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Pyongyang’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal

Introduction

North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear weapons test in September 2016, which was its strongest to date.
At the same time, operations continue at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, North Korea’s primary fissile material production facility. Pyongyang is producing both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) at Yongbyon, and is expanding operations there. Pyongyang is also enhancing its ballistic missile capability, and is in the final stages of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that may be capable of reaching the United States mainland. These developments underscore North Korea’s determination to deploy a robust nuclear arsenal, with the capability of striking both regional and global targets. They also reflect the ineffectiveness of international sanctions to date in halting these efforts.

Nuclear Tests

North Korea conducted two nuclear tests in 2016. These were its fourth and fifth tests overall. Pyongyang claimed that the first test of 2016, conducted in January in Punggye-ri, was of a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported to Congress shortly after that test that the low-yield (6-10 kilotons) “is not consistent with a successful test” of a hydrogen bomb. However, another U.S. official familiar with the evidence told CNN that the device likely contained components associated with a hydrogen bomb. North Korea is also believed to have access to lithium-6 (Li-6), which is used to produce tritium in boosted and single-stage thermonuclear weapons.

The second 2016 test was conducted in September, again at the Punggye-ri site. The yield was Pyongyang’s most powerful to date, with estimates ranging from 10-20 kilotons. Following the test, North Korea claimed that it had “standardized” its nuclear warheads, and is able to mount them onto ballistic missiles. Earlier nuclear tests were conducted in February 2013, May 2009, and October 2006. North Korea’s first two tests are believed to have been of plutonium-based devices. It is not known whether the later tests were of devices fueled with HEU or plutonium.

Stockpile and Capabilities

Assessments of the current size of Pyongyang’s arsenal of nuclear warheads vary, due in large part to differences regarding the assumed amount of fissile material used per weapon. In any case, North Korea likely has had a stockpile of nuclear warheads for some time. In 2004, U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly assessed that it had anywhere from “possibly two to at least eight” nuclear warheads.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that North Korea has approximately ten nuclear warheads. SIPRI further estimates that North Korea uses five kilograms (kg) of plutonium per warhead. These estimates were published in June 2016. Also in June 2016, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimated that Pyongyang had 12-20 warheads, assuming two to four kg of plutonium per warhead and 15-25 kg of weapons grade HEU per warhead. The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) assessed in early 2016 that the warheads could number anywhere from four to over 20, assuming eight kg of plutonium per warhead and 25 kg of HEU per warhead. A Chinese nuclear expert associated with the China Institute of International Studies reportedly indicated in 2015 that North Korea may have as many as 20 warheads, and that it could double its arsenal within a year’s time.

Estimates of North Korea’s stockpile of fissile material vary as well. The most recent estimate comes from the South Korean Ministry of Defense, which assesses that North Korea had 50 kg of plutonium as of the end of 2016, enough for 10 nuclear weapons. In two reports published in 2016, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, estimated North Korea to have 32 to 54 kg of plutonium and 300-400 kg of HEU. He also suggested that North Korea could be producing up to 150 kg of HEU annually if it is operating covert enrichment facilities covertly. In 2015, ISIS estimated North Korea’s separated plutonium stockpile at 30-34 kg and its HEU stockpile at between 100-240 kg. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) estimated that Pyongyang has produced approximately 30 kg of separated plutonium by the end of 2014, and assesses that the enrichment facility at Yongbyon is capable of producing HEU.

North Korean leader King Jong Un announced in March 2016 that his country successfully developed a miniaturized nuclear warhead capable of being mounted on a ballistic missile. That month, North Korean state media also released images of Kim inspecting what is believed to be a mock-up of a miniaturized warhead. Washington is skeptical of Pyongyang’s miniaturization claims. Still, the head of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) informed Congress in March 2016 that “it’s the prudent decision on my part to assume that [North Korea] has the capability to…miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM.” South Korea reportedly assesses that it will take several years before Pyongyang masters miniaturization technology.

Currently, North Korea’s longest-range deployed ballistic missile is the Nodong. With a maximum range of 1,250-1,300 km (approximately 775-800 miles), the Nodong is capable of reaching all of South Korea and parts of Japan.

Fissile Material Production Facilities

Yongbyon

The Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, located approximately 90 km (54 miles) north of Pyongyang, is North Korea’s main nuclear complex. It houses all of its key (known) facilities, including its plutonium production reactor, reprocessing center, and enrichment plant. Yongbyon will remain a reliable source of both the plutonium and HEU North Korea needs to expand its nuclear arsenal. The 5 MW(e) reactor is producing recoverable plutonium, the reprocessing facility is functioning, and the enrichment facility is online.

Below is a list of the major facilities located at Yongbyon:

5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant: a graphite-moderated reactor. This reactor has been in operation since 1986 and provides North Korea with a source of plutonium. It was shut down between 2007 and 2013. In April 2013, North Korea announced that it would restart the reactor, which appears to have operated intermittently since then. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the reactor appeared to be shut down from October to December of 2015, likely to remove spent fuel for reprocessing.

Radiochemical Laboratory: a reprocessing facility, where plutonium and uranium are extracted from irradiated (spent) nuclear fuel. It has a production capacity of 100-150 tons of heavy metal per year. North Korea reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods here after expelling international inspectors in 2009. According to the IAEA, the facility appeared to be operating from early 2016 to July 2016. ISIS estimates that North Korea separated approximately 5.5 – 8 kg of plutonium during this time, enough for approximately 1 – 4 additional nuclear weapons. In August 2016, an official from North Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute claimed that Pyongyang had resumed spent fuel reprocessing.

Uranium Enrichment Plant: reportedly contains 2,000 centrifuges in six cascades with an enrichment capacity of 8,000 kg seperative work units (SWU) per year. The DNI assessed in 2014 that North Korea was expanding this facility, an assessment confirmed by satellite imagery. According to a 2014 report, North Korea may be adding as many as 2,000 centrifuges, thus doubling its enrichment capacity. In August 2016, an official from North Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute claimed that Pyongyang was producing HEU. The IAEA has stated that the enrichment facility appears to be in operation.

Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant: used to convert uranium oxide (U3O8 or “yellowcake”) into uranium metal, and has housed uranium dioxide (UO2) powder, fuel rods, and fuel rod cores.

Light-water reactor (under construction): reportedly has a capacity of 100 MW(th) (25 to 30 MW(e)). In its August 2012 safeguards report, the IAEA indicated that North Korea had made “significant progress” in the construction of the light water reactor at Yongbyon. The facility was reportedly still under construction as of August 2016.

Nuclear fuel rod storage facility.

Mines and Mills

North Korea has two known uranium mines: Wolbisan and Pyongsan. In addition, it has two known uranium mills: Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Plant and Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant. The IAEA has not visited these sites since 1992, relying on satellite imagery to monitor activity there. Satellite imagery analysis by private experts has concluded that the Pyongsan mill is undergoing “significant refurbishment,” suggesting that North Korea plans to mine and mill a “significant amount” of uranium from the Pyongsan mine and possibly other locations.

Sanctions

North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, and expelled international inspectors from the country in 2009, after the collapse of the six party talks. In response to Pyongyang’s refusal to cease its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the international community has imposed sanctions. After the first nuclear test in 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1718. Among other measures, the resolution prohibits the import to or export from North Korea of battle tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft systems, warships, items applicable to its nuclear or ballistic missile programs, and luxury goods. After each subsequent test, the Security Council adopted additional sanctions, further restricting North Korea’s access to sensitive or restricted materials and technology, and to the global economy.

The Security Council enacted additional sanctions against North Korea in response to each of the two tests conducted in 2016, further restricting access to the international banking system, the shipping sector, and to dual-use and luxury items. Resolution 2270 (March 2016) requires the inspection of all cargo going to or coming from North Korea or being shipped by a North Korean national, and imposes other prohibitions on North Korean vessels and aircraft. Resolution 2321 (November 2016) places a cap on North Korea’s annual coal exports, in addition to other measures. Pyongyang reportedly collects over $1 billion annually from its exports of coal—its largest source of revenue. Much of this money is funneled into its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The Security Council resolutions also impose restrictive measures, including an asset freeze, transaction prohibition, and travel ban, against designated organizations and individuals connected to North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and military programs. To date, 39 individuals and 42 organizations have been designated by the Security Council.

These measures have targeted some of the main entities in charge of North Korea’s nuclear program. For example, the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (aka General Bureau of Atomic Energy*), which was designated in 2009, oversees North Korea’s nuclear program, including activities at Yongbyon. In 2013, it was put in charge of modernizing the country’s atomic energy industry. It is currently in charge of the day-to-day operations of the nuclear weapons program and oversees a number of nuclear-related organizations and research centers. Another entity, the Munitions Industry Department (MID), which was designated in 2016, oversees North Korea’s weapons production and R&D programs. MID planned and prepared the January 2016 nuclear warhead test. According to a 2010 UN Panel of Experts on North Korea report, it has also been involved in overseeing operations at Yongbyon.

The Security Council has also designated producers of machinery and components for the nuclear program. One such entity is Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, which was targeted in 2013. Ryonha is North Korea’s primary producer of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines, including multi-axis CNC machines, which are important for the production of nuclear weapons. Another production entity designated by the Security Council is Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation. Hyoksin, which was targeted in 2009, is involved in the development of unconventional weapons. It produces electronics and instruments for measuring and testing.

Other entities supporting North Korea’s nuclear program have not been designated. One example is Kim Chaek University of Technology. This institute produces concentrated nitric acid (CNA)- resistant low-carbon stainless steel, which is used in plutonium extraction equipment and spent fuel storage vessels. The University has also trained personnel at Yongbyon.

In recent months, individual countries have sought to increase pressure on Pyongyang and to enforce the sanctions already in place. The United States, Japan, and South Korea implemented another round of autonomous sanctions shortly after the passing of Resolution 2321. Also, in November 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department issued new regulations designed to prevent North Korean banks from accessing the U.S. financial system covertly through correspondent accounts in the United States and other countries. And a number of governments have reportedly either suspended or restricted trade with North Korea in response to international sanctions. These autonomous measures, combined with Security Council resolutions, restrict North Korea’s access to foreign goods and currency.

However, the sanctions regime has failed to change Pyongyang’s behavior or sufficiently hinder its activities abroad, a situation highlighted by the U.N. Panel of Experts. In its latest report from February 2017, the Panel indicates that, despite the strength of existing measures, Pyongyang has still managed to effectively evade sanctions, trade in restricted items, and access the international banking system. North Korea is able to conduct illicit activities due to its sophisticated evasion methods as well as the “insufficient and highly inconsistent” sanctions implementation by U.N. member states.

Sanctions Evasion and Illicit Procurement

North Korea uses shell companies all over the world to procure sensitive material for its nuclear program and other programs of concern. This evasion technique is regularly employed by North Korea’s shipping sector. In 2014, Pyongyang’s Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM) was designated by the Security Council for its role in an illicit shipment of weapons from Cuba to North Korea. Prior to its designation, OMM was one of North Korea’s largest shipping companies. Since then, it has transferred control of its fleet to an elaborate network of front companies scattered around the world, and has also renamed most of its vessels in an attempt to circumvent international sanctions.

North Korea is also believed to use embedded agents in foreign companies and diplomatic personnel in order to trade in prohibited items. In addition, North Korean state trading companies based in China are reportedly an important channel for Pyongyang to smuggle sensitive equipment and materials. These companies are believed to operate in partnership with private Chinese companies, with many of the larger ventures operating inside of China. In recent years, a number of Taiwanese companies have also exported sensitive equipment to North Korea, including CNC machine tools, a horizontal machining center, advanced industrial computers, and stainless steel tubes.

The Chinese government’s weak enforcement of U.N. sanctions has allowed North Korea’s procurement networks to operate. The New York Times reported in March 2016 that many of the new restrictions against North Korea, including the requirement to inspect all of its cargo, are largely ignored in the Chinese border city of Dandong, through which approximately half of China’s trade with North Korea flows. The report adds that North Korean procurement officials operate freely in the city.

North Korean banks play an important role in the evasion of sanctions, processing payments for illegal transactions and blacklisted end users. One such institution is Daedong Credit Bank, which was designated by the Security Council in 2016. Daedong held over $25 million in Macau-based Banco Delta Asia for financing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, illicitly gained through narcotics sales and counterfeiting. Another institution is the Korea Kwangsong Banking Corporation, which was also designated by the Security Council in 2016. Kwangson has provided financial services to U.N.-sanctioned entities connected to North Korea’s unconventional weapons programs. And Pyongyang’s Foreign Trade Bank has been used to facilitate transactions on behalf of entities linked to North Korea’s proliferation network. In response to such activities, Resolutions 2270 and 2321 restrict the ability of North Korea’s banks to operate abroad. How effective these restrictions are remains to be seen.

Proliferation to Other Countries

North Korea’s most well-known nuclear client is Syria. Until 2007, Pyongyang was helping Damascus build the Al Kibar nuclear reactor, a covert facility in Dair Alzour, which was to be used for producing plutonium. This assistance came to a halt in September of that year, when Israeli fighters destroyed the facility. Unconfirmed reports indicate that North Korea also supplied Syria with 45 tons of yellowcake for Al Kibar, enough for 89 to 130 kilograms of weapons grade HEU upon further processing and enrichment.

North Korea’s involvement in nuclear activities in other countries is less clear, but it remains willing to export its expertise and technology. In 2016, a North Korean company posted an advertisement online for the sale of Lithium-6. In addition, according to some reports, Iranian scientists were present to observe North Korea’s 2013 nuclear test.

Conclusion

The steady progress North Korea is making in its nuclear program is a testament to the determination of its government and the success of its illicit procurement networks. The latest round of U.N. sanctions has the potential to disrupt these efforts. However, this potential can only be realized if the sanctions are strictly enforced by U.N. member states, especially China.

* The MAEI and GBAE are sanctioned as separate entities by the UN Security Council and the US Treasury Department. Here they are treated as the same entity, per the recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts in its 2015 report.

Iran’s Nuclear Veil

How to increase transparency under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Introduction

The day is fast approaching when the new American administration, led by President Donald J. Trump, will conduct an unfriendly review of the nuclear pact with Iran reached in 2015. No one knows what this review will produce. If the President decides to “enforce the terms of the […] deal to hold Iran totally accountable,” as he promised during his campaign, a first step should be to make Iran’s nuclear status more transparent.[1]  Transparency is a benefit that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was supposed to deliver, but did not.  Instead, a sort of diplomatic veil has been drawn around Iran’s nuclear status, obscuring important parts of it from public view.  As a result, it is difficult to know whether the limits on Iran’s nuclear progress are being maintained and the verification procedures established by the deal are functioning properly.

