News

Japan Should Refuse American Pressure to Decontrol Supercomputers

By Gary Milhollin

English language version of article appearing in Yomiuri Shimbun
September 28, 1995

The United States is getting ready to pressure Japan into lowering export controls on supercomputers, the most powerful instruments used to design nuclear and other advanced weapons. Japan should not agree, unless it wants to undermine its own security just to help President Clinton win California in the U.S. election of 1996.

The United States and Japan have cooperated since 1984 to deny supercomputers to countries that are trying to develop nuclear arsenals. But the U.S. Defense Department is convincing the White House to greatly reduce controls on the sale of supercomputers to nuclear weapon powers China and Russia, and also to India, Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and are secretly building nuclear warheads and long-range missiles.

And the U.S. State Department, in a memo written to other U.S. agencies in July, has proposed that the U.S.-Japan agreement be ended unless Japan agrees to reduce export controls in line with the Pentagon’s position. But a concerned U.S. official, who asked not to be identified, fears that by helping China build up its military capability, “the Pentagon is undermining our own security commitment to the Japanese.”

The supercomputer was invented in the mid-1970s to design U.S. nuclear weapons. Today, no U.S. nuclear weapon or missile design is physically tested until it is optimized in computer models. A supercomputer can simulate the implosive shock wave that detonates a nuclear warhead, calculate the multiplication of neutrons in an explosive chain reaction and solve the equations that describe fusion in a hydrogen bomb. For missile design, it can model the thrust of a solid-fuel rocket, calculate the heat and pressure on a warhead re-entering the atmosphere and simulate virtually every other force that affects a missile from launch to impact. Because of the billions of computations needed to solve these problems, a supercomputer’s speed is invaluable for finding design solutions in a practical length of time.

U.S. and Japanese manufacturers currently need approval from their governments to export any machine that can perform 1.5 billion operations per second or more, and they also need a security plan to make sure it is not diverted to nuclear or high-tech weapon design. The Pentagon’s new proposal is for a level of seven billion, which would make machines operating below that level available without security plans to many more countries.

To obtain a supercomputer, a buyer need only promise not to use it for military purposes. But, as one U.S. official opposed to the plan points out, “there is really no difference between civilian and military buyers in countries like China and Russia.” This is also true in many third world countries.

Next year, when they sign a treaty to ban nuclear tests, China and Russia will depend entirely on computer modeling to maintain their arsenals. A senior weapons expert in the U.S. government, who is deeply worried about the decontrol, asked me: “Are we going to make it easier for Russia and China to maintain their stockpiles? Why should we do that?” The Japanese government should ask the U.S. government the same question.

The U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are opposed to lifting controls. But the U.S. Commerce Department sides with Defense Secretary William Perry, a former computer executive who, informed officials say, is heeding the call of Silicon Valley (which heavily supported the Clinton campaign in 1992 and could help carry California for Clinton in 1996). Industry lobbyists claim that export controls are too much of a burden and are shutting America out of deals other countries are free to make.

That is not true. The Commerce Department has already slashed U.S. controls to a tenth of what they were in 1989 and it denies less than 2 percent of the high-tech license applications that it gets. Nor are American companies facing foreign competition. Japan, the only other serious supercomputer producer, has export controls as strict as America’s and its supercomputers only compete with the slowest American models.

In its memo written in July, the State Department went so far as to propose ending the U.S.-Japan accord unless Japan agrees to an “acceptable” control level. “If the proposed new threshold is so high that the U.S. holds a near monopoly in the marketplace, we should seriously consider whether a continuation of this control regime is warranted,” the State Department wrote in the memo, a copy of which I have obtained.

The Pentagon’s plan is based on a still-confidential study that the State Department hoped to give to a Japanese delegation that visited Washington in early August, but the Japanese “arrived before we got our position worked out,” one knowledgeable U.S. official said, “so they were told to stay tuned.”

Even some experts on Secretary Perry’s staff say privately that they oppose the plan. A recent survey by the Pentagon’s computer experts found that American engineers are now developing some of the most advanced U.S. weapons with the very computers that Defense Secretary Perry wants to free for export. “We are giving away our technological superiority,” one concerned staff member told me.

