is symbolically closed.

1990: Argentina and Brazil sign the Foz de Iguacu Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy renouncing nuclear weapons and pledging to develop a system of safeguards.

1991: Argentina and Brazil sign a bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, creating the Argentine-Brazilian Accounting and Control Commission (ABACC) to verify implementation of the agreed-upon safeguards.

1994: A Quadrapartite Agreement for nuclear inspections enters into effect between Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and the ABACC.

1994: Brazil enters into the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

1996: Brazil joins the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

1996: The Brazilian Navy announces that it has suspended plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine due to a shortage of funds.

1997: An agreement with the United States for peaceful nuclear cooperation is submitted to the U.S. Congress.

1998: Brazil ratifies both the NPT and the CTBT.

2001: The Angra II light water power reactor begins commercial operation.

2003: Brazil announces it still plans to build a nuclear submarine.

2003: Brazil announces that it will enrich uranium at a commercial-scale facility in Resende.

2004: Brazil prevents IAEA inspection of equipment at the facility in Resende, claiming it needs to protect its superior technology.

China’s Ballistic Missile Update – 2004

Introduction

China continues to modernize its ballistic missile arsenal. Although limited in number and capability when compared to their American counterparts, China’s ballistic missiles are being improved in a number of key ways, making them a growing threat to the United States. The newly-developed DF-31 is capable of targeting the west coast of the United States, while its longer-range follow-on, the DF-31A, once deployed, may be able to reach much of the continental United States. These missiles will be mobile and require far less launch-preparation time than China’s older missiles, making these new weapons more likely to survive a preemptive strike. Furthermore, advances in warhead design and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology (including a successful test of a MIRVed DF-21) appear intended to enable China to overcome U.S. missile defenses, allowing it to maintain a credible deterrent. Information and technology purchased from foreign companies and stolen from U.S. weapons labs has contributed greatly to the success of China’s modernization program.

Modernization efforts

DF-21:

The DF-21 is a two-stage, solid-fuel, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile carried in a canister on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It can be armed with a single 200-300 kiloton-yield nuclear warhead, is reported to be 10.7m long and 1.4m in diameter, to weigh 14.7 tons, and to have a range of 1800 km with a payload of 600 kg. It is estimated that 48 DF-21s have been deployed. In 2002, according to a report in Japan’s Daily Yomiuri newspaper, a DF-21 equipped with several MIRV-ed warheads was successfully test-launched, making it the first Chinese missile to be successfully armed with multiple warheads. The DF-21 is capable of reaching U.S. military bases in Asia, as well as targets in Russia, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.

DF-31:

The DF-31 is a three-stage, solid-fuel, mobile missile that forms an essential part of China’s modernization effort. It has an estimated range of 8,000 km with a 700 kg payload, and is designed to carry a single 200-300 Kt nuclear warhead. The DF-31 was successfully flight-tested in August 1999, reportedly using a dummy warhead and several decoys. China conducted two more successful flight tests of the DF-31 during 2000. According to a report in the Washington Times, a 2002 test of the DF-31 re-entry vehicle was unsuccessful, ending in a mid-flight explosion. The DF-31 offers a number of operational advantages over older Chinese missiles such as the DF-4. Instead of being launched from a single location, the DF-31 can be transported on its TEL to one of many predetermined launch sites, providing greater survivability in the event of a first strike. Furthermore, liquid-fueled missiles such as the DF-4 require greater launch preparation time. The DF-31 may also be the first Chinese missile to be armed with a warhead based on the W-88 or W-70, U.S. warheads the designs for which were stolen from American weapons labs. Despite a number of successful flight tests, deployment of the DF-31 has not come as quickly as previously predicted. Currently, the system is expected to be deployed before the end of the decade. The JL-2 is the submarine-launched version of the DF-31.

DF-31A:

The DF-31A is an extended-range version of the DF-31. It is estimated to have a range of around 12,000 kilometers; however, few details are known about the new system. It will likely replace the now-canceled DF-41 as the future mainstay of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal. The DF-31A is likely to supplement, rather than replace, the DF-5/DF-5A, China’s existing ICBM. Like the DF-31, the DF-31A would provide mobility and a shorter launch preparation time. The DF-5 is stored in silos and elevated prior to launch, making it vulnerable to a preemptive strike.

