Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

North Korea Deal Complicates Nuclear Policy

February 1, 1995March 14, 2017

The U.S.-North Korea accord, hailed by U.S. officials as the best solution in a difficult situation, could create problems for controlling nuclear exports to other sensitive countries.

The October agreement opens three North Korean reactors and a plutonium plant to international inspections and prevents 8,000 spent fuel rods from being reprocessed into weapon material. However, the agreement marks the first time the United States has arranged for a country in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to get nuclear reactors. This precedent could make it difficult to block sales of Chinese, Russian or German reactors to Iran, a country that has not openly broken the Treaty but which the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) suspects of running a secret bomb program.

Phases of the U.S.-North Korean Accord

What North Korea Does

Phase One: 1994-2000
Freezes, under inspection, three reactors, a plutonium plant, and 8,000 plutonium-bearing fuel rods
Allows inspection of declared nuclear sites

Phase Two: 2000-2003
Allows full inspection of two suspect sites thought to contain evidence of bomb-making
Answers all questions about its nuclear past
Sends 8,000 plutonium-bearing fuel rods out of the country

Phase Three: 2003-2005
Dismantles existing graphite reactors and plutonium plant

In Addition
Resumes diplomatic dialogue on denuclearization with South Korea

What North Korea Gets

Phase One: 1994-2000
Free oil, new reactors and aid, while keeping any plutonium or A-bombs it has already made and being freed from trade sanctions

Phase Two: 2000-2003
Increased level of aid
Key nuclear components to complete first light water reactor

Phase Three: 2003-2005
Completion of second light water reactor

In addition
U.S. pledges not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea

Testimony: Three Points on the US-North Korean Nuclear Accord

January 26, 1995March 31, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services

January 26, 1995

I am pleased to appear here today before this Committee to discuss the United States-North Korean nuclear accord signed last October. I am a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, and I direct a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

America’s principal gain under the agreement is the freeze in North Korea’s plutonium production. North Korea has promised not to extract the plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods in its possession. There are an estimated 25 kilograms of plutonium in the rods, enough for four to five weapons. North Korea also promises not to complete two graphite reactors that have been under construction. Those reactors could produce enough plutonium for 25-30 bombs per year if they came on line as scheduled over the next two years. North Korea also promises to stop operating a small graphite reactor that discharged the 8,000 fuel rods.

I would like to cover three points: the agreement’s effect on our nonproliferation policy; its effect on the International Atomic Energy Agency; and its effect on the peninsula.

The agreement with North Korea abandons non-proliferation policies that the United States has followed since the 1970s. The United States has always opposed the sale of light water reactors to countries that are proliferation risks. We talked the French out of supplying such a reactor to Pakistan and talked the Germans out of supplying two to Iran. We would not even consider selling such a reactor to Israel, a U.S. ally, because of Israel’s rejection of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.

Only last week, Secretary of State Christopher was quoted in a speech at Harvard University as warning that Iran has a “crash” program to build nuclear weapons. According to the Washington Post, an aide said that Christopher’s comment was “a shot at the Russians,” who have announced that they will complete two reactors in Iran. The reactors are at Bushehr, and have a special history.

American diplomacy convinced Germany, which started building the reactors, not to finish them, and Iraq felt that they were so threatening that Iraqi planes bombed them during the Iran-Iraq war. Now, in the wake of the U.S.-North Korean deal, the Russians are stepping into the picture. If the Russians finish the first reactor within five years, which is the current estimate of the construction time, Iran will have its first access to weapon quantities of plutonium. This will be a disaster for U.S. diplomacy, which has tried for many years to prevent Iran from reaching this point. And the Russians are not stopping with Iran. There are also reports that they will build light water reactors in India. This action will break a de facto nuclear reactor embargo on India that has held since the 1970s.

Mr. Christopher’s remark shows that the State Department is having trouble facing reality. How can the United States expect Russia not to sell reactors to Iran if we are giving the same type of reactors free to North Korea?

Why are light water reactors important? Because they, like all other reactors, make plutonium that can be used in atomic bombs. That is why the International Atomic Energy Agency inspects light water reactors in countries around the world, and why the United States has opposed their sale to Iran. The two reactors going to North Korea can make twice as much bomb-grade plutonium as the graphite reactors North Korea has now, including the ones under construction. The two giant light water reactors could turn out at least 70 bombs’ worth of weapon-grade plutonium per year. North Korea’s existing graphite reactors are only one eighth as big, and could make only 25-30 bombs’ worth per year. The State Department does not dispute these numbers.

Is the plutonium from light water reactors more “proliferation resistant” than plutonium from graphite reactors? The answer is no. If North Korea wants to, it can operate the light water reactors to make plutonium that is ideal for bombs. To make weapon-grade plutonium, it would only be necessary to shut down and reload more often. In such a mode the two reactors would produce at least 400 kg of plutonium per year, enough for roughly 70 bombs if one assumes between five and six kilograms per bomb. The Iranian light water reactors at Bushehr could do the same. By contrast, the three North Korean graphite reactors would not produce more than 150 kg per year, enough for 25-30 bombs.

