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Israeli A-Bombs and Norwegian Heavy Water: Arms Control Through Public Pressure

Remarks in Rjukan, Norway

Despite its small size, Norway has made a large contribution to the spread of nuclear weapons–essentially by selling heavy water. According to the Norwegian government, by 1987 Norway had produced 440 to 450 tons of heavy water, and virtually every kilogram of it was exported. Norway started a small heavy water reactor of its own at Halden in 1957, but Norway imported 16 tons of American heavy water to fill it. This left Norway free to sell its own water on the world market–at a higher price. American heavy water was available only with inspection rights; Norwegian water was usually available without such rights.

Twenty tons went into Israel’s Dimona reactor in 1963, which has now made enough plutonium for well over 100 atomic bombs.

One hundred fifty-one tons went into France’s Celestin reactors in the 1960s, which made the tritium for the first French hydrogen bomb, set off in 1968. Since then, these reactors have produced both plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons. France also imported about 150 tons of heavy water from the United States, at roughly the same time. France used the American water to run the French civilian heavy water reactors, leaving the Norwegian water free for bombs.

Twenty-seven point seven tons went to India, which smuggled 15.2 tons through Germany and Switzerland in 1983, and smuggled 12.5 tons through Romania in 1986, all for uninspected reactors. These reactors too are making plutonium for atomic bombs.

Eighty tons went to Sweden for a reactor that Sweden hoped would produce plutonium for its secret nuclear weapon program. The Swedes canceled the program in 1970; otherwise, Norwegian heavy water would have made bombs in Norway’s back yard.

In April 1990, Israel agreed to return 10.5 of the 21 tons it had imported (one more ton was shipped in 1970), ending more than three years of controversy over Israel’s use of the water to make atomic bombs. The controversy started in 1986, when the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which I direct, revealed Norway’s right to inspect the water. Working through the American and Norwegian press, and enlisting the help of Norwegian legislators, the Project forced Israel to account for at least part of Norway’s water. The Project also publicized the fact that most of Norway’s heavy water exports had gone directly into nuclear weapon programs around the world. As a result, Norway stopped exporting heavy water permanently.

This campaign was only partially successful. Israel was not made to account for the plutonium that it had already produced with the heavy water–now the backbone of Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Project’s work in Norway is an example of how, by forcing governments to live up to their international commitments, nuclear proliferation can at least be slowed if not stopped. When quiet diplomacy through official channels fails, as it did in Norway and Israel, international media campaigns can be an effective alternative.

Background: Israel’s Nuclear Program

Israel’s nuclear program began and still operates in secret. But in the 1980s, the crucial role played by foreign suppliers began to be revealed. Norway was only one of the countries that helped Israel become the world’s sixth most powerful nuclear state.

In the late 1950s, France built Israel’s Dimona reactor, still the main source of Israel’s plutonium–its main nuclear weapon material. The reactor’s heavy water, essential to achieve a chain reaction, was supplied by Norway in 1959, which sent twenty tons. In 1963, when the reactor started operation, the United States supplied four more tons.

From 1965 through 1969, U.S. nuclear specialists inspected Dimona every year, looking for signs of nuclear weapon production. It is not clear whether they found any, but in 1968 the Central Intelligence Agency reported to President Johnson that Israel had already made an atomic bomb.

In 1976, the CIA told the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a secret briefing that Israel was building bombs with plutonium from Dimona. In 1980, the former head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Francis Perrin, acknowledged that French companies had helped build a plant in Israel to extract plutonium from Dimona’s spent fuel and that France and Israel had helped each other design nuclear weapons.

In 1982 French investigative journalist Pierre Pean, who had gained access to the official French files on Dimona, published Les Deux Bombes, a book revealing that Dimona’s cooling circuits were two to three times larger than necessary for a 24-megawatt reactor–proof that Dimona had always been intended to make bomb- quantities of plutonium. The book also confirmed that French technicians had built a plutonium extraction plant at the same site. According to Pean, Israel had extracted enough plutonium from spent fuel for a nuclear weapon by 1966 or 1967.

Norway’s Inspection Rights

On November 10, 1986, the Wisconsin Project released its study, “Israel’s Nuclear Shadow,” which traced Israel’s nuclear development. The study revealed that Israel was using Norwegian heavy water in the Dimona reactor, and that Israel had promised both the United States and Norway that it would not use their heavy water to make nuclear weapons and would allow both countries to inspect the water to verify that the peaceful use pledge was being kept. Articles based on the study appeared in the U.S. and Norwegian press the following week.

The Project’s study was timed to follow the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli technician who had worked at Dimona for eight years, and who had recounted his experience a month earlier in the London Sunday Times. Vanunu described Dimona’s underground plutonium factory, offered evidence that Israel was making thermonuclear weapons, and said that the Dimona reactor had been scaled up twice before he arrived in 1977.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry flatly rejected the Project’s findings. It said that as far as it knew, Israel was using the heavy water for peaceful purposes.

The Media Campaign

On January 21, 1987, the Project published its first op-ed in Arbeiderbladet, the newspaper allied with the governing Labor party. On February 6, 1987, the Norwegian Broadcasting Company (the official state network) followed with an hour-long radio documentary on Norway’s heavy water exports, including interviews with British physicist Frank Barnaby and me. Barnaby and I both charged that Israel was making nuclear weapons and urged Norway to exercise its inspection rights.

A week later the Norwegian government reacted. It said that it would ask Israel informally to allow an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel rejected this request in April, stating that it would be impossible to distinguish Norwegian heavy water from stocks received from other sources. Israel also said that the IAEA was biased against Israel and would not perform a fair inspection.

In May the Wisconsin Project published a second article in Arbeiderbladet, rebutting Israel’s claims and pointing out that Israel was the first country in history to break an inspection pledge on a “peaceful” nuclear import. The Project argued that if Israel would not allow an IAEA inspection, Norway should exercise its right under the 1959 agreement to demand that Israel return the heavy water.

At the end of September 1987, Israel formally denied the request for an IAEA inspection. In October Norway sent a technical team to Israel but the team was not allowed to conduct an inspection. On November 18, Foreign Policy magazine published my article entitled, “Heavy Water Cheaters,” which described the critical role that heavy water had played in the French, Indian and Israeli nuclear weapon programs, and called for stronger enforcement of supplier controls. “Heavy Water Cheaters” generated front page stories in Norway’s national newspapers, stories in the American and Israeli press, and radio and TV broadcasts in Norway and the United States, intensifying the pressure on Norway to pursue its inspection rights. The Project also revealed that Israel had admitted privately that it was operating Dimona with Norwegian heavy water, therefore giving Norway the clear right to apply Israel’s peaceful use pledge to at least some of the plutonium Dimona had produced.

In April 1988, Israel offered a compromise: it would allow Norwegian representatives to inspect about nine tons of heavy water which, it claimed, were all that remained of the original 21-ton purchase after operating losses. The inspection would take place away from Dimona, Norway would not have access to any Israeli plutonium, and Israel would not even guarantee that the water inspected was Norwegian. The Project published an op-ed in Arbeiderbladet terming the offer “a heavy water whitewash.” I traveled to Norway on May 1 to meet with members of Parliament and the Norwegian diplomats negotiating with Israel. I urged in news interviews that Norway reject the compromise. During the visit, I also publicized diversions of Norwegian heavy water by West Germany in 1983 and Romania in 1986, increasing the Norwegian government’s embarrassment over the issue and fueling demands by opposition politicians for a more responsible nuclear export policy.

On June 9, an Israeli delegation in Norway nevertheless initialed the proposed compromise. Several Norwegian parliamentarians, including Foreign Relations Committee chairman Kare Willoch, criticized the agreement on radio and in the newspapers, and Norway’s Foreign Minister then agreed not to approve the agreement without the consent of the Foreign Relations Committee. I visited Norway again at the end of June and met with Mr. Willoch, after which he announced in a televised press conference that he could not support the compromise. He said: “I find it impossible for Norway to give up its right to inspect not only in the future but also to find out what happened in the past….” This statement effectively killed the compromise and threw the issue back into the arena of bilateral negotiations, where it would remain for nearly another two years.

After the death of the compromise, the Project continued to publish articles and work with journalists. The object was to pressure the Norwegian government to hold Israel accountable for the plutonium it was still making with Norwegian heavy water. The Project urged Norway to seek U.S. assistance in making Israel open up its nuclear program. But American leaders struck a hands-off posture throughout the debate, saying that while they supported Norway’s efforts “in principle,” the U.S. involvement had not been officially requested. They also said that they were satisfied that the four tons of U.S.-origin heavy water in Israel were being held according to the terms of the Israeli-American sales agreement.

On November 2, 1988, Norwegian Broadcasting aired a 50-minute television documentary, “Norwegian Heavy Water For Nuclear Weapons,” based on the Wisconsin Project’s work and documenting the Project’s charge that most of Norway’s heavy water exports around the world were being used to make nuclear weapons. In response to the program, the Norwegian government announced that it would permanently end heavy water exports.

The inspection issue was not finally resolved until April 1990, when Israel announced that it had agreed to sell 10.5 tons of heavy water back to Norway rather than allow a Norwegian inspection in Israel. Israel maintained that 10.5 tons were all that remained of the original purchase after operating losses at Dimona. Unfortunately, Israel refused to allow inspection of the plutonium illegally made with Norway’s heavy water–enough for about one hundred atomic bombs. Israel also kept about eight of Norway’s original 21 tons of heavy water. According to the Project’s calculation, Israel had exaggerated spillage and evaporation rates at Dimona and still had about 18.5 rather than 10.5 tons of the original purchase on hand. Socialist Left leader Theo Koritzinsky acknowledged that Norway could not even be sure that the heavy water Israel returned would be Norwegian, but he called the arrangement “the next best solution” to inspection.

Lessons

Limited as this victory was, it marked the first time anyone had pressured Israel into doing anything significant in its nuclear program that it did not want to do. The three-year controversy offers three important lessons:

The danger of secrecy. The 1959 sale of heavy water was ostensibly a peaceful nuclear export. There was no reason why it should have remained hidden until 1986. Norway has claimed that Israel wanted the deal to be secret to avoid scrutiny of Dimona; Israel has claimed that Norway wanted the deal to be secret to avoid embarrassment from the sale. Regardless of who is right, it is now clear that if the deal had been public from the start, Norway would have been obliged to inspect the water from the start, and Israel could not have used it to make plutonium for nuclear weapons.

The power of media pressure. The Norwegian government had no desire to enforce its rights in Israel. But heavy media pressure created so much embarrassment that it had no choice. This was especially true after opposition parties in Parliament became involved. To maintain this pressure, the Project wrote six articles in Norwegian newspapers, wrote several articles in U.S. newspapers, generated and provided the background for more than thirty news stories in the Norwegian and U.S. press, inspired and helped make a television documentary, and gave repeated briefings to key members of the Norwegian parliament. Without the political momentum that this work generated, the Norwegian government would have quietly sent this issue to an early grave.

Enforcing supplier controls. Norway is only one of the nuclear supplier countries. Others, such as Germany, have export records that are worse. Yet on paper, almost all of these countries require sellers of sensitive goods to get licenses, and almost all require end users to pledge peaceful use and even allow inspection of the sensitive goods they buy. It is vital to make the suppliers’ actions match their words. Now that Iraq has shown everyone how easy it is to buy a nuclear weapon program, it is up to the supplier countries to change their ways. If they must be embarrassed into doing so, it will be well worth the effort.

Testimony: American Trade Relations with China

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and the Environment
Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

May 20, 1993

I am pleased to be able to address these subcommittees today on the question of American trade relations with China–and more specifically, on whether China should continue to enjoy the status of a most favored nation.

I believe that China should lose that status unless it stops sabotaging Western efforts to curb nuclear and missile proliferation. Unless China changes its export behavior, the proliferation problem can’t be solved. China is now the leading supplier of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology to the developing world. During the 1980s and 1990s, China supplied billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear and missile technology to South Asia, South Africa, South America and the Middle East. It did so in the teeth of U.S. protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on today. And while they do, they make it virtually impossible for the United States and the West to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction–a trend that endangers everyone.

North Korea

The North Korean A-bomb program now threatens to start a nuclear arms race in Asia. Instead of cooperating with the rest of the world in pressuring North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung to give up the bomb, China is in favor of coddling him. On March 12, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency insisted on visiting two suspected nuclear waste sites. North Korea refused the inspections, violating its Treaty pledge. On April 2, when the IAEA voted to refer the violation to the U.N. Security Council, only China and Libya voted against it. China also warned that it would oppose Security Council sanctions if the matter came to a vote there. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said that “it is a question mark” whether Pyongyang is building nuclear weapons and claimed that “dialogue is more effective than pressure”–ignoring the fact that China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner.

North Korea’s withdrawal becomes effective June 12. China remains the biggest roadblock to sanctions. Despite its claim that it does not want a nuclear North Korea, Beijing’s threat of a using its U.N. veto boils down to shielding Pyongyang’s nuclear bomb program.

Pakistan

According to a stream of news reports, U.S. intelligence recently spotted Chinese M-11 missiles, or at least their components, moving through the Pakistani port of Karachi. The M-11 flies over 186 miles with a nuclear-sized payload, so by selling it China is violating its promise to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Regime is an agreement among supplier nations to prohibit the sale of this sized missile to a country like Pakistan. Since Pakistan can also make nuclear warheads, China is taking India and Pakistan another step closer to a possible nuclear war.

Syria

In early 1992, U.S. officials said that China had delivered about 30 tons of ingredients for making solid missile fuel to Syria, and that China planned to send 60 more tons soon afterward. These deliveries may be related to a reported agreement in 1989 to sell its 360-mile M-9 missile to Syria. To avoid getting caught selling entire missiles to Syria, China appears to be selling missile components and the means to make missiles.