DF-5:

China currently has approximately 20 DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1) ICBMs in service, most of which are believed to be targeted at U.S. cities. This two-stage, liquid-fueled missile has a range of over 13,000 kilometers, highest among China’s missiles. The DF-5 Mod 1 will reportedly be replaced by a longer range version, the DF-5 Mod 2 (CSS-4 Mod 2), possibly by mid-decade.

Outside assistance

China’s ballistic missile program has received outside assistance from a variety of sources. A 1999 report by the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China found that information supplied by several U.S. firms to China intended to improve the reliability of its space launch vehicles could also be used to improve China’s ballistic missiles. A number of well-known U.S. defense and aerospace firms were convicted of transferring data and technology to China in violation of U.S. export control laws. In 2003, Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Systems, for example, were forced to pay $32 million in penalties for 123 such violations during the 1990s, while Loral Space and Communications Corporation and Lockheed Martin Corporation received fines of $20 million and $13 million, respectively. In June 2000, Lockheed Martin was also fined for supplying China kick motor technology in 1994 that could help position satellites in orbit.

China’s efforts to deploy MIRVed warheads on several of its missile systems may also have been assisted by information received from U.S. firms in the 1990s. Hughes, for example, helped China improve the fairing of its Long March 2E rocket. This technology could potentially be used with MIRVed warheads, as well as with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Hughes also provided China with diagnostic and failure analysis techniques that could help it solve other problems in its missile programs. Such transfers have become all the more troubling since the revelation that China may have developed miniaturized warheads based on designs stolen from U.S. weapons labs, making the MIRV-ing of even mobile missiles– such as the DF-31– a distinct possibility.

The transfer of sensitive technology to China is also conducted by individuals– often Chinese nationals– living and working in the United States, as well as US-based companies with ties to the Chinese military. In 1998, Means Come Enterprises, a Florida company run by two Chinese nationals, was investigated for exporting to China several thousand radiation-protected computer chips, devices that can be used in ballistic missiles and other weapon systems. In 2004, three Chinese citizens– John Chu, Sunny Bai, and Zhu Zhaoxin– were indicted for attempting to export to China GyroChips (angular rate sensors) and military-grade power converters, both items with applications in missile systems. While it is difficult to gauge the impact that these comparatively minor transfers might have on China’s overall missile program, it is reasonable to assume that they, like the larger transfers, have the effect of reducing the amount of time and resources China is required to devote to research and development of its own.

Threat outlook

China’s ballistic missile arsenal presents a limited, but increasing, threat to the United States. China’s missiles can target both cities on the American mainland and U.S. military bases in Asia. China’s ICBM arsenal has always been small when compared to those of the United States and Russia, a reflection of China’s belief that a minimal nuclear deterrent is sufficient. China’s ongoing modernization of its missiles will result in both qualitative and quantitative improvements. The increased mobility and brief launch preparation times of the DF-31 and DF-31A will boost the PLA’s confidence in its ability to survive and respond to a first strike.

Whether China’s long-range missiles increase in number will depend on whether China chooses to continue to deploy its more outdated systems alongside its modern missiles. This decision will likely be influenced by the United States’ development and deployment of a national missile defense system, which, if effective, could put the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent into question. Concerns over missile defenses were probably also a motivating factor behind China’s efforts to develop multiple warheads for some of its missiles and to test decoys and other penetration aids on other missile systems. These efforts have been spurred by China’s recent advances in nuclear warhead design, which may have benefitted greatly from leaked information on U.S. warheads. A series of nuclear tests conducted from 1992 to 1996 showed that China was capable of building small, light warheads that could be MIRVed or deployed on mobile missiles. As a result, the number of warheads capable of hitting the United States may be increasing more rapidly than the rate at which new missiles are being deployed.