According to the Pentagon survey, Pentagon designers are using–or will need to use–machines performing between one and ten billion operations per second to develop ground radars for theater missile defense, infrared trackers to detect incoming missiles, acoustic detectors, airborne lasers, stealth aircraft, and designs for rocket motors. Mr. Perry’s plan would free many such machines for export to China without individual licenses. “This proposal sells out our soldiers and gives away our technology,” says Representative Duncan Hunter of California, who is Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement of the House Committee on National Security. Six members of the Committee have written to the White House to protest the plan.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Congress voted to give the U.S. military billions of dollars to build missile defenses, some of which will benefit Japan. If the effort to lift export controls is successful, the United States and Japan will soon be spending even more money to stay ahead of the foreign weapons designed on American and Japanese supercomputers.

Fire Sale

By Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
September 18, 1995, p. A15

The Defense Department has found a new mission: to make it easier for Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals and to help other countries build advanced weapons. This will happen if the Pentagon wins a quiet debate over exporting supercomputers, the most powerful instruments used to develop high-tech weapons.

Federal officials who oppose this effort say the Pentagon is urging the White House to adopt greatly reduced controls on exporting supercomputers not only to Russia and China, but also to India, Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and are widely believed to be building nuclear warheads.

Manufacturers currently need Commerce Department permission to export to China and Russia any machine that can perform more than one billion operations per second; for India, Israel and Pakistan, the limit is 500 million operations per second. The Pentagon plan would raise those limits, lifting export controls on machines that work seven to 10 billion operations per second.

To obtain a supercomputer, a buyer need only promise not to use it for military purposes. But as one official, who asked not to be identified, pointed out, “There is really no difference between civilian and military buyers in China and Russia.” That is also true in many third world countries.

Next year, when they are expected to sign a treaty to ban nuclear tests, China and Russia will depend entirely on computer modeling to maintain their arsenals. One weapons expert in the Government asked me: “Are we going to make it easier for Russia and China to maintain their stockpiles? Why?”

The supercomputers would help third world nations build nuclear weapons, too. Scientists can use them to conduct simulated tests that are much cheaper and more easily concealed than actual fission experiments.

The State and Energy Departments and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are, wisely, opposed to lifting controls. But the Commerce Department sides with Defense Secretary William Perry, a former computer executive who, informed officials say, is heeding the call of Silicon Valley (which heavily supported the Clinton campaign in 1992). Industry lobbyists claim that export controls are shutting the United States out of deals foreign manufacturers are free to make.

This is not true. For one thing, the Commerce Department has already slashed controls to a tenth of what they were in 1989, and it now denies less than 2 percent of the high-tech export applications it gets.

Nor are American manufacturers facing foreign competition. Japan, the only other serious producer of supercomputers, has export controls as strict as ours. Besides, its models can only compete with the slowest American ones.

Even some experts on Secretary Perry’s staff say privately that they oppose the plan. A recent survey by the Pentagon’s computer experts found that many advanced American weapons are being developed with the very computers Mr. Perry wants to free for export. “We would be giving away our technological superiority,” one staff member told me.

According to the Pentagon survey, American engineers are using these powerful machines to design stealth aircraft, infrared trackers to detect incoming missiles, acoustic detectors for use in shallow water, airborne lasers and designs for rocket motors. “This proposal sells out our soldiers and gives away our technology,” says Representative Duncan Hunter, Republican of California.

This month, Congress voted to give the military billions of dollars to build our missile defenses. If the effort to lift export controls is successful, don’t be surprised if the Pentagon asks for even more money to stay ahead of the foreign weapons soon to be designed on American supercomputers.

Iran: Nuclear Suspicion Grows

U.S. intelligence believes Iran is running a two-track nuclear effort. On one side, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is buying reactors for a “civilian” nuclear program. On the other, the military is seeking nuclear equipment and materials to satisfy its appetite for weapons of mass destruction.