Iran

In September 1992, China agreed to sell a 300-megawatt power reactor to Iran, and has also considered selling a 25 to 30-megawatt research reactor. Each of these reactors would give Iran its first access to bomb quantities of plutonium, the nuclear weapon material that destroyed Nagasaki.

Algeria

China is now building a nuclear reactor in Algeria, which was begun in secret in the 1980s and revealed by U.S. intelligence in 1991. The reactor is at a remote location, has no electric power lines, is too small to be plausible for electricity, and too large to be necessary for research. At its announced power of 15 megawatts, the reactor could make enough plutonium for about two A-bombs every three years. At a power of sixty megawatts, which has also been mentioned, it could make over two bombs per year. Since power levels in heavy water reactors of this type can readily be scaled up, the reactor moves Algeria, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, much closer to the bomb.

Other dangerous exports

Nobody should be surprised by this pattern of exports. It has been going on for a long time. In 1983, U.S. intelligence discovered that China had given Pakistan the design of a tested nuclear weapon. And in 1991, U.S. officials confirmed that China had also given Pakistan something even worse–enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel the bomb. With the Chinese design, Pakistan was able to manufacture and test nuclear weapon parts one by one and then test the whole design with a dummy nuclear core. Pakistan could thereby avoid an overt test, which would have cut off American aid. According to a news report unchallenged by U.S. officials, Pakistan now has a workable bomb weighing only four hundred pounds.

Despite China’s outrageous nuclear aid to Pakistan, U.S. officials initialled a nuclear trade agreement with China barely a year later, in April 1984. The accord was based on a famous White House toast in January 1984, in which Premier Zhao declared that China does not “engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.”

But China continued to help Pakistan. In 1986, according to West German officials, China sold Pakistan a quantity of tritium, used to achieve thermonuclear fusion in hydrogen bombs and to boost the yield of fission (atomic) bombs. With a supply of tritium, Pakistan could make its current fission bombs powerful enough to destroy entire cities.

Meanwhile, from 1982 to 1987, China secretly sold India at least 130 to 150 tons of “heavy water.” Heavy water looks and tastes like ordinary water but is used to operate reactors that make plutonium. The Chinese could have been under no illusions about where the water was going. Ton quantities of heavy water are needed only for reactors, and in the mid-1980s only Indian reactors needed multi-ton quantities.

China sold the water secretly, with no strings attached, allowing India for the first time to start a reactor entirely free of international controls–meaning that the plutonium the reactor made would be free to go into atomic bombs. Chinese heavy water sales continued until 1987, enabling India to start at least one and possibly three reactors free of international controls. Running at full capacity, these three reactors can make enough plutonium for up to 40 atomic bombs per year.

In South America, U.S. officials began to contend with Chinese shipments in the early 1980s. In 1982, China sent at least 50 tons of heavy water to Argentina, enough to help build a few atomic bombs per year if Argentina wanted. This occurred after China had been told in 1981 that the shipments were being diverted. The French, who had asked for explanations because the shipments went through Paris, seem to have found the real motive: “One receives the impression that…each Chinese department tries in its own way to bring in the much sought-after foreign exchange….”

In 1984, China also supplied Argentina’s rival, Brazil. Secretly, and without requiring international inspection, China sold Brazil enriched low-uranium useful for bomb-making. China also agreed in 1985 to help Brazil with liquid fuel technology and missile guidance in return for Brazil’s solid fuel rocket technology. This may help Brazil build its first strategic missile, projected to have a range of over 2,000 miles, from its VLS space rocket.

China also helped South Africa’s nuclear efforts. In 1981, China secretly sent Pretoria two large shipments of low-enriched uranium. The sale happened just as the United States was trying to cut off enriched uranium supplies in order to get South Africa to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. U.S. officials protested that the Chinese shipments “would weaken the American potential to influence South African policies.”

I have already mentioned China’s current deals in the Middle East. In addition to its reactor sales to Algeria and Iran, and its missile deal with Syria, China sold the 1,500-mile range CSS-2 missile to Saudi Arabia. This missile is almost useless as a conventional weapon because of its low accuracy, but it becomes a real threat when armed with a nuclear warhead.

American attempts to stop China’s dangerous exports have consistently failed. The American policy has been to complain, and then to do nothing when its complaints are ignored. There is a saying that “you don’t change a winning game.” But you do change a losing game, and a losing game is what we have with China.

How do we change it? I think we must convince China that it has more to lose from these sales than it has to gain. And the best way to convince China is to put its trade surplus with the United States at risk. China’s surplus is now reported at about $18 billion per year. Its nuclear and missile deals with the third world are only a fraction of that. If forced to chose, China is likely to prefer its trade relation with the United States to selling weapons of mass destruction to developing countries.

I recommend that China’s MFN status be removed unless China does the following:

  • Joins the Missile Technology Control Regime as a full member and publicly renounces and halts its sales of M-11 and M-9 missiles. China should also renounce and halt the sale of any components, materials or manufacturing equipment useful for making missiles covered by the Regime.
  • Cancels its reactor sales to Iran and scales back the reactor being sold to Algeria to ensure that its power cannot be increased.
  • Joins the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the consulting organization through which supplier countries structure their nuclear sales according to nonproliferation guidelines. This would help stem the flow of sensitive exports to countries like Iran.
  • Supports sanctions against North Korea in the U.N. Security Council if North Korea does not abandon its nuclear weapon program.

Iraq’s Bomb — an Update

New York Times
April 26, 1993, p. A17

Soon, possibly this week, the U.N. will report that its inspectors in Iraq have found yet another cache of strategic equipment for making nuclear weapons. Their chief inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Maurizio Zifferero, should be embarrassed. He announced in September that President Saddam Hussein’s atomic weapons program was “neutralized” and “at zero.” He even said that Iraq had “decided at the higher political level to stop these activities.”

Saddam Hussein never told the I.A.E.A. about the newly discovered equipment, as required by UN resolutions. And he continues to rain down threats and intimidation on the inspectors, indicating that he has more to hide. In March 1992, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, told inspectors that Iraq had not relinquished the right to build weapons of mass destruction.

Before his army marched into Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein had a workable bomb design, many key components, a multi-billion dollar nuclear manufacturing base and a global supply network able to exploit lax Western export controls, especially those in Germany. His Western-trained scientists had produced small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium: the fuels in the bombs that destroyed Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They even did clandestine research in laboratories the I.A.E.A. inspected regularly.

If Saddam Hussein had left Kuwait alone, he might have had his first bomb by now. He still has his scientists on the payroll and has protected the identities of many of his global suppliers. He has even started to get European and American inquiries on future oil sales: petro-dollars for a renewed bomb effort.

Here is a summary of nuclear-related equipment in Iraq today. It draws on export records and reports by inspection teams. The names of manufacturers, who may not have supplied their products directly to Iraq, are given where known. Iraq claimed the equipment was for civilian use The U.S. Government wants most of the material destroyed; the IAEA may let Iraq use it under the agency’s monitoring. It was just such “monitoring,” however, that failed to detect Iraq’s bomb program in the first place.

Found but Not Destroyed or Removed

These items have been tagged for possible destruction, monitoring by the I.A.E.A. or unconditional release to Iraq.

  • 580 tons of natural uranium (Brazil, Niger and Portugal).
  • 1.7 tons of enriched uranium (Italy).
  • 255 tons of HMX, a high explosive for detonating atomic bombs.
  • 60 machines that shape metal into centrifuge parts, by Dorries, H&H Metalform, Kieserling & Albrecht, Leifeld and Magdeburg (Germany), Matrix Churchill (Britain) and Schaublin (Switzerland).
  • Mass spectrometers to monitor bomb-fuel production, by Finnegan-MAT (US, Germany).
  • Two electric frequency converters to power atomic bomb fuel production, by Acomel (Switzerland).
  • More than 700 valves that can process atomic bomb fuel, by Balzers, VAT (Switzerland) and Nupro (US).
  • Two coordinate-measuring machines to monitor centrifuge production, by DEA (Italy).
  • 70 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, some by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).
  • Machines for milling metal, by Maho, Schiess, SHW and Wotan (Germany), Innocenti (Italy) and Zayer (Spain).
  • Two assembly presses and two balancing machines to make centrifuges.
  • One resin-mixing and discharge machine to support electromagnetic uranium enrichment, by Millitorr (Britain).
  • One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).
  • One 63-ton hydraulic press to shape explosive atomic bomb parts.
  • One mainframe computer used to process nuclear atomic bomb codes, by NEC (Japan).
  • Two oxidation furnaces for making centrifuge parts, by Degussa (Germany).
  • One electron-beam welder to assemble centrifuges, by Sciaky (France).
  • Tantalum metal sheets for making crucibles to cast atomic bomb cores.

Still Missing

These items are suspected or known to be in Iraq, but have not been found or accounted for:

  • More than $1 million worth of computers, electronic testing machines, computer graphics equipment and frequency synthesizers licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by Hewlett Packard (US).
  • More than $7 million worth of computers, licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by International Computer Systems (US).
  • Nuclear reactor control panels, instruments and computers salvaged from a damaged reactor, by the consortium Cerbag (France).
  • Computers and instruments capable of analyzing metals and powders for atomic bomb manufacture, licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder by Siemens (Germany, US).
  • $43,000 worth of computers for a nuclear weapon testing site, licensed for shipping by EZ Logic Data (US).
  • $30,000 worth of electronic and computing equipment lo measure neutrons and gamma rays, licensed for shipping by Canberra Industries and Canberra Elektronik (US, Germany).
  • Five frequency converters capable of powering centrifuges, by Acomel (Switzerland).
  • Parts that collected enriched uranium in electromagnetic enrichment machines.
  • One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).
  • One powder press suitable for compacting nuclear fuels, by XYZ Options (US).
  • $15 million worth of cylindrical presses, by Leifeld (Germany).
  • $2.2 million worth of computers, licensed to be shipped to an atomic bomb builder by Unisys (US).
  • $280,000 worth of computers and electronic and photographic equipment for nuclear weapons laboratories, licensed to be shipped by Perkin Elmer (US).
  • $367,000 worth of computers licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder to run its machine tools, by Gerber Systems (US).
  • Design plans for a $5.6 million plant to process uranium, by Natron (Brazil).
  • More than 100 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).
  • Centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium.
  • Underground reactor and heavy water to produce plutonium.
  • Records of Iraq’s foreign sources of expertise on uranium enrichment, foreign equipment suppliers and explosive tests of atomic bomb components.
  • Records containing identities and current activities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, including those trained by H&H Metalform, Interatom, Leybold, Lurgi and ZSI (Germany), Balzers (Switzerland), Chemadex (Poland), CNEN (Brazil) and Matrix Churchill (Britain).
  • Computer database showing status and extent of the entire nuclear weapon program.

 

Can Sanctions Stop The Bomb?

Paper given at the conference entitled Economic Sanctions and International Relations

Fourth Freedom Forum and
The Joan B. Crock Institute for
International Peace Studies
Notre Dame University

My topic today is faraway places–those countries across the world that don’t yet have the bomb but may soon get it–and what can be done to stop them. I will try to discuss what these countries are up to in the context of “sanctions”–the subject of this conference. I will allow myself to define sanctions as broadly as possible. The concept will include anything unpleasant that one country might do to get another country to change its behavior.

In general, countries build the bomb because they perceive its benefits to be greater than its costs. Each country makes this appraisal from its own vantage point. To convince a country not to make the bomb, it must be persuaded that the costs are too high. The United States has been trying for many years to convince a number of developing countries of that proposition. The fact that the United States itself has incurred staggering costs to have thousands of bombs has not made the task easier.

We have asked Ukraine, for example, to move from nuclear weapon to non-nuclear weapon status and to give up voluntarily what other countries have struggled and paid lots of money to acquire. What Ukraine decides will set an important precedent for the rest of the world. We must convince Ukraine’s leaders that any benefit from having nuclear weapons will be outweighed by the cost of being deprived of Western aid and trade, which must be withheld unless Ukraine makes the “right” decision.

The Russians also want our help. We haven’t asked them to give up nuclear weapons, but we can ask them not to help other countries develop long-range missiles. The Russians are now selling India a powerful space rocket that would help India make an ICBM. In addition, India would get the rocket production technology, which would allow India to mass-produce the rocket and supply it to other countries. India freely converts its space rockets to ballistic missiles.

These sales would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international accord that limits the sale of missile technology. Although the Russians have not joined the regime, they have promised to abide by its provisions. If the sales go through, the regime would be severely wounded. Should the West withhold aid to Moscow until Moscow renounces this deal? Should the West refuse to save Yeltsin, and set back reform in Russia because of a smelly missile deal? We see that there are definite limits on the use of sanctions to stop proliferation.

There are, however, successes. Argentina and Brazil have promised recently to stop short of nuclear weapon status, after years of effort devoted to making both nuclear weapon material and long-range missiles. And even South Africa has promised to become a non-nuclear weapon state, although that country actually manufactured warheads. These three countries have apparently decided that the cost of having the bomb is simply too high. They seem to have decided that whatever benefit they might derive from nuclear weapons was smaller than the cost of being deprived of high technology–which the advanced world was prepared to withhold unless they renounced the bomb. These countries want to be viewed as reliable trading partners by the developed world, and they have promised to give up the bomb to gain that status.

North Korea is now facing the same choice as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. The developed world is threatening to isolate North Korea–diplomatically and economically– unless it gives up its bomb program. The isolation will push North Korea ever farther behind South Korea in real political and economic power, and hence influence. North Korea must decide whether the bomb is worth such a price. One of the main factors in the decision, of course, is China. The rest of the world needs China to make sanctions against North Korea work. It remains to be seen whether China will cooperate. If it doesn’t, it may face sanctions itself. China’s U.S. trading status as a most favored nation is coming up in Congress again, and may be voted down again without a veto by George Bush to save it.