President Obama claimed the deal would furnish “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history.”[2]  However, the promised transparency has not materialized.

There are two reasons for this opacity:  first, the terms of the JCPOA[3], which provide expressly that the work of the bodies set up to implement it shall be confidential; second, new resolutions by the U.N. Security Council[4] and the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA)[5], which replace a series of punitive resolutions from both bodies.  The nuclear deal and the new resolutions were negotiated by the Obama administration, which wished to enshrine the agreement as a foreign policy victory and avoid scrutiny that might draw attention to its flaws.

The lack of transparency is most evident in the work of the multilateral Joint Commission, set up under the deal to resolve disputes.  Its deliberations and even its final decisions are confidential.  Thus the public may never find out, for example, if Iran had limited inspectors’ access to a suspect site, or was importing sensitive nuclear items, or was dispensed from respecting one of the many nuclear material or activity caps enshrined in the agreement.   And the IAEA, long the major source of reliable data on Iran’s nuclear progress, is now issuing reports with a fraction of the information it provided in the past.  As a result, there is uncertainty about whether Iran remains at least one year away from being able to fuel a nuclear weapon—the deal’s milestone achievement.

The new administration, free of any political bias in favor of the deal, should be willing to drop the veil and let the public see as deeply into the deal as originally promised.  This increased transparency would be welcomed by both critics and supporters of the agreement.  It could be accomplished by reinterpreting the scope of the IAEA’s public reporting and changing the rules that govern the Joint Commission.  Neither would require renegotiating the deal itself.

Nuclear Reporting

In February 2016, the IAEA published its first report on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA after its “Implementation Day.”[6]  The brevity of the report came as a surprise: a scant seven pages, compared to previous reports that routinely ran over 20 pages and included detailed technical annexes.[7]  The post-Implementation Day reports—there have now been four—offer a far narrower view of Iran’s nuclear wherewithal.

Crucially, the new reports fail to include important details that are needed for outside experts to independently assess Iran’s nuclear status and its compliance with the agreement.  The charts below compare what the IAEA reported before and after Implementation Day.  Where in the past, for example, the IAEA published a precise inventory of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU), including a detailed accounting of all LEU stockpiles, production, and flows, now the IAEA merely publishes a statement that Iran has not exceeded its overall limit on LEU—without offering any more specific information on the quantity or forms of Iran’s LEU stockpile.  Likewise, the IAEA’s post-Implementation Day reports offer far less detail on the centrifuges operating at Iran’s nuclear facilities, the amount of enriched uranium they are producing, Iran’s research and development work on advanced centrifuges, and other aspects of its nuclear conversion and fuel manufacturing work.  The level of detail needed to assess Iran’s nuclear status is simply not present.  This is all the more baffling because, as a result of the deal, Iran is provisionally applying the Agency’s “Additional Protocol,” which requires Iran to open additional sites to inspectors and provide a greater amount of information about its stockpiles and nuclear plans.  The IAEA is collecting more information, but disclosing less of it to the public.

Below are tables that present a side-by-side comparison of the IAEA’s reporting on Iran’s nuclear program before and after Implementation Day.  They show that the nuclear agreement, which promised unprecedented visibility, has actually provided less transparency and less public information.

Reporting on LEU Stocks in Gaseous Form (Up to 5%)
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Amount of low-enriched UF6 produced

Increase in amount of this UF6 since last report

Annex with details on UF6 production and flows
 
Statement that total stock of UF6 enriched to 3.67% did not exceed 300kg

 

Reporting on LEU Stocks in Gaseous Form (Up to 20%)
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Amount produced at Natanz and Fordow
(As of 2014 Joint Plan of Action)

Amount fed into conversion process

Amount downblended

Amount stored as UF6
 
Statement that Iran is not enriching above 3.67%

Statement that Iran transferred, diluted, or fabricated into fuel plates all uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20%

 

Reporting on Centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Number of IR-1s installed

Number of IR-1s operating

Number of IR-2ms installed

Number of centrifuges placed in storage
 
Number of 1R-1s installed

Number of centrifuges withdrawn from storage to replace failed or damaged units

 

Reporting on Centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Number of IR-1s installed

Number of IR-1s operating

Number of centrifuges placed in storage
 
Number of 1R-1s “maintained”

 

Reporting on Advanced Centrifuge Research and Development
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Models fed with natural UF6

Number of each model installed and size of cascades

Amount of natural UF6 fed into advanced centrifuges
 
Statement that Iran has conducted enrichment in line with its long term plan

 

Reporting on Additional Information
Before Implementation Day After Implementation Day
Natural UF6 produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

Natural UF6 converted into other forms at UCF

Details of nuclear fuel manufacturing at multiple facilities using natural and enriched uranium

An updated list of declared nuclear facilities in Iran
 
 
 
Size of heavy water stockpile

In the past, the IAEA was careful to give narrative accounts of its inspections of key Iranian nuclear sites.  These accounts named the specific sites visited, gave dates of inspection and specific methods of inspection, listed specific equipment inspected and requests to interview Iranian personnel, described the issues raised and explanations received by the inspectors, and listed any unresolved questions.  This allowed the public to know the questions the IAEA was pursuing, the level of cooperation it was receiving from Iranian authorities, and whether questions were being resolved to the Agency’s satisfaction.

This limited reporting has been attributed to a new U.N. resolution.  As of Implementation Day, reporting was no longer driven by the Agency’s “absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes” – the conclusion that sent Iran’s case to the Security Council in 2005.[8]  Rather, the IAEA’s governing board resolved that the Agency has “become seized of a separate agenda item covering JCPOA implementation and verification and monitoring in Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231.”[9]  In a March 2016 interview, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano explained the distinction:  “In the previous reports the bases were the previous U.N. Security Council resolutions and Board of Governors.  But now they are terminated.  They are gone.  The basis of our report is the resolution of the United Nations Security Council 2231 and the Board of Governors resolution adopted on the 15th of December.  […] And as the basis is different, the consequences are different.”[10]  In other words, it is no accident that there is less transparency now.  The architects of the deal minted a new U.N. resolution that could be interpreted to make it that way.  Now the consequences of that decision are being felt.

The JCPOA also allows Iran to request exemptions from the deal’s requirements.  However, neither such requests, nor the Joint Commission’s decisions, are included in IAEA reports.  For example, the IAEA has never mentioned a series of exemptions that Iran received in order to expedite the implementation of the nuclear deal in January 2016.  As first reported by the Institute for Science and International Security in September 2016, the exemptions fell into three categories.  First, 3.5 percent LEU contained in low level nuclear waste was not counted toward the 300 kilogram cap on LEU, and Iran was given a pass on the near 20 percent LEU contained in “lab contaminant,” which was judged “unrecoverable.”  Second, Iran received permission to continue operating 19 “hot cells” larger in size than permitted by the agreement.  Third, Iran was allowed to bypass the 130 ton limit on heavy water by storing heavy water in Oman that nevertheless remained under Iranian control.[11]  None of these exemptions are described in any of the IAEA’s reports, though all have an impact on the ability to assess Iran’s nuclear status.

Nor do the Agency’s reports describe how Iran is carrying out its “long-term enrichment and research and development enrichment plan,” which Iran has submitted to the IAEA as a requirement of the nuclear agreement.  The agreement allows for limited work on several more powerful centrifuge models but perfecting their operation would decrease Iran’s nuclear breakout time.  Therefore, public information on the work is essential for an assessment of Iran’s nuclear status, as former IAEA deputy director Olli Heinonen has argued.[12]  Iran is publicizing this work on its own so why shouldn’t the IAEA report on it?  For instance, on January 28, Iran’s atomic energy organization announced that it had begun feeding uranium into its IR-8 centrifuge, which it called the “the most advanced generation of centrifuges.”[13]

Nuclear Inspections

Since Implementation Day, the reports contain none of this detail.  Instead, they merely state that the IAEA has “conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in Iran.”[14]  Not even the sites visited are mentioned.

There is also the question of “challenge” inspections.  The JCPOA provides a mechanism for mounting inspections of suspicious, undeclared sites in Iran.  How the IAEA would gain access to such sites was one of the most contentious issues in the nuclear talks.  The compromise reached in the agreement allows the IAEA to inspect a suspicious site if five of the eight members of the Joint Commission agree.  This process, including adjudication by the Commission, could take up to 24 days.[15]  While this process is clearly described in the agreement, it is not clear how much information about it would be made public.  Given the known limits on IAEA reporting and the general secrecy of the workings of the Joint Commission, there is cause for skepticism that any meaningful information about challenge inspections would ever come to light.  In fact, over one year after the agreement’s implementation, it is unclear whether a single challenge inspection has been sought or mounted.

This question is particularly important in light of Iran’s claim that its military sites remain off-limits.  The Supreme Leader’s foreign policy advisor, Ali Akbar Velayat, told al Jazeera on July 25, 2015 that “The access of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency or from any other body to Iran’s military centers is forbidden.”[16]  Foreign Minister Javad Zarif similarly assured the Iranian Parliament in July 2015 that he made sure access to military sites was a “red line.”[17]  Nevertheless, these are sites to which, under the deal, Iran is obligated to provide access if the Joint Commission requires it.  Access to military sites is crucial because the IAEA in the past has uncovered evidence of undeclared nuclear work at such sites, like the Parchin military complex, and reported on it.  The IAEA has also connected military entities to illicit nuclear procurement.[18]  The IAEA must establish clear modalities for accessing these sites, and should test them as soon as possible.

The Joint Commission

The JCPOA established a multilateral Joint Commission to act as the dispute resolution and oversight body for the agreement.  It includes representatives from each of the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Iran, and the European Union.  The Commission has crucial responsibilities.  They include issuing decisions on disputes by parties, on challenge inspections, on nuclear procurement requests, and on requests for exemption from nuclear restrictions.

According to media reports, the Commission has met at the ministerial level about six times in order to discuss nuclear exemptions requested by Iran, as well as Iran’s dissatisfaction with the pace of economic relief.

However, the Commission operates under rules of confidentiality imposed by the agreement.  The Commission does not even issue a broad public report, as does the IAEA.  Instead, its deliberations and decisions are secret.  Late last year, the Commission released eight documents related to its work, including four decisions made before Implementation Day that exempted Iran from meeting some of the  nuclear restrictions the JCPOA was designed to impose.[19]  It is not clear whether the documents are the totality of the Commission’s decisions or just a selection.

When the American press broke the news last September of the secret nuclear exemptions the Commission gave Iran, State Department spokesperson John Kirby took pains to repeat that “the work of the Joint Commission, as stipulated in the agreement itself, is to be confidential.”[20]  Mr. Kirby would not comment on any decision of the Commission and even refused to use the word “exemption.”  The Commission’s secrecy on this point is troubling because the Commission can grant exemptions in a broad range of areas—exemptions that could loosen the very restrictions that the agreement imposes.  Specifically, the Commission can approve exemptions for research and development on uranium-metal based fuel; the operation of additional or larger hot cells; mechanical testing of new types of centrifuges; the export of enrichment or enrichment-related equipment and technology; and the development, acquisition, or use of multi-point detonators that could be used to trigger a nuclear explosion.[21]  Iran could receive an exemption for any of this activity, and the public might never know.

This veil of secrecy also enshrouds the Procurement Working Group, a technical body overseen by the Commission whose role is to review proposals for nuclear exports to Iran through an official procurement channel.  The group has apparently met to discuss a handful of sales requests.  According to a December 2016 report by the U.N. Secretary General, five proposed sales have been submitted: three were approved and two were under review.[22]  However, there is no description of the item to be exported, the end-user, or the end use.

Finally, as discussed above, the public may never be informed about disputes and decisions on the inspection of suspicious, undeclared sites in Iran—one of the most important and potentially contentious mechanisms created by the agreement.

The U.N. Security Council

U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, which officially implements the JCPOA,[23]  carries forward an embargo on arms imports and exports.  It also restricts ballistic missile development.[24]  The Security Council is charged with enforcing these restrictions for five years for conventional arms, and eight years for ballistic missiles.  However, the Security Council has the authority to approve requests that bypass these restrictions, and its decision to do so is confidential.  According to the Secretary General’s December 2016 report, the Council already has received one request to sell conventional arms to Iran.  That request is “still under consideration.”[25]  There have been Russian media reports that Iran and Russia are actively discussing the sale of $10 billion worth of military hardware, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft.[26]  If the Security Council were to approve such a request, the public may only learn about it once the arms are delivered.

The Security Council also has a role in the nuclear procurement channel.  It issues a final decision on proposals for the sale of sensitive nuclear items to Iran, based on advice provided by the Procurement Working Group.[27]  As explained above, the Security Council has thus far approved three such sales and is considering a further two.  Nothing specific is known about these requests, or the criteria used by the Council to make its decision.

Resolution 2231 does ask that the Secretary General report on the implementation of the resolution’s provisions over which the Security Council has authority.  Two such reports have been issued thus far, and have provided useful, albeit general, information.  Both have described violations by Iran related to arms exports and missile tests; both also have concluded that without consensus among Security Council members, the provisions of the resolution cannot be enforced.

How to fill the transparency gap?

If the Trump administration decides to honor and enforce the agreement, it should start by increasing transparency.  Such a step would be seen as modest and even reasonable, a reaction the administration should welcome.  Although the rules governing the agreement do not require such an increase in clarity, they do not prevent it either.

First, the administration should insist that the IAEA reinterpret U.N. Security Council resolution 2231.  That resolution sets the rule.  It asks the IAEA to “undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments […]” under the agreement.  And it asks for “regular updates […] on Iran’s implementation.”  But it says nothing about what the updates should contain.  The resolution tells the IAEA what is “necessary” to inspect, but not what is “necessary” to report.  Thus, there is nothing in the resolution that requires the IAEA to report less now that it did before the agreement was implemented.  The IAEA has simply chosen to report less, and has cited resolution 2231 without true justification.  The new U.S. administration is free to challenge that choice, and to insist that the reporting be restored to its previous level of detail.

Second, the new administration could ask for a change in the rules governing confidentiality at the Joint Commission.  The JCPOA states only that the Commission’s work “is confidential […] unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.”[28]  It also states that the Commission may “adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities.”[29]  Thus, it is clear that the confidentiality provisions can be changed.  If they were, the public would not be remitted to getting its information from targeted leaks and the post-hoc, incomplete release of randomly chosen documents, as is the case today.  All parties to the agreement would have the benefit of unbiased information released directly and promptly by the Commission itself.  This information should cover Iranian nuclear exemption requests and decisions, the result of any IAEA request for a challenge inspection, and the Commission’s recommendation on procurement requests.