Neither North Korea nor Iran has a plant to extract plutonium from light water reactor fuel, but North Korea could modify its existing plutonium plant to do so, and Iran could build a plant. Both countries could do this without violating the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Why does North Korea want light water reactors? Nobody outside that country seems to know. The administration admits that the United States could provide coal- or oil-fired plants much faster and cheaper, and without creating dependence on outside suppliers for fuel. And why does Iran want light water reactors? Iran is sitting on one of the biggest pools of oil in the world. Iran can make electricity from oil or gas for a fraction of what it would cost to make it from uranium. And with reactors, Iran too would start depending on outside suppliers for fuel. To believe that North Korea and Iran want light water reactors to make electricity is to believe in fairy tales.

There is a more plausible explanation for North Korea’s strange desire for a light water reactor. It is delay. If the United States supplied gas-, oil- or coal-fired plants, the deal could be done in one year instead of five or ten. But that would mean that North Korea would have to perform its side of the bargain in one year. North Korea would have to let international inspectors see the plutonium it is hiding. North Korea would also have to start dismantling its nuclear plants. But North Korea doesn’t want to do that. It wants to get its economy rescued, and keep its bomb program alive, both at the same time. The light water reactor–because it takes so long to build–meets both those needs. Delay has been North Korea’s strategy all along, and still is.

In effect, over the first five years of the agreement, the United States is agreeing to let North Korea keep any bombs it has already made, and is paying North Korea not to make any more. North Korea is the only country ever to join the Treaty and then openly break the inspection obligations under it. This strategy has obviously paid off. Uncle Sam is rewarding North Korea not only with oil and reactors, but by dropping the trade restrictions that are now driving down North Korea’s economy.

The message to other countries is clear. If you join the Nonproliferation Treaty, and break it by secretly making bombs, you will receive billions of dollars worth of free nuclear- and fossil- fuel energy. And you will get these benefits even if you are committing human rights violations, even if you have an undisputed record as a terrorist nation, and even if you are developing and exporting nuclear-capable missiles to other terrorist nations.

The State Department, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Energy Committee, argued that the North Korean deal was not a precedent for Iran, since Iran isn’t being asked to shut down any nuclear facilities. But that is because Iran has no nuclear facilities like North Korea’s. The State Department’s case amounts to saying that the only difference between the two cases is that Iran isn’t blackmailing us–because it can’t yet.

There is also the question of international inspections. North Korea is being treated as a “special case,” essentially because North Korea has successfully blackmailed us. Hans Blix, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has said that a country must either be either in or out of the Nonproliferation Treaty. If it joins, it must accept the whole menu of inspection rights; it can’t order “a la carte.” But that is what the United States has allowed North Korea to do. The IAEA asked North Korea to allow international inspectors into two waste sites under the IAEA’s “special inspection” procedure. Instead of backing up the IAEA, the U.S. State Department cut a special deal exempting Pyongyang from such inspections for at least five years. This left the IAEA twisting the wind in North Korea, and undermined it everywhere else. If Iran now demands the same exemption from special inspections that North Korea is getting under the U.S. agreement–and there is no reason to think Iran won’t–the IAEA won’t stand a chance of finding the secret bomb program that the CIA and Secretary Christopher say Iran is running.

This lack of inspections leads to the third question: how North Korea might take advantage of the agreement to advance its program of plutonium and weapons production. The CIA says there is a “better than even” chance that North Korea has already incorporated its secret cache of plutonium into bombs. If so, North Korea can remain a nuclear power while being paid not to be. If North Korea has not made a bomb yet, it has five years to perfect one secretly, because surprise inspections are effectively barred until then. The agreement, in Section IV, gives North Korea at least five years to “come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement.” The State Department says this means that North Korea is exempt from inspection of any site connected to its past plutonium accumulation from its small reactor. In fact, this loophole is big enough to exempt every suspect site in the country.

North Korea also is allowed to keep its three graphite reactors, its plutonium processing plant and its 8,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods intact until the next century, when the first light water reactor will be completed. The risk is that North Korea could accept the oil, trade and diplomatic benefits until it gets back on its feet. Then, it could kick out the inspectors and make five more bombs’ worth of plutonium from the spent fuel rods. A revived and stronger North Korea would be harder to deal with than the crumbling North Korea we are facing now.

Pyongyang’s military threat is unaffected by the pact. North Korea’s troops and tanks are still massed on the South Korean border. North Korea can also continue to develop its heavy NoDong missile for sale to Libya, Iran and Syria. The NoDong’s range is estimated at 1,000 km, enough to deliver a nuclear weapon to Japan from North Korea. It could also be launched from Libya to reach Southern Europe, and from Iran or Syria to reach Israel.

I would like to close by saying that the best time to confront the North Korean nuclear threat was during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The program had not yet reached the threshold of success, and there was still time for sanctions to work. Both administrations watched the program grow. But they pushed the problem into the Clinton administration. Now the Clinton administration has made a deal that will probably push the problem into the next administration, since that is when a breach by North Korea is most likely to occur. Pushing problems off to one’s successor may be tempting politically, but it is a risky way to deal with the spread of nuclear weapons.