Next we come to the subcontinent, where India and Pakistan can each deploy nuclear weapons and are embroiled in a longstanding border dispute. Neither country has a clear military doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons, so if fighting breaks out over Kashmir, both countries would be stepping into the unknown. No one on either side knows what would happen.

Our best policy on the subcontinent is to ask India and Pakistan to choose between bombs and breakfast. Everybody knows that you can’t eat bombs for breakfast, but if somebody else is willing to buy your breakfast and let you keep making bombs, you never need to choose between the two.

The Indian and Pakistani bombs were built without jeopardizing anyone’s breakfast. U.S. aid to Pakistan continued throughout the 1980s, even though it was clear that Pakistan was bent on making the bomb. Strangely enough, U.S. aid flowed into Pakistan until Pakistan was actually able to assemble a nuclear device, at which point we cut them off. The timing was strongly affected by the war in Afghanistan, but one has to wonder at the political vision behind such a policy.

India also enjoyed uninterrupted U.S. aid while it was developing its nuclear program. In fact, the bomb that India tested in 1974 was made with plutonium produced with U.S. heavy water, supplied to an Indian research reactor through Canada. Heavy water is used in reactors to make plutonium–a nuclear weapon material–from natural uranium. During the mid-1980s, India finally achieved the ability to make a nuclear arsenal by smuggling large quantities of heavy water from China, Norway and the Soviet Union. The United States detected the shipments and discovered that they were being made by a German broker. American diplomats complained about the broker to the German government, but Germany ignored the complaints, just as it ignored other U.S. complaints about the poison gas plants that German firms were supplying to Iraq and Libya at the same time. The State Department apparently decided not to embarrass Germany publicly, so all the deals went through. Foggy Bottom missed a great opportunity to apply sanctions during the 1980s–a series of phone calls to the media would have stopped an enormous amount of proliferation.

There has been a bill in Congress to cut off multilateral aid to bomb and missile makers. It would cut into the free breakfast. India, for example, could not make bombs with one hand and still take money from the World Bank with the other. According to its 1991 Annual Report, the World Bank loaned India more than two billion dollars in 1991 and has loaned India almost $40 billion altogether. For Pakistan the figures are $677 million in 1991 and $8 billion altogether; for Argentina, $680 million in 1991 and $5.8 billion altogether; for Brazil $955 million in 1991 and $18.9 billion altogether. All of these countries also get help from the International Monetary Fund. The Fund loaned India over two billion in 1991 and loaned Pakistan $130 million.

It is also interesting to look at other types of aid. India got over four billion dollars’ worth of Export-Import Bank financing from the United States from 1970 to 1989, the period during which India was actively developing nuclear weapons. India also got another $20 billion in bilateral aid from Western countries other than the United States from 1980 to 1988.

When all these numbers are added up, one can see that the West was sending many billions of dollars in foreign exchange into India at the very same time that India was sending out billions to import its nuclear and missile infrastructure. In effect, the West was buying not only breakfast, but lunch and dinner for India’s nuclear and missile makers. India never had to decide between bombs and breakfast because everything was free.

It is one thing for India to build nuclear weapons, nuclear missiles, and even nuclear submarines, which it is now doing, but it is quite another to have U.S. taxpayers finance it.

One final note on India. According to the standard references, India is now exporting only $17 billion in goods while importing $25 billion, thus running a trade deficit of $8 billion, which must be added to the interest payments on its $70 billion foreign debt. Thus, India is in a financial vise. Yet India is still spending over nine billion per year on defense, and is ready to pay the Russians $200 million to import the rocket technology. Where will India get the money? From foreign aid.

Congress could put a stop to at least some of this. India could be cut off from multilateral aid unless it gives up its dangerous nuclear and missile programs. It is eminently fair to force India to make such a choice. If a country has enough money to build nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, it does not need foreign aid.

In Iraq we now have something close to the maximum imaginable sanctions. Nothing is supposed to go in except food and medicine, and virtually nothing is supposed to come out. If the Iraqis act up under the pressure, F-16s and Tomahawk missiles are standing by.

Iraq is now forbidden even to possess a lot of equipment and material useful for civilian purposes, because it can also make weapons of mass destruction. This obligation is enforced by inspectors who can fly into the country to look anytime, anywhere, for anything. This unprecedented state of affairs–surely the dream of every sanctions advocate–will go on indefinitely unless Iraq complies with a list of U.N. resolutions.

This has become the great sanctions showcase. If they don’t work in Iraq, where will they work? And if they do work in Iraq, will they work in countries that haven’t lost a war recently?

In spite of everything, Saddam Hussein has not changed his goal. He is still trying to wriggle out of the embargo and keep as many of his mass-destruction programs as he can. We still don’t know whether he will succeed. The U.N. does not understand his entire nuclear program, and does not seem to have found all of his nuclear equipment. It is certain that his supplier network, which is perhaps his most dangerous asset, has not been exposed. To do the inspection job right in Iraq, the International Atomic Energy Agency needs to be more aggressive. There must be more inspectors, they must move into Iraq, and they must engage the Iraqis continuously until a complete picture of the Iraqi bomb program can be drawn. To help this effort succeed, countries like Argentina, Brazil and Egypt, which helped Iraq make nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, should tell the inspectors what they know. So far, they aren’t talking.

Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains a problem. It is not easy to convince the Islamic countries that they don’t need nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or long-range missiles when Israel has all three, with America’s apparent blessing. Israel has passed along missile guidance technology to China and missile and nuclear technology to South Africa, making Israel an additional source of proliferation. Israel has also diverted U.S. missile technology–supplied to help Israel defend itself against missiles–to its own offensive long-range missile program. The United States, in protest, has held up military aid to Israel, but has never been willing to cut the enormous foreign aid handout that Israel gets every year. It is unrealistic to suppose that Israel will ever suffer real sanctions at the hands of the United States, despite its bad proliferation record.

I will end with Iran, which our Secretary of State last Wednesday called an “outlaw state” determined to make the bomb. Iran has oil money and doesn’t much care what America thinks. Our best bet for slowing Iran down is to cut off its strategic imports. The Bush administration tried to convince other developed countries to withhold all high-tech exports that could be used to make A-bombs or missiles, but the success of the mission is still uncertain.

After looking at all these countries, the conclusion has to be that sanctions must be tailored to the particular case, and are more promising in some cases than in others. When countries need trade and economic help, withholding such benefits can provide leverage. China, Ukraine, India, Pakistan and North Korea come to mind. Israel and Russia could also fall into this category, but because of other political considerations, the leverage probably won’t be exercised. Iraq is in a category by itself; it is not poor, but it lost a war. Iran and Libya are the tough cases. They have money, want the bomb, and are willing to defy world opinion to get it. If they get close to success, there will probably be pressure for military action.

The Iraqi Bomb

The New Yorker
February 1, 1993, p. 47

Because the International Atomic Energy Agency is ineffectual, Saddam Hussein will continue to outwit U.N. inspectors.

Last week, as the United States and its coalition partners sent cruise missiles crashing into a nuclear site near Baghdad, the message to Saddam Hussein was clear: Don’t interfere with international inspectors-let them look anywhere, any time, and at anything, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. The allies know that Saddam is still hiding part of his atom-bomb program, and they’re eager for the inspectors to find it. What the allies did not say is that, even though Saddam has now allowed the U.N. nuclear inspectors back in, they probably won’t find what he is hiding. They are being thwarted by their own management as well as by Saddam Hussein.

The inspection trips are a constant test of nerves. The inspectors usually stay at the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, in Baghdad. “It is unlike any other Sheraton in the world,” one of them told me. “The most gruesome thing is the dove. It’s on a poster in the lobby, stretched out on a cross-crucified-with blood dripping down. And on the top of the cross is written ‘U.N.'” This inspector is discouraged, and so are many others. For almost a year, they have found practically nothing new. The Iraqis are outfoxing them at every turn, harassing them, and making it more and more likely that Saddam Hussein will wriggle out from under the current embargo with large parts of his A-bomb effort intact. In fact, some inspectors believe that if Saddam escapes the embargo soon, he could get the bomb within five to seven years.

The best chance to deter him has already been lost. When the inspections began, in May of 1991, the Iraqis were still reeling from the Gulf War and were not able to deceive the inspectors. In June, the inspectors flushed out a convoy of trucks carrying A-bomb-making equipment, and in September they found trunkfuls of classified nuclear documents in Baghdad office buildings-apparently left there by mistake. These finds produced invaluable leads, which, if they had been followed aggressively, might have unveiled the essentials of the Iraqi nuclear program. The opportunity was lost, many inspectors believe, because of the timidity of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an arm of the U.N. based in Vienna. The I.A.E.A. was created in 1956 with two conflicting goals: to encourage the proliferation of atomic energy and, at the same time, to insure that the civilian nuclear projects it spawned did not make atomic bombs. After the Gulf War, the Security Council created a Special Commission to uncover the Iraqi missile, nuclear, and chemical-and-biological weapon programs, but left control of the nuclear inspections in the hands of the I.A.E.A. The Special Commission and the I.A.E.A. immediately began to feud.

It is the Special Commission that gets intelligence about Iraq from the United States and other governments; it then designates sites for the I.A.E.A. to inspect, and it controls the inspection budget. The Special Commission also persuades friendly governments to supply technical experts, who are used to augment I.A.E.A. inspection teams. But the I.A.E.A. runs the inspections in the field, and it tends to rely on Iraqi disclosures, as it does in its civilian inspections. It also hoards any information it finds. The Special Commission does have inspectors of its own-on loan from friendly governments-but when they go to Iraq they are under the I.A.E.A.’s thumb.

The agency’s timid managers, several inspectors say, gave the Iraqis the crucial time they needed to spin a web of deception-a web now too dense for the inspectors to penetrate. Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, the most prominent congressional investigator of U.S. exports to Iraq, told me that he is critical of “the ineffective manner in which the agency has addressed Iraq’s secret network of Western suppliers,” and he added, “The whole effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends on making the I.A.E.A. much more effective than it has been to date.” Most of the inspectors I’ve spoken with-all of whom insist on anonymity-despair of finding anything more in Iraq as long as the I.A.E.A. remains in charge.

Here is how one inspector describes a team’s arrival in Iraq: “You fly in from Bahrain on a C-160 Transall, operated by the German Air Force-the Luftwaffe. You sit on canvas seats made for paratroopers, and it gets cold. You take everything in with you-food, water, money, equipment, even tires. You need the tires to replace the slashed tires on U.N. vehicles. You land at Habaniya, an airport about sixty miles from Baghdad. The first thing you see is a dilapidated bus, in the green-and-white colors of Iraqi Airways. It’s low-slung, belching, and stinking. It takes you to the operations center, where you get your visa stamp. Then you load your bags on another bus, which takes you to Baghdad. On this bus you meet your ‘minders.’ These are the Iraqis who will be your hosts. They’re always with you, wherever you go. You assume the bus is bugged.

“At the hotel, everything is dimly lit-the lobby, the restaurant, the hallways, the rooms. Deliberately. The hotel is also bugged. In the lobby, there is an enormous portrait of Saddam, looking down on everything. There is also the poster of the dove. This is when you first notice the security guys. They’re not the same as the minders. They stand around the lobby and watch everybody. Most of them wear dark jackets. They are also in the hallways upstairs. At about seven in the evening, you have the first team meeting, in a conference room off the lobby. The whole team usually has one or two dozen inspectors. Some are from the I.A.E.A. and some are from the U.N., but most are technical experts lent by friendly governments. The chief inspector breaks the team up into subgroups, and each group has a different mission. After the team meeting, you meet the Iraqis-or their representatives. These are your counterparts-the technical guys who are the experts. They ask you where you’re going. They want to know, because they’re going with you. They provide your security and arrange your visits. You tell them about the routine inspections-the ones where you go back to sites you’ve already been to-but you don’t tell them about the surprise inspections, where you go to new sites. You save these until the next morning, at the last minute.”

The I.A.E.A. chief inspector for Iraq is Maurizio Zifferero, a sixty-two-year-old nuclear chemist from Italy who is a specialist in plutonium processing. He was asked to join the I.A.E.A. in 1980 as a deputy director-general-a high post for which he needed his government’s backing. Several U.N. inspectors condemn his conduct of the entire inspection operation and cite a string of incidents involving him which, they claim, have enabled the Iraqis to stay ahead of the game. Last week, I gave him an opportunity to comment on these incidents in a telephone conversation with him at I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna.

Two U.N. inspectors who were present at secret pre-inspection discussions last February in Baghdad say that they believe the Iraqis were alerted to several surprise inspections because Zifferero discussed them in areas the Iraqis had bugged. The result, a United States official says, was that on one “surprise” inspection, the Iraqis were waiting for the inspectors with coffee and doughnuts. Rejecting this charge of careless talk, Zifferero told me, “I assume that everything is bugged in the hotel, and I never mention sites in meetings.” The inspectors insist that it happened, and that United States intelligence and several inspectors warned Zifferero beforehand that the areas were bugged.

The same U.N. inspectors say that Zifferero has been lax about the security of documents. Inspection-team members are supposed to keep their backpacks with them at all times, but they say they saw Zifferero relaxing in the hotel without his backpack, which at the time contained line drawings of Iraqi nuclear sites based on recent American intelligence photographs. Again, Zifferero disputes the charge. He told me he always wears his backpack and always keeps his documents in it. (The seriousness of the Iraqi effort to find out what the inspectors know manifests itself outside the country. In New York, Marjatta Rautio, Finland’s representative to the Special Commission, got a shock in her hotel room when she emerged from the bathroom to find a man who had been let in by the bellboy going through her wastebasket. The U.N. inspectors assume he was an Iraqi agent.)