Third, there is no reason why the U.N. Security Council should hide its decisions.  The new administration could also insist that the U.N. disclose its decisions on Iran’s missile development, on proposed military sales by or to Iran, and on approval of nuclear sales to Iran.  The Security Council’s work, as stated vaguely in the nuclear agreement, is governed by “confidentiality procedure of the UN.”[30]  And while this procedure states that sensitive or confidential information is “carefully protected in order to safeguard the interests of the Organization,” other U.N. guidance also promotes “openness and transparency.”[31]  Openness and transparency are exactly what the parties to the nuclear deal promised the agreement would bring.

And fourth, in order to ensure that a commitment to transparency continues through the 15-year lifetime of the agreement, there should be greater congressional involvement.  Congress could help bridge the transparency gap by creating an independent commission to monitor and oversee implementation of the agreement and report violations.  It could be modeled on the Helsinki Commission or the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.  This new commission would have access to U.S. government information, be staffed by specialized experts, and have credibility as an official body independent of any administration.  Also, crucially, the commission would allow Congress not only to exercise an oversight role but to work with the new administration to enforce the agreement, and with future administrations if the agreement survives.  The idea of creating a congressional commission was proposed in the previous Congress (HR 3741, the “Commission to Verify Iranian Nuclear Compliance Act”).  The creation of such a commission could be included in a comprehensive Iran sanctions bill that the new Congress is likely to take up.

More transparency should be welcomed by all.  If Iran is shown to be performing, that fact will undercut claims that it cannot be trusted.  If Iran is shown to be cheating, that fact will undercut claims that it can be trusted.  Either way, the public will come out ahead.  It will have gained an amount of truth in what some people fear may be a new, post-factual era.


Footnotes: 

[1] Donald J. Trump, Transcript of remarks at AIPAC Policy Conference, March 21, 2016, available at http://www.policyconference.org/article/transcripts/trump-2016.asp.

[2] Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon, April 2, 2015, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon.

[3] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), July 14, 2015, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/european-union/joint-comprehensive-plan-action.

[4] Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Security Council (S/RES/2231), July 20, 2015, available at: http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/res2231e.pdf.

[5] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation and verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), International Atomic Energy Agency Resolution (GOV/2015/72), December 15, 2015, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iaea-pmdresolution-121515.pdf.

[6] Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), International Atomic Energy Agency Report (GOV/2016/8), February 26, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/international-atomic-energy-agency/verification-monitoring-islamic-republic-iran-light-united-nations-security.

[7] Subsequent post-Implementation Day reports are less than five pages each.

[8] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency Resolution (GOV/2005/77),  September 24, 2005, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iaea-iranresolution-092405.pdf.

[9] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation and verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), International Atomic Energy Agency Resolution (GOV/2015/72), December 15, 2015, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iaea-pmdresolution-121515.pdf.

[10] Statement by IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, March 7, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/international-atomic-energy-agency/iaea-director-general-yukiya-amano-comments-iaeas-reporting-requirements-iran.

[11] David Albright and Andrea Stricker, Institute for Science and International Security, JCPOA Exemptions Revealed, September 1, 2016, available at http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/jcpoa-exemptions-revealed/.

[12] Olli Heinonen, “Ensuring Iran’s Enrichment R&D is for Peaceful Purposes,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 26, 2017, available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/olli-heinonen1-ensuring-irans-enrichment-rd-is-for-peaceful-purposes/#sthash.zpgmyI8D.dpuf.

[13] “Iran Injects UF6 into IR-8 Centrifuges,” Mehr News Agency, January 28, 2017, available at http://en.mehrnews.com/news/123078/Iran-injects-UF6-into-IR-8-centrifuges.

[14] Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) International Atomic Energy Agency Report (GOV/2016/8), May 27, 2016, available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/06/gov2016-23.pdf.

[15] See “How Will Inspections Work in Iran under the Nuclear Deal?” Iran Watch Policy Brief, July 14, 2015, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/nuclear-iran-weekly/how-will-inspections-work-iran-under-nuclear-deal.

[16] “Leader’s Top Aide: Int’l Inspectors Not Allowed to Visit Iran’s Military Sites,” Fars News Agency, July 25, 2015, available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940503000415.

[17] “Iranian MPs thank negotiating team for standing firm on redlines,” Islamic Republic News Agency, July 13, 2015, available at http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81680602/.

[18] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the

Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency Report (GOV/2011/65), November 8, 2011, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iaea-iranreport-110811.pdf.

[19] Communication dated 21 December 2016 to the Agency sent on behalf of High Representative Mogherini in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/907), December 23, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/international-atomic-energy-agency/communication-dated-21-december-2016-agency-sent-behalf-high-representative.

[20] State Department Spokesperson John Kirby Addresses ISIS Report on JCPOA Exemptions for Iran, September 1, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/united-states/executive-branch/department-state/state-department-spokesperson-john-kirby-addresses-isis-report-jcpoa-exemptions.

[21] JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, 2.1.

[22] Second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Security Council (S/2016/1136), December 30, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/unsyg-secondreporton2231.pdf.

[23] Security Council tasks under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Security Council (S/2016/44), January 16, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/unsc-s-2016-44-20160116.pdf.

[24] Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Security Council (S/RES/2231), Annex B, July 20, 2015, available at: http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/res2231e.pdf.

[25] Second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Security Council (S/2016/1136), December 30, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/unsyg-secondreporton2231.pdf.

[26] “Russia, Iran plan $10bn arms supply to Tehran,” Russia Today, November 14, 2016, available at https://www.rt.com/news/366871-russia-iran-weapons-delivery/.

[27] Security Council tasks under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Security Council (S/2016/44), January 16, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/unsc-s-2016-44-20160116.pdf.

[28] JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, 3.4.

[29] JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, 2.1.15.

[30] JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, 3.4.

[31] Ethics Advice and Guidance: Confidentiality and Use of Information, United Nations Ethics Office, available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/information.shtml.

Attachment:

Iran’s Nuclear Veil: How to increase transparency under the JCPOA

Two Los Angeles-Area Men Arrested in Conspiracy to Export Defense Items to Iran

Two men based in the Los Angeles area were arrested on October 26, 2016 on federal charges related to a conspiracy to export military aircraft parts and other defense items to Iran.  Zavik Zargarian, 52, of Glendale, California, and Vache Nayiran, 57, of Lakeview Terrace, California, were taken into custody and charged with violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR).  Zagarian and Nayiran are both dual citizens of Iran and the United States.

The indictment, unsealed on October 26, also names Zagarian’s Glendale-based company, ZNC Engineering, along with two Iranian nationals believed to be in Iran: Hanri Terminassian, 55, and Hormoz Nowrouz, 56.

The indictment alleges that the five defendants participated in a scheme to purchase and illegally export fluorocarbon rubber O-rings to Iran.  O-rings have a variety of military applications and can be used in aircraft hydraulic systems and landing gear.  According to the indictment, Nowrouz, who is managing director of a company called Kalaye Sanaty Iran (KSI), would contact Tarminassian with requests to acquire the O-rings.  Tarminassian, who is a citizen of Iran and a legal permanent resident of the United States, would then contact Zargarian.  Zargarian used his company, ZNC Engineering, to purchase the O-rings from a California-based company. Tarminassian would then arrange for payment to be sent through Nayirian, who would assure the transfer of funds to Zargarian.  Nayrian would ship the O-rings to addresses in Dubai or Kuwait using deliberately falsified export documents that undervalued the items in order to avoid suspicion by the authorities.  Tarminassian would then arrange for the transshipment of the items to Iran, where the ultimate end-user was the Iranian Air Force. According to the indictment, the defendants exported more than 7,000 O-rings to Iran.

Federal authorities also accused three of the defendants of conspiring to purchase and ship jet fighter aircraft parts worth over $3.6 million to Iran.  According to the indictment, Zargarian, acting as an officer of ZNC Engineering, sought to acquire military aircraft parts from U.S.-based suppliers on behalf of Tarminassian. These parts include a pneumatic accumulator, a liquid oxygen converter, and a liquid oxygen tank, parts which can be used in F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 fighter jets.  Zagarian negotiated to purchase between 10 and 30 units of each item for Tarminassian from an undercover Homeland Security Investigations officer posing as a parts supplier.

The trial for Zargarain and Nayirian begins on December 20, 2016 in federal court before U.S. District Judge S. James Otero.  If convicted on all counts, Zagarian faces a maximum sentence of 115 years in prison and a $4,770,000 fine.  Nayiran faces 95 years in prison and a $3,700,000 fine.  Both defendants pleaded not guilty and were freed on bail on October 26.  Tarminassian and Nowrouz remain at large.


Sources:

[1] “Two Los-Angeles-Area Men Among Those Charged in Scheme to Smuggle $3 Million in Military Aircraft Parts and Defense Items to Iran,” Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, October 28, 2016.

[2] Indictment, United States of America v. Hormoz Nowrouz, aka Hormoz Naurouz; Hanri Terminassian; Zavik Zargarian; ZNC Engineering, Inc.; and Vache Nayirian, Case No. CR-14-00598, United States District Court, Central District of California.

Iranian Arms Shipments to Yemen Violate U.N. Resolutions

The United States and its allies have interdicted five separate weapons shipments from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen since April 2015—shipments that violate U. N. Security Council resolutions.  According to U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donergan, “We know they came from Iran and we know the destination.”[1] The U.S. State Department has also criticized Iranian arms smuggling to Yemen, including the provision of missiles to the Houthis.[2]

This lethal aid violates an arms embargo that was imposed as part of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 implementing the nuclear agreement with Iran and the resolutions it replaced.[3] It also violates U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, which imposes an arms embargo against the leadership of the Houthi rebels.[4] However, no action has been taken at the United Nations to punish these violations. In a little noticed report released this summer, the Secretary General raised concern over one Iranian arms shipment interdicted by the United States but concluded only that the U.N. was “still reviewing the information provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran” and that he would “provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course.”[5]

Despite the interdictions, some Iranian arms shipments are clearly making it into Yemen. The U.S. State Department has publicly linked Iran to the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis to strike targets in Saudi Arabia. Last month, Saudi officials reported two separate interceptions of ballistic missiles launched from Yemen: one near the city of Taif on October 10, the other near the city of Mecca on October 28.[6] In an October 11 press briefing, U.S. State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated, “In the Saudis’ case, their cities, their citizens are under very real, darn-near daily threat from missiles being launched on the Yemeni side of their border, missiles that are provided by Iran to the Houthi rebels.”[7] Another State Department official later told IHS Jane’s that “Iran has provided critical capability and assistance to the Houthis in their campaign to attack Saudi Arabian territory with ballistic missiles and rockets.”[8]

The two failed attacks on U.S. Navy ships last month by cruise missiles launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen have also grabbed headlines, though the Pentagon has not yet officially commented on the type or origin of these missiles.[9] Some naval analysts believe that the most likely missile used by the Houthis in this attack is the Noor, an Iranian variant of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missile.[10] Iran has officially denied involvement in the failed missile attacks on the U.S. ships, with a foreign ministry spokesperson saying, “The vague and contradictory remarks by American officials these past days are false, paranoid and inappropriate.”[11]

Iranian arms shipments seized by coalition forces

The following is a description of four Iranian arms shipments destined for the Houthis in Yemen and interdicted by U.S. or allied forces since September 2015.

September 2015: According to a U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen, U.S. and Australian navy ships stopped the Nassir off the coast of Oman and seized the weapons onboard, including 56 TOW anti-tank guided missiles, 4 TOW optical sights, 4 TOW tripod mounts, 4 TOW launch tubes, 2 TOW battery sets, 2 TOW launch assembly units, 3 TOW missile guidance systems, 14 TOW battery assemblies, and 19 9M113 AT Konkurs.[12] After examining the weapons, the U.N. Panel noted that the equipment bore “the markings bearing the names of Iranian industrial companies” and that the “Konkurs missiles had markings with characteristics similar to Russian and Iranian markings, indicating that they were likely to have been maintained or overhauled in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[13] Photos from the Panel’s report reveal the stamps of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Shiraz Electronics Industries, both of which are Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) subsidiaries and still subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.[14] The Panel also registered the presence of instructions written in Persian for the TOW system.[15]

February 2016:[16] Australia’s HMAS Darwin intercepted a small fishing vessel 170 nautical miles off the coast of Oman and discovered some 2,000 AK-47s, 100 RPGs, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels, and 20 60mm mortar tubes onboard.[17] The U.S. Navy has assessed that the arms originated in Iran, and U.S. military sources say the shipment was likely intended for Houthi rebels in Yemen.[18] Jane’s reports that the seized RPGs had green heat-resistant covers, a feature most often seen on RPG-7s manufactured by Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an entity subject to U.N. sanctions.[19] One of the photos included in the report also shows that some of the machine guns found were North Korean Type 73s. This weapon is only in use by the North Korean and Iranian militaries, according to Jane’s.[20]

March 20, 2016: A helicopter operating with the French Navy’s frigate Provence encountered a suspicious dhow off the coast of the Yemeni island of Socotra. French forces boarded the craft and found a cache of arms hidden under fishing nets.[21] The U.S. Navy later confirmed the find to include almost 2,000 Ak-47s, 64 Dragunov sniper rifles, 9 anti-tank missiles, and other equipment.[22] An analysis by Jane’s again notes the presence of Type 73 machine guns in one of the photos provided by the French Ministry of Defense.[23]

March 28, 2016: Two U.S. Navy ships encountered and boarded a dhow transiting international waters near the Gulf of Oman and discovered a large weapons cache onboard, including 1,500 AK-47s, 200 RPG-7 and RG-7V Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs), and 21 DshK 12.7mm machine guns. After interviewing members of the crew and analyzing the seized arms, U.S. authorities concluded the weapons had originated in Iran and were most likely bound for Yemen.[24] Iran has denied the allegation and claims it “has never engaged in such delivery.”[25]

Despite mounting public evidence of continued Iranian arms transfers to Yemen in violation of two U.N. Security Council resolutions, little appears to have been done at the United Nations. In a July 25 report, the U.N. official in charge of overseeing implementation of U.N. resolution 2231 stated that he “look[ed] forward to a formal reply in due course” from Iran about the report of the March 28 arms seizure.[26] However, no formal action has been taken. The other confirmed interdictions have not been raised publicly at the United Nations.