Most U.S. officials concede that Iran’s nuclear quest is at the embryonic stage. Many of Iran’s best scientists left the country after the 1979 revolution, and most of those left working at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) “are not considered first rate,” says a U.S. analyst. But no one wants to underestimate the Iranians, particularly the military outfit known as the Defense Industries Organization. “DIO is a fairly competent organization at pulling programs together,” says a senior U.S. official, who credits it with building Iran’s chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles.

U.S. officials worry that the military in Iran will use the civilian nuclear program as a front for its weapon research. That is why Washington is trying to convince Moscow to cancel its plans to build nuclear reactors at Bushehr. “Bushehr will give Iran training, legitimacy and a billion-dollar cover for the nuclear program,” warns one official, who predicts that Iran will use the reactors as a pretext for all sorts of sensitive nuclear purchases. This sentiment is shared by the Russian Academy of Science’s Dr. Aleksey Yablokov, who recently wrote in Izvestiya that he suspects “a hidden military component” in Russia’s planned sales of reactors to Iran.

The uranium path

To make a bomb, Iran needs to produce high-enriched uranium or plutonium. Iran denies it has any intention to develop nuclear weapons or that it is even interested in uranium enrichment. But U.S. officials counter such claims, pointing to Iran’s obvious attempts to buy sensitive uranium-processing technology.

Iran’s procurement efforts seem to follow almost exactly the pattern set by Pakistan and Iraq, countries that smuggled equipment from Western Europe and China to construct gas centrifuges. Pakistan succeeded in enriching enough uranium for a small nuclear arsenal, but Saddam was thwarted by the Gulf War. U.S. officials deny reports that Pakistan is now helping Iran’s nuclear program, but they do believe Iran is using the same suppliers and methods as Pakistan. “There’s this club of suppliers in Europe … the same guys that sold to Pakistan and Iraq,” a senior official tells the Risk Report. He says that the State Department is briefing the Europeans “pretty religiously” on the matter.

Western officials are watching Iran’s procurement patterns closely. Iran is making progress on centrifuge research, U.S. officials say, but it is unlikely that Iran has bought enough equipment to put together any significant enrichment hardware or production capability.

Of particular concern is a deal brewing in China where Iran is “looking to buy a turnkey facility” to convert uranium to hexafluoride gas, says a senior U.S. official familiar with U.S. intelligence. Uranium hexafluoride is the feedstock gas that is enriched in centrifuges to make weapon-grade material. The only practical use for a hexafluoride plant is uranium enrichment. Foreign officials also tell the Risk Report that Iran is shopping for a fluorine production plant from France. Fluorine is needed to make hexafluoride gas, and Iran reportedly tried without success to buy fluorine in 1991 for the Sharif University of Technology.

Iran is also trying to develop its own sources of uranium. China has already helped with mining, purification and fuel fabrication. In September 1989, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization announced that Iran was prospecting for uranium in the Saghand region of Yazd Province, where uranium reserves of over 5,000 tons have been reported. International inspectors visited Saghand in February 1992 and found uranium-ore drilling rigs staffed by fewer than two dozen workers, indicating that large-scale mining had not yet occurred.

Meanwhile, Iran was negotiating to buy 2,000 tons of natural uranium from Russia as part of the Bushehr reactor deal. This has fueled suspicion in the West because the Bushehr reactors will never use natural uranium they will be fueled by enriched uranium from Russia and they won’t be built for several years.

The fear is that Iran wants to enrich the uranium to make bombs.

U.S. officials also suspected Iran’s motives in 1992-93 when Iranians visited Kazakhstan to buy low-enriched uranium from the production complex at Ust-Kamenogorsk. Again, the Iranians cited the Russian reactors as the reason they were interested in uranium.

The plutonium path

Dr. Reza Amrollahi, director of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, says nearly 200 Russian technical and engineering personnel are already in Iran working on the Bushehr reactor site. When complete, the reactors will give Iran its first access to bomb quantities of plutonium.