The anxieties about Zifferero’s performance go beyond concern over his carelessness. He is also charged with “spoiling” fresh intelligence. A few months ago, documents seized in Iraq revealed that the Iraqis had been doing secret research on plutonium metal. Some thirteen pounds of this substance destroyed Nagasaki in 1945. Although plutonium can fuel nuclear reactors, there is no real use for plutonium metal other than in atomic bombs, so the fact that the Iraqis were working on it proved their dedication to bomb-making. It was assumed that Zifferero, as the I.A.E.A.’s chief inspector, would use the tip as a lead and do additional research. That might have produced enough detail to force the Iraqis to reveal more leads, or might have brought about a surprise inspection. Instead, to the dismay of his colleagues, Zifferero merely took the information to the Iraqis and asked for an explanation. They coolly replied that they were planning to study neutrons. This was not credible technically, but Zifferero simply quoted the Iraqi reply, without comment, in his December 10th inspection report, which did not even note that Iraq was experimenting with bomb material. Last week, Zifferero told me that the I.A.E.A. didn’t consider the matter closed, and might pursue it further.

Zifferero’s behavior has not escaped the eye of the United States Congress. Senate Intelligence Committee staff members have specifically requested information about Zifferero from the C.I.A. The committee should have been told, among other things, that in the mid- nineteen-seventies Zifferero, who was then working for the Italian Atomic Energy Commission, went to Baghdad to, as he put it to me last week, help “negotiate a bilateral agreement” for Italy to sell plutonium-production equipment to Iraq. The equipment was essential to Iraq’s plan for the bomb, and would complement a reactor that France was preparing to build there: the Italian equipment would extract plutonium after the French reactor irradiated uranium. Other Italian equipment, also part of the deal, would fabricate uranium into reactor fuel rods suitable for irradiation. Iraq had bought a complete plutonium production line.

“We raised hell about the Italian deal,” a senior American official who opposed it at the time told me. Zifferero says that in 1976 he visited an Iraqi radiochemistry lab to help Iraq determine whether it could do “fuel-cycle research”-plutonium research-in its existing facilities. He says that he never went back to Iraq-and never visited the facilities that were using the Italian equipment-until he was sent by the I.A.E.A. after the Gulf War.

The Israelis, who were not fooled by Iraqi promises of peaceful use, destroyed the French reactor with precision bombing in 1981. But the Italian equipment survived. In fact, it lived on to become the hottest topic of conversation during the I.A.E.A.’s fourth inspection, which began in late July of 1991. Before a shocked group of inspectors, a senior Iraqi official calmly revealed that Iraq had used the Italian equipment to extract plutonium in violation of Iraqi promises to the I.A.E.A.

This was a watershed for the I.A.E.A. It was the first time in history that a country was known to have broken its pledge to report all work with plutonium to agency inspectors. Thus the very equipment that Zifferero helped supply was used to break the promise that he is now responsible for enforcing. To make matters worse, the Iraqi official was himself a former I.A.E.A. inspector. He told his outraged ex-colleagues that his I.A.E.A. experience had made it easier to dupe them. “He really rubbed their noses in it,” said David Kay, a former inspector and I.A.E.A. employee, who has led several inspections in Iraq, and was present at the meeting.

The Italian equipment was not all that survived the 1981 attack. The U.N. inspectors believe that Israel’s bombs also missed the French reactor’s control panels, instrumentation system, and computers. These are vital components, and the Iraqis would have a hard time replacing them if they decided to build a second reactor. Some U.N. inspectors think they have tried to build a new, underground reactor; otherwise, the plutonium research makes no sense. The inspectors have searched for this reactor with no success.

The French components were yet another lead that was not followed up. The components are on an I.A.E.A. list of sensitive nuclear items that the inspectors know the Iraqis have, and which the Iraqis are required to account for, but when Zifferero asked where the components were, the Iraqis refused to produce them (while admitting that they existed). Zifferero accepted this refusal without challenge. Last week, when I pressed Zifferero about the components, he said, “This is a lead that will be followed up soon. It may have been an oversight not to follow it up earlier.”

Senate Intelligence Committee staff members are still puzzled about Zifferero. The committee asked the C.I.A. months ago about his background, but still has no answer. Some senior officials at the Pentagon say they have been complaining about Zifferero for months, but they say the State Department has done nothing to have him removed. Our government is divided on this issue. Officials in at least one other major Western government also have doubts about him. According to a well-placed official, its intelligence analysts find his behavior inexplicable.

An inspector described to me a typical day in the field: “The loudspeakers in the mosques come on at 5 A.M. with the first call to prayer, so you don’t need an alarm. You assemble in the lobby by seven. If you are driving, you go in a bus or a van, usually a blue-and-white Toyota. All the vehicles are Toyotas, usually with broken windows. Behind you is a U.N. vehicle driven by a U.N. medic or radio operator. It’s loaded with water, communication equipment, medical kits, and food. The Iraqis provide all the other vehicles, including the one you ride in, and the drivers. In front, there’s an Iraqi police car-an Olds Cutlass Ciera, with a blue light on top. If you get caught in traffic, the Iraqi police stick their arms out the windows and wave their guns. Then everybody gets out of the way.”

The teams always take along a portable IMARSAT-International Marine Satellite dish. The size of a big suitcase, it beams its signal up to an IMARSAT over the Indian Ocean, enabling team members to talk to the U.N. in New York. If a team is going to a new site, its leader shouldn’t tell the Iraqis where until the team actually gets in the car. Then the Iraqis radio ahead. This usually gives the site a half hour to an hour’s notice. And, of course, the Iraqis can drive slowly. The site is usually protected by a high fence and anti-aircraft guns. Team members go first to the headquarters building to meet the director-general in his office. In many of the factories, there is a model of the site after it was bombed, showing every piece of damage in detail. Next to it is a model of the new site-rebuilt to the highest standards. (As they approached one site, team members saw huge piles of debris that the Iraqis had bulldozed to clear the way for a new building. The Iraqis told the team that they had taken all the machines out of the site to escape the bombing. They hid them between people’s houses, and after the war they moved them into the new building.)

The team leader will ask the director-general for a history of the plant, whether it made any nuclear equipment, and other questions. The Iraqis always deny everything. The interview takes twenty or thirty minutes. Then the team tours the plant, looking for proscribed activities and for equipment on Annex 3-the list of items that Iraq is not allowed to possess under U.N. resolutions. It also looks at the plant’s potential for going back into weapons production. Team members can take notes, or samples, or photographs.

The inspector says, “Normally, you don’t find anything. After two or three hours, you eat lunch. Usually it’s American M.R.E.s-meals ready to eat-and bottled water. Then you go to the next site. By the end of the day, you’re tired, because it’s hot and you’ve walked so much. Everybody is also demoralized, because you haven’t found anything. You do this every day for about ten days”-the usual duration of a team’s tour. “Back at the hotel, you have the team meeting, which is a debriefing. The subgroups report on what they did, but you can’t be very specific, because the room is bugged. Then you shower, eat dinner, and go to bed.”

Before the war, I.A.E.A. inspectors had visited Iraqi nuclear sites twice a year for a decade. Their job was to verify that Iraq was keeping its promise not to make an atomic bomb. As late as 1990, they rated Iraqi cooperation as “exemplary.” But all that time Saddam was running a vast A-bomb program under their very noses. The inspectors spent their time at a huge complex called Al Tuwaitha, where they visited only the buildings that Saddam designated; they never looked at what was going on next door. If they had, they would have found laboratories busily engaged in research on both plutonium and uranium for atomic bombs. In the words of an American official, “the I.A.E.A. missed the Iraqi bomb before the war, and now it’s missing it again.”

One U.N. inspector accuses the agency of “playing information games.” The process of gathering information about Iraqi activities is fairly complex. The Iraqis are watched by satellites, by U-2 spy planes, and by U.N. helicopters flying out of Baghdad. They are also being informed on by a number of defectors. Most of this intelligence pours in to the C.I.A., which sifts it and prepares a package of promising sites to visit. The package then goes to both the State Department and the Pentagon, which together decide what sites to propose to the Special Commission. The British, French, German, and Russian intelligence agencies do the same. The Commission weighs all this advice and decides where to strike next.

The process has worked well for missile and chemical-and-biological inspections, but it hasn’t worked for nuclear inspections. When the missile inspectors, who work independently of the I.A.E.A., find something-a rocket engine diagram, say-they immediately inform the governments that provided the leads. The governments then funnel the data back to their missile experts, who evaluate it and provide more leads. The Special Commission’s missile inspectors thus get the benefit of concerted expert analysis, which they could never provide themselves. Each inspection builds on the previous one.

The I.A.E.A. doesn’t work that way. It deems the results of its inspections confidential, and puts only a fraction of what it knows in its written reports; it gives data to the Special Commission only upon specific request. The Special Commission’s inspectors complain that they don’t know what to ask for, because they don’t know what the agency has. Nor does the agency generally report its findings back to the governments that have supplied its intelligence leads. The result is a gap in the information loop, isolating the nuclear inspectors from competent intelligence work. The agency has no expertise in nuclear weapons, because since its inception it has inspected only civilian nuclear plants. Most of its employees are from countries without nuclear weapons, and they lack security clearances. “Your typical I.A.E.A. inspector wouldn’t know a nuclear-weapon part if it fell on him,” says one American bomb expert who was an inspector in Iraq. The agency has no photo interpreters-essential for understanding data from satellites. Its few available analysts cannot possibly match the power of the American, Russian, British, and French nuclear-weapon laboratories. (Incidentally, the I.A.E.A.’s practice of including as many nationalities as possible on the inspection teams allows inspectors from countries without nuclear weapons to learn in Iraq what machines are needed to build them, where to get the machines, and how to avoid detection.)

Only two of a total of sixteen nuclear inspections in Iraq have produced major intelligence leads, and in both the inspectors had to violate I.A.E.A. policies to get them. Late in June of 1991, at the beginning of the second inspection, the inspectors were giving the Iraqis between six and twelve hours’ notice before each site visit. This was the rule laid down by I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna. The Iraqis understood the rule far too well; they were moving equipment from one site to another during the notice period. In June, as American satellites watched, the Iraqis went to hiding places in the desert, dug up giant machines for processing uranium, loaded them on trucks, and drove them to a site called Abu Gharib, to which the inspectors had been denied entry. Then the satellites saw the trucks move the equipment from Abu Gharib to a second site, at Al Fallujah.

David Kay, the American who led the team, says that he got this information in Iraq at about 3 A.M. He then called together six inspectors “for a long walk in Baghdad,” during which they could talk without being bugged. They agreed to do a zero-notice inspection at Al Fallujah that morning, despite the policy of giving six to twelve hours’ notice. Kay told the Iraqis that he was going “in the direction of” a site the team had already toured-a site that happened to be on the road to Al Fallujah. Kay managed to get his vehicle in front of the column and went right by the first site. The Iraqis “went crazy,” Kay says. “They turned on red lights, pulled us over, and argued with us, but we got to Fallujah anyway.” There they were denied entry, but they managed to photograph trucks leaving through another gate, while the Iraqis fired bullets over their heads.

The moment was dramatic: the inspectors had the first clear proof that Saddam was trying to make a bomb. The equipment included huge seventeen foot magnets, weighing more than fifty tons, which could be used only for enriching uranium-raising it from its natural state to nuclear-weapon grade. Kay saw it as a vindication of the team. “We all pulled together and it worked,” he said. “Even though we had to break I.A.E.A. rules to do it.”

The I.A.E.A. then sprang into action. It and the Special Commission rushed to Iraq a high-level delegation that included Mohamed El Baradei, an Egyptian on the I.A.E.A legal staff. The delegation found the Iraqis arguing lamely that the equipment had nothing to do with uranium enrichment. El Baradei, fresh on the scene, embodied the tradition of the I.A.E.A. Before an incredulous group of inspectors, he declared, as Kay recalls it, “The Iraqis do not have a uranium-enrichment program. I know so, because they are my friends and they have told me that they don’t.”

El Baradei was wrong, of course. But he was following the line laid down by his I.A.E.A. superiors. If they had had their way, Kay’s inspection might never have occurred. After the first inspection, in May, Iraq had accounted for all the imported nuclear material it had previously informed the I.A.E.A. about, which balanced the agency’s accounts.

“The I.A.E.A. was lucky,” a former inspector who was on the first team says. Kay and this inspector say that Zifferero and his boss, Hans Blix, the director-general of the I.A.E.A., wanted to put out a report at the end of May concluding that everything was fine. But a minority of inspectors, mostly Americans, wouldn’t go along. They couldn’t understand why the Iraqis had left some of the bombed buildings untouched while razing others, even tearing out foundations as far as several metres down. The Americans thought that the Iraqis might be concealing nuclear-weapon work, and they wanted the report to say so. “It all looked very suspicious,” the inspector said. “But the I.A.E.A. wasn’t interested. It wanted to pasteurize our language and put the report out anyway.” The I.A.E.A. was saved from humiliation by a defector, who turned up just before the report was to be released and told Western intelligence about the equipment. A few weeks later, Kay succeeded in finding and photographing it.

Kay also led the only other team that produced major intelligence leads. After arriving in Baghdad late in the afternoon on September 22, 1991, the team set out early the next morning. Kay pointed toward the Al Rashid Hotel, and told the Iraqis simply to “drive that way.” By 6 A.M., the team was searching a nine-story building in Baghdad from the top down. It turned out to be where the Iraqis were designing facilities for their first atomic bomb. When they reached the basement, a few hours later, the team found trunkfuls of classified documents from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

This discovery sparked an intense confrontation. The Iraqis kept the team in the parking lot until 7 P.M., confiscated the documents until 2 A.M. the next day, and then gave only some of them back. What the Iraqis didn’t know was that the inspectors had spirited out two reports marked “Top Secret.” These crucial papers contained the bomb design. The design was crude but workable, and would have produced a weapon with nearly twice the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

Early on the morning of September 24th, Kay’s team began a search of two other buildings, using the same tactics. These buildings turned out to be the headquarters of the entire Iraqi A-bomb program, code-named Petrochemical 3. The team turned up personnel lists and procurement records, and four hours later there was another confrontation. The Iraqis demanded that the team surrender its records, its photographs, and its videotapes. When the inspectors refused, the Iraqis held them at the site. This was the celebrated “parking lot incident”-a four-day standoff in the scorching Baghdad heat. The team lived near its immobilized bus until the Iraqis finally backed down.