Under prior U.N. resolutions, a dedicated U.N. panel of experts was charged with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against Iran. This independent panel investigated possible violations and proposed sanctions designations in response. It played a valuable role in scrutinizing and publicizing a number of illicit Iranian arms exports. Unfortunately, in response to Iranian demands, the U.N. panel on Iran was dissolved when the nuclear agreement took effect at the beginning of this year. Now, it appears, officially documented reports of repeated Iranian violations face a dead-end diplomatic process at the United Nations, in which the absence of consensus among Security Council members stalls any action.


Footnotes: 

[1] Courtney Kube, “U.S. Officials: Iran Supplying Weapons to Yemen’s Houthi Rebels,” NBC News, October 27, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-officials-iran-supplying-weapons-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-n674181

[2] Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm; Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 24, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/united-states/executive-branch/department-state/state-department-spokesperson-john-kirby-comments-irans-supply-weapons-houthis

[3] “Resolution 2231,” United Nations, S/RES/2231 (2015), Annex B paragraph 5.

[4] “Resolution 2216,” United Nations, S/RES/2216 (2015), paragraph 14

[5] “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section I paragraph 9.

[6] Jeremy Binnie, “Saudi coalition confirms longest-range Yemeni ballistic missile attack to date,” Jane’s Defenec Weekly, October 11, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com); “Yemen’s Houthis Launch Missile Toward Saudi Holy City,” Reuters, October 28, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-missiles-idUSKCN12S016

[7] Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm

[8] Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: US spokesman says Iran supplying missiles to Yemen,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 13, 2016.

[9] Dan Lamothe, “Navy launches Tomahawk missiles at rebel sites in Yemen after attacks on U.S. ships,” Washington Post, October 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/12/more-missiles-fired-from-rebel-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships/

[10] Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Admiral: Attacks Like Those on USS Mason Will Become More Common,” USNI News, October 27, 2016, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/10/27/22246; Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer USS Mason Unsuccessfully Attacked from Yemen,” USNI, October 10, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/10/destroyer-uss-mason-attacked-yemen

[11] “Iran denies role in attacks on US navy from Yemen,” AFP via Al-Monitor, October 20, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/10/yemen-conflict-iran-us.html

[12] “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 12.

[13] “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Section III paragraph 82.

[14] “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

[15] “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

[16] “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

[17] “HMS Darwin Seizes Large Weapons Cache,” Combined Maritime Forces, March 6, 2016, available at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2016/03/06/hmas-darwin-seizes-large-weapons-cache/, accessed September 23, 2016.

[18] “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, April 4, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990; Joshua Berlinger, “French seize weapons cache in Indian Ocean that may have come from Iran,” CNN, March 30, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/middleeast/weapons-seizure-indian-ocean/

[19] Jens Kastner,“Combined Maritime Forces seize weapons shipment off Oman,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 3, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

[20] Jeremy Binnie, “US Navy seizes another Iranian weapons shipment in Arabian Sea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 4, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

[21] “Combined Task Force 150: the frigate Provence carries out an important arms seizure off the coast of Somalia,” French Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2016, available (in French) at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/ocean-indien/ctf-150-la-fregate-provence-realise-une-importante-saisie-d-armes-au-large-de-la-somalie, accessed September 23, 2016.

[22] “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

[23] Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: Third Arabian Sea arms shipment seized in six months,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

[24] “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex II “Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).

[25] “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex I paragraph 3.1.

[26] “Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), United Nations, S/2016/649, paragraph 24.

Turkey Transshipment Chronology – 2000-2016

Turkey has emerged as a destination of concern for transshipment to countries involved in proliferation, including Iran and Syria. The following are significant events involving re-transfers or transshipments through Turkey.

October 2003: Authorities at the Italian port of Taranto intercept the BBC China vessel en route to Libya containing components for uranium centrifuges. The components are shipped on behalf of the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. The shipment reportedly contains aluminum castings and dynamos supplied to Libya by Turkish companies connected to Henk Slebos, a Dutch businessman. Some components from Turkey are reportedly not detected during the inspection in Taranto and eventually reach Libya.

2005 – 2007: A German businessman transships 16 tons of graphite used in the production of rocket nozzles to Iran, using a Turkish intermediary. He falsely declared the graphite to be of low grade, to avoid seeking an export license. The businessman is later charged and confesses to the exports.

March 2005: Milad Jafari, an Iranian citizen, allegedly ships U.S.-origin fiber optic testing equipment from the United States to Turkey, for transshipment to Iran.

November 2005: Two Turkish companies, Tekno Elektrik (ETI Elektroteknik) and EKA, are reportedly discovered to have bought 40,084 ring magnets used in uranium centrifuge enrichment from Germany. 20,000 of these magnets were reportedly reshipped to Gulf Industries, a company based in Dubai, and the rest transshipped to Pakistan. These activities are reportedly part of an effort by the Khan network to supply a uranium enrichment plant to Libya.

November 2005: An investigation by the Turkish Customs Inspection Board reportedly reveals that Turkish companies transshipped millions of dollars’ worth of components to Libya, including ring magnets, frequency convertors, and centrifuge motors.

2004 – 2006: Press reports indicate that Step Standard Technical Part (Step A.S.), an Iranian-owned company based in Turkey, and Multimat Import and Export, its Iranian-owned affiliate, are involved in illegal transshipments of guided missile parts and dual-use nuclear-related material, including high strength aluminum tubes, from dozens of countries to Iran via Turkey.

July 2006: Milad Jafari allegedly ships an alloy product from the United States to Turkey for later transshipment to Iran.

2007 – 2008: Milad Jafari’s procurement network facilitates over $7 million worth of transactions for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Jafari uses companies in Iran and Turkey to procure metal products, including steel and aluminum alloys, for AIO.

January 2007 – May 2011: Four individuals allegedly conspire to transship restricted items from the United States, including pressure transducers, thermal imagers, and solenoid valves, to Iran via Canada, Mexico, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The individuals are Abbas Moradi, Amirreza Sahebjamei, Shahin Tabatabaei, and Seyed Mohammad Akhavan Fatemi.

June 2008: Ankair, a Turkish airline, is temporarily denied export privileges by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) after attempting to illegally re-export a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 air cargo plane to Iran.

September 2009 – August 2010: Saeid Kamyari, an Iranian resident, Oguzhan Aydin, a Turkish resident, and two companies, AGM Ltd. Co. and Blue Sky Aviation, allegedly attempt to procure aircraft parts for an F-14 fighter jet for transshipment to Iran, via Turkey.

July 2010: Milad Jafari is indicted and charged with exporting specialized metals with aerospace applications from the United States to Iran, via Turkey, for entities that have been sanctioned for involvement in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.

July 2010 – April 2015: A network of companies acting on behalf of Iran-based Faratel Corporation allegedly make at least 250 shipments of equipment related to uninterruptable power supply (UPS) technology to Iran. The conspiracy allegedly involves transshipping the equipment via Golsad Istanbul Trading Ltd., a company based in Turkey.

February 2011: The U.S. Treasury Department sanctions Macpar Makina San Ve Tic A.S. and Step A.S., two Turkish companies connected to Milad Jafari, for supplying goods and technologies to AIO in Iran.

March 2011: Asi Kiymetli Madenler Turizm Otom, a Turkey-based company, allegedly sends a $35,900 international wire to a Chinese company as part of an effort led by Reza Zarrab to assist Iranian entities in evading U.S. sanctions.

October 2011: AAG Makina, a Turkish equipment manufacturer, allegedly forwards U.S.-origin valve parts and a pressure transmitter from Turkey to Iran.

July 2012: Oguzhan Aydin, Saeid Kamyari, AGM Ltd. Co., and Blue Sky Aviation are indicted and charged with attempting to procure aircraft parts from the United States for transshipment to Iran, via Turkey.

February – March 2013: Amin al-Baroudi, a Syrian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, makes two trips from the United States to Turkey, smuggling U.S. origin goods, including military equipment, in his luggage. He later supplies these items to groups in Syria.

March 2013: Hossein Tanideh, an Iranian citizen, is arrested for using shell companies to ship nuclear materials from Germany and India to Iran, via Turkey. He reportedly shipped hundreds of nuclear-related items through these companies.

April 2013: Turkish authorities reportedly intercept a shipment of rifles, pistols, ammunition, and gas masks aboard a Libya-flagged vessel in Istanbul. The weapons reportedly originate in North Korea, but their final destination is unknown.

July 2013: On behalf of its CEO, Erdal Kuyumcu, New York-based Global Metallurgy exports 330 pounds of cobalt metal, which has nuclear and missile applications, from the United States to Turkey for transshipment to Iran.

August 2013: Abbas Moradi, Amirreza Sahebjamei, Shahin Tabatabaei, and Seyed Mohammad Akhavan Fatemi are indicted in California and charged with shipping restricted items from the United States to Iran via Canada, Mexico, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

April 2015: A group of companies located in the Iran, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States are indicted and charged with transshipping U.S.-origin dual use microelectronics to Iran-based Faratel Corporation, via Turkey and Taiwan. The defendants are Smart Power Systems Inc., Bahram Mechanic, Tooraj Faridi, Khosrow Afghahi, Arthur Shyu, Hosoda Taiwan Co., Ltd., Matin Sadeghi, Golsad Istanbul Trading Ltd., and Faratel.

January 2016: Amin al-Baroudi pleads guilty to conspiring to export U.S.-origin tactical equipment to Syria, via Turkey.

March 2016: Reza Zarrab, a dual citizen of Turkey and Iran, as well as Camelia Jamshidy and Hossein Najafzadeh, both Iranian citizens, are indicted and charged with conducting financial transactions on behalf of Iranian entities and concealing the beneficiary of these transactions by using companies located in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates in an effort to evade U.S. sanctions.

June 2016: Erdal Kuyumcu, a U.S. citizen, pleads guilty to conspiring to illegally export metallic powder that may be used in missile production and in nuclear and aerospace applications to Iran, via Turkey.

Another Iranian Bank Receives Early Sanctions Relief

Another Iranian bank has received sanctions relief earlier than anticipated under the nuclear deal with Iran.  The European Union’s sanctions on state-owned Bank Saderat Iran and its London-based subsidiary, BankSaderat PLC, which were originally set to last until 2023, were quietly lifted this week.  The decision was made in April, in response to Bank Saderat’s successful legal challenge of its 2010 designation.  However, instead of lifting the sanctions in April, the E.U. modified the reasons supporting the sanctions and extended them—but only for a period of six months, through October 22.  This is the latest in a series of concessions to Iran’s financial sector, beyond what was agreed to in the nuclear deal.

Bank Saderat was originally sanctioned by the E.U. in July 2010 for providing financial services to three entities linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), and Mesbah Energy Company.[1]  A number of legal steps followed: the bank challenged its sanctions designation in European court; in 2013, the court threw out the designation; the European Council appealed this decision; but on April 21, 2016, the European Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, citing a failure to provide evidence linking Bank Saderat to the proliferation activities of the three cited Iranian entities.[2]

On April 18, just before its appeal was dismissed, the E.U. modified the rationale supporting the sanctions on Bank Saderat and BankSaderat PLC.  The new justification only cited Bank Saderat’s handling of letters of credit in March 2009 on behalf of DIO, which was then and remains under U.N. sanctions for involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[3]  The E.U. likely modified the rationale because one or more E.U. member-states were unwilling to provide sensitive information in open court.  In its appeal, the E.U. stated that its evidence concerning Bank Saderat’s support for Mesbah “comes from confidential sources which, if disclosed, would enable those who provided the information to be identified, endangering their lives and safety.”[4]

But in addition to modifying the rationale, the E.U. specifically extended the sanctions only until October 22, 2016.[5]  This set off action by other governments, with the United Kingdom lifting its sanctions against London-based BankSaderat PLC and its parent and unfreezing their assets this week.[6]  According to a senior E.U. official speaking on condition of anonymity, the six-month extension was “a political decision of the member-states taken at the time.”  The official noted that E.U. decisions related to sanctions are reached by consensus and declined to comment on why the E.U. decided to extend the sanctions on Bank Saderat only for six months and not until 2023, as set forth in the nuclear agreement.

Meanwhile, Bank Saderat and its subsidiaries remain on the U.S. blacklist for supporting terrorism.  Bank Saderat is one of Iran’s most important financial institutions and operates over 2,500 branches, including overseas offices throughout Europe and the Middle East.  According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Bank Saderat has been used by the Iranian government to channel funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Between 2001 and 2006, the Central Bank of Iran used Bank Saderat’s London subsidiary to transfer $50 million to Hizballah fronts in Lebanon.[7]

Ever since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, Iran has been complaining that the sanctions relief from the deal has not offered sufficient economic benefit.  This is largely a negotiating tactic, aimed at gaining additional concessions, particularly in the area of reintegrating Iran into the international financial system.  And it has worked.  Earlier this month, the Treasury Department relaxed its restrictions on dollar-denominated transactions with Iran and also now permits foreign companies to do business with non-sanctioned Iranian entities that are nonetheless minority-owned or controlled by an entity on the U.S. blacklist.[8]  In January, the U.S. also agreed to lift the U.N. sanctions on Bank Sepah and its London-based affiliate Sepah International, which had been blacklisted by the United Nations for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program.[9]  Bank Saderat is yet another case of a major Iranian bank receiving sanctions relief earlier than anticipated and of Iran gaining an important concession beyond what was agreed to in the nuclear deal.


Footnotes: 

[1] “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2010 of 26 July 2010 implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 195/28, July 27, 2010, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0025:0036:EN:PDF, accessed on October 28, 2016.

[2] “Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 April 2016 – Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran, European Commission (Case C-200/13 P),” Official Journal of the European Union, 2016/C 211/02, April 21, 2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:211:FULL&from=EN, accessed on October 28, 2016.

[3] “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/603 of 18 April 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 104/8, April 20, 2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0603, accessed on October 28, 2016.

[4] “Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 April 2016 – Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran, European Commission (Case C-200/13 P),” EUR-Lex, Document 62013CJ0200, April 21, 2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0200, accessed on October 28, 2016.

[5] “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/603 of 18 April 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 104/8, April 20, 2016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0603, accessed on October 28, 2016.