China’s ballistic missile modernization must also be viewed within the context of Beijing’s long-term objective of taking possession of Taiwan, through force if necessary. While China’s nuclear force has historically been intended to deter an attack on or invasion of the mainland, recently deployed missile systems and others still under development appear designed to both intimidate Taiwan and deter the United States from taking military action if a conflict arises across the Strait. China has devoted extensive resources towards producing short-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9). China currently has approximately 450 of these short-range missiles, most– if not all– of which are based in the Nanjing Military Region facing Taiwan. China has used test-firings of these missiles to try to intimidate Taiwan and influence the island’s politics, most notably during the run-up to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election. China’s newer missiles are also intended to pose a threat to U.S. military forces stationed in the region, in order to convince Washington that any U.S. intervention over Taiwan would be costly.

Brazil’s Nuclear Sites

Uranium Reserves (world’s sixth largest)

Deposit Status Estimated Reserves (tons U3O8)

Pocos de Caldas Shutdown 4,500
Lago Real Operating 100,770
Itataia Deferred 142,500
Others 61,600

TOTAL 309,370

Uranium Enrichment

Facility Year Annual Capacity (SWU) Process

Resende 2004* 20,000 gas centrifuge
2010* 100,000
2014* 200,000
Aramar Current 9,000 gas centrifuge

* Estimated

Other Uranium Processing

Facility Status Scale Capacity

Conversion to UF6 Under Construction Pilot Plant 40 t HM/a
Conversion to UO2 Operating Commercial 120 t HM/a
Conversion to U metal Operating Pilot Plant 30 t HM/a
Fuel Fabrication (Pellets) Operating Laboratory 2,550 Kg/a
Fuel Fabrication (Pellets) Operating Laboratory 21 elements/a
Fuel Fabrication (LWR) Operating Commercial 240 t HM/a

Power Reactors

Facility Type Supplier Net Capacity Commercial Date

Angra 1 Light-water power Westinghouse 626 MW(e) Dec. 1, 1984
Angra 2 Light-water power Siemens/KWU 1270 MW(e) Feb. 1, 2001
Angra 3 Light-water power Siemens/KWU 1224 MW(e) Suspended

Other Reactors and Assemblies

Facility Type MW Days Thermal Power, Criticality Date per Year Steady (kw)

IEA – R1 Pool Research 250 5,000 Sept. 16, 1957
Argonauta Argonaut Research 1 0.2 Feb. 20, 1965
IPR – RI Triga Mark I Research 2 100 Nov. 6, 1960
IPEN / MB – 01 Crit Assembly Research 0 0.1 Nov. 9, 1988

Other Facilities

Facility Status Scale

Subcritical Graphite Reactor Completed Pilot Plant
Experimental Irradiation Reactor Deferred Large-Scale
Heavy Water Production Plant Reported Pilot Plant
Plutonium extraction plant Completed Laboratory
Plutonium extraction plant Deferred Large-Scale

Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle

By Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin

Science
October 22, 2004, p. 617

Brazil is planning to commission later this year a uranium enrichment plant that, if configured to do so, could fuel several nuclear weapons annually. As a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil has promised not to make such weapons and is obliged to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure this is the case. But this spring Brazil took the extraordinary step of barring the plant’s doors to the IAEA’s inspectors.

Brazil and the IAEA are now negotiating over how much access the IAEA will have. The outcome will set a precedent for Iran and for any other country that decides to build an enrichment plant while a member of the treaty.

At its announced capacity, Brazil’s new facility located at Resende will have the potential to produce enough U-235 to make five to six implosion-type warheads per year.[1][2] By 2010, as capacity rises, it could make enough every year for 26 to 31[3] and by 2014 enough for 53 to 63.[4]

Brazil has pledged to enrich uranium to only 3.5% U-235, the concentration required by its two power reactors. This would be too weak to fuel a bomb, which typically requires a concentration of 90% or above. If Brazil should change its mind, its stockpile of uranium already enriched to 3.5 or 5% will have received more than half the work needed to bring it to weapon grade.[5][6] This confers what is known as “breakout capability”—the power to make nuclear weapons before the world can react. Such a power is what the United States and some European countries fear Iran is aiming at.

Iran, too, plans to field thousands of centrifuges at a new enrichment facility at Natanz and claims that its sole purpose is to produce low-enriched reactor fuel. If Brazil succeeds in denying the IAEA access to its centrifuges, Iran can demand the same treatment. Under the NPT, there is no legal ground for treating the two countries differently.