U.S. officials believe Iran is interested in plutonium for bombs because of Tehran’s keen interest in a particular type of reactor, one that is ideal for making nuclear weapons. Iran has been shopping in China and Russia for a 30-40 megawatt heavy water research reactor, precisely the size and type Israel and India used to make the plutonium for their first fission bombs. Iran also tried to buy smaller versions of this reactor from Argentina and India. U.S. officials say that Iran’s sudden interest in heavy water technology cannot be peaceful because Iran’s nuclear program since the days of the Shah has been based on light water reactors, a wholly different technology. So far, the United States has persuaded other countries not to sell heavy water reactors to Iran, but Russia may sell a light water research reactor instead.

To prepare plutonium for use in bombs, Iran would have to build a plant to extract it from spent reactor fuel. So far, there is no evidence that Iran is doing that. Iran has only been able to extract gram quantities of plutonium in laboratory “hot cells” supplied by the United States in 1967 along with a small research reactor.

Western officials hope they are catching Iran’s nuclear weapon program in its early phase the best time to stop it. “We have done remarkably well so far using export controls; they seem to be working in Iran,” says a U.S. official. But this optimism will be short-lived unless other countries cooperate. Russia is persisting in its reactor deal despite being shown a laundry list of U.S. intelligence reports this spring. Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said the reports “did not contain specific facts which would be evidence” of Iran’s “striving” for nuclear weapons. And West European officials complain that the U.S. intelligence they have seen is “only circumstantial,” which helps explain why European governments have declined to join the U.S. trade embargo on Iran.

Finally, there is the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iranian spokesmen never tire of citing the agency to prove Iran’s innocence. The AEOI’s Dr. Amrollahi says: “We would like to tell the world community that if our activities were not peaceful, the IAEA would have said so.” Tehran has challenged Washington to give the IAEA any proof U.S. intelligence has that Iran is trying to build the bomb, and Tehran has invited the agency to look anywhere it likes to verify U.S. claims. David Kyd, the agency’s spokesman, says: “If U.S. intelligence has proof that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, we haven’t seen it.”

Iran: IAEA Seeks Enhanced International Inspections

The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna has seen “no evidence” that Iran has a military nuclear program, says spokesman David Kyd. But, Kyd is quick to add: “We don’t give the Iranians a clean bill of health; we just haven’t seen anything to indicate otherwise.” For now, he says, the agency must continue its work as if the Iranians are acting in good faith.

During the past year, IAEA inspectors started to pay quarterly visits to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, where they have never detected any prohibited activities. Iran has issued a standing invitation for inspectors to visit any site, anytime, anywhere.

U.S. officials, who believe Iran plans to acquire nuclear weapons, say it is too early to prove that Iran is breaking the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). “There has been no material breach of the Treaty per se,” says one U.S. official. He admits that the type of equipment Iran has bought for its nuclear program can be explained as “dual-use” technology with civilian applications.

Stung by its failure to detect the secret nuclear weapon programs of South Africa and Iraq, the IAEA has proposed stronger inspection measures. These would include waiving the standard visa requirements for inspectors so they could conduct “no-notice” visits to suspected nuclear sites. The IAEA also wants better reports from countries on their nuclear-related imports and exports and wants permission to use special monitoring equipment to determine what kind of nuclear activity, if any, is taking place at sites the Agency is allowed to visit.

In addition, the IAEA wants to install instruments that would trigger an alarm in Vienna if suspicious activity takes place at a monitored site. Currently, the inspectors have to visit the sites in person to check video surveillance equipment, change film, and inspect seals designed to prevent unauthorized movement of nuclear material.

“It would be a bonus for Iran to accept the new measures,” says Mr. Kyd. He doesn’t expect Iran to oppose them provided they are endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors and apply to all other countries. The enhanced inspection methods, known as the 93+2 program, could be used only at nuclear sites the agency is allowed to inspect.

A U.S. official who monitors nuclear developments in Iran says Washington opposes all nuclear cooperation with Tehran. Mr. Kyd admits that Iranians are permitted to train at the IAEA’s European nuclear institutes but argues that the agency is “not heavily involved in technical cooperation with Iran.”