[6] “Financial Sanctions Notice: Iran (Nuclear Proliferation), Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, HM Treasury, October 24, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/uk-hmtreas-banksaderatdelist-102416.pdf

[7] “Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center, October 25, 2007, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx

[8] “Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Departmetn of the Treasury, October 7, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/united-states/executive-branch/department-treasury/frequently-asked-questions-relating-lifting-certain-us-sanctions-under-joint-1

[9] Simon Chin and Valerie Lincy, “U.S. Surrenders Powerful Financial Weapon to Counter Iran’s Missile Program,” Iran Watch Policy Brief, October 6, 2016,  http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/policy-briefs/us-surrenders-powerful-financial-weapon-counter-irans-missile-program

U.S. Surrenders Powerful Financial Weapon to Counter Iran’s Missile Program

Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Obama administration secretly agreed to lift United Nations sanctions on two of Iran’s missile financing institutions as part of a package of controversial accommodations with Iran in January.[1] Critics of the move have focused on an alleged “quid pro quo” in which the delisting of Bank Sepah and Sepah International was part of a “ransom” paid for the release of Americans being held in Iran.[2] But the decision to clear the banks also diminishes the ability of the United States and other governments to enforce U.N. sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program, which remain in place until 2023. Specifically, the United States has weakened its ability to target the Iranian banks that finance missile development—one of the most powerful means of countering Iran’s missile progress.

Bank Sepah and its London-based affiliate Sepah International were two of only a handful of banks that had been sanctioned by the United Nations, thus cutting them off from the international financial system. They were targeted for their support of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and two AIO subsidiaries also sanctioned by the United Nations, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG). Together, these entities oversee Iran’s solid and liquid fueled missile development. Yet the United States agreed to lift U.N. sanctions on Bank Sepah and Sepah International as well as to remove them from the U.S. blacklist.  This move came despite the United States calling Bank Sepah AIO’s “bank of choice”[3] as well as “the financial linchpin of Iran’s missile procurement network [that] has actively assisted Iran’s pursuit of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.”[4]

U.S. officials have insisted that the nuclear agreement with Iran has not affected the continuation of sanctions on its ballistic missile program. Yet as part of the nuclear agreement, in addition to Bank Sepah and Sepah International, the United States removed from its blacklist seven other Iranian-controlled banks supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program, including banks that have provided financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which controls AIO; banks that have facilitated the purchase of missile-related items; and banks that supported sanctions evasion by entities tied to Iran’s missile program. Four of the nine banks also have links to Iran’s Bank Saderat, which remains on the U.S. blacklist for its role in financing terrorism.

These nine banks remain on the U.S. Executive Order 13599 List, indicating that they are part of the Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution and are therefore still off-limits to U.S. parties. However, the United States removed its secondary sanctions on these banks, which had extended U.S. sanctions to take aim at foreign parties that dealt with the banks. As a result, these banks are now able to reconnect to the SWIFT financial messaging service, which is critical for processing transactions. Many of the banks have also re-established commercial ties to Europe this year. One of the banks, the Export Development Bank of Iran, also extended a $1 billion line of credit in July 2015 to the Syrian Commercial Bank.

The nine Iranian-controlled banks linked to missile activity that were removed from the U.S. blacklist since the beginning of the year are described below.  No evidence has been presented indicating that these banks have stopped engaging in the behavior that warranted sanctions in the first place.  Yet these missile financing banks, while still cut off from the U.S. financial system, are now free to do business with the rest of the world.  Thus, the United States has weakened one of its most powerful tools to counter Iran’s ballistic program—the targeted sanctions that effectively cut off the banks that finance Iran’s missile activity from large parts of the global financial system.

  • Bank Melli has provided financial services to the key Iranian agencies responsible for the ballistic missile program, including AIO, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a missile manufacturer, and SHIG and SBIG, both of which remain subject to U.N. sanctions. Through its financial services, Bank Melli has facilitated numerous purchases of sensitive material for Iran’s missile program. It also has links to terrorism through its transactions on behalf of the IRGC-Qods Force. Bank Melli also has ties to Bank Saderat, with which it established Future Bank B.S.C. in Bahrain as a joint venture. While never under U.N. sanction, Bank Melli was the subject of a warning in U.N. resolution 1803 that called for financial institutions to “exercise vigilance” with respect to Bank Melli due to its links to nuclear and missile-related activities.
  • Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) has provided handled transactions for MODAFL and other entities associated with Iran’s missile program and has facilitated procurement activities. EDBI also allegedly served as an intermediary handling financing, including WMD-related payments, for Bank Sepah after Bank Sepah was sanctioned in 2007. In July 2015, EDBI extended a $1 billion line of credit to the state-owned Syrian Commercial Bank, a form of financial aid to the Assad regime.[5]
  • Bank Refah Kargaran has provided financial services to MODAFL and facilitated the millions of dollars of purchases by MODAFL of weapons-related items, including missiles. It has also served as a conduit for sanctions evasion, processing outstanding transactions for Bank Melli following the sanctions imposed on Bank Melli by the European Union. It also has ties to Bank Saderat and EDBI, with whom it founded Belarus-based Onerbank as a joint venture.
  • Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG (EIH) is a German-based bank controlled by Iranian interests. It shareholders include Bank of Industry and Mine, Bank Mellat, and Bank Tejarat. EIH has reportedly done over a billion dollars of business for Iranian companies associated with conventional military and ballistic missile procurement, including AIO, DIO, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In addition, it has acted as a conduit for payments on behalf of Iranian banks under sanction, including Bank Sepah, Bank Mellat, and Bank Saderat. When the nuclear agreement with Iran was announced, EIH stated that it was poised to “place its full range of services at the disposal of old and new customers.”[6] In March 2016, EIH extended lines of credit totaling over 480 million euros to Iranian banks, including Bank of Industry and Mine, Bank Mellat, and Bank Tejarat.[7]
  • Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) helped several banks blacklisted for ballistic missile activity, including Bank Mellat and EIH Bank circumvent international sanctions, by concealing their involvement in payments. It is the majority stakeholder in EIH Bank and received a 108 million euro line of credit from the German bank in March 2016.[8]
  • Bank Tejarat has provided financial services for MODAFL and other Iranian entities linked to the country’s missile program. It has begun re-establishing commercial ties to Europe. Last month, ten bankers from Bank Tejarat reportedly attended a class on compliance and European banking in the Netherlands.[9] It also received a line of credit from EIH Bank in March 2016.[10]
  • Bank Mellat had been sanctioned by the United States for facilitating hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities. It also received a line of credit from EIH Bank in March 2016.[11]

Footnotes:

[1] Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, “U.S. Signed Secret Document to Lift U.N. Sanctions on Iranian Banks,” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signed-secret-document-to-lift-u-n-sanctions-on-iranian-banks-1475193723

[2] Jordain Carney and Sylvan Lane, “GOP lawmakers slam secret agreement to help lift Iran bank sanctions,” The Hill, September 30, 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/298711-obama-admin-agreed-to-push-for-iran-sanctions-relief-for-prisoner-deal-report

[3] “Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury Sepah Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 9, 2007, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp219.aspx

[4] “Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury Sepah Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 9, 2007, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp219.aspx

[5] “Syria ratifies fresh $1 billion credit line from Iran,” Reuters, July 8, 2015, http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN0PI1RD20150708?sp=true

[6] Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/company/europ%C3%A4isch-iranische-handelsbank-ag

[7] “Iranian banks open €480mn credit via IECB,” Mehr News, March 14, 2016, http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115212/Iranian-banks-open-480mn-credit-via-IECB

[8] “Iranian banks open €480mn credit via IECB,” Mehr News, March 14, 2016, http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115212/Iranian-banks-open-480mn-credit-via-IECB

[9] Mamta Borkar, “In an effort to play by international rules, Iranian banks take Dutch compliance course,” Sanctions Alert, September 26, 2016, http://sanctionsalert.com/in-an-effort-toplay-by-international-rules-iranian-banks-take-dutch-compliance-course/

[10] “Iranian banks open €480mn credit via IECB,” Mehr News, March 14, 2016, http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115212/Iranian-banks-open-480mn-credit-via-IECB

[11] “Iranian banks open €480mn credit via IECB,” Mehr News, March 14, 2016, http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115212/Iranian-banks-open-480mn-credit-via-IECB

Quietly, U.N. Signals Violation by Iran of New Resolution

According to a July 2016 report by the U.N. Secretary General, Iranian firms participated in a defense trade show in Iraq last March, in potential violation of U. N. Security Council resolution 2231.[1]  Under the resolution, prior approval is required by the Security Council for any arms transfer to or from Iran;[2] none was sought.[3]  What’s more, one of the firms participating in the trade show, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), remains on the U.N.’s blacklist – even following the nuclear agreement.[4]  The report concludes that Iraqi authorities “should have frozen all of the entity’s funds, other financial assets and economic resources” pursuant to resolution 2231.[5]  However, two months following the report’s publication, no action has been taken to address these apparent violations.

The Fifth Iraqi Defense, Security, and Military Exposition (IQDEX) hosted over 100 companies in Baghdad on March 5-8, 2016, including six Iranian entities.[6]  The U.N. report specifically references DIO’s participation and includes a picture of the firm’s booth at the trade show.[7]  DIO is controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and, in addition to producing a range of military equipment, has been connected to gas centrifuge production and to Iran’s missile program.

Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), boasted that MODAFL and its affiliates “actively [took] part in the Iraq Defense Exhibition” and that a number of ambassadors visited the Iranian showcase.[8] Al-Monitor reported that the items on display included “twinned combat boats, powerful sea engines, unmanned aerial vehicles, various mortars, different rockets and artillery systems, defense items such as advanced systems capable of identifying chemical and radioactive elements, as well as systems capable of designing and producing helicopter and reconnaissance aircraft.”[9]

Other Iranian entities listed as attending IQDEX include Marine Industries Organization, Aviation Industries Organization, and National Geographical Organization, also known as the Armed Forces Geographical Organization.[10]  All are subject to European Union,[11] Canadian,[12] Japanese,[13] and U.S. sanctions for ties to nuclear and missile proliferation.  A sixth Iranian entity, Shahid Meisami Group, was also listed as an exhibitor.  Less is known about this group, which does not appear on any publicly available restricted party list.  In 2003, an Iranian resistance group linked Shahid Meisami to chemical and biological weapon-related work and claimed that it housed the Biological Research Center of the Special Industries Organization,[14] a DIO subsidiary that is still subject to U.N. and national sanctions.[15]

The U.N. Secretary General has sought clarification on the trade show from both Iraq and Iran. Predictably, Iran claims that it did not violate resolution 2231 because no actual arms were transferred. Iraq’s response is more worrisome.  Iraqi representatives told the United Nations that the terms of the 14 page resolution are “lengthy, technical and confusing.”[16]  However, the resolution states clearly that countries must “take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the U.N. Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran” until five years following the adoption of the nuclear agreement (October 2020).[17]

Media coverage of the report around the time of its release this summer focused on the Secretary General’s expression of concern that recent Iranian ballistic missile launches were “not consistent with the constructive spirit demonstrated by” the nuclear agreement.[18]  The report’s coverage of Iranian arms exports that appear to constitute violations of resolution 2231, including Iran’s high-level participation at IQDX, received scant attention.   Nor does the Security Council appear to have taken any action following the report, some two months after its release.  Indeed, the evidence is mounting that there is no appetite for robust enforcement of the nuclear agreement and its implementing resolution, less than one year from when they took effect.


Footnotes: 

[1] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section V paragraph 32.

[2] U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), Annex B, paragraph 6b, July 20, 2015.

[3] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section II paragraph 10.

[4] “The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” Section B, available at https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=iran.

[5] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section VI paragraph 35.

[6] “Exhibitors List,” The Fifth Session of the Security, Defense and Iraqi Military Industries International Fair, available at http://iqdexiraq.com/IQDEX2017/exhibitorslist.pdf.

[7] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section II paragraph 11, Section VI figure IV.

[8] “Baghdad Exhibit featuring Iran defense, military capabilities,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), March 5, 2016.

[9] Abbas Qaidaari, “Is Iran becoming a major regional arms producer?” Al-Monitor, March 24, 2016, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/iran-weapons-arms-experts-iraq-syria-lebanon.html.

[10] “Exhibitors List,” The Fifth Session of the Security, Defense and Iraqi Military Industries International Fair, available at http://iqdexiraq.com/IQDEX2017/exhibitorslist.pdf.

[11] “Consolidated List of Sanctions,” European Union, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/8442/consolidated-list-of-sanctions_en.

[12] “Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, Government of Canada, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/iran_sema_regulations-iran_lmes_reglement.aspx?lang=eng&pedisable=true.

[13] “End User List, August 2016, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/tutatu/kaisei/20160329_3.pdf.

[14] “Press Briefing by Soona Samsami and Alireza Jafarzadeh,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-iranian-regimes-programs-biological-weapons-5-15-03.

[15] “The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” Section B, available at https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=iran.

[16] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section II paragraph 12.

[17] U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), Annex B, paragraph 6e, July 20, 2015.

[18] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section II paragraph 8.

The Real Problem with Iran’s Nuclear Exemptions is Secrecy

The controversy over the Iran nuclear agreement was reignited last week, after a new report revealed secret exemptions Iran received in order to meet the requirements of the agreement.  The response to the report has been predictably polarized, reflecting the entrenched political positions either for or against the deal.  While the specific exemptions allegedly received by Iran appear minor, the report did raise a serious concern: the secrecy surrounding oversight of the agreement.  These exemptions were granted by the multilateral Joint Commission overseeing the agreement—a body that operates confidentially.  This Commission has the authority to issue additional exemptions in the future that could materially affect Iran’s nuclear weapon capability, and these decisions would remain hidden from the public.

The new report, published by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), revealed that Iran was exempted from certain requirements of the nuclear agreement in order to expedite its implementation, which took place on January 16, 2016.  The exemptions fell into three categories, according to the Institute’s report.  First, 3.5 percent low-enriched uranium (LEU) contained in low level nuclear waste was not counted toward the 300 kilogram cap on LEU set by the agreement.  Iran also was given a pass on the near 20 percent LEU contained in “lab contaminant,” which was judged “unrecoverable.”  Second, Iran received permission to continue operating 19 hot cells larger in size than permitted by the agreement.  Third, Iran has been allowed to bypass the 130 ton limit on heavy water by storing “large amounts” of heavy water in Oman that nevertheless remained under Iranian control.