Testimony: Messages Behind the US-North Korean Nuclear Accord

January 19, 1995April 7, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

January 19, 1995

I am pleased to appear here today before this Committee to discuss the United States-North Korean nuclear accord. I am a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, and I direct a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

The Committee has asked me to discuss three questions. First, what are America’s gains under the agreement compared to its obligations? Second, what are the dangers of treating North Korea as a “special case” under international inspections? Third, how might North Korea take advantage of the agreement to advance a program of plutonium and weapon production?

America’s principal gain under the agreement is the freeze in North Korea’s plutonium production. North Korea has promised not to extract the plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods in its possession. There are an estimated 25 kilograms of plutonium in the rods, enough for four to five nuclear weapons. North Korea also promises not to complete two more graphite reactors now under construction. Those reactors could produce enough plutonium for 25-30 bombs per year if they came on line as scheduled over the next two years. North Korea also promises to stop operating a small graphite reactor that discharged the 8,000 fuel rods.

America’s burden is that it must supply millions of dollars’ worth of oil, and arrange for the construction of two large light water reactors worth over $4 billion, while North Korea remains in violation of its international inspection obligations. North Korea is refusing to open the doors of two nuclear waste sites where the United States believes evidence of illicit plutonium production is hidden. This illicit production has resulted in enough plutonium for one or two bombs, according to U.S. intelligence.

The message to other countries is clear. If you join the Nonproliferation Treaty, and break it by secretly making bombs, you will receive billions of dollars worth of free nuclear- and fossil- fuel energy. And you will get these benefits even if you are committing human rights violations, have an undisputed record as a terrorist nation, and are exporting nuclear-capable missiles to other terrorist nations.

The light water reactors also send a message. The United States cannot endorse such reactors for North Korea without giving the green light to Russia and China to build them in Iran. The Russians have just announced that they will complete the two Iranian light water reactors at Bushehr. These reactors have a special history. American diplomacy convinced Germany, which started the reactors, not to finish them, and Iraq felt that they were so threatening that Iraqi planes bombed them during the Iran-Iraq war. Now, in the wake of the U.S.- North Korean deal, the Russians are stepping into the picture. If the Russians finish the first reactor within five years, which is the current estimate of the construction time, Iran will have its first access to weapon quantities of plutonium. This will be a disaster for U.S. diplomacy, which has tried for many years to prevent Iran from reaching this point. And the Russians are not stopping with Iran. There are also reports that they will build light water reactors in India. This action will break a de facto nuclear reactor embargo on India that has held since the 1970s.

Why are light water reactors important? Because they, like all other reactors, make plutonium that can be used in atomic bombs. That is why the International Atomic Energy Agency inspects light water reactors in countries around the world, and why the United States has opposed their sale to Iran. The two reactors going to North Korea will make twice as much bomb-grade plutonium as the graphite reactors North Korea has now, including the ones under construction. The two giant light water reactors could turn out at least 70 bombs’ worth of “weapon-grade” plutonium per year. North Korea’s existing graphite reactors are only one eighth as big, and could make only 25-30 bombs’ worth per year.

I should explain how I arrived at these numbers. First, each standard-sized light water reactor has a power rating of about 1,000 MW(e). That makes 2,000 MW(e) for two. Taken together, North Korea’s three graphite reactors are rated at only 255 MW(e). If operated to maximize electricity production, the two light water reactors would make at least 500 kg of plutonium per year. That plutonium would be almost all “reactor grade.” It could be used in bombs but would not be of optimum quality for such a purpose. If operated to produce “weapon-grade” plutonium, the light water reactors would have to be shut down and reloaded more often. In such a mode they would produce at least 400 kg per year, enough for roughly 70 bombs if one assumes between five and six kilograms per bomb. The Iranian light water reactors at Bushehr could do the same. By contrast, the three North Korean graphite reactors would not produce more than 150 kg per year, enough for 25-30 bombs.

Why does North Korea want light water reactors? Nobody outside that country seems to know. The administration admits that the United States could provide coal- or oil-fired plants much faster and cheaper, and without creating dependence on outside suppliers for fuel. And why does Iran want light water reactors? Iran is sitting on one of the biggest pools of oil in the world. Iran can make electricity from oil or gas for a fraction of what it would cost to make it from uranium. And with reactors, Iran too would start depending on outside suppliers for fuel. To believe that North Korea and Iran need light water reactors to make electricity is to believe in fairy tales.

The Committee also asked me to discuss the danger of treating North Korea as a “special case” under international inspections. Hans Blix, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has said that when a country joins the Nonproliferation Treaty, it must accept the whole menu of inspection rights; it can’t order “a la carte.” But that is what the United States has allowed North Korea to do. The IAEA asked North Korea to allow international inspectors into two waste sites under the IAEA’s “special inspection” procedure. Instead of backing up the IAEA, the U.S. State Department cut a special deal exempting Pyongyang from such inspections for at least five years. This left the IAEA twisting in the wind in North Korea, and undermined it everywhere else. If Iran now demands the same exemption from special inspections that North Korea is getting under the U.S. agreement–and there is no reason to think Iran won’t–the IAEA won’t stand a chance of finding the secret bomb program that the CIA thinks Iran is running.