Iran: Washington Tightens the Screws – 1979-1995

The scope of U.S. trade sanctions against Iran has steadily widened since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, culminating in the embargo declared in May. Criminal penalties for breaking the embargo can reach $500,000; penalties for individuals can reach $250,000 and 10 years in jail. The sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in Washington, D.C. (phone: 202-622-2520)

1979: Executive Order No. 12170: President Jimmy Carter imposes comprehensive sanctions on Iran during the hostage crisis, but trade restrictions are relaxed in January 1981 with the signing of the Algiers accords to release the hostages and the creation of an Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague.

1984: U.S. State Department designates Iran a supporter of international terrorism: U.S. regulations prohibit certain foreign assistance and investment, including the use of U.S. credits, loan guarantees and other financial aid to help Iran acquire munitions. Current Commerce Department regulations limit the export of dual-use technology to countries on the terrorism list, which now includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria.

1987: Executive Order No. 12613: President Ronald Reagan bans direct imports of Iranian goods and services, including oil, when Iran fires on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.

1992: Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act: The President may penalize any person or company who contributes “knowingly and materially” to efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire “chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.” Penalties include a ban on contracts with the U.S. government and withdrawal of export privileges for two years.

March 1995: Executive Order No. 12957: U.S. companies are barred from developing petroleum resources in Iran.

May 1995: Executive Order No. 12959: Virtually all U.S. trade and investment with Iran is barred, including the purchase and resale of Iranian oil by U.S. companies and their subsidiaries. Re-export of U.S. goods to Iran through third nations is also prohibited.

Pending legislation: Proposals before Congress would give the President authority to penalize foreign exporters who sell oil and gas equipment to Iran.

Iran: Bonn, Paris and Tokyo Refuse to Join U.S. Embargo

Since May, when the Clinton administration declared its trade embargo against Iran, U.S. diplomats have had little success in getting Europe and Japan to follow suit. Paris, Bonn and Tokyo rely heavily on Iranian oil and trade and do not agree that stopping high-tech exports will moderate Tehran’s behavior. A U.S. diplomatic official tells the Risk Report that the United States can only push its allies so far: “We don’t want to be undercut,” he says, “but we also don’t want to do things that are more damaging than trade with Iran.”

The U.S. sanctions ban virtually all trade with Tehran, including financial services and new investments. The main effect, however, is to stop U.S. companies from buying Iranian oil. By 1994, America had become Iran’s largest trading partner. U.S. companies were buying nearly one-third of Iran’s oil, worth over $4 billion, and selling it through overseas subsidiaries. That is now against U.S. law.

It is not illegal for European or Japanese companies, however. French, German and Japanese officials tell the Risk Report that they oppose a trade ban on Iran, and will not even bar Tehran from buying sensitive dual-use equipment. These countries all buy large amounts of Iranian oil, and some officials fear Iran would retaliate by defaulting on past loans.

In June, the White House scored a victory when the “Group of Seven” industrial nations agreed to prohibit major nuclear sales to Iran. The G-7 countries (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States) plus Russia also vowed not to help Iran acquire nuclear weapons. “We call on all states to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability,” the group said in a statement at the conclusion of the Halifax summit. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who chaired the talks, emphasized that seven of the eight summit participants had banned transfers of nuclear reactors or associated technology to Iran out of “grave concern” that they could be used to build a bomb. Only Russia has agreed to supply reactors to Iran.

Germany does more high-tech trade with Iran than any other Western country, especially in machine tools and electronics. “An embargo is economic war, not export control. Iran may be a devil of a country, but it becomes a question of how you deal with the devil, not whether you deal with it,” says a German industry representative. While most German officials reject the U.S. embargo, they insist that almost no controlled goods are going from Germany to Iran. A German intelligence report leaked to the press in March, however, portrays the Iranian embassy in Bonn as the heart of Tehran’s European procurement efforts.

France does less high-tech trade with Iran than Germany does, but depends more on Iranian oil. “We don’t believe in unilateral embargoes,” says a French diplomatic official, “This is why we are holding, what we call among ourselves, a critical dialogue with Iran.” A French official argues that “France does not export much from the control list,” but like other European countries, France exports commodities such as computers (up to 260 MTOPs) to Iran without controls. A French official says France recently refused to sell Iran graphite and an isostatic press, both useful in developing nuclear weapons.