On their own, these reported exemptions may appear minor.  LEU in waste or lab contaminant cannot be put through a centrifuge, and therefore the effect on Iran’s breakout time (how long it would take Iran to produce one bomb’s worth of nuclear fuel) is minimal, unless this material is recovered.  That recovery process would have to be reported to the IAEA.  Larger hot cells could separate plutonium if misused, but to do so would violate both Iran’s nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the nuclear deal.  Still, the agreement specifically limits in size the hot cells Iran is permitted to operate for a good reason: their plutonium separation capability.  While the agreement authorizes the Joint Commission to review and approve the use of larger hot cells at Iran’s request, granting Iran an immediate exemption from this limit weakens the deal and could encourage Iran to seek additional such exemptions.  The heavy water issue is also troubling.  It suggests that Iran could use such overseas locations as a sanctuary for other nuclear materials in excess of the agreement’s restrictions and potentially as a storage location for new purchases.  It also exposes a weakness in the deal that gives Iran a financial incentive to produce excess amounts of heavy water as long as it is exported.

But more than the specific exemptions, the real problem is the secrecy with which they were issued by the Joint Commission.  This Commission, which includes representatives from each of the P5+1 countries, Iran, and the European Union, is the agreement’s dispute resolution and oversight body.  As State Department spokesperson John Kirby took pains to repeat at a recent press conference, “the work of the Joint Commission, as stipulated in the agreement itself, is to be confidential.”  Mr. Kirby would not comment on any specific decisions of the Joint Commission and even pointedly refused to use the word “exemption.”

The Commission’s secrecy is troubling because the agreement gives it the authority to review and approve exemption requests from Iran in a range of areas—exemptions that could materially affect Iran’s nuclear capability by loosening the very restrictions that the agreement imposes.  Specifically, the Joint Commission can approve exemptions for research and development on uranium-metal based fuel; the operation of additional larger hot cells; mechanical testing of new types of centrifuges; the export of enrichment or enrichment-related equipment and technology; and the development, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point explosive detonators that could be used for a nuclear explosive device.  Iran could receive an exemption on any of these issues, and the public might never know.

Keeping the Commission’s decisions secret weakens the deal.  It erodes public confidence that the deal is maintaining strict limits on Iran’s nuclear capability.  It raises concern among already skeptical governments not party to the agreement or directly privy to Commission decisions.  And it provides fuel to the deal’s political opponents, who want to see it fail.

The best outcome would be to make Joint Commission’s proceedings more transparent.  If exemptions granted by the Commission are reasonable, few would complain.  The agreement does allow the Commission to “adopt or modify” its procedures if all members agree, but the Commission is unlikely to do so in favor of greater transparency.  Iran, one of seven governments represented on the Commission, would surely object.

Even if the United States cannot change the Commission’s rules, the administration should brief Congress on Commission decisions in a comprehensive way.  It is not clear that this is happening.  According to the State Department spokesman, “the Administration has briefed Congress frequently and comprehensively on all the Joint Commission’s work.”  But Senator Bob Menendez, a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, told Reuters: “I was not aware nor did I receive any briefing (on the exemptions).”  And Congressional sources have told us that members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have not been briefed about the exemptions either.

The Joint Commission’s secrecy, together with the reduced nuclear reporting by the IAEA since the deal was implemented, has resulted in less visibility into Iran’s nuclear program and a troubling lack of transparency on how the agreement is operating.  Congress, independent experts, and the public know less rather than more about what is happening at Iran’s nuclear sites.   While the Obama administration promised that the deal would provide an unprecedented level of visibility into Iran’s nuclear program, reality so far has proven otherwise.

A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program

This is a brief history of Iran’s progress toward the ability to build a nuclear weapon. The emphasis is on achievements, rather than motives. The achievements presented here have been cataloged primarily by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Following a decade of steady expansion and years of diplomacy to halt the progress of Iran’s nuclear program, Iran agreed to an historic accord with six major world powers on July 14, 2015.  The agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), substantially reduced Iran’s known nuclear capability in return for sanctions relief. Under it, Iran has dismantled thousands of uranium-enriching centrifuges, shipped tons of low-enriched uranium to Russia, destroyed the core of a heavy water reactor capable of producing plutonium, and agreed to reconfigure the reactor so as to produce less plutonium.  Before the agreement, Iran might have—by illicit steps—been able to produce the fuel for a nuclear weapon in as little as a few months.  Now Iran would require about a year.  In addition, Iran has promised not to expand its capability beyond its present limit for at least ten years.[1]

The JCPOA was the culmination of years of controversy and diplomatic activity surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.  International interest in Iran was heightened dramatically in the summer of 2002, when the existence of two nuclear sites was revealed by an exiled Iranian resistance group.[2]  Within a year, the world realized that Iran had built or was building everything needed to produce enriched uranium, which could fuel nuclear weapons as well as nuclear reactors. The sites included a uranium mine at Saghand, a yellow cake production plant near Ardakan, a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a commercial-scale enrichment facility on the same site. In addition, Iran was continuing work on a 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr and was building a heavy water production plant at Arak, next to which Iran planned to build a 40 megawatt heavy water reactor. Beginning in March 2003, following revelations that Iran had concealed nuclear work from the IAEA, the Agency began investigating Iran’s nuclear history.[3]  The IAEA now has the responsibility of monitoring and verifying the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA.

Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is benign, legal, and authorized by its membership as a non-nuclear weapon state in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees its members the right “to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”[4]  However, the United States has countered by contending that Iran has no need for nuclear energy and that its civilian energy program serves only to camouflage a nuclear weapon effort.[5] The JCPOA marks a shift away from this position, as the agreement will allow Iran to develop a commercial-scale uranium enrichment program after the first 10 years of the accord.

Early Nuclear Efforts

Under the Shah, Iran launched a series of ambitious nuclear projects that relied on assistance from the United States and Europe. According to Akbar Etemad, the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), from 1974 through 1978, Iran was already carrying out nuclear research and education at the University of Tehran when the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970.[6] The work centered on a five megawatt research reactor supplied by the United States, which began operation in 1967.

By the mid-1970s, according to Etemad, Iran had launched an extensive nuclear energy program. In 1974, the Shah set the goal of producing roughly 23,000 megawatts of electrical power from a series of nuclear power stations within twenty years. A host of contracts between Iran and nuclear suppliers in Europe and the United States followed: Iran struck a deal with Kraftwerk Union (KWU, a Siemens subsidiary) of then-West Germany to build two 1,200 megawatt reactors at Bushehr[7] and negotiated with the French company Framatome for two additional 900 megawatt reactors. In 1974, Iran reportedly invested $1 billion in a French uranium enrichment plant owned by Eurodif, a European consortium.[8] Etemad also described Iran’s indigenous work on the nuclear fuel cycle in the 1970s, including plans for a new nuclear research center at Isfahan and the exploration of uranium mining and ore processing.

The 1979 Iranian revolution halted this work for a number of years. The war with Iraq, which began in 1980, consumed resources and damaged Iran’s existing nuclear infrastructure. The two power reactors under construction at Bushehr were bombed several times,[9] after which Siemens abandoned the project.

During Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, beginning in the late 1980s, Iran’s nuclear program revived. By the early 1990s, as Iran recovered from the war with Iraq, its nuclear program was once again moving forward, based on assistance from Russia, China and Pakistan. With China, Iran signed two nuclear cooperation protocols, in 1985 and again in 1990. And in 1995, Iran concluded a protocol of cooperation with Russia to complete the construction of the reactor at Bushehr and possibly supply a uranium enrichment plant.[10] Some of the items originally contemplated in these deals, like the enrichment plant, were never delivered as a result of pressure from the United States. Others, like Bushehr, served as a screen behind which Iran obtained sensitive equipment that would not be sold on its own because of its bomb-making potential. Throughout the 1990s, entities in Russia and China continued to help Iran, despite occasional pledges from their governments to curtail nuclear assistance. During this period, Iran is also believed to have received uranium enrichment technology through the black market network run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan.[11]

The deals-official and illicit-struck by Iran in the 1990s allowed it to make important progress in its indigenous nuclear effort. By 2003, when the scope of its nuclear program became clear, Iran had already made progress towards mastering the technology needed to make enriched uranium[12], one of the materials that can be used to fuel a nuclear weapon. Because many of its nuclear experiments were conducted in violation of its inspection agreement with the IAEA, Iran was forced to provide new information on this work and to explain its purpose. Iran’s explanations, along with the results of the IAEA’s inspections, were published in a series of Agency reports beginning in June 2003.[13]

Seeking Nuclear Fuel

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear expertise has taken it down two differnt pathways to nuclear weapon fuel: uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing to recover plutonium.  These materials are “fissile” because they are unstable and fission, or split, when struck by neutrons. Both can fuel a nuclear bomb or be used as fuel in a nuclear power reactor. However, producing nuclear fuel, regardless of its ultimate use, is a difficult task.

The Uranium Path

The difficulty in producing a concentrated amount of uranium 235-the fissile form of uranium needed to fuel a nuclear weapon-is that natural uranium contains only a small amount (.7%) of this isotope. Producing a concentrated amount of U-235 requires a series of steps that begins at the mine and ends with the production of enriched uranium fuel. Iran has sought to master each step in this process.

Mining and milling

Before uranium can be refined to fuel a reactor or a bomb, it must be mined. This is the first step in what is referred to as the “front end” of the nuclear fuel cycle. On February 9th, 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami declared that his government intended to extract uranium from a mine at Saghand, in the province of Yazd.[14] The mine is a key part of Iran’s plan to produce nuclear fuel indigenously. According to Dr. Ghannadi-Maragh, the Vice President of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, the mine site consists of two deposits, with a combined reserve of 1,580,000 tons of uranium ore and an average grade of 553 g/tonne.[15]  The Saghand mine has an estimated annual production capacity of 50 tonnes of uranium, according to the IAEA.[16] The Gchine mine, located in the south of Iran near Bandar Abbas, has an estimated production capacity of 21 tonnes of uranium per year.  Iran reported that mining operations at Gchine started in July 2004.[17]  The reserve at Gchine is estimated at 40 tonnes of low but variable grade uranium.[18]

Once mined, uranium ore must be processed into a uranium concentrate called yellowcake. In February 2003, Iranian authorities admitted to producing yellowcake at a milling plant in Ardakan in Yazd Province.[19] The AEOI had approved the construction of a yellowcake production plant in 1994 and contracted with an Iranian company to build the plant in 1999.[20] The Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant has a design capacity that corresponds to that of its associated mine at Saghand, 50 tonnes of uranium per year.[21]

China is believed to have been the source of the Saghand mining technology. Iran has admitted that Chinese experts participated in detailed exploration work for the mine. Experts from China’s Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology have conducted scientific exchanges with Iranian nuclear scientists and have explored in Iran in the past.

Conversion

Once mined and concentrated into yellowcake, the uranium must be converted to a gas. This gaseous form of uranium, called uranium hexafluoride (UF6), serves as the feedstock for centrifuges, which then enrich uranium to a form suitable for either reactor fuel or nuclear weapons. In 2000, the Iranian government informed the IAEA that a plant for uranium conversion was being constructed at Esfahan (Isfahan).[22]  In a speech to the IAEA in May 2003, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of the AEOI, said that the conversion facility, which is located at the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), would be used to convert yellowcake into UF6.[23]

The IAEA received preliminary design inforatmion on the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan in July 2000 and updated design information in April 2003.

According to the design information provided by Iran, the conversion plant was intended to have a number of process lines for transforming uranium compounds.  The planned process lines included steps for converting uranium ore concentrate into UF6 (yielding 200 t annually of UF6 ); converting low enriched UF6 into UO2 (yielding 30 t annually of UO2 enriched to 5% U-235); converting depleted UF6 into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) (yielding 170 t annually of depleted UF4); converting low enriched UF6 into low enriched uranium metal (yielding 30 kg annually of uranium metal enriched to 19.7% U-235); and converting depleted UF4 into depleted uranium metal (yielding 50 t annually of depleted uranium metal).[24]

Iran’s activities at UCF have focused on the first two of these process lines: the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF6 and the production of UO2.  The other process lines are still planned.[25] Iran began conducting hot tests at UCF in May and June 2004, generating about 30-35 kg of UF6.[26] Since the start of conversion activities at UCF, Iran has produced 550 tonnes of natural UF6 at UCF, of which 185 tonnes have been transferred to the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.  Iran has also produced 13.8 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO2 at UCF, of which 13.2 tonnes have been transferred to the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan.  In November 2015, the IAEA reported that Iran has neither produced UO2 at UCF nor transferred any UO2 from UCF to FMP since January 2014.  Iran is continuing R&D activities at UCF on the recovery of uranium from scrap generated from conversion activities.[27]

China is widely acknowledged to be the source of information for the conversion plant. As part of a 1997 agreement with the United States to prevent new cooperation and to halt all existing projects with Iran in the nuclear field, China pledged to cancel a project to help Iran build a conversion plant. Despite this promise, however, China appears to have provided Iran with a blueprint for the plant. Iran admits that the conversion plant is based on a design provided by a foreign supplier in the mid-1990s. China is also believed to have given Iran design information and test reports for equipment.[28]

In addition, China supplied uranium compounds in 1991, which Iran did not declare to the IAEA and which allowed Iran to conduct laboratory tests of the processes to be used in the conversion plant. These compounds included 1000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4 and about 400 kg of natural UO2.[29]

Enrichment

After uranium is mined and converted into a gaseous form, the U-235 isotope must be separated from the more abundant U-238 isotope in a process called enrichment. But because these two uranium isotopes are identical chemically, they cannot be readily separated by a simple chemical reaction. They must be parted by exploiting the slight difference in their weights. Uranium enriched to between three and five percent U-235 is typically used to fuel power reactors of the type Iran is constructing at Bushehr; uranium enriched to 90% or more U-235 can be used to fuel nuclear weapons.

There are a number of different ways to enrich uranium. Iran has focused on gas centrifuge enrichment and has also experimented with laser isotopic separation.

-Centrifuges

Centrifuge separation works by passing UF6 through high-speed rotational machines called centrifuges. The different weights of the uranium isotopes cause them to separate, with the heavier U-238 being thrown to the outside of the centrifuge and the lighter U-235 staying nearer the inside. Centrifuges require several repetitions with the enriched product to reach the desired level of concentration; more repetitions are required to obtain a higher concentration of U-235, which is necessary to produce weapon-grade fuel.