Never before has the United States treated a country in open violation of international inspections as a member in good standing of the Nonproliferation Treaty, or arranged for such a country to get nuclear reactors. U.S. law forbids the sale of a reactor to such a country. The State Department hopes to finesse this point by withholding key components until the inspection questions are cleared up, but reactor construction will begin, years will pass, and lots of money will be spent while North Korea is still defying the inspectors. North Korea also will start enjoying trade and diplomatic benefits while still in breach. This undermines both U.S. nonproliferation policy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

This lack of inspections leads to the third topic: how North Korea might take advantage of the agreement to advance its program of plutonium and weapons production. The CIA says there is a “better than even” chance that North Korea has already incorporated its secret cache of plutonium into bombs. If so, North Korea can remain a nuclear power while being paid not to be. If North Korea has not made a bomb yet, it has five years to perfect one secretly, because surprise inspections are apparently barred until then. I say “apparently” because the agreement, in Section IV, gives North Korea at least five years to “come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement.” If special inspection of North Korea’s two suspect sites is suspended for that period, it seems highly unlikely that other special inspections would be allowed.

North Korea also is allowed to keep its three graphite reactors, its plutonium processing plant and its 8,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods intact until the next century, when the first light water reactor will be completed. The risk is that North Korea could accept the oil, trade, and diplomatic benefits until it gets back on its feet. Then, it could kick out the inspectors and make five more bombs’ worth of plutonium from the spent fuel rods. A revived and stronger North Korea would be harder to deal with than the North Korea we are facing now.

Pyongyang’s military threat is unaffected by the pact. North Korea’s troops and tanks are still massed on the South Korean border, and they can be fueled with oil freed up by U.S. deliveries. North Korea can also continue to develop its heavy NoDong missile for sale to Libya, Iran and Syria. The NoDong’s range is estimated at 1,000 km, enough to deliver a nuclear weapon to Japan from North Korea. It could also be launched from Libya to reach Southern Europe, and from Iran or Syria to reach Israel.

I would like to close by saying that the best time to confront the North Korean nuclear threat was during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The program had not yet reached the threshold of success, and there was still time for sanctions to work. But those administrations pushed the problem into the Clinton administration. Now, the Clinton administration has made a deal that will probably push the problem into the next administration, since that is when a breach by North Korea is most likely to occur. Pushing problems off to one’s successor may be tempting politically, but it is a risky way to deal with the spread of nuclear arms.

Phases of the U.S.-DPRK AccordPhase One: 1994-2000

What North Korea Does:
Freezes, under inspection, three reactors, a plutonium plant, and 8,000 plutonium-bearing fuel rods; allows inspection of admitted nuclear sites.

What the U.S. and its Allies Do:
Provide hundreds of millions of dollars in free oil and billions in new reactors, while allowing North Korea to keep any A-bombs it has secretly made and freeing North Korea from trade sanctions.

Phase Two: 2000-2003

What North Korea Does:
Allows full inspection of two suspect sites thought to contain evidence of bomb-making; answers all questions about its nuclear past; sends 8,000 plutonium-bearing fuel rods out of the country.

What the U.S. and its Allies Do:
Increase level of aid; install key nuclear components and bring on line first light water reactor.

Phase Three 2003-2005

What North Korea Does:
Dismantles existing graphite reactors and plutonium plant.

What the U.S. and its Allies Do:
Complete second light water reactor.

In Addition

What North Korea Does:
Resumes diplomatic talks with South Korea on denuclearization.

What the U.S. Does:
Pledges not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

Israel Gets High-Speed Computers

January 1, 1995March 31, 2017

In November, the United States approved the sale of powerful computers that could boost Israel’s well-known but officially secret A-bomb and missile programs.

The most controversial exports are a pair of supercomputers produced by Cray Research and IBM. Valued at roughly $2 million each, they perform at speeds more than ten times faster than the current level at which most American machines are controlled for export.

“This would be the largest machine ever sold to Israel,” said one senior official, describing the Cray Research machine. Several smaller computers approved for individual sale to Israeli universities are also more powerful than anything Israel has now.

The Israel sale highlights a relaxed U.S. policy on the sale of high-performance supercomputers to countries known to be working on weapons of mass destruction. Five federal agencies fought for months over whether to allow Cray Research to sell its machine to a network of Israeli universities, with the National Security Council making the final decision for approval in November. The decision came after a high-level review of supercomputer export policy.

Although supercomputers perform many civilian functions, they were invented primarily to design U.S. atomic and hydrogen bombs. Supercomputers are a powerful tool for developing both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles because they can simulate the implosive shock wave that detonates a nuclear warhead, or model the forces affecting a missile from launch to impact.

The Cray machine is destined for the Inter-University Computation Center, a “wide area network” that connects Israel’s leading universities, several of which are known to be working on nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

A 1987 Pentagon-sponsored study found that Technion University, one of the schools in the network, was helping design Israel’s nuclear missile re-entry vehicle. U.S. officials say Technion’s physicists also worked in Israel’s secret weapon complex at Dimona, where an Israeli reactor makes plutonium for atomic bombs. In 1989, Cray was denied a license to sell a supercomputer to Technion because the university conducted research on nuclear-capable missiles.

Hebrew University in Jerusalem also would be allowed to use the Cray supercomputer, even though the study said Hebrew University supplied physicists to Israel’s nuclear lab at Soreq, where scientists were “developing the kind of codes which will enable them to make hydrogen bombs.”