Eventually, the team hauled out pay records, computer files, and more than sixty thousand pages of documents, including the two top-secret reports on bomb design. The reports were a gold mine of intelligence nuggets: they revealed numerous aspects of Saddam’s bomb-manufacturing effort and still constitute the primary evidence of how close he was to the bomb when the war broke out.

The aggressive tactics required for this breakthrough did not please the I.A.E.A. Zifferero, who was not in Iraq at the time of that inspection, later told an inspector who was there that the episode was “one of the worst things that ever happened.” And, according to Kay, Hans Blix reacted by saying that Kay was not going to be assigned to any more inspections in Iraq. Kay then resigned from the agency. He and another American inspector who was in the parking-lot standoff maintain that “everybody associated with the parking-lot incident became persona non grata” at the I.A.E.A. As for the sixty thousand pages of documents, only about fifteen per cent of them have been translated from the Arabic, although summaries of most documents have been completed. The titles alone show that the documents are rich in procurement data and other leads. The I.A.E.A. has farmed most of them out to coalition governments for translation, but none has committed the resources to do the job effectively. Thus, the inspectors are like treasure hunters who can read only scraps of a map.

Acting on an intelligence tip from a United States ally, Zifferero finally had a chance to lead his own team into the Petrochemical 3 headquarters last December. The team was an unusual combination. It had Special Commission inspectors from New York, who were looking for missile and chemical-and-biological-weapons documents, and I.A.E.A. inspectors who suspected the Iraqis of having moved nuclear documents back into the building. On this particular trip, I’m told, Zifferero appeared to observe security precautions more closely. Nevertheless, the difference in methods and attitudes between the I.A.E.A. and the Special Commission was striking.

When Zifferero gave the order to begin, the Special Commission’s “document exploitation team” fanned out quickly to surround and occupy the building. Zifferero, however, had no experience with rapid engagement. “As team leader, he had to be ready to order teams to go here, go there-immediately-and to order Iraqi escorts to go with them,” a missile inspector later said. “But he was totally unable to do that-he couldn’t keep up.”

The result was a breakdown in command and control. The Special Commission and I.A.E.A. inspectors started to debate procedures in front of the Iraqis, and the Iraqis themselves began to move documents. One threw a bundle out a window, and another picked it up and ran with it to a city bus. A Special Commission inspector dashed in front of the bus to stop it, but had to leap out of the way to avoid being run over. (The Iraqis later returned what they said were the documents.) In this instance, the I.A.E.A. procedures were probably harmless, because Petrochemical 3 had been turned into a fundamentalist seminary with low security, making it an unlikely hiding place for sensitive information. The intelligence tip from the allied government was probably a dud.

To put the blame on Zifferero or Hans Blix for the I.A.E.A.’s attitude and its unwillingness to run intrusive inspections is to miss the point. Many inspectors don’t see Zifferero as a villain. They say that he is simply the wrong man for the job. One inspector sums it up this way: “Zifferero has poor organizational skills in the field, and he is out of his element when it comes to getting things done if the opposition doesn’t want you to.” Other inspectors agree that he doesn’t have the temperament for confrontation. The fundamental problem is the I.A.E.A. itself. “The agency’s charter didn’t have in mind the amplitude of inspections called for by the U.N. resolutions” on Iraq, says Gerard C. Smith, who was Ambassador at Large for Non-proliferation Matters in the Carter Administration and represented the United States on the I.A.E.A.’s board of governors. The agency was established in the glory days of nuclear power, when people thought that electricity from the atom would be “too cheap to meter.” It was given the job of spreading nuclear technology to developing countries, mostly by promoting exports from advanced countries. At the same time, it was supposed to inspect the exports to make sure they weren’t used to make atomic bombs. The conflict of interest is obvious: if the agency catches somebody making bombs, it means that the nuclear exports were too dangerous to have been sold in the first place, and should not have been promoted.

Iraq is the perfect example. The I.A.E.A. gave Saddam a clean bill of nuclear health for a decade before the invasion of Kuwait. Why would the agency now want to find even more evidence of how badly it was duped? “It’s against the I.A.E.A.’s culture to find anything,” says an American expert who was on one of the early inspection teams. Only this “culture” can explain Zifferero’s statements to the press. Just a year ago, in February, he told Reuters that “practically the largest part of Iraq’s nuclear program has now been identified-probably what is missing is just details.” He made this statement after his team’s tenth inspection trip–the one during which he is said to have discussed surprise-inspection sites in the bugged hotel.

On September 2nd, Zifferero told Reuters that Iraq’s nuclear program “is at zero now,” and that the Iraqis “have stated many times to us that they have decided at the higher political level to stop these activities.” He also made the spectacularly improbable statement “This we have verified.” Even the I.A.E.A. had to disavow that, it put out a statement the next day blaming the press for giving “a misleading impression of his understanding of the situation,” and saying that it is “too early to conclude” that Iraq’s entire nuclear program had been uncovered. Zifferero, undeterred, reiterated the same day that “there is no possibility of a substantial organized [nuclear] program going on in Iraq now.” And, for good measure, he said a few days later, “I don’t believe in the existence of an underground reactor.”

When I asked Zifferero about these statements last week, he insisted, “The Iraqi program is now dormant. Iraq has other priorities, and now has no labs in which to continue the program.”

Zifferero stated in his latest report that the inspection team “was not harassed.” If that was the case, it was unique. On most trips, the inspectors tell me, the harassment is unrelenting. “The Iraqis start calling about 1 A.M., one of them said. “They threaten you or they just dial to wake you up. You also get notes under the door.” The Special Commission inspectors say the notes are often death threats. Some of the German members got notes saying that what the United States did to Iraq during Desert Storm was the same as what the United States did to Germany during the Second World War, so the Germans shouldn’t cooperate with the “American” inspections.

Another inspector says, “They also come into your room, whether you’re there or not. You have to put everything valuable in your backpack, and you have to assume that if you don’t sleep with it tied to you, you’ll lose it. This creates a lot of tension and makes it hard to sleep.” Team members are also harassed in restaurants, another inspector adds. “Somebody will stop at your table, pick up your plate, and dump your food in your lap. This is always a young, well-dressed, physically fit Iraqi male.”

On two occasions, while groups of inspectors were standing in the hotel atrium, someone threw a light bulb down on them from three stories up. It terrified everybody, because when it hit the floor it sounded like a rifle shot. A Special Commission inspector says, “They even came up to one of our people in the street and threw diesel fuel on him.” Another inspector tells me that “after two weeks of this, you’re exhausted. Nobody is sad on the trip back to the airport. When the plane takes off, everybody applauds.”

The Special Commission flatly rejects Zifferero’s rosy picture of Iraq’s nuclear status. In its reports to the Security Council, the Commission accuses the Iraqis of “non-cooperation, concealment and sometimes false information” in all areas that are being inspected, and goes as far as to say that they have “actively falsified the evidence.” The Special Commission’s inspectors still want to find (1) parts of the giant machines that the Iraqis used to raise uranium to nuclear-weapon grade, to learn how much progress they made; (2) the identities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, to learn what those people are doing; (3) records of test explosions, to learn the status of the Iraqi bomb design; (4) other records of the nuclear weapon program, to learn whether all its components have been discovered; (5) Iraq’s foreign sources of technical advice, to cut them off; and (6) Iraq’s network of foreign equipment suppliers, to make sure that the network does not revive as soon as the embargo is lifted.

These inspectors also fear that Saddam may be hiding experimental centrifuges used to raise uranium to weapon grade, and an underground reactor that could secretly make plutonium for bombs. They are not likely to find any of these things under the aegis of the I.A.E.A. Zifferero’s press statements alone have undermined his credibility. Can he plausibly search for something that he says doesn’t exist? The solution to the problem, these inspectors argue, is to transfer authority for the nuclear inspections to the Special Commission, which would require a U.N. resolution. The I.A.E.A. knows how to do only one thing: visit declared sites. In civilian inspections, a country tells the agency what it is doing and invites it in, and then the agency inspects only agreed-upon items at agreed-upon sites. It closes its eyes to anything else. And, worse, it usually doesn’t reveal what it finds. But no bomb-builder ever admits what he is doing, let alone where he is doing it. And Saddam Hussein is certainly no exception. (However, some United States government analysts think that Saddam is likely to make a spectacular offer soon to President Clinton. It will probably contain a dramatic revelation about one or more of the weapon programs and will probably include information-and disinformation-about Western companies that provided crucial help. Saddam’s goal will be to drive a wedge into the Gulf War coalition by convincing some of its members that he has finally come clean, and that the embargo should be lifted.)

There are still two big jobs to do in Iraq: find the rest of Saddam’s bomb program and prevent him from gaining control of resources already found and reconverting them to bomb-making. To accomplish the first task, the inspectors need to change tactics. “We have diplomats when we should have detectives,” a knowledgeable American official says. “This is a shell game, and you have to stop the other guy from moving the shells.” The inspectors are reluctant to go into government ministries, universities, and private homes, but that is their best chance of finding the nuclear-bomb program. United States intelligence is convinced that the program is on computer data bases. Only a data base could keep track of the design, manufacturing, testing, and procurement data essential to continuity. The computers are believed to be at universities or in the homes of key members of the nuclear program. “We think that if the inspectors went into these places they would find some important stuff,” says an informed United States official.

The United States government has also proposed that the Special Commission adopt an “area strategy,” in which the Commission would pick an area and search every building and every cave before moving on to the next area. “There are only a few places where Iraq has the people, communications, and infrastructure to continue to run the program,” an American official says, “so you can designate the areas.” The goal is to freeze Saddam’s shells in place so that any moves by the Iraqis could be detected.

This strategy would require more inspectors. The United States proposes that a score or more move into Iraq permanently. The plan is that they would work in prefabricated, bug-free quarters flown in from America, enabling them to talk to New York without Iraqi ears bent over their telephones. When new intelligence develops, they could strike quickly, hitting two or three areas at a time, thus overwhelming Saddam’s disinformation specialists.

The United States proposal was submitted to Rolf Ekeus, of Sweden, the head of the Special Commission. Ekeus has been a tenacious leader of the Special Commission inspectors, but, with the exception of the proposal for secure, prefab quarters, he has rejected the American plan, out of concern that the U.N. might lose control of the inspections in the field. The inspectors would be mostly British and American, and he fears that once they began to generate hot intelligence leads, which would be analyzed in London and Washington, the U.N. could be pushed out of the information loop. He also points out that Saddam would have more ammunition for his charge that the inspections are really an Anglo-Saxon operation.

It may be that Ekeus can no longer afford these qualms. The information tug-of-war between the C.I.A. and the I.A.E.A. has reached a deadlock. As David Kay describes it, “The I.A.E.A. is saying, ‘Tell us where to go,’ and the C.I.A. is saying, ‘Do something to get something moving, so we can see it.'” The C.I.A. has the better argument: some action is needed to flush Saddam’s nuclear covey from its hiding place.

The other big job in Iraq is to guard what has been found. By mid-November, the I.A.E.A. had compiled a list of six hundred and ninety pieces of sensitive equipment, of which eighty-four have direct nuclear-weapon applications. Virtually all the equipment was imported, and most of it is “dual use”-capable of making either civilian products or weapons of mass destruction. The U.N. must decide whether to destroy it, monitor it, or release it to the Iraqis.

The United States wants the inspectors to destroy any item that was either used to make nuclear weapons or intended for such use. The I.A.E.A. doesn’t want to go along with that proposal. It argues that Iraq would still have many machines – some still in their crates-equivalent to the ones destroyed, and therefore destruction would not really derail the Iraqi bomb program but would only be punitive. The I.A.E.A. would rather let the Iraqis use the machines under its monitoring.

But Iraq smuggled many of those machines out of Western countries illegally, and it falsely promised to confine others to peaceful use. For example, in the late nineteen-eighties, the Iraqi government secretly took over a British machine-tool maker called Matrix Churchill, which apparently lied to British customs about the uses to which its exports would be put in Iraq. According to a U.N. report, Matrix Churchill supplied thirty-three machines with nuclear-weapon potential. Matrix Churchill also sold Iraq nineteen additional machines, which were found in damaged condition. Letting Iraq keep these machines rewards Iraqi fraud.

If the inspectors were allowed to destroy any sensitive equipment not bought honestly, they would catch most of the machines now in dispute. Iraq is already supposed to disclose its supplier network, to comply with U.N. resolutions. But that network is one of its most important secrets. If Iraq won’t say where it got the machines, the inspectors should assume that it got them dishonestly. To leave the machines in Iraqi hands, one inspector says, would be folly, for “Iraq already has the people and the know-how, and it will still have the dual-use equipment, so if the world gets tired of monitoring, Iraq is back in business.”

Without new leadership and protection, the inspection effort will die by demoralization. The stakes are enormous. An American A-bomb expert who served on one of the inspection teams says that if Saddam had not invaded Kuwait, “he could have had a first crude device by now, deliverable with great accuracy in a Ryder truck.” There is no evidence that any of Saddam’s nuclear scientists have been laid off, and unless the inspectors find the rest of his nuclear program and neutralize it, the world will face the same uncertainty about the Iraqi bomb in 1993 that it faced before the war.