Iran’s centrifuge program was launched in 1985 at facilities controlled by the AEOI in Tehran.[30]  Around 1987, Iran received a centrifuge design through what the IAEA has termed a “foreign intermediary.”[31]  During this first phase of Iran’s centrifuge effort, Iran also obtained about 2,000 components from abroad.[32] According to a February 2004 Malaysian police report, Iran received two containers of centrifuge parts, worth $3 million, through the Khan network.[33]  This transfer allegedly took place between 1994 and 1995.[34]

In 1997, Iran moved its centrifuge development effort to the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran.[35]  According to Iranian authorities, from 1997 through 2002, Kalaye was used to test and assemble centrifuges for uranium enrichment.[36]  In October 2003, after initial denials, Iran admitted that it had used 1.9 kg of UF6, allegedly imported from China in 1991, to test centrifuges at Kalaye.[37] This work took place between 1998 and 2002 and, according to Iranian officials, achieved an enrichment level of 1.2% U-235.[38]  The IAEA first visited parts of Kalaye in March 2003 and Agency inspectors were allowed to take environmental samples at the site during a follow-up visit in August 2003.[39] During this visit, inspectors noted that “considerable modification” had been made to the facility since their visit in March.[40]

Beginning in 2002, Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program was moved to Natanz,[41] the location chosen for a 1,000 centrifuge pilot plant and a commercial-scale facility intended to house over 50,000 centrifuges. According to Iran, the Natanz site will produce nuclear fuel for power plants using uranium enriched from three to five percent U-235.

The Natanz site was revealed publicly in August 2002 by the NCRI[42] and first visited by the IAEA in February 2003. In his report to the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that the site included a pilot plant that was “nearly ready for operation, and a much larger enrichment facility still under construction.”[43]

Iran first used UF6 to test a centrifuge at the pilot plant in June 2003, and in August 2003 tested a ten-machine cascade using UF6.[44] Enrichment work at the pilot plant was suspended beginning in November 2003, following an agreement between Iran and Britain, France and Germany. However, Iran continued to manufacture centrifuge parts and assemble centrifuges at a number of workshops.[45]

The machines at Natanz are of an early European design, similar to the P-1 centrifuge that has been under the control of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan, and which was stolen from Western Europe’s Urenco program during the1970s and 1980s. According to a paper presented by France at a Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in May 2003, Iran was believed to have improved on the Pakistani design and achieved “a model effective enough to consider enrichment on an industrial scale.”[46] Iran’s first-generation centrifuge is referred to as the IR-1.

In addition to the IR-1 centrifuge, Iran has a program to develop more advanced models. Iran received a design for the P-2 in 1994 from what the IAEA termed “foreign sources.”[47] The IAEA has concluded that Iran received the same drawings for the P-2 as Libya,[48] which received the design, along with P-2 components, through the Khan network. The P-2 uses a maraging steel rotor with bellows and is similar to another early European centrifuge design.[49] According to Iran, mechanical testing of the P-2 rotors began in 2002,[50] using carbon composite rotors manufactured domestically rather than rotors made with maraging steel, which Iran was unable to produce.[51] The AEOI contracted with a private company based in Tehran to produce the rotors and to conduct the tests, allegedly without using nuclear material.[52] Iran has procured magnets useful in the P-2 from Asian suppliers and has sought to acquire about 4,000 magnets suitable for the P-2 through a European intermediary.[53]

These investments in equipment and know-how  paid off. By the end of 2007, Iran had commenced feeding uranium hexafluoride gas into approximately 3,000 centrifuges it had installed at its site at Natanz. All were of the IR-1 variety. The number of these centrifuges then rose steadily. By late 2008 Iran had installed almost 5,000 centrifuges, and by August 2015, Iran had installed over 15,000 centrifuges and was feeding gas into more than 9,000 of them.  In February 2013, Iran began installing a more advanced centrifuge model at Natanz, referred to as the IR-2m.  By August 2015, 1,008 IR-2m centrifuges had been installed, though none had been fed with uranium gas. During this same period Iran made great strides in producing uranium hexafluoride at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan. From March 2004 through February 2011, Iran produced a total of 371 tons of this material.[54]

The result was to enable Iran to produce, by November 2015, a stockpile of 8.3 tons of low-enriched uranium (enriched to 3.5% U-235), an amount sufficient to fuel seven nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapon grade.  Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran was required to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to no more than 300 kilograms, a requirement Iran fulfilled by shipping most of its stockpile to Russia in December 2015.[55]

For the first 10 years of the JCPOA, Iran will be permitted to maintain no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and will not be permitted to enrich uranium above 3.67 percent for the first 15 years.  All excess centrifuges were dismantled and stored at Natanz under IAEA monitoring.

Work at Natanz also included experiments at a pilot plant. These have concentrated on the development of more advanced centrifuges, including the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, and IR-8. Some of these machines have been tested with UF6. According to the terms of the JCPOA, Iran is permitted limited research and development activities and testing of these advanced centrifuge models for the first ten years of the agreement.  After ten years, Iran will be permitted to manufacture complete models of advanced centrifuges and begin installing and operating them at the Natanz facility.  After 15 years, Iran will be allowed to install and operate any type of centrifuge at any of its declared uranium enrichment facilities.  Iran’s aim is to make centrifuge operations entirely indigenous, developing not only centrifuge components but also measuring equipment and vacuum pumps.

The most sensitive endeavor at the Natanz pilot plant was  to increase the enrichment level of low-enriched uranium, an essential step to being able to fuel a nuclear weapon. Iran justified this action by claiming that the higher enrichment (to 20% U-235) is necessary to fuel a small  research reactor.  The interim nuclear accord struck with Iran in November 2013 halted this work.  By that date, Iran had produced 450 kg of this material.  According to calculations by the Wisconsin Project, Iran would theoretically need 120 kg of this 20 percent material in order to produce a bomb.

Until halting production in January 2014, Iran was using an experimental cascade of 328 centrifuges at Natanz to produce some 4.4 kg each month of 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride — a level of enrichment which accomplishes 90 percent of the work needed to process natural uranium to weapons grade.

Iran had also been making this 20 percent material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.  Of the nearly 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges installed at the plant, about 700 were contributing to the production of 20 percent enriched uranium before this activity was halted in January 2014.[56]

Fordow was considered a troubling choice for this work. It consists of a series of chambers built into a mountain and fortified against air attack. The plant was built secretly and its existence was only revealed by President Obama in 2009.  Under the JCPOA, Fordow will be converted into a nuclear research center, and no uranium enrichment or enrichment-related research and development will be permitted in the facility for the first 15 years of the agreement.

-Laser Isotopic Separation

Because isotopes of different masses absorb different wavelengths of light, uranium isotopes can be separated by lasers precisely tuned to excite or ionize only the U-235. The U-235 is then separated out using a chemical reaction or magnetic forces that attract the excited atoms and leave behind the neutral ones. Iran has pursued two types of laser enrichment technology: the first, atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS), has achieved the greatest success; the second, molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS), appears not to have progressed as far.

Iran’s laser enrichment program began before the 1979 revolution and relied on assistance from at least four foreign sources.[57]  In 1975, Iran contracted with a foreign supplier for a laboratory to study uranium metal. The laboratory, which was established at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), contained two mass spectrometers. In the late 1970s, Iran contracted with a second supplier for help with the study of MLIS technology.[58]

Then, in 1991, Iran ordered a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory (LSL) and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (CSL) from a third supplier.[59] Iran received 50 kg of natural uranium metal from the same supplier in 1993. Both laboratories were originally set up at the TNRC,[60] where, between 1999 and 2000, eight kilograms of uranium metal were used in AVLIS enrichment experiments.[61] The labs were then relocated to Lashkar Ab’ad in October 2002,[62] where further AVLIS enrichment experiments were carried out using 22 kg of the uranium metal.[63] Iran had previously established a pilot plant for laser enrichment at Lashkar Ab’ad.[64] According to Iranian laboratory reports supplied to the IAEA, the average level of enrichment in these experiments was between eight and nine percent, and occasionally as high as 15%.[65] This is above the level of three percent Iran had originally claimed.[66] The IAEA has estimated that Iran’s AVLIS installation at Lashkar Ab’ad had the capacity to produce one gram of uranium per hour, but could not operate continuously.[67]

Iran contracted with a fourth supplier in the late 1990s for information and equipment related to laser enrichment but secured only some of the equipment it had requested, which was delivered to Lashkar Ab’ad. This equipment was suitable for use in AVLIS experiments.[68]

After conducting this laboratory-scale work, and before informing the IAEA of it, Iran dismantled the relevant equipment and moved it to a storage facility at Karaj.[69]

The Plutonium Path

Iran has also sought the ability to produce plutonium, a second fissile material that can be used to fuel nuclear weapons. But because plutonium exists naturally only in trace amounts, it must be manufactured in a nuclear reactor. This is done by bombarding U-238 reactor fuel with slow neutrons. When the U-238 captures a neutron, the U-239 isotope is produced, which decays into plutonium 239.

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)

In the late 1960s, the United States supplied the TNRC with a five megawatt research reactor, hot cells and 93% enriched uranium reactor fuel.[70]  The United States stopped the fuel supply after the revolution. In the late 1980s, Argentina reportedly helped Iran reconfigure the reactor’s core and later provided about 115 kg of uranium enriched to 20% U-235.[71] This fuel was delivered in 1992.

In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that between 1988 and 1992 it had irradiated depleted uranium dioxide targets (UO2) in the reactor and then conducted plutonium separation experiments in hot cells in a nearby building.[72] According to Iran, seven kilograms of UO2 were irradiated, three kilograms of which were processed into separated plutonium.[73]  The separated plutonium was presented to inspectors from the IAEA in November 2003 at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories, located at the TNRC.[74]  Iran estimated that it had produced 200 micrograms.[75]  However, the inspectors concluded that Iran understated the amount of plutonium and that the age of the plutonium was less than the 12-16 years Iran declared.[76]

Light-water reactor at Bushehr

Russia has constructed a 1,000 megawatt pressurized light-water reactor at the Iranian port of Bushehr. Russia took over the project in 1995, after Germany halted its construction of the plant. The plant is capable of contributing about four percent of Iran’s total electricity output to the national power grid.[77]  The facility is also capable of providing Iran with enough weapon-grade plutonium to construct approximately 35 nuclear weapons annually. This assessment is based on an estimate of the plutonium output from a typical 1,000 megawatt pressurized light-water power reactor.

To use the plutonium from Bushehr in a nuclear weapon, however, Iran would have to construct a plant to extract plutonium from the spent reactor fuel. Iran would also have to keep the spent fuel. Russia has an agreement with Iran to provide low-enriched uranium fuel through the first decade of the Bushehr plant’s operation, and the spent fuel will be returned to Russia in accordance with a protocol signed in February 2005. Iran has also agreed to allow the reactor and its fuel to be inspected by the IAEA, so any unauthorized use of the fuel would violate Iran’s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

After years of delay, the billion dollar reactor has reached completion. Preliminary testing began in late February 2009 and delivery of the reactor fuel needed for start-up, some 82 tons, was completed in January 2008. The reactor was connected to Iran’s national grid on September 12, 2011, and commissioning for the reactor began in January 2012.  Iran took control of the Bushehr reactor from Russia in September 2013.

Despite Iran’s promises to return the spent fuel, Iran has made purchasing attempts that indicate it seeks a capacity to reprocess and manipulate spent fuel. According to a May 2003 French paper submitted to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Iran has sought to acquire high density radiation shielding windows for hot cells and 28 remote manipulators from the French nuclear industry.[78] Such equipment is expressly designed for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

Heavy water technology

Iran has also sought to master heavy water technology. Iran decided to  develop a heavy water production plant and a heavy water research reactor at a site in the Khondab area near Arak, approximately 150 miles southwest of Tehran,. The existence of the heavy water production plant was first revealed by the NCRI in August 2002[79] and verified by commercial satellite imagery in December 2002.[80] The heavy water plant was inaugurated in August 2006 and, using satellite imagery, the IAEA has judged the plant to be operational.  Iran informed the IAEA that the two heavy water production lines at Arak would produce about 16 tons of heavy water annually.

On May 5, 2003, Iran also announced plans to build a 40 megawatt thermal heavy water research reactor, called the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), at the same site.[81] The reactor, fueled by natural UO2, was designed to use heavy water as both coolant and moderator.[82]  Iran has admitted that it received some foreign assistance for the design of the reactor; the United States suspects that Russia provided the help.

The heavy water reactorwas the subject of a visit by the IAEA in November 2010. The IAEA inspectors confirmed that civil construction at the site was “almost complete” and that some major equipment, including the pressurizer for the reactor cooling system and the main crane in the reactor building, had been installed. In May 2013, the IAEA confirmed that the reactor vessel had arrived at Arak and that major components had been installed at the reactor.  In June 2013, Iran installed the main reactor vessel at Arak.[83]

Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran was required to remove the calandria from the reactor at Arak and fill it with concrete, rendering it inoperable.  The IAEA verified that Iran had fulfilled this requirement in January 2016.[84] Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran is prohibited from pursuing the construction of the IR-40 reactor based on its original design.  Instead, with the assistance of an international consortium, Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor to minimize the production of plutonium.  The nominal power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth.[85]

Iran has always claimed that the IR-40 is intended for civilian research and development and for the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. However, most states that have built this type of reactor, which is widely considered larger than necessary for research, have used it to produce bombs. The well-known precedents are Israel’s Dimona reactor, supplied by France and Norway, and India’s Cirus reactor, supplied by Canada and the United States.

Some fuel for the original IR-40 reactor had been produced at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant at Esfahan.  On May 23, 2009, IAEA inspectors were able to visit the facility.  It was operational and had produced natural uranium pellets to fuel the heavy water reactor at Arak.  Iran ceased the production of fuel assemblies for the Arak reactor after the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action in January 2014.  All previously produced fuel assemblies remained at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant.

Weaponization?

Every country trying to develop a nuclear weapon has faced two challenges. First came the need to produce a critical mass of fissile material-uranium 235 or plutonium-the metals needed to fuel a first-generation bomb. The second challenge was to produce a device that could cause the uranium or plutonium to explode in a nuclear chain reaction. This second process is called weaponization.

A number of the activities and experiments Iran has undertaken, when coupled with its concealment efforts and its firm commitment to mastering the production of fissile material, suggest that Iran could be trying to make a nuclear device.

In September 2003, the IAEA discovered that Iran had produced polonium-210, a radioisotope with a half-life of 138 days.[86] Iran conducted Po-210 production experiments in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) between 1989 and 1993 by irradiating bismuth metal.[87] One of the best-known uses for Po-210 is as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons.[88] It also has civilian applications, such as in nuclear batteries.[89] However, the IAEA considers the applications of Po-210-based nuclear batteries to be extremely limited.[90] Iran has said that the experiments were part of a study on neutron sources, but has been unable to provide documentation supporting this purported intent.[91]

There have also been reports that Iran has sought deuterium gas from Russia.[92] According to an intelligence report citing Russian sources that was circulated at the IAEA in July 2004, Iranian middlemen negotiated with companies in Russia to purchase deuterium gas after failing to produce it domestically. Deuterium gas is used, in conjunction with tritium, to boost the yield of fission bombs. Deuterium and tritium are hydrogen isotopes that release neutrons and energy when they fuse in thermonuclear explosions.