And the university network includes the Weizmann Institute, whose scientists, the study said, studied high energy physics and hydrodynamics needed for nuclear bomb design, and worked on lasers to enrich uranium, the most advanced method for making the material dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Cray and U.S. officials say the computer’s security plan minimizes the risk that it could be used for illicit military calculations. Cray maintains its personnel will have access to the computer at all times, though it admits it won’t constantly oversee the machine and cannot disable it in case of diversion. Cray also says high-level technical committees will be formed to oversee Israel’s promise not to misuse the machine. “If someone ran a large calculation that seemed suspicious, the U.S. government would know about it and could ask the Israeli government for a copy,” a Cray spokesman said.

No one involved argues the deal is without risk. “The question is how much risk we are willing to take,” says a U.S. official.

The Pentagon, the Department of Energy and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) voted against the Cray sale on the inter-agency working level, while the Commerce and State Departments supported it. The vote also was split on the smaller machines.

The decision then was bumped to the next bureaucratic level, the Advisory Committee on Export Policy. DOE changed its vote to “yes” on the Cray and “no” on the smaller machines, reasoning that if university scientists wanted to work on A-bombs, there would be less risk of detection on the smaller in-house computers.

Cray believes the desire for military secrecy will deter a possible bomb or missile maker from revealing data and software over an open network. But one U.S. official who opposed the sale says that “safeguards are impossible with such wide access.” He argues that “the conditions are just a fig leaf” because skilled Israeli scientists could defeat the safeguards. Israel will be permitted to design aircraft on the machine, with air-flow calculations that would be nearly impossible for any expert to distinguish from missile designs or to distinguish effectively enough to support a diplomatic protest.

The U.S. official also contends the sale contradicts current policy. “Other computers went to Israel for joint [U.S.-Israel] programs, or for purely civilian applications, but not to a network where everybody can log on.” He and a former U.S. official familiar with nuclear weapon design worry that the boost in computing power will help Israel with its latest engineering problem, shrinking thermonuclear warheads to fit on long-range missiles.

Critics also are concerned with precedent. If you say “yes” to supercomputers going to Israel, they contend, how do you say “no” to India, China and Pakistan?

U.S. Computers Approved to Israel – November 1994

Exporter Speed (CTP)* Buyer
Cray Research 5,225.0 Tel Aviv University
Cray Research 1,325.0 Weizmann Institute
IBM 6,796.1 Tel Aviv University
IBM 1,421.0 Hebrew University
IBM 1,421.0 Bar Ilan University
IBM 1,278.1 Technion Institute
IBM 1,278.1 Weizmann Institute
Silicon Graphics 1,334.0 Weizmann Institute
Silicon Graphics 1,071.0 Bar Ilan University

* Composite Theoretical Performance

India’s Missiles and Rockets

January 1, 1995March 27, 2017

These are India’s six biggest missiles and space rockets. If a U.S. firm “knows or is informed” that its products will contribute to their development, the firm must obtain a U.S. export license.

Prithvi
Range (as a missile): 150-250 km
Payload: 500-1,000 kg warhead
Weight (in metric tons): N/A
Propulsion: Single stage; liquid fuel
Orbit: —-
Mission: Nuclear-capable; mobile launcher
Status: 1st flight, February 1988; 12 subsequent tests; possible deployment in 1995

Agni
Range (as a missile): 1,200-2,400 km
Payload: 1,000 kg warhead
Weight (in metric tons): 14.2
Propulsion: 1st stage solid fuel, second stage liquid fuel
Orbit: —-
Mission: Nuclear-capable; mobile launcher
Status: 1st flight, May 1989; failure in May 1992; successful launch February 1994

Satellite Launch Vehicle-3
Range (as a missile): 1,200-2,000 km
Payload: 40 kg satellite
Weight (in metric tons): 17
Propulsion: Four stages of solid fuel
Orbit: Low earth
Mission: Launch Rohini satellites
Status: 1st flight, July 1980; 4th and final flight, April 1983

Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV)
Range (as a missile): 3,200-5,200 km
Payload: 150 kg satellite
Weight (in metric tons): 41.7
Propulsion: Four stages of solid fuel; two strap-on motors
Orbit: Low earth
Mission: Launch Rohini satellites
Status: Failures in 1987 and 1988; successful launches in May 1992 and May 1994

Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV)
Range (as a missile): INtercontinental
Payload: 1,000 kg satellite
Weight (in metric tons): 280
Propulsion: Four stages: 1st and 3rd solid fuel; 2nd and 4th liquid fuel
Orbit: Polar sun-synchronous
Mission: Launch remote sensing satellites
Status: Failed launch un 1993; success in October 1994

Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV)
Range (as a missile): Intercontinental
Payload: 2,500-3,500 kg satellite
Weight (in metric tons): 530
Propulsion: Same as PSLV plus cryogenic fuels
Orbit: Geosynchronous transfer
Mission: Launch communication satellites
Status: 1st launch planned for 1997

Indian Missiles: Threat and Capability

January 1, 1995March 27, 2017

As Indian scientists watched their new space rocket ascend over the Indian Ocean, they were jubilant. The rocket’s four giant stages lifted a three-quarter ton satellite into a near polar orbit, a tremendous achievement for Indian rocketry.