Knocking on the Clubhouse Door

The New York Times
The Week in Review
January 10, 1993

The international market in missile and nuclear arms technology has been thriving in the 1990’s. The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, based in Washington, compiled this list of transactions known to have taken place since Iraq invaded Kuwait, touching off the gulf war. Any list of important participants in previous years would also have included France, Germany, and Switzerland, which were among the many nations trading in nuclear and missile technology with Iraq before the war; Germany also helped the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan and South Africa, according to the Wisconsin Project.

To view the graphic, click here:  Knocking on the Clubhouse Door

The Pentagon and the Bomb

Structuring the Department of Defense to Combat Nuclear Arms Proliferation

What U.N. inspection teams discovered in the aftermath of the gulf war–that a massive, secret nuclear weapon program had brought Iraq within 18-24 months of an atomic bomb–came as a cold shock to America and the West. No one should have been more chagrined than the U.S. Department of Defense.

If Saddam Hussein had succeeded, the consequences for the United States would have been profound; and they would have fallen most immediately and heavily on the U.S. defense establishment. If it had been suspected that even one of Saddam’s elusive Scuds were armed with a nuclear warhead, it is doubtful that the Saudis would have hosted American troops, that the Western coalition would have held together, or that Israel would have refrained from launching a preemptive strike.

A surprise Iraqi nuclear strike would have subjected coalition forces to staggering losses, and quite possibly forced the United States into an impossible choice between a humiliating withdrawal or nuclear retaliation.

In the end, it was left to the Pentagon to stop Saddam from getting the bomb. Yet the Pentagon had no sure way of knowing how close he was, and no means short of war to block him.

For years the Pentagon has relegated nuclear nonproliferation to the status of a housekeeping chore, to be pursued on a perfunctory basis by a handful of mid-level specialists buried in the Pentagon hierarchy. The small office responsible for tracking proliferation is staffed only by a director, an assistant director, two mid-level nuclear analysts, one missile analyst, and two borrowed military officers. It has no budget, is physically remote from major Pentagon policy offices, and plays no significant role in policy formulation or nuclear diplomacy.

With such meager tools the Pentagon cannot possibly confront the proliferation menace in the dozen or more nations that have crossed, or are trying to cross, the nuclear arms threshold. Improving the Pentagon’s ability to stop the spread of the bomb should be a high priority for the Clinton administration.

WHAT ROLE FOR THE PENTAGON?

In the eyes of senior Defense planners, stopping the nuclear spread has not been immediately relevant to the Pentagon’s mission, which was to ensure America’s ability to contain the Soviet threat. They assumed that America’s vast nuclear prowess made an attack on the United States by newly emerging nuclear forces unthinkable. Thus, Defense officials regarded a third-world nuclear threat as a remote contingency, more the province of long-range diplomacy than of current national security planning. To a large degree this view was based on an uncritical and naive confidence in treaty commitments.

The Persian Gulf war dramatically exposed the danger of this complacency. Neither the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nor the inspection system run by the International Atomic Energy Agency could detect or contain Iraq’s nuclear threat. Iraq conducted a clandestine bomb program, based largely upon imports from America and Europe, in flagrant violation of its treaty commitments. Never before had the drift into proliferation come so close to putting American military forces at risk.

Given this obvious danger to U.S. forces, the Pentagon can no longer limit its nonproliferation mission to military countermeasures after the fact. It must have a central role in halting proliferation before a military response is required.

The Pentagon should focus its attention on four areas: policymaking, export control, international inspection and counter-proliferation.

Policy formulation and diplomacy

America’s relations with other countries are central to its nonproliferation efforts; the Department of State therefore has the lead responsibility. But other departments, including Defense, should be informed of diplomatic developments that affect their missions. Defense should help formulate policy options, and should participate in discussions with other governments. These roles are essential to ensure that the Pentagon’s expertise and point of view are taken into account.

The Pentagon has not been able to perform these roles in the recent past, primarily because of policy clashes with personnel at the State Department. For years, sensitive State Department nonproliferation cables have been deliberately withheld from Defense. During the five-year negotiation of an extremely controversial nuclear agreement with Japan, State withheld virtually all information concerning the agreement from Pentagon staff, and State officials repeatedly refused access to the draft text of the agreement until it was finalized, initialed by both governments, and ready for submission to the White House. Nor was the Pentagon’s nonproliferation office consulted on a series of decisions to continue military aid to Pakistan despite that country’s well-known nuclear weapon program; nor did this office play any significant role in military planning for the Gulf war.

Even within the Pentagon, the nonproliferation office has been unable to have a major impact because of its lack of leadership and resources. Policymaking has resided in regional and country desks, which have often put nonproliferation below military and diplomatic relations on their list of concerns. The only way to balance the influence of the country desks is to ensure that those responsible for foreign policy issues that transcend geographic boundaries are given the resources, the leadership, and the bureaucratic clout to affect policy.

Export control

Every third-world country that has sought the bomb has imported the means to make it. Exporters have therefore adopted comprehensive controls on items that are unambiguously nuclear, such as reactor components and uranium fuel. But this is not true of “dual-use” items, those that have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications. Some of these are extremely sensitive. They can produce components for such things as uranium enrichment machines and nuclear weapon firing circuits, and they can help in bomb fabrication and testing. Millions of dollars’ worth of dual-use exports flow into worrisome countries each year, free of the international inspection that follows purely nuclear exports. Nuclear dual-use exports are routinely approved on the faith of end-use assurances that, as the buyer knows, are never verified.

Control of such exports by Western countries has ranged from poor to appallingly bad. Countries with nuclear ambitions have successfully resorted to deception, evasion and smuggling. Pakistan and Iraq developed such techniques to a high art, operating networks of procurement agents abetted by sloppy export practices, avarice, and the unwillingness of supplier nations to injure their own commercial interests or offend other governments through tighter controls or punitive measures against violators. Iran now seems to be following the same path.

There is an obvious need for concerted action to eliminate these abuses. Controlling dual-use equipment, because of its ambiguous nature, requires nuclear and industrial expertise, accurate intelligence, and good judgment. It also requires the political will to refuse lucrative contracts and even offend foreign governments. Establishing effective export controls is a daunting challenge, but it is cheaper than another Desert Storm. It should be a strong priority for the U.S. Defense Department.

The U.S. government should begin by cleaning its own house. The Commerce Department is now in charge of licensing dual-use nuclear exports. It writes the regulations and screens the license applications. It either issues the license immediately on its own or consults the Department of Energy for advice. Energy either advises Commerce to approve the case or to refer it to the interagency committee SNEC (Subgroup on Nuclear Export Control), whose decision is usually final.

This system is simply not working. Only two percent of the total applications approved for Iraq from 1985 to 1990 reached the SNEC. The Commerce-approved exports included millions of dollars’ worth of U.S. equipment earmarked for secret nuclear weapon research sites in Iraq. The Pentagon wound up bombing Commerce’s mistakes.

One remedy for this is to give the Pentagon a more decisive role in dual-use licensing. The Pentagon should have the power to review all license applications, the power to concur in approvals, the power to help draft any regulation affecting nuclear exports, and the power to cause any application to be forwarded to the SNEC. The Energy Department should no longer be permitted to advise Commerce unilaterally to approve nuclear cases; instead, Energy should act only as a conduit and secretariat for the SNEC.

The Energy Department currently funds Livermore Laboratory’s Z-division to advise it on the SNEC’s cases. But the Pentagon should also help fund, and have regular access to, the Z-division’s resources. Furthermore, the persons whom the agencies send to the SNEC should meet minimum standards of technical competence, and should be cleared for sensitive intelligence. That is not now the case.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense should direct that all military technical assistance and cooperation that the Pentagon provides to other nations, including training programs, be reviewed by the nonproliferation office to ensure that this assistance does not contribute to proliferation.

International inspection

Sensitive exports are often misused after approval. Saddam Hussein was able to divert civilian nuclear imports to his A-bomb program without detection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA’s inspectors visit only declared sites. They make no attempt to detect clandestine nuclear activities — they inspect only what the country voluntarily designates; they see only what the country wants them to see. The system is thus vulnerable to cheating. It can even abet proliferation by providing a cloak of legitimacy for illicit activities. This is precisely what happened in Iraq.

There is now no international agency with the authority and ability to inspect undeclared sites. The IAEA has neither the resources nor the will to do so. Indeed, one of the IAEA’s main tasks is to promote the spread of nuclear technology, which undermines its inspection function. Its authority is also subject to the will of its governing board, which includes countries suspected of secret bomb-making.

Moreover, there is no international or U.S. agency with the mission of carrying out destruction operations such as the United Nations and the IAEA are now performing in Iraq. These operations are now conducted on an ad hoc basis, without the support of Pentagon staff trained in the technologies that bear on nuclear and missile proliferation.

The Defense Department should urge that an international inspection agency be created under the auspices of the United Nations to perform these inspection and destruction missions. The Pentagon should have the staff necessary to support it, and should offer to train, and when necessary to protect, teams of inspectors to staff it.

Counter-proliferation

The Pentagon must also plan for post-cold-war conflicts that could turn nuclear. Such planning will affect U.S. force structure, tactics, logistics, and equipment. There are also longer-range implications for research and development. The Pentagon’s nonproliferation policy office should be a catalyst, advisor, and point of liaison for these plans. Once the Pentagon begins to quantify the cost of combat in a regional nuclear war, its planners will realize how important it is to prevent a further drift into proliferation.

INSIDE THE PENTAGON: A RECIPE FOR FAILURE

If the Pentagon is to have more than a marginal impact on nonproliferation policy, a major reorganization is essential. Currently, the Pentagon’s nonproliferation office labors under an impossible set of self-imposed, internal handicaps.

First, the nonproliferation office, NPP, is an organizational anomaly. It “reports” to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), but it is not headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary or organized like other ISA components. NPP has been directed by a political appointee (a former Dan Quayle staffer) whose title is simply “Deputy.” The office is physically remote from the rest of ISA, and shares space with the Office of Multilateral Negotiations, which is concerned primarily with chemical weapon treaty negotiations, and which reports to a different Assistant Secretary.

In addition to the Deputy and his assistant, whose functions are primarily administrative, the NPP staff consists of two nuclear analysts (a GS-15 and a GS-12), one missile analyst (GS-15) and two temporary duty military officers who assist on missile issues. The two nuclear analysts are overburdened with specific statutory responsibilities, such as serving on the SNEC and preparing physical security assessments for nuclear transfers, and have virtually no time for bilateral and multilateral meetings, analysis of nuclear agreements, intelligence monitoring, or for the many other tasks that determine policy. Similar conditions prevail for the missile analyst.

At interagency meetings, the Pentagon’s representative is usually no higher than a GS-15 analyst. Such a representative cannot deal on an equal footing with the higher-ranking representatives from other agencies. On the rare occasions when the ISA Assistant Secretary or his Principal Deputy participate in nonproliferation meetings, their shallow immersion in the subject has made them easy marks for their counterparts from other agencies who work proliferation issues full-time.

To make matters worse, NPP has no budget of its own. There are not enough funds to permit staff travel to meetings in other capitals. NPP has not attended recent bilateral talks with Australia, Great Britain, Canada or Russia. A recent trip to South Asia by a U.S. nonproliferation team included no one from the Defense Department.

Finally, NPP’s small staff has little time to communicate or coordinate with relevant staffs on the Pentagon’s regional desks, or with the Defense Intelligence Agency, DTSA, OSD/Acquisitions (which has most of OSD’s technical expertise and its own set of international contacts), the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the General Counsel/Legislative Affairs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of these other Pentagon offices routinely take actions that affect nonproliferation policy. The NPP office should have enough personnel to insure adequate coordination with these offices if the Pentagon is to act coherently on nonproliferation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Proposed below is a blueprint for a revitalized nonproliferation effort at the Pentagon. The requirements to staff and fund it are modest. The staffing levels proposed could, if necessary, be supplemented with military officers.

  1. Defense’s nonproliferation effort should be headed by a distinguished senior official with experience in nonproliferation. The position should be at the Assistant Secretary level, with one Deputy Assistant Secretary for nuclear and missile proliferation, and one for chemical and biological warfare (CBW).
  2. The nuclear/missile effort should not be integrated with the CBW effort below the Assistant Secretary level. The differences in technology, export laws, treaty obligations, etc., would prejudice the ability of a combined office to deal with either subject effectively.
  3. Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for nuclear/missile proliferation, there should be four separate offices, each headed by a career Senior Executive Service officer. These officers should not be political appointees. They should be experts in their fields, as are their counterparts in the State and Energy Departments. In addition, these positions should be available on a civil service career path in order to encourage Pentagon employees to specialize in nonproliferation. Such “career path rewards” do not now exist at the Pentagon. The four offices are as follows:
    • Nuclear policy (staff of 8 to 10). Function: to participate in nuclear policy development and diplomacy, including bilateral cooperation agreements, the IAEA, transfers of nuclear materials, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other multilateral consultations on nonproliferation. In order to help level the playing field vis-a-vis the ISA country desks, some members of the policy staff should also be political specialists with recognized expertise in regions of proliferation concern. This office should be located in the Pentagon in close proximity to the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation.
    • Missile policy (staff of 4 to 5). Function: analogous to the above nuclear policy office, except that it would be devoted to missile proliferation topics such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). A total staff of 12 to 14 would be divided between the nuclear and missile policy offices.
    • Export control (staff of 10 to 12). Function: to screen nuclear- and missile-related export license applications, and to represent the Pentagon on SNEC and its MTCR counterpart. These nuclear and missile experts, at least some of whom would have export control experience at DTSA or elsewhere, would also work on improving export controls. They should have access through a computer link to the nuclear and missile export databases maintained by the Commerce and Energy Departments.
    • International inspection (initial staff of 2 to 3). Function: to help create an international inspection agency and supply trained staff. The immediate task of this office would be to support the U.N. Special Commission in Iraq. This staff could be increased as negotiations progressed toward an international inspection agency.
  4. Similar offices should be established under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for chemical and biological warfare.
  5. Few policy areas are as dependent on reliable, timely intelligence as nonproliferation. The Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation should have an intelligence office, with a staff of four, to serve the entire effort. It would track and analyze foreign nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs, including their procurement activities. This office would cooperate with the intelligence community.