Japan, like Europe, relies heavily on Iranian oil, buying 400,000 barrels a day. A Japanese trade official tells the Risk Report that Tokyo plans “to keep its oil purchases flat from Iran, out of consideration for U.S. feelings,” but Tokyo argues that efforts to isolate Iran will only worsen Tehran’s behavior. And a Japanese diplomat adds: “Our policy is to engage critical engagement … to keep the channels for communication open.”

The White House believes that the more Iran is squeezed, the harder it will be for its clerical rulers to build the bomb, support terrorist groups and sabotage the Mideast peace process. But Iranian President Rafsanjani (above) doesn’t seem worried. In an August interview in Mideast Insight, he asks: “What can possibly happen? If they ban trade with us, it is the United States that is going to lose. The things that we are used to buying from the United States we’ll get from other countries …. These bans have had no impact on our economy, and they will not affect this country.”

Iran’s Phantom Bomb

Suspicion Grows that Tehran Seeks Uranium for Nuclear Weapons

U.S. officials are adamant that Iran wants an atomic bomb, and they tell the Risk Report that Tehran is giving uranium enrichment high priority. “There are Iranians who have been given the task to get or make fissile material for a weapon,” says a senior U.S. official who has tracked Iran’s nuclear program for more than a decade.

These officials say that one of the strongest indications of Iran’s nuclear weapon intentions is its attempt to buy gas centrifuges from Russia this year. The centrifuges Iran sought would convert uranium found in nature to nuclear weapon grade a process known as enrichment. The deal made no sense commercially; Iran could purchase enriched reactor fuel cheaply from foreign suppliers, and Russia had already promised to supply fuel for the reactors it would build in Iran. The only rational use for the centrifuges would be to make bombs.

Under American pressure, Moscow promised in May not to sell the centrifuges to Iran. But that has not lessened U.S. worries about Iranian plans to enrich uranium. Western intelligence reports assert that Iran already has gas centrifuge design information and is now trying to buy components for a secret enrichment effort run by the military.

Caption text from cover photo follows: Russia has contracted to build nuclear reactors at Bushehr, 750 kilometers south of Tehran. West German firms started construction in 1974, but stopped after the 1979 revolution. Iraq bombed the site during the Iran-Iraq war, and Germany has refused to complete the reactors because of suspicions about Iran’s nuclear weapon intentions. Washington is trying to persuade Moscow to cancel the deal, in part because the reactors will give Iran its first access to bomb quantities of fissile material.

U.S. Relations with China

By Gerard White

Congressional Digest
August-September 1995, pp. 218, 220-1

China should lose trade privileges with the United States unless Beijing stops sabotaging Western efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. China is now the leading supplier of nuclear, chemical, and missile-related technology to developing countries.

During the 1980s and 1990s, China supplied billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear and missile technology to South Asia and the Middle East. It did so in the teeth of U.S. protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on today. And while they do, they make it virtually impossible for the United States and the West to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction-a trend that endangers everyone.

Over the last three years, the United States has sniffed out a series of secret shipments of Chinese poison gas ingredients to Iran, but has declined to impose sanctions on Beijing. In addition, China’s missile exports to Pakistan have continued.

China has evidently made a cynical calculation. It appears to think that the Clinton Administration is so committed to American high-tech jobs that it will never jeopardize high-tech exports, even to slow the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

In 1993, President Clinton decided not to link U.S trade restrictions to China’s export policies. This removed the main barrier to Beijing’s missile exports to Pakistan and Syria and its nuclear help to Pakistan and Iran. Last year, Clinton refused to punish China for human rights abuses, removing a crucial barrier to prison labor.

Only when China started pirating intellectual properties such as software and blockbuster movies did the President take a stand. The U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on more than a billion dollars’ worth of Chinese imports, and Beijing backed down. Clinton’s victory on intellectual property shows that if China is forced to choose between chemical proliferation and U.S. trade, it will choose trade. But putting a higher priority on Hollywood videos than on sales of Chinese poison gas and missiles has a price. In March 1993, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry warned that Iran was installing chemical weapon batteries near the mouth of the Persian Gulf, a sea lane that the U.S. Navy must defend.