In addition, French intelligence services have reported that Iran has sought items useful for nuclear tests and simulation, including documentation on flash radiography equipment and pulse generators.[93] Iran has also tried to purchase machines that can be used to shape uranium or plutonium metal, such as isostatic presses and vacuum furnaces.[94] And according to a May 2003 media report, a Swede of Iranian origin arranged the purchase of 44 high-voltage switches for Iran from Behlke Electronic GmbH, a German company. The switches, which were reportedly seized by German customs agents, could be used to trigger nuclear weapons.[95][96][97]

Beyond its procurement efforts, the way in which Iran has organized and delegated its nuclear work to entities related to the defense ministry could suggest a military purpose. According to the IAEA, seven of the 13 workshops dedicated to the domestic production of centrifuge components are located on sites controlled by the ministry of defense.[98]

Moreover, if Iran received the same package of nuclear goods from the Khan network as did Libya-an eventuality that is widely suspected-then it could have received the same Chinese-origin bomb design. China is believed to have supplied Pakistan with a tested nuclear bomb design in the early 1980s. It is reportedly this design that the Khan network resold to Libya, along with documents in Chinese containing detailed instructions on how to manufacture parts for and assemble an implosion-type device.

Suspicions about Iran’s intentions have also been increased by Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA. In early February 2008, the IAEA presented member states, including Iran, with specific evidence that Iran had pursued work related to nuclear weapons. In its May 2008 report, the Agency listed eighteen documents supporting these allegations. Iran has called the documents “forged” or “fabricated,” and refuses to help the Agency investigate their validity by providing access to individuals, records and sites. For instance, it has barred IAEA inspectors from interviewing Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, former head of the Physics Research Center who was reportedly described by the IAEA as the Iranian military official in charge of Iran’s nuclear effort.

In 2011, the IAEA consolidated all of its outstanding questions about Iran’s alleged efforts to pursue nuclear weaponization research: the so-called “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.” The analysis in the report was based on information that the Agency received from IAEA member states, from the Agency’s own investigative efforts, and from information provided by Iran.  The IAEA judged the allegations of work on nuclear weapons “to be, overall, credible” and “consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved, and time frames.”[99]

The 2011 IAEA report contained detailed information about Iran’s effort to develop a nuclear weapon, including:

  • computer modeling of implosion, compression, and nuclear yield, as recently as 2009;
  • high explosive tests simulating a nuclear explosion but using non-nuclear material in order to see whether an implosion device would work;
  • the construction of at least one containment vessel at a military site, in which to conduct such high explosive tests;
  • studies on detonation of high explosive charges, in order to ensure uniform compression in an implosion device, including at least one large scale experiment in 2003, and experimental research after 2003;
  • support from a foreign expert, reportedly a former Soviet weapon scientist named Vyacheslav Danilenko, in developing a detonation system suitable for nuclear weapons and a diagnostic system needed to monitor the detonation experiments;
  • manufacture of a neutron initiator, which is placed in the core of an implosion device and, when compressed, generates neutrons to start a nuclear chain reaction, along with validation studies on the initiator design from 2006 onward;
  • the development of exploding bridgewire detonators (EBWs) used in simultaneous detonation, which are needed to initiate an implosive shock wave in fission bombs;
  • the development of high voltage firing equipment that would enable detonation in the air, above a target, in a fashion only making sense for a nuclear payload;
  • testing of high voltage firing equipment to ensure that it could fire EBWs over the long distance needed for nuclear weapon testing, when a device might be located down a deep shaft;
  • a program to integrate a new spherical payload onto Iran’s Shahab-3 missile, enabling the missile to accommodate the detonation package described above.[100]

Between 2011 and 2015, the IAEA regularly reported that the Iran was evading questions related to the Agency’s investigation of Iran’s alleged weaponization efforts.  When the JCPOA was agreed to in July 2015, Iran and the IAEA also signed a “Road-Map” agreement intended to resolve all of the IAEA’s outstanding questions related to this investigation.  As part of a separate agreement, the IAEA received environmental samples from the Parchin military base, which was a suspected site of nuclear weapons experimentation.  The samples were reportedly collected by Iranians under IAEA monitoring by video and still cameras and GPS tracking.[101]

On December 2, 2015, the IAEA issued its final report on Iran’s alleged weaponization efforts, concluding that Iran had a coordinated nuclear weapon-related program until 2003, and that some weapon-related activities continued through 2009.[102]  The IAEA report disclosed that Iran did not provide new information or meaningful information for most of the 12 outstanding issues in the IAEA’s investigation.  To many of the Agency’s questions, Iran offered no new information, or made denials without explanation, or gave explanations contradicted by other information available to the Agency.  Nonetheless, the IAEA Board of Governors voted unanimously to close the Agency’s investigation on December 15, 2015.[103]

Safeguards Violations

Under the NPT, Iran must allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear-related material so that the Agency can verify its peaceful use. This includes what the NPT calls all “source or special fissionable material” and all facilities where such materials are being used, processed or produced anywhere on Iran’s territory or anywhere under its control. Iran must also tell the IAEA about changes to its nuclear material inventory and submit inventory change reports when necessary.[104] Finally, Iran is required to provide updated design information on its nuclear facilities and information on facilities where nuclear material is held or stored.[105]

In a report to the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2003, following four months of Agency inspections in Iran, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei concluded that Iran “has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”[106]  Following that conclusion, the IAEA has documented a number of instances in which Iran violated its safeguards agreement by failing to report:

  • The import of nearly 2,000 kg of uranium compounds (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4 and 400 kg of UO2) in 1991,[107] allegedly from China;
  • The processing of 1.9 kg of UF6 (imported in 1991) in centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company, which produced 1.2% enriched uranium;[108]
  • The conversion of 9.43 kg of the UF4 imported in 1991 into UF6 in a laboratory at the TNRC;[109]
  • The production of uranium metal in a laboratory at the TNRC in the 1990s using 376.6 kg of UF4 imported in 1991;[110]
  • The production of 2.5 kg of UF4 using UO2 imported in 1991;[111]
  • The irradiation of several grams of UO2 in the TRR and its subsequent processing in a laboratory at the TNRC;[112]
  • The irradiation of 3 kg of depleted UO2 targets in the TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments carried out in hot cells at the TNRC, in which about 200 micrograms of plutonium were produced;[113]
  • The import of 50 kg of natural uranium metal in 1993;[114]
  • The processing of 30 kg of the uranium metal imported in 1993 in two series of AVLIS enrichment experiments: first between 1999 and 2000 at the TNRC using 8 kg of uranium, and second at Lashkar Ab’ad between October 2002 and February 2003 using 22 kg of uranium metal;[115]
  • Pilot-scale laser enrichment operations at the TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad using imported equipment and failing to provide design information on these sites;[116]
  • The transfer of nuclear equipment and material used in laser experiments to a waste storage facility at Karaj, and failing to provide design information on this new site;[117]
  • The use of uranium compounds imported in 1977 and exempted from inspection (U3O8 and depleted UO2) and yellowcake imported in 1982 in experiments at two laboratories at the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Technology Center;[118]
  • The use of depleted UO2, which Iran had originally declared as material lost during experiments, to produce UF4 in a laboratory at the TNRC;[119]
  • Research and development work on a more advanced centrifuge, known as the P-2, which should have been disclosed to the IAEA in Iran’s October 2003 full nuclear report to the Agency. This omission violated Iran’s obligations under the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which Iran had agreed to honor, pending ratification in the Iranian parliament.[120]

Footnotes: 

[1] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), July 14, 2015, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iran_joint_comprehensive_plan_of_action.pdf

[2] New Information on the Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program, Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh, National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 14, 2002, (via Iran Watch): /library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02.

[3] Statement to the IAEA Board of Directors, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), March 17, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-director-generals-statement/statement-director-general-mohamed-6.

[4] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 22, 1970: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf

[5] U.S. State Department Briefing with Deputy Spokesman J. Adam Ereli, November 19, 2004, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/us/dos/us-dos-depspokesperson-111904.htm.

[6] Akbar Etemad, “Iran.’ A European Non-Proliferation Policy. Ed. Harald Muller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. p. 207.

[7] “Iran’s Nuclear Power Profile,” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), updated on December 2002, p. 438, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/other-iaea-document/irans-nuclear-power-profile-iaea.

[8] Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, September 30, 2003, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/iran/iran-mfa-soltanieh-092003.htm.

[9] Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Delayed by Another Year, Islamic Republic News Agency, August 22, 2004, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/iran/iran-irna-sabouri-bushehrdelay-082204.htm.

[10] V.N. Mikhailov and R. Amrollah, Protocol of Negotiations, January 8, 1995, (via Iran Watch): /library/government/russia/russia-protocol-negotiation-between-iran-and-russia.

[11] Richard P. Cronin, Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options, January 25, 2005, p. 11-12, (via Iran Watch): /library/government/united-states/congress/congressional-research-service-reports/pakistans-nuclear-proliferation-activities-and-recommendations-911.

[12] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), November 10, 2003, p. 6-7, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[13] For access to all IAEA reports and statements on Iran, see: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports

[14] Iranian President Mohammad Khatami on the Right of all Nations to Nuclear Energy, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), February 9, 2003, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/Iran/iran-irna-khatami-yazd-isfahan-kashan-020903.htm.

[15] Mohammad Saeidi, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities in Iran,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, September 7, 2005, p. 3, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/iran/iran-aeoi-worldnuclearassociation-saeidi-090705.pdf.

[16] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/83, p. 2, November 15, 2004, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/iaea-iranreport-111504.pdf

[17] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/83, p. 3, November 15, 2004, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-83.pdf

[18] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2008/4, p. 5, February 22, 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-4.pdf; Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/83, p. 3, November 15, 2004, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-83.pdf

[19] “Latest Developments in the Nuclear Program of Iran, in Particular on the Plutonium Way,” Presentation by France at the Nuclear Suppliers Group Information Exchange Meeting, May, 2003, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/france/france-nsgpaper-2003-.htm.

[20] M. Ghannadi-Maragheh, “Iranian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Experience,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, September 3, 2003, p. 4-5, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/government/iran/iran-aeoi-worldnuclearassociation-ghannadi-090303.pdf.

[21]  Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/83, p. 3, November 15, 2004, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-83.pdf

[22] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/40, p. 5, June 6, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-3.

[23] Reza Aghazadeh, “Iran’s Nuclear Policy: Peaceful, Transparent, Independent,” IAEA Headquarters, May 6, 2005, p. 5, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/IAEAgovdocs/iran-iaeastatement-aghazadeh-050603.pdf.

[24] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 1, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[25] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2015/50, p. 10, August 27, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-50-derestr.pdf

[26] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/60, p. 9, September 1, 2004, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-60.pdf

[27] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2015/65, pp. 11-12, November 18, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-65.pdf

[28] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 1, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[29] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/40, p. 2, June 6, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-3.

[30] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[31] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[32] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[33] Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme, Royal Malaysia Police Office, February 20, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/government/malaysia/royal-police-office/press-release-inspector-general-police-relation-investigation-alleged-production-components-libya%E2%80%99s.

[34] Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme, Royal Malaysia Police Office, February 20, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/government/malaysia/royal-police-office/press-release-inspector-general-police-relation-investigation-alleged-production-components-libya%E2%80%99s.

[35] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[36] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[37] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 9, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[38] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 9, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[39] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/63, p. 7, August 26, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-2.

[40] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/63, p. 7, August 26, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-2.

[41] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 8, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[42] Alireza Jafarzadeh, New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program, National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 14, 2002, (via Iran Watch): /library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02.

[43] Mohammed ElBaradei, Statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, March 17, 2003, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/international/iaea/iaea-iranvisit-031703.htm.

[44] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/63, p. 7, August 26, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-2.

[45] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, p. 8, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[46] Latest Developments in the Nuclear Program of Iran, In Particular on the Plutonium Way, Nuclear Suppliers Group: France, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/government/france/france-nsg-paper-latest-developments-nuclear-program-iran.

[47] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA): GOV/2004/11, p. 8, February 24, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-0.

[48] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 6, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[49] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA): GOV/2004/11, p. 8, February 24, 2004, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-iranreport-022404.pdf.

[50] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 6, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[51] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA): GOV/2004/11, p. 8, February 24, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-0.

[52] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA): GOV/2004/11, p. 8, February 24, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-0.

[53] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 7, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[54] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2015/65, pp. 11, November 18, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-65.pdf

[55] Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/INF/2016/1, p. 4, January 16, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2016-1.pdf; David E. Sanger and Andrew E. Kramer, “Iran Hands Over Stockpile of Enriched Uranium to Russia,” New York Times, December 28, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-hands-over-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-to-russia.html

[56] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2014/10, p. 8, February 20, 2014, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-10.pdf

[57] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 10, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[58] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 10-11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[59] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 10, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[60] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 10-11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[61] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 2, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[62] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[63] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[64] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[65] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 7, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[66] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 7, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[67] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2004/34, Annex p. 8, June 1, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-ira-11.

[68] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[69] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 11, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[70] Communication dated 12 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): INFCIRC/657, p. 4, September 15, 2005, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf

[71] Technical Cooperation Project Schedules for 1991-1992, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), p. C.168, October 29, 1990, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/project-schedules-1991-92.

[72] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 5, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[73] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 5, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[74] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/75, Annex 1 p. 6, November 10, 2003, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-1.

[75] Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA): GOV/2004/11, p. 5, February 24, 2004, (via Iran Watch): /library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-report/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-0.

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[79] Alireza Jafarzadeh, New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program, National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 14, 2002, (via Iran Watch):: /library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02.

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[84] Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/INF/2016/1, pp. 1-2, January 16, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2016-1.pdf

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[92] Intelligence Report Citing Russian Sources, Circulated at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), July 2004: (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/international/iaea/iaea-iran_report_d_t.pdf.

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[95] Iran’s Suppliers, “Eddie Johansson”, (via Iran Watch): http://www.iranwatch.org/search/view_record.asp?sc=suppliers&id=95.

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[101] Thomas Erdbrink and David E. Sanger, “Atomic Agency Defends How Iran Collected Evidence at Secret Base,” New York Times, September 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/middleeast/iran-gives-un-nuclear-inspectors-samples-from-secret-military-base.html

[102] Final Assessment of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2015/68, December 2, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf

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