ADDENDUM

How not to organize the Pentagon’s nonproliferation effort

A member of the armed services is now circulating a proposal to reorganize the Pentagon’s nonproliferation effort by subsuming it within the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), which would be given a new name and mission: Counter-Proliferation.

DTSA is a relic of the cold war whose chief function was to control the export of militarily useful technology to the Soviet bloc. DTSA now finds itself without a mission and in danger of drastic downsizing or elimination.

The proposal contemplates moving all or most of the Pentagon’s current nonproliferation staff, and the Office of Multilateral Negotiations (a CBW policy office) out of the Pentagon and into DTSA’s quarters at 400 Army-Navy Drive. There they would enter a large empire, employing over 100 people, replete with a Chief of Staff, an Ombudsman, a Secretariat, an Office of Public and Legislative Affairs, and a General Counsel. The purpose of this change is touted as bringing the large forces of DTSA to bear on a new “counter-proliferation” mission.

That mission, however, would concentrate heavily on planning military countermeasures, including an emphasis on maintaining a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent. It therefore suffers from precisely the kind of thinking that has kept the Pentagon out of nonproliferation policymaking in the past. Policy and diplomacy would be left in the hands of the State Department, and the Pentagon would clean up the mess with military countermeasures if the policy and diplomacy fail.

The physical move alone would be a blow for the nonproliferation office. It would cripple communication with top policymakers and would instantly demote the nonproliferation effort in the eyes of other Pentagon offices and other agencies.

Putting the existing nonproliferation and CBW staff in DTSA would leave them outnumbered ten to one by DTSA staff. They would be submerged in an organization studded with high-ranking officials lacking any apparent qualification for a nonproliferation role. DTSA is far too large, too bloated, and too tied to its cold-war-oriented past to be converted to an effective nonproliferation force. Few of its employees have the right technical skills or the knowledge of foreign nuclear programs, international agreements, and international institutions that form the context for nonproliferation policy.

What DTSA can offer to nonproliferation is its experience in export control, and in dealing with American industry. The difficulty, however, is that its focus has been on the Soviet Union and the advanced technologies that were relevant to superpower military competition. It has little experience in the nuclear-related exports that are the central concern of nonproliferation, or with many of the companies that produce them. An expanded nonproliferation effort may profit by absorbing a few DTSA employees, but attempting to convert DTSA into a nonproliferation office could never work.

How Western greed created Hussein’s Iraq

A Review of THE DEATH LOBBY
How the West Armed Iraq. By Kenneth Timmerman.
Houghton Mifflin. 443 pp. Illustrated. $21.95.

Saddam Hussein may have done the world a favor. By invading Kuwait when he did, he triggered the destruction of his atomic bomb program, which was only a few years short of producing deployable weapons. Iraq is a textbook example of how the existing system for stopping nuclear arms proliferation doesn’t work. It remains to be seen whether this spectacular lesson, provided at so much cost to the Iraqi people, will cause the world to learn anything.

Like every other developing country that has tried to make the bomb, Iraq was using imports. Saddam bought all the vital ingredients from willing sellers, most of whom were in the Western countries arrayed against him.

Kenneth Timmerman’s “The Death Lobby” tracks the stream of these sordid deals, beginning with the first French reactor contract in 1975 which resulted in an A-bomb factory that the Israelis bombed in 1981 to the purchase in the 1980s of the “supergun” a long-range, nuclear-capable cannon that resulted in the murder of its Canadian creator outside his Belgian apartment in 1990.

Timmerman’s account of these complex deals is clear, well-written and interesting. Most of what he describes has already been reported in one place or another, but drawing it together is a great achievement. The book’s only shortcoming may be its lack of a broader context into which the Iraqi experience can be fit, and from which prescriptions for cure can be derived. That, however, would take another volume.

Timmerman catalogs the people, the companies and the governments who sold Saddam his arsenal. We meet the unscrupulous French prime minister, Jacques Chirac, and his trusty nuclear aides, Andre Giraud and Bernard Goldschmidt. They sold Saddam a reactor in full knowledge that he wanted it for making bombs. This led to additional lucre for the French, whose Thompson CSF later sold Saddam high-tech radar and other military electronics.

France, however, could not keep up with the Germans when it came to the really dangerous stuff. German firms sold an entire poison-gas industry, complete with chemical ingredients and the machinery to make them. The famous Messerschmidt firm, still in business under the name MBB, became Saddam Hussein’s main missile technology supplier. What MBB learned from the Pentagon about the US Pershing 2 missile it could pass along to Saddam for his new Condor 2 missile, which had the same range and configuration. Other German firms gave Saddam vital help in the difficult process of making nuclear weapons material.

The United States also contributed. Timmerman singles out Marshall Wiley, former US ambassador to Oman. After leaving Foggy Bottom, Wiley set up the US-Iraq Business Forum, a group of big US firms that wanted to do more business in Iraq. Aided by assistant secretary of state Richard Murphy, who later went to work himself as a lobbyist for the chairman of the Forum, Wiley used the political clout of the Forum’s members to push export licenses for Iraq through the federal bureaucracy.

Success was not difficult, The man in charge of licensing at the Commerce Department was Dennis Kloske, who, to speed up approvals for Iraq, cut the Pentagon out of the review process. Kloske simply did not want to deal with the Pentagon’s pesky objections. In full knowledge that Iraq was developing missiles at a giant complex known as Saad-16, Commerce under Kloske approved millions of dollars worth of sensitive US electronics clearly marked for Saad-16. These products directly aided the Iraqi missile design and production effort.

The deals that Timmerman recounts are now history, but the exporters who supplied Saddam are still there. They await their next customer, who could be Saddam himself if he ever gets access to money again. When the United Nations inspection team visited the secret site where the Iraqi bomb was being designed, an Iraqi designer told an inspector: “We are just waiting for you to leave so we can get on with our work.”

There is no hope of stopping nuclear arms proliferation without closing down the network that supplied Iraq, and there is no hope of closing down the network without exposing and condemning it. This the United Nations can do – it has complied a list of companies that supplied Saddam’s nuclear, chemical and missile complexes. The United Nations has also seized documents that discuss contracts and reveal whether laws were broken.

The United States is reported to be in favor of making the information public, but Germany and France are lobbying to keep it secret. They want to protect their companies. If the names don’t come out, the suppliers will never face the punishment and opprobrium they deserve. And if the documents are not released, there will be no pressure on Western governments to improve their leaky export-control systems. North Korea, Iran and Libya are next in line at the A-bomb bazaar. They will buy the same equipment from the same firms that Iraq did unless something is done to choke off the supply.

Although “The Death Lobby” catalogs the cupidity of high-tech arms merchants and the governments that protect them, it is only the first step toward correcting what went wrong in Iraq. The next step is for government – including our own – to pass and enforce tough export laws. Only then will we have a chance to stop the spread of the bomb.

Testimony: U.S. Exports to Iraq

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

October 27, 1992

I am pleased to appear here today before this Committee to discuss United States exports to Iraq.

I am a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, and I direct a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

The Committee has asked me to answer the question whether American exports aided Iraq’s effort to build weapons of mass destruction.

The answer is “yes.” Saddam Hussein is the first monster with imported fangs. Although the West Germans supplied the canines, Americans supplied some of the lesser teeth. Both governments knew what was going on, but chose not to stop it.

I have been working on the problem of exports to Iraq for almost three years. In September 1990, in testimony before Congressman Barnard’s subcommittee, I recommended that the subcommittee obtain a list of the dual-use exports that the U.S. Commerce Department had approved for Iraq since 1985. The committee then did so with my continuing advice and assistance. After the list was released, I prepared a study analyzing it, which was completed in June 1991. I would like to offer the study today for inclusion in this committee’s hearing record.

In April 1992, I also published an article in the New York Times that listed over forty American companies that got more than one hundred licenses to supply sensitive, dual-use equipment to Iraq. All of these licenses were for Iraqi nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development sites. The April article followed an earlier one that I published in March 1992 in the New York Times Magazine. The March article showed which companies had contributed to developing the individual components of the first bomb Saddam was trying to build. I would also like to offer these two articles for inclusion in the hearing record. All of these publications are based squarely on official records kept by the U.S. Commerce Department.

The records show beyond any doubt that American equipment went directly into the Iraqi mass-destruction weapon programs. The records also show that our officials knew it was going there, but held their noses and waived it through.

Today I am going to talk about two categories of American exports: first, the ones that the UN inspectors actually found in Iraqi mass destruction weapon programs, and second, the ones that the Commerce Department licensed to these programs but that the UN has either not found or not included in its reports.

AMERICAN EXPORTS THAT THE UN HAS FOUND

The electron beam welder. The inspectors found a giant electron beam welder at an Iraqi nuclear weapon plant. It was an essential part of Saddam’s production line for making centrifuges, which Saddam was counting on to make his first critical mass of nuclear weapon material. The welder even had a special fixture for holding the centrifuges in place. The inspectors included it on a list of “the more important equipment” that they found.

This case sheds a lot of light on how the export licensing system worked. The exporter was the Connecticut branch of a German company called Leybold Vacuum Systems. In May 1987, Leybold had already made the newspapers. It was being investigated for trying to smuggle blueprints for uranium enrichment to Pakistan. And another German firm was suing it for stealing the blueprints. According to a German official, the evidence against the company was “very incriminating.” The newspaper stories appeared only six months before the company applied for its two U.S. export licenses in December 1987. Despite the applicant’s notoriety, Commerce approved both licenses in January and February 1988. Neither case was referred to the Pentagon or the State Department for review.

What were the Iraqis going to do with the welder? The application said, in plain English, that they wanted it for “general military repair applications such as jet engines, rocketcases, etc.” So Commerce explicitly approved military repairs, and work on rocketcases.

And who was buying the welder? Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries. One of Nassr’s main jobs was to buy equipment for Project 1728, devoted to increasing the range of Iraq’s SCUD missiles. The Iraqis did that by cutting up and rewelding the rocketcases to make them hold more fuel. Nassr also bought equipment for making centrifuges, which Saddam hoped would make his first atomic bomb.

So the Commerce Department allowed a known nuclear smuggler to send strategic U.S. equipment straight into the Iraqi bomb and missile program even after being told that the export was going to help make military rockets.

NBC News later discovered an internal Commerce memo showing that Commerce staffers had objected to the license. One employee wrote that “it is difficult to be a consenting party to a transaction such as this.”

The mass spectrometers. The UN found two U.S.-licensed mass spectrometers in the nuclear weapon program. These instruments are used to measure the quality of uranium as it is being enriched to nuclear weapon grade. The Commerce Department licensed one in December 1988 to the Ministry of Heavy Industries, a front company that bought equipment for the Iraqi nuclear weapon development sites, and another to Sa’ad 16 in 1985.

The vacuum pump oil. The UN also found vacuum pump oil made by Dupont in the nuclear program. Vacuum pumps move uranium gas through the enrichment process, while the uranium is raised to nuclear weapon grade. The gas is corrosive, so special pumps are needed to move it. The oil is a restricted item because it is used to lubricate these special pumps. The Commerce Department licensed the pump oil in February 1989.

In addition to this American equipment, which the UN listed as “important,” and which it said was actually being used in the atomic bomb program, there was also a transfer of know-how.

The detonation conference. In 1989, the Pentagon and the Department of Energy invited three Iraqis to attend a “detonation conference” in Portland, Oregon in August. Financed by American taxpayers, the meeting brought together experts from around the world to explain to the Iraqis how to produce shock waves in any desired configuration. There were even lectures on “H.M.X.,” the high explosive of choice for nuclear detonation, and on flyer plates, used to help produce the precise shock waves needed to ignite A-bombs. The UN found both H.M.X. and flyer plates at Iraq’s main nuclear weapon development site. The three Iraqis who attended the conference came from the laboratory that provided parts for Iraq’s first high explosive nuclear detonator.

Chemical and missile items. In February 1992 the UN sent the State Department a list of American equipment that had been found in Iraq’s chemical and missile programs. The list reveals a number of interesting things.

At the al-Muthanna State Establishment at Samarra, the largest Iraqi site for producing chemical weapons, the U.N. inspectors found American equipment during UNSCOM 17, the fifth chemical weapon inspection. They found air compressors, pressure and temperature regulators, power supply components, air filters for ensuring a clean and dry working environment, and buffer vessels, all made by a company in North Carolina. They also reported finding a filling system for projectiles–to fill the projectiles with chemical agents–made by a company in Connecticut and process control equipment made by a large American electronics manufacturer.

In addition, they reported finding a generator, some motors, and an ion exchange machine at al-Fallujah, another chemical weapon site. The UN said that all of these items were made by American companies. The UN also said in its letter that it had not determined how the equipment had found its way to Iraq, so it was possible that it had got there without the companies’ knowledge.

AMERICAN EXPORTS LICENSED BUT NOT YET FOUND

The second category I want to talk about is the equipment that the Commerce Department licensed, but that the UN has either not found or not mentioned in its reports.

It should be clear by now that U.S. export controls on Iraq suffered a massive breakdown in the period preceding the Gulf War. Front companies for every known nuclear, chemical and missile site in Iraq bought American high-speed computers and electronics. Computers exports alone exceeded $96 million. The Commerce Department also licensed equipment for making such things as military radar, and even told one company that it did not need a license for equipment that the Iraqis had specified as being able to operate 66 miles above the surface of the earth. I will mention here only a sample of the licenses that were approved.