Ignoring egregious nuclear exports also has a price. Today, South Asia is the most likely place on earth for a nuclear war, and China shares much of the blame. China’s shocking contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear effort was uncovered by U.S. intelligence in the early 1980s: China had supplied Pakistan the complete design of a tested nuclear weapon. U.S. officials also say China gave Pakistan weapon-grade uranium for bomb fuel. If, as reported, the design was the same as China’s fourth test device, it could yield the equivalent of 20 to 25 thousand tons of TNT, twice the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

Despite all this, U.S. officials initiated a nuclear trade agreement with China barely a year later, based on a White House toast in which Premier Zhao Ziyang declared that China does not “engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.” Washington has never ratified the agreement because China did not live up to its promises. By 1986, Chinese scientists were seen at Pakistan’s secret Kahuta complex, where Pakistan was producing its own weapon-strength uranium with gas centrifuges. According to West German officials, China sold Pakistan tritium, used to boost the yield of atomic bombs.

In 1991, Chinese companies were caught secretly selling Pakistan the M-ll missile. The M-11 can carry a nuclear warhead about 300 kilometers-the range set by the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, an agreement among missile supplier nations controlling missile sales to countries like Pakistan. The U.S. President sanctioned the China Great Wall Industries Group and the China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation for selling to Pakistan. The companies’ sales to the United States were banned for two years, and they were denied U.S. munitions exports, including missile technology. But sanctions were waived less than a year later, because China had promised once again to halt its missile sales.

China was caught again supplying components for the M-11 missile to Pakistan in 1993. This time the U.S. President imposed sanctions against ten Chinese firms as well as Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense. The sanctions against Pakistan remain in force, but those against China were waived in October 1994, once China promised again to control its missile exports.

Over the years, Washington has watched China make several missile and nuclear deals in the Middle East. China helped Iran develop short-range missiles used against Iraq, and sold Iran Silkworm anti-ship missiles in 1986 and 1987 to threaten U.S. shipping in the Gulf. And unless Secretary of State Warren Christopher does something more than complain belatedly about China’s nuclear reactor deal with Iran (first announced in September 1992), U.S. forces in the Gulf could soon be faced with the threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb.

China in 1988 caught U.S. officials off guard by shipping Chinese CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia. It was the first time any country had sold nuclear-capable, intermediate-range missiles to a Mideast nation, giving Saudi Arabia the longest-range missile in the region. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman later tried to play down the sale by saying, “Except for Saudi Arabia, where a small number of midrange missiles were sold, China has never sold, nor is planning to sell, missiles to any Middle East country.”

But in 1989, China reportedly agreed to sell Syria the 600-kilometer-range M-9 missile. In 1992. U.S. officials said China had delivered the ingredients for making solid missile fuel to Syria and planned to send more. To avoid getting caught selling entire missiles, as in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, China now appears to be selling Syria missile components and the means to make missiles.

U.S. intelligence revealed in 1991 that China was secretly building a nuclear reactor at a remote location in Algeria. The reactor is too small to be plausible for electricity, and too large to be necessary for research. At its announced power of 15 megawatts, the heavy water reactor could make enough plutonium for one atomic bomb every few years. Algeria purchased the reactor in 1983, but only after the deal became public in 1991 did China and Algeria put the reactor under international inspection.

China is now building reactors in Pakistan and plans to build reactors in Iran, even though the CIA says Iran is running a secret bomb program. Syria too wants Chinese reactors.

American attempts to stop China’s dangerous exports have consistently failed. The American policy has been to complain, and then to do very little when its complaints are ignored. There is a saying that “you don’t change a winning game.” But you do change a losing game, and a losing game is what we have with China.