For the rest of the world, however, last October’s launch was more ominous: India had just proved that it could soon reach any point on the globe with a nuclear warhead.

India tested its first nuclear device in 1974. Since then, according to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), its researchers have progressed to working on more powerful thermonuclear bombs and the missiles to deliver them. India’s smallest nuclear-capable missile now threatens Pakistan, and its medium-range missile will threaten China’s border regions. If India converts its new space rocket to a missile, it could reach cities as far away as London, Tokyo and New York.

Whether India succeeds will depend on help from abroad. India has long claimed that it has a perfect right to run a space program, and India has never promised not to make nuclear-capable missiles. India is not seen as a “rogue country.” Yet, India has consistently used foreign help to convert its space rockets to nuclear-capable missiles. Imports, some clandestine, some overt, have nourished India’s nuclear and rocket efforts from the start.

India built the medium-range Agni missile by taking a first-stage rocket from a small space launcher and combining it with guidance technology developed by the German space agency. The effort dates from the 1960s. U.S. scientists from NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) launched the first small rocket from Indian soil – an American Nike Apache – in 1963. “We were waiting for the payload to arrive when we saw a guy on a bicycle coming up an unpaved road,” recalls one NASA veteran of the launch. “He had the payload in the basket.”

From this humble beginning, the United States, Britain, France and Russia launched more than 350 small rockets over the next twelve years, all from India’s new Thumba test range, which these countries helped build and equip. It was through this early training that India learned the solid fuel technology that later wound up in the first stage of the Agni missile.

One of India’s ablest students was A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. While training in the United States, he visited the space centers where the U.S. Scout rocket was conceived and was being flown. Kalam returned home to build India’s first space rocket, the Satellite Launch Vehicle – SLV-3, a carbon copy of the Scout. NASA made Kalam’s task easier by supplying unclassified technical reports on the Scout’s design.

France supplied the next technology infusion. In the 1970s, its Societe Europeene de Propulsion gave India the technology for the Viking high-thrust liquid rocket motor, used on the European Space Agency’s Ariane satellite launcher. The Indian version, the “Vikas,” became the second stage of the large rocket India launched in October. Liquid fuel technology also helped India develop the Prithvi missile, which can reach Islamabad. Derived from a Soviet-supplied anti-aircraft missile, the Prithvi became the second stage of the Agni missile.

But aid from America and France was soon dwarfed by aid from Germany. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Germany helped India with three indispensable missile technologies: guidance, rocket-testing and composite materials. Earmarked for the space program, all were equally useful for building missiles.

In 1978, Germany installed an interfero-meter on an Indian rocket to measure, from the ground, a rocket’s angle of flight. Four years later, India tested its own version. From 1982 to 1989, Germany helped India build a navigation system for satellites based on a Motorola microprocessor. During the same period, and following the same steps, India developed its own navigation system for missiles and rockets based on the same microprocessor.

Germany also tested India’s first large rocket in a wind tunnel at Cologne-Portz; it helped India build its own rocket test facility; and it trained Indians in glass and carbon fiber composites at Stuttgart and Braunschweig. These lightweight, heat-resistant fibers are ideal for missile nozzles and nose cones. To help India use the fibers, Germany provided the documentation for a precision filament winding machine, a sensitive item now controlled for export by other countries, including the United States.

India’s quest for imports provoked a row with the United States in 1992. The Russian space agency tried to sell India advanced cryogenic engines for India’s most ambitious space rocket, the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The United States opposed the deal, rejecting India’s argument that the engines were only suitable for space launchers. “If you can do space launches, you can do ballistic missiles,” a Commerce Department analyst told the Risk Report. The analyst’s stance is buttressed by a CIA report declassified in 1993. It said that a space launcher “could be converted relatively quickly by technologically advanced countries … to a surface to surface missile.”

In 1993, India’s procurement effort surfaced again. A Massachusetts company was charged with violating U.S. export laws by selling India components for a hot isostatic press. The press, which India obtained through the company’s Scottish subsidiary, can be used to shape advanced composites for missile nose cones.

The question now is what India will do next. If it perfects a lightweight nuclear warhead, which the CIA says it is working on, the Agni missile could carry bombs to Beijing. And if India perfects an accurate long-range guidance system, its new space rocket could become an intercontinental ballistic missile. Success would change the strategic equation in Asia and make India a world nuclear power.

But India still needs crucial help. A recent Pentagon study cites composites, electronics, computers, sensors and navigation equipment as some of the technologies in which India is still weak.

India: Commerce Approves Most U.S. Nuclear-related Exports

January 1, 1995March 27, 2017

Less than 2 percent of U.S. applications to export nuclear dual-use equipment to India were denied from 1988-1992, according to a report published last year by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Approximately 77 percent were approved, and the rest were returned without action, still pending, cancelled or suspended.

India has not joined the international agreements to halt proliferation, so most U.S. exports of nuclear, chemical/biological or missile-related equipment or technology require a license.

India appears on all the Commerce Department control lists (see supplements 4, 5 & 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations), which name countries and projects of concern for nuclear, missile and chemical/biological proliferation.

India: Missile Helpers

January 1, 1995March 27, 2017

India did not build its missiles alone. The world’s leading rocket producers gave essential help in research, development and manufacture.