The Iraqi Air Force. This is obviously a military institution, yet it was licensed to get $57 million worth of high-tech American exports, including navigational, radar, and air communication equipment and almost a million dollars worth of compasses, gyroscopes, and accelerometers. Compasses, gyroscopes and accelerometers are used in the guidance systems of missiles as well as aircraft. The Commerce Department approved them despite the fact that they were on the U.S. missile technology control list, which came into effect before the approvals were made. They fell under export control category 1485. All items under that category are controlled as missile items. Commerce also approved them without referral to the State Department, which was required for missile-tech items.

Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. It was directly in charge of nuclear weapon research in Iraq, yet it was licensed to get several American computers that were fast enough to require licenses for export.

Ministry of Defense. Obviously another military organization. It got over $2 million worth of computers, over $1 million worth of guidance equipment, and almost $300,000 worth of navigation, radar, and airborne communication equipment. Many of these items were approved without referral to the Pentagon, even though the buyer was clearly a military enterprise.

Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). This was another military organization, run by Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid. It built Al Atheer, Iraq’s primary nuclear weapon development and testing site. It also ordered the now-celebrated furnaces from Consarc that the White House blocked in June 1990 because of Iraq’s plan to divert the furnaces to nuclear weapon production. MIMI was licensed to get roughly $8 million worth of computers and a half million worth of computer-controlled machine tools.

Al-Qaqaa. Part of MIMI and part of Iraq’s nuclear weapon program. It sent the three experts I mentioned above to the detonation conference, and was the buyer of the nuclear weapon triggers that the Iraqis got caught smuggling out of the United States in March 1990. It was licensed to get $200,000 worth of American computers.

Badr. This organization was jointly in charge of all the centrifuge production in Iraq. It was also one of the few places I know of that actually got a “pre-license check” by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. After U.S. officials toured the plant, Ambassador Glaspie cabled in September 1989 that Badr was “a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S.-origin technology.” It was licensed to get $1.6 million worth of American computers.

Salah al Din (Saad 13). UN inspectors visited this plant and reported that it manufactured radar for the Iraqi army. It also supplied control panels for machines that enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Commerce licensed it to get over $1 million worth of quartz crystals–essential for making radar–from Zeta Laboratories despite the fact that the crystals were on the missile technology control list and the license was granted in January 1988–after the list went into effect. The stated end use was “components for a radar system.” As late as November 1989, Commerce also licensed Hewlett Packard to sell frequency synthesizers used to develop radar, despite the clear statement on the application that they would be used for “calibrating, adjusting and testing of a surveillance radar.”

These are only some of the licenses. There were other dangerous exports that went out without licenses. This happened because the Commerce Department inexplicably told exporters that no license was required. One of the most mystifying is what I call the case of the “flying tractor.”

The flying tractor. In 1991 the Los Angeles Times discovered that a New Jersey company had contacted the same Commerce Department representative, Michael Manning, who had advised Consarc about the furnaces. Iraq wanted to buy “time-delay relays.” These have civilian uses but are also used to separate the stages of ballistic missiles in flight. Iraq wanted a special model, “tested for shock and vibration,” that would perform at 350,000 feet. That is 66 miles above the earth. An employee of the company told the Los Angeles Times that “when I heard 350,000 feet, I thought missile.”[1]

The employee also said that he told Manning about the high-altitude specifications, which were military grade. They contradicted the Iraqis’ claim that the relays were for “heavy industrial use.” The employee said he told Manning that “they’re not putting tractors 350,000 feet in the air.”[2] Nevertheless, U.S. officials told the company that if a civilian use were stated, there was no reason to bar the export.

I think these examples show an unmistakable pattern. Our government allowed a mountain of dangerous equipment to go to Iraq, and now the UN is finding it at mass-destruction weapon sites. Rather than deny the facts, the government should try to learn something from them.

WHAT DID OUR GOVERNMENT KNOW AND WHEN DID IT KNOW IT?

Did our government actually know what Saddam was up to? And did it know early enough to stop these dangerous exports? The answer is clearly “yes.”

Sa’ad 16. In November 1986, the Pentagon sent the Commerce Department a letter stating that the Pentagon had intelligence information linking a giant Iraqi site called “Sa’ad 16” to missile work.[3] The letter also said that Sa’ad 16 was working on other weapons of mass-destruction. As we now know, Saad 16 was the biggest missile development site in Iraq. U.S. pilots were sent to bomb it during the Gulf War.

We also know that Commerce had even more information about Saad 16 earlier. In May 1985, the general contractor for Sa’ad 16, a West German company called Gildemeister, filed an application for a $60,000 computer for the Sa’ad General Establishment, which Commerce approved six weeks later (case A897641). With the application was an Iraqi letter listing 78 laboratories at Sa’ad 16, including four for testing “starting material and fuel mixtures,” two for “calometric testing of fuels,” two for developing “control systems and navigation” equipment and one for “measuring aerodynamic quantities on models.” On May 3, 1986 a second letter from Sa’ad revealed that the Sa’ad General Establishment was a part of the “State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI)” and that another name for Sa’ad 16 was the “Research and Development Center.”[4] Commerce undoubtedly received this second letter–an internal Commerce memo mentions it.[5] These two letters from Sa’ad, combined with the November 1986 message from the Pentagon, should have barred any of these organizations from receiving sensitive U.S. exports after November 6, 1986.

But the Sa’ad General Establishment got over half a million dollars’ worth of U.S. computers in eight cases, seven of which were approved after November 1986. Sa’ad also got $290,000 worth of precision electronic and photographic equipment, approved in February 1987, three months after Commerce received the Pentagon letter and more than a year after the receiving the letter describing Sa’ad 16’s laboratories.

The second Iraqi organization mentioned in the Sa’ad letter, SOTI, got high-speed U.S. oscilloscopes in March 1988, a year and a half after Commerce received the Pentagon’s letter (case B259524). SOTI is part of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. It directed the construction and equipping of a solid rocket motor production plant called “DOT,” and it also procured equipment for at least two SCUD missile enhancement projects. High-speed oscilloscopes are essential to maintain radar, computers and missile guidance systems, all of which have internal electronics that operate in short time frames. Oscilloscopes are also used to capture the brief signals from a nuclear weapon test, which occur in a microsecond or less. Only high-speed oscilloscopes need a license for export.

The third organization mentioned in the Sa’ad letter was the “Research and Development Center,” which the letter said was another name for Sa’ad 16. The “Center” was allowed to buy $850,000 worth of high-performance measuring, calibrating, and testing equipment (cases B060729 and B075876), all approved in January 1987, three months after the Pentagon’s letter and more than a year after the Iraqi letter describing Sa’ad 16’s laboratories. The Defense Department apparently objected at the staff level but did not escalate its objections to a higher level before Commerce approved the exports. The Center also got communicating and tracking equipment valued at $3,000 in 1989 (case B382561).

In addition to the letters from Sa’ad and the Pentagon, there were other warnings. According to U.S. officials, American intelligence began to brief other U.S. agencies on the Iraqi end user network at least at early as 1987. The briefings continued throughout 1988.

In the open press, the earliest detailed accounts of Sa’ad 16 emerged in January 1989, when the German magazine Stern published a list of the Sa’ad 16 laboratories. Over the next several months, the German press published several stories linking Sa’ad 16 to Iraqi missile, nuclear and chemical weapon development. But even these press reports did not stop Commerce from approving the tracking equipment in June of 1989.

Thus the Commerce Department continued to let sensitive American equipment flow to Iraqi front companies even after it knew that the equipment was likely to be diverted.

Internal U.S. government memos. Due to the excellent investigative work done by Representative Henry Gonzales, we now have documents showing that U.S. intelligence knew about, and was reporting on, Iraq’s nuclear weapon effort well before many of the most dangerous exports went out.

As early as June 28, 1985, a Pentagon memo referred to a CIA report, attached to a letter from Secretary of State George Shultz, stating that “there is a body of evidence indicating that Iraq continues to actively pursue an interest in nuclear weapons,…[and] that Iraq has been somewhat less than honest in regard to the intended end-use of high-technology equipment.” Despite the CIA report, Shultz asked the Pentagon’s help in licensing exports to Iraq “without impractical conditions.”

On April 3, 1986, a State Department memo complained about the Pentagon’s effort to hold up licenses to Iraq. It said that the Pentagon’s evaluation of the Iraqi proliferation threat “differed radically from all other agencies,” and that “DOD has simply found a device for blocking legitimate high-tech sales to Iraq while appearing to take the high ground on nonproliferation.”

On February 22, 1989, Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, explicitly told the House Armed Services Committee that Iraq was “actively pursuing” nuclear weapons.

On March 23, 1989, a State Department memo stated that Iraq was “working hard at chemical and biological weapons.”

Despite all this, on October 2, 1989, President Bush issued NSD 26, stating that “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our influence in Iraq.”

Only a month later, on November 6, 1989, the CIA reported that “Baghdad has created complex procurement networks … to acquire technology for its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile development programs.”


Footnotes:

[1] Henry Weinstein, “Despite Warning, U.S. Okd Sale of Missile Part to Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1991. p. A7.

[2] Id.

[3] United States Government Accounting Office, “Arms Control: U.S. Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology” (Report to the Honorable Dennis DeConcini, U.S. Senate), GAO/NSIAD-90-176, p. 14.

[4] Sa’ad General Establishment, letter of May 3, 1986 from H. A. Al-Dahan to Gildemeister Projecta.

[5] U.S. Department of Commerce, Memorandum to John Knofala from Willard A. Workman, August 12, 1986.

Winking at Proliferation

The Washington Post
August 16, 1992, p. C2

Why Are U.S. Firms Still Able to Aid the Mideast Missile Race?

The Bush administration this summer has missed a major opportunity to slow the spread of missiles in the Third World. In June, it published a list that purports to name the world’s most dangerous rocket projects so that U.S. firms would not sell material of any sort to them. However, after political arm-twisting by several foreign governments, the administration has deleted the names of every dangerous project in the Mideast. The effect of this, bafflingly, is to let U.S. firms continue selling missile-related technology not only to Israel, but to its rivals.

Among the nations and projects listed in the original Commerce Department tally but dropped from the final list are: Egypt’s upgraded Scud and Condor II missiles; Iraq’s Scud-B, Al-Husayn, Al-Abbas, Condor II and Tammuz missiles, and Al-Abid rocket; Israel’s Jericho I and II missiles and Shavit space launcher; Libya’s upgraded Scud and Al-Fatah missiles; and Syria’s upgraded Scuds. Also dropped were Argentina’s Condor I and II missiles and Alacran rockets. President Carlos Menem pledged to end the Condor II program, but it remains an active component of his nation’s unneeded space-launch program.

To be sure, some of these deletions are theoretical — total embargoes are in effect in such countries as Iraq. But the deletions mean that U.S. firms can continue to fan missile proliferation, especially in the Middle East, by selling equipment and technology while claiming they do not know which projects are missile efforts.

U.S. law forbids U.S. firms from selling anything — even a pencil sharpener — to a project that they “know” is missile-related, unless they obtain an export license from the Commerce Department. The procedure is intended to give Commerce direct oversight of any exports to dangerous projects. But the only way for an exporter to “know” legally is through the newly published — and now deeply flawed — list.

The new list is an example of unsavory political favoritism. For example, by omitting the potent Jericho II missile, which has a range that allows it to reach every Mideast capital, the administration winks at Israel’s diversion of U.S. technology to the missile effort.

The list also winks at Israel’s agreement to develop the Jericho jointly with South Africa, and that is because the administration’s list is also nonsensical. Though it leaves out the Jericho, it names South Africa’s “Surface-to-Surface Missile Project” — which is Pretoria’s half of the Jericho project.

The list’s same lack of logic is at work in other international missile projects. While leaving out Syria’s short-range missiles, for example, the list names North Korea’s “Scud Development Project,” which is virtually identical. North Korea is selling short-range Scuds to Syria as fast as it can. The list also fails to mention Syria’s medium-range missiles, but names China’s medium-range “M Series Missiles,” even though the technology to make them is being sold to Damascus by Beijing.

The Israelis fought the administration’s 1991 version of the list because it did name the Jericho, their premier missile. After caving in to Israeli demands that the Jericho be excluded, the administration felt forced to exclude projects underway in Egypt, Libya and Syria because, administration officials told me privately, it would have been politically embarrassing to do otherwise.

The task of compiling the list divided the administration. On one side were officials whose job is to stop proliferation; on the other were the country desk officers at the State Department, whose job is to maintain good relations with the countries on the list. “We went back and forth for more than a year,” said one official close to the debate, “and ‘the desks’ finally won.”

The result did not please the exporters. “It shows that the president’s program lacks clear objectives,” asserts one exporter. “It doesn’t really achieve any foreign policy goals.” In fact, American exporters are the loudest proponents of a better list that would enable them to tell safe buyers from the risky ones.

To be truly useful, the list should name the various companies, institutes, “research” enterprises and other entities that are the actual buyers of equipment for missile programs.

Some examples would be: Israel’s Technion University, which has helped design the Jericho II’s re-entry vehicle, and Israel Military Industries, which makes the Jericho’s rocket motors; and the Indian Institute of Science and the Institute of Technology, which are studying such things as stresses on rocket bodies and computer modeling of solid rocket fuel performance.

In Brazil, the Embraer company, an arm of the Brazilian Air Force, and another firm, Orbita, are trying to turn Brazil’s Sonda IV space launcher into an intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missile.

The administration is now said to be considering adding such companies and institutes by name to the June list. But there is still a black hole in place of the rocket projects of Argentina and the Mideast.

A detailed list from the administration would be a message to the world. All exporters — foreign and domestic — would rely on it. Foreign governments would immediately feel the pressure to incorporate the list into their own laws. The result could be a lot less missile proliferation. If Saddam Hussein has taught us anything, it is that half-hearted export controls don’t work.