How should it change? Washington must convince China that it has more to lose from these sales than it has to gain. The best way to convince Beijing is to put its trade surplus with the United States at risk. China’s surplus is now close to $30 billion per year. Its nuclear and missile deals with the Third World are only a fraction of that. If forced to choose, China is likely to prefer its trade relation with the U.S. to selling the means to build weapons of mass destruction to developing countries.

Washington should bar the Chinese companies that make dangerous chemical, nuclear, and missile sales from trading with the United States.

The United States should relink China’s most-favored-nation trade status to Beijing’s non-proliferation credentials. MFN should be withdrawn unless China agrees to do the following:

Join the Missile Technology Control Regime as a full member and publicly renounce and halt its sales of M-11 and M-9 missiles to countries like Pakistan and Syria. China should also renounce and halt the sale of any components, materials, or manufacturing equipment useful for making missiles covered by the Regime.

Join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the consulting organization through which supplier countries structure their nuclear sales according to non-proliferation guidelines. This would help stem the flow of sensitive exports to countries like Iran and Pakistan. To show good faith, China should cancel its planned reactor sale to Iran.

Join the Australia Group of supplier countries that control over 50 poison gas ingredients to developing countries. China should start by shutting down the supplies of chemical precursors flowing through front companies to Iran.

Pakistan’s A-Bomb Potential

The high-enriched uranium produced at the Kahuta gas centrifuge plant near Islamabad is suitable for bombs and free from international controls. International inspectors are not allowed to visit Kahuta, so the plant’s exact capacity is not known. U.S. officials and Pakistani reports estimate that at least 1,000 centrifuges operate at Kahuta, giving Pakistan the ability to produce more than 20 kilograms of 93 percent high-enriched uranium annually. Since the mid-1980s, Pakistan could have produced enough material for up to a dozen nuclear bombs, with each bomb using approximately 15 kilograms of high-enriched uranium.

Pakistani officials say the Kahuta plant has stopped making weapon-grade uranium, and is now producing only low-enriched uranium to help fuel the nuclear reactor being built by China atChashma. There are reports, however, that Pakistan is building a new enrichment facility at Golra, about six miles west of Islamabad. Golra is part of the same complex as Kahuta, but its director, A.Q. Khan, denies Golra is an uranium enrichment facility.

Plant: Kahuta
Capacity: 1,000 or more centrifuges, 5 separative work units (SWU) per centrifuge per year
Start-up: Early 1980s
High-Enriched Uranium: Approximately 170 kilograms. enough for 8-12 bombs

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan – The Father of the Islamic Bomb

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is the undisputed hero of Pakistan’s nuclear saga. Called “the father of the Islamic bomb,” Dr. Khan pioneered and led Pakistan’s effort to enrich uranium with gas centrifuges. In 1976 he took charge of the secretive Engineering Research Laboratories at Kahuta, now named the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in his honor, where he assembled the machinery and manpower it would take to produce weapon-grade uranium. Khan recruited scores of Pakistani scientists living abroad to work with him at Kahuta, boasting that “the scientists and engineers whom I recruited had never heard of a centrifuge, even though some of them were Ph.D.’s.”

Khan had learned about gas centrifuges when he worked on uranium enrichment technology for a Dutch company from 1972 to 1975. Khan says he and his colleagues devised “a strategy to buy everything we needed in the open market to lay the foundation of a good infrastructure and would then switch over to indigenous production.” In 1983 Khan was sentenced in absentia for trying to steal enrichment secrets from the Netherlands. He denies the charges, and his conviction was overturned in 1986.

In 1990, Pakistan President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, lauded A.Q. Khan’s contributions to the nuclear field and declared: “The name of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan will be inscribed in golden letters in the annals of the national history of Pakistan.” And even Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has acknowledged his “invaluable contribution not only in the nuclear field but also in other fields including defense production.”

A.Q. Khan says Western governments repeatedly tried to prevent Pakistan from developing a nuclear weapon capability, but they were foiled by the greed of their own companies: “Many suppliers approached us with the details of the machinery and with figures and numbers of instruments and materials … In the true sense of the word, they begged us to purchase their goods. And for the first time the truth of the saying, They will sell their mother for money,’ dawned on me. We purchased whatever we required…”