France
Licensed production of sounding rockets in India
Supplied the liquid-fuel Viking rocket engine, now the “Vikas” engine of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) second stage
Tested Indian-produced Vikas engine in France

Germany
Delivered measurement and calibration equipment to ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) laboratories
Trained Indians in high-altitude tests of rocket motors and in glass and carbon fiber composites for rocket engine housings, nozzles and nose cones
Designed high-altitude rocket test facilities
Conducted wind tunnel tests for Satellite Launch Vehicle – SLV-3 rocket
Developed radio frequency interferometer for rocket guidance
Developed computers for rocket payload guidance based on U.S. microprocessor
Supplied documentation for a filament-winding machine to make rocket engine nozzles and housings
Helped build Vikas rocket engine test facilities
Designed hypersonic wind tunnel and heat transfer facilities
Supplied rocket motor segment rings for PSLV

Russia
Supplied surface-to-air missiles which became the models for the Prithvi missile and the second stage of the Agni medium-range missile
Sold seven cryogenic rocket engines

United Kingdom
Supplied components for Imarat Research Center, home to the Agni missile
Supplied magnetrons for radar guidance and detonation systems to Defense Research and Development Laboratory

United States
Launched U.S.-built rockets from Thumba test range
Trained Dr. Abdul Kalam, designer of the Agni
Introduced India to the Scout rocket, the model for the Satellite Launch Vehicle – SLV-3 rocket and the Agni first stage
Sent technical reports on the Scout rocket to Homi Bhabha, the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission
Sold equipment that can simulate vibrations on a warhead

India’s Missile Shopping List

January 1, 1995March 27, 2017

India is still weak in many vital rocket technologies, and needs help in composites, electronics, computers, sensors, navigation, guidance, control and propulsion, according to a Pentagon study which ranks countries’ military capabilities. To bolster its efforts in these areas, India is looking for imports.

Composites from America dried up in 1992 when the United States sanctioned the Indian Space Research Organization. Lightweight and heat-resistant composite materials are ideal for making rocket motor cases and nozzles. They improve a rocket’s range as well as its engine thrust. The U.S. sanctions also dried up ISRO’s American sources of application-specific integrated circuits, which are needed for rocket and missile guidance.

India also needs high quality gyroscopes and accelerometers for mis-sile guidance. India has some gyroscopes of its own, but Indian engineers are seeking better equipment “to improve the accuracy and stabilization of their missile systems,” says one State Department analyst. India recently obtained U.S. ring laser gyro-scopes for fighter planes, but the gyros are difficult to adapt for missiles. “I don’t think India can get there without a lot of help from the outside,” the analyst says.

India also hopes to get high quality accelerometers to measure missile speed more accurately. In addition, India is shopping for laser radars to improve guidance, although India has not approached U.S. companies to buy them recently.

Computers are also on India’s shopping list, according to the Pentagon study, which says that India has “limited” capability in digital computing, “no capability” in hybrid computing, but “capabilities in some critical elements” of advanced computing.

According to the Pentagon, computers play “a pivotal role in the development and deployment of missiles and missile systems.” Digital computers can predict the behavior of entire weapon systems and are required to process space-borne sensor data in real time, the study says. The recent decontrol of computers may have helped India fill some of its needs.

Testimony: The US-North Korean Nuclear Accord

December 1, 1994April 7, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

December 1, 1994

I am pleased to appear here today before this Subcommittee to discuss the United States-North Korean nuclear accord.

I am a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, and I direct a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

In October, the United States promised North Korea billions of dollars in aid in exchange for Pyongyang’s pledge to halt its secret A-bomb effort. The accord comes after many months of hard work by U.S. negotiators. It is intended to close down North Korea’s nuclear program by freezing North Korea’s plutonium production, and by replacing its existing graphite reactors with new ones from the West. While portions of the pact remain secret, the part that is public presents both benefits and risks. The question is whether the benefits are greater than the risks.

The administration has described the benefits quite fully. I will concentrate on the risks, which are as follows:

Light Water Reactors: North Korea is getting two free reactors over the next decade, worth $4 billion. The risk? These reactors will make more bomb-grade plutonium than the graphite reactors North Korea has now, including the ones under construction. Press reports to the contrary are simply wrong. Although light water reactors (LWRs) are less efficient at producing bomb fuel, these two giant reactors could turn out at least 70 bombs’ worth of “weapon-grade” plutonium per year. North Korea’s existing graphite reactors are only one eighth as big, and could make only about 25-30 bombs’ worth per year.

I should explain how these numbers were arrived at. First, each Western-style light water reactor has a power rating of about 1,000 MW(e). That makes 2,000MW(e) for two. North Korea’s existing graphite reactors are rated at only 255MW(e). That consists of the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) plants under construction and the 5MW(e) reactor that has been running since 1986.

If operated to maximize electricity production, the two light water reactors would make at least 500kg of plutonium per year. That plutonium would be almost all “reactor grade.” It could be used in bombs but would not be of optimum quality for such a purpose. If operated to produce “weapon-grade” plutonium, the light water reactors would only have to be shut down and reloaded more often. In such a mode they would produce at least 400kg each per year, enough for roughly 70 bombs if one assumes between five and six kilograms per bomb. The three North Korean graphite reactors would not produce more than 150kg per year, enough for 25-30 bombs.