There is little evidence that Brazil actually intends to become a nuclear weapon power. Brazil’s science and technology minister Eduardo Campos declared earlier this year that “the Brazilian nuclear project is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.”[7] He pointed out that Brazil has joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the NPT, both of which forbid Brazil to make nuclear weapons. Brazil has also adopted a new constitution that does the same.

These statements, however, must be seen in light of Brazil’s nuclear history. During the 1980s, Brazil ran a secret effort to build an atomic bomb that ran in parallel with the public program to make electricity. It was administered by the military, and hidden from the IAEA. In 1990, the program was openly repudiated by Brazil’s newly elected President, Fernando Collor de Mello.[8] Brazil then joined the NPT and accepted international inspection.

But now, Brazil has built a physical screen around its centrifuges at Resende for the express purpose of preventing inspectors from seeing them. Brazil says it has done this to protect its advanced technology from leaking out to competitors. The IAEA, however, has a long history of protecting commercial secrets. Brazil is thus a serious challenge to the IAEA’s authority.

The real effect of the screen will be to make it harder—if not impossible—for the IAEA to do its job. The IAEA must account for all the enriched uranium the plant makes and must ensure that it is used only to fuel peaceful power reactors. Brazil contends that the inspectors will be allowed to see everything going into Resende and everything coming out and that that should be sufficient. But with a screen in place, it will be difficult to be sure the centrifuges are not hooked up to a hidden supply of uranium. Such a hookup would allow Brazil to stockpile enriched material while inspectors believe that the facility is less efficient than it really is. And since there is no requirement that Brazil enrich a certain amount of uranium, no one would be the wiser. Unfortunately, the IAEA has already allowed the Brazilian Navy to shield a group of centrifuges for several years at a pilot plant, where uranium was enriched. Thus, Brazil can argue that if the IAEA could certify for years that the pilot-scale plant was not siphoning off any uranium, and could do so without seeing the centrifuges, the same should be possible at Resende.

One response to this argument is that the throughput of the plants is different. Resende will have the capacity to enrich enough uranium for dozens of bombs per year. If the machines are shielded, the inspectors can only measure input and output and then calculate the “material unaccounted for.” This is the amount of uranium assumed to be hung up somewhere in the system. Every plant has some. The question is whether the amount makes sense. At Resende, the amount could be considerable, whereas the amount at the pilot plant, given the limited number of centrifuges there, was fairly small.

It seems unlikely that Brazil is really concerned that the IAEA will illegally reveal industrial secrets. More likely, Brazil is trying to hide the origin of the centrifuges. In December 1996, Brazil arrested Karl-Heinz Schaab, a former employee of Germany’s MAN Technologie AG, a firm that developed centrifuges for the European enrichment consortium called Urenco.[9][10] German authorities wanted Schaab extradited to prosecute him for selling centrifuge blueprints to Iraq. There is evidence that Schaab and other experts were helping Brazil as well.[11] It follows that, if the IAEA inspectors were to see the Brazilian centrifuges, they might discover that Urenco’s design data had been transferred.

The United States has decided not to challenge Brazil’s new status and instead has tried to persuade Brazil to cooperate with the IAEA. Its inspectors were to arrive in Brazil 15 October to pursue a solution to the inspection dispute. The rest of the world should help the United States convince Brazil to put these concerns to rest and to be a good nuclear citizen.

Footnotes:

[1] If one assumes that the plant’s first cascade will produce 20,000 SWU/year and that 16 kg of uranium enriched to 93.5% U-235 are needed for an implosion device. For SWU capacity, see [2].

[2] M. Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 7 July 2000.

[3] If one assumes 100,000 SWU/year.

[4] If one assumes 200,000 SWU/year.

[5] About 3000 kg of uranium feed requires ~3500 SWU to make one implosion bomb. The same feed needs more than 2000 SWU to enrich to 3.5%. See (6).

[6] T. B. Cochran et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 2, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production, (National Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 1987), Table 5.1, p. 127.

[7] “Brazil refuses to let UN inspectors into nuclear facility,” AFX.com, 5 April 2004.

[8] J. Brooke, New York Times, 9 October 1990, p. A1.

[9] M. Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 19 December 1996, p. 1.

[10] M. Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 20 March 1997, p. 17.

[11] M. Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 23 March 1998, p. 5.