I should point out that under the agreement, plutonium from the light water reactors will not be available for at least a decade, whereas more plutonium from the smallest graphite reactor could be available as early as next year. Also, if North Korea started to extract plutonium from the spent light water reactor fuel, the supply of fresh fuel for those reactors could be stopped. However, North Korea could wait until it had accumulated a year or so of plutonium produced from the first light water reactor before it moved toward extraction, which would give it about 35 bombs’ worth. Thus, cutting off the fuel would not be much of a remedy.

I should also point out that light water reactors are unnecessary if the goal is simply to provide power. The United States could provide coal or oil-fired plants much faster and at a much lower capital cost.

Pyongyang’s existing plutonium: The CIA says North Korea is hiding enough plutonium for one to two Nagasaki-sized bombs, which the agreement lets North Korea keep for at least five years. The risk? The CIA says there is a “better than even” chance that the plutonium is already made into bombs. If so, North Korea can remain a nuclear power while being paid not to be. If not, it has five years to perfect a bomb secretly, because surprise inspections are apparently barred until then. I say “apparently” because the agreement, in Section IV, gives North Korea at least five years to “come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement.” If special inspection of the North Korea’s two suspect sites is suspended for that period, it seems highly unlikely that other special inspections would be allowed.

Pyongyang’s nuclear potential: Its three graphite reactors, its plutonium processing plant and its 8,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods would be frozen and put under inspection until the next century, when the first light water reactor is completed. The risk? The facilities will not be dismantled until then, which means that North Korea could decide at any time to kick out the inspectors, turn on the processing plant and extract five more bomb’s worth of plutonium from the spent fuel rods.

Pyongyang’s military threat: Unaffected by the pact. The risk? North Korea’s troops and tanks, massed on the South Korean border, could be fueled with other oil freed up by U.S. deliveries. North Korea can also continue to develop its heavy NoDong missile for sale to Libya, Iran and Syria. The NoDong is big enough to deliver a nuclear weapon to Japan from North Korea. It could also be launched from Libya to reach Southern Europe, and from Iran or Syria to reach Israel.

Pyongyang’s economy: By January, North Korea will start getting free oil shipments that will eventually reach 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year. It will also be freed from its trade embargo and will get diplomatic ties leading to full recognition. The risk? North Korea could accept the oil, trade, and diplomatic benefits until it gets back on its feet. It could then kick out the inspectors and make five more bombs’ worth of plutonium from the spent fuel rods. A revived and stronger North Korea would be harder to deal with than the North Korea we are facing now.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Under the October accord, North Korea agreed to begin complying with the Treaty and to open its seven declared sites to inspection. The risk? North Korea is still in breach of the Treaty because it has locked inspectors out of two undeclared sites, where the CIA believes evidence of secret bombmaking is stashed. Unlike Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, which were made to come clean before entering the Treaty or its equivalent, North Korea will be let in with its hands dirty, and they will stay dirty for several years. Hans Blix, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has said that when a country joins the Nonproliferation Treaty, it must accept the whole menu of inspection rights. It can’t order “a la carte.” But that is what the United States has allowed North Korea to do. Pyongyang is getting cake before it eats its spinach.

The precedent: Never has the United States arranged for a country in violation of international inspections to get nuclear reactors. U.S. law forbids the sale of a reactor to a country in violation of international inspection obligations. The State Department hopes to finesse this point by withholding key components until the inspection questions are cleared up, but reactor construction will begin, years will pass, and lots of money will be spent while North Korea is still defying the inspectors. North Korea also will start enjoying trade benefits and getting free oil while still in breach. This undermines both U.S. nonproliferation policy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. After endorsing light water reactors for North Korea, it will be much harder for the United States to keep trying to block China and Russia from selling them to Iran–which is in full compliance with international inspections. Iran is already grumbling about being denied nuclear benefits. If Iran demands the same legal status as North Korea is getting under the U.S. agreement, including exemptions from challenge inspections, international inspectors won’t stand a chance of finding the secret bomb program that the CIA thinks Iran is running.

Conclusion: This agreement was reached under adverse conditions, in which no good options were available. The best time to confront the North Korean nuclear threat was during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The program had not yet reached the threshold of success, and there was still time for sanctions to work. But those administrations pushed the problem into the Clinton administration. Now, the Clinton administration has made a deal that will probably push the problem into the next administration, since that is when a breach by North Korea is most likely to occur. Pushing problems off to one’s successor may be irresistible politically, but it is a risky way to deal with the spread of nuclear arms.

Phases of the U.S.-DPRK AccordPhase One: 1994-2000

What North Korea Does:
Freezes, under inspection, three reactors, a plutonium plant, and 8,000 plutonium-bearing fuel rods; allows inspection of admitted nuclear sites.

Phase Two: 2000-2003

What the U. S. and its Allies Do:
Increase level of aid; install key nuclear components and bring on line first light water reactor.

Phase Three 2003-2005

What North Korea Does:
Dismantles existing graphite reactors and plutonium plant.

What the U. S. and its Allies Do:
Complete second light water reactor.

In Addition

What North Korea Does:
Resumes diplomatic talks with South Korea on denuclearization.

What the U.S. Does:
Pledges not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.