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China’s Nuclear Ambition Grows

Despite international protests, China continues to conduct nuclear tests to develop lighter warheads for new missiles that fly farther and are more accurate.

“China is in the process of building a more reliable and longer-range arsenal because that is what great powers do. The Chinese are expending an enormous amount of money, but prestige has an awful lot to do with it,” says one U.S. government specialist who tracks China’s nuclear program. Many U.S. officials do not believe that China poses a direct threat to the United States, but U.S. defense planners still evaluate potential military scenarios in which Chinese nuclear forces could be turned against American targets. “There is a real possibility that the Chinese are developing their arsenal to keep the United States at bay as they work their will in East Asia,” says a U.S. government analyst. Chinese generals view China’s “sovereignty” as extending to Taiwan and disputed territories such as the Spratly Islands, which China seized in February 1995.

In the May issue of the Risk Report on China’s missile program, former Ambassador to China James Lilley cautioned that it is important not to have any illusions about China’s military ambitions. Asked why the Chinese continue to test nuclear weapons despite international efforts to ban such tests, Ambassador Lilley tells the Risk Report: “They consider a nuclear weapon program important because the United States has never fought a war with a nuclear power. If you cancel out the nuclear option by having capability on both sides, you drop down to conventional capabilities.” The Chinese plan years ahead and foresee a gradual expansion of their influence, Lilley says. “If you project ahead ten years, the Americans are drawing down their forces in Asia and the Chinese are building theirs up; so the balance of power will have shifted and that’s in China’s interest.”

China became the fifth nuclear weapon state in 1964 when it successfully tested its first nuclear bomb, made with high-enriched uranium. The bomb was set off at the Lop Nur Nuclear Test Base in Xinjiang province and had an explosive yield of 22 thousand tons of TNT. Shortly after the design work for the first atomic bomb was completed, Chinese scientists turned their attention to thermonuclear weapons, capable of destroying entire cities. In June 1967, China conducted its first multi-stage thermonuclear test explosion. To date, China has tested and deployed six different nuclear warhead designs, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Nuclear Weapon Databook.

U.S. officials estimate that China has roughly 450 nuclear warheads, though China has produced enough weapon-grade uranium and plutonium to build an arsenal more than three times that size. In August, China conducted its 43rd nuclear weapon test. U.S. analysts expect that Beijing will test again this year, and maybe two or three times in 1996 before an international treaty to ban nuclear tests comes into effect.

In 1956, China established a central nuclear ministry the Third Ministry of Machine Building Industry, now known as the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to take charge of the country’s entire nuclear program. By mid-1958, Deng Xiaoping, the Central Committee General Secretary, had approved the sites selected for nuclear weapon development. The first major site, the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute, was a temporary facility replaced in 1962 by the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy, called the Ninth Academy. Located near Haiyan in Qinghai Province, the Ninth Academy was built from Soviet designs and known as the “Los Alamos of China” during its heyday in the 1960s.

In fact, the Soviet Union built all the essentials of China’s fledgling nuclear infrastructure, based on six Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation and assistance agreements between 1955 and 1958. The first of these, signed in April 1955, resulted in the supply of a Soviet reactor and cyclotron, useful in uranium enrichment research. During the 1950s, a time of rapid growth in China’s nuclear program, many of China’s top nuclear scientists and engineers were trained in the United States. Ironically, this was also a time when China viewed the United States as its chief adversary. Indeed, China’s nuclear arsenal and missiles were originally conceived and designed to target U.S. forces and allies. China’s first major task was to find and mine uranium ore. The ore would then be purified and converted to uranium hexafluoride gas that could be enriched to weapon-grade. In January 1955, a week after China’s official decision to pursue the bomb, China and the USSR signed a secret agreement to conduct joint surveys for uranium in China and to sell Chinese uranium to the USSR. The Soviets guided China’s early mining efforts, and China eventually developed 26 major uranium mines.

According to China Builds the Bomb, a ground-breaking work by China experts John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, the most extraordinary Sino-Russian agreement was the New Defense Technical Accord of October 1957, in which the Soviets agreed to give China a prototype atom bomb. The prototype was never delivered, however, because Sino-Soviet relations soured in 1960 and Moscow withdrew some 230 Soviet advisors and technicians working in China, along with important technical data and blueprints. The cutoff of Soviet assistance delayed Chinese weapon progress by several years, in particular plutonium production.

After relations with Moscow deteriorated, Chairman Mao authorized the rapid construction of new nuclear production facilities in Sichuan. The first Soviet-designed nuclear plants had been built near the Soviet border and were highly vulnerable to air or missile strikes. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, China rapidly duplicated its nuclear facilities in remote regions to make it more difficult for enemy aircraft to penetrate Chinese air defenses.

These “Third Line” facilities included a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant, a plutonium production reactor and extraction facility, a Nuclear Fuel Component Plant, and an alternative weapon design center established in the late 1960s at Mianyang.

China is believed to have stopped making enriched uranium for military purposes in the late 1980s, and to have stopped producing plutonium for bombs in 1991. But a U.S. government nuclear specialist cautions that China’s declarations are “a masterpiece of Chinese-speak; you must listen carefully when they say they have stopped making plutonium for military purposes.'” China continues to enrich uranium for use as reactor fuel, and is building a pilot plutonium extraction plant, scheduled to start by the year 2000. China also may build another large plutonium extraction plant for “commercial” purposes, but Beijing promises that the new facilities will be open to international inspection.

The next great leap forward in China’s nuclear program will be in the civilian sector. China has embarked on a crash program to build nuclear power reactors and has plans to market its nuclear products to other countries, including Pakistan and Iran. Coming full circle, China is once again working closely with Russia. Sino-Russian relations have warmed considerably since the Cold War. The two countries have signed de-targeting agreements, and defense and nuclear cooperation is budding. European, Japanese and Canadian companies are also active in Chinese nuclear projects, but Americans are limited by the lack of an effective U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement.

Statistics

Capital: Beijing
Political System: Communist
Chief of State: Jiang Zemin
Head of Government: Li Peng
Population: 1.2 billion
Gross Domestic Product: $510 billion (1994 est.)
Armed Forces: 3 million, the largest in the world
Nuclear Weapon Capability: Tested first bomb in 1964
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): Signed in 1992
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): Not a member
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Not a member
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): Signed but not ratified

China: Westinghouse Leads the Way Into Nuclear Market

With help from the Clinton administration, Westinghouse is wedging its way into China’s nuclear power reactor market, a venue previously closed to U.S. firms because of China’s record of helping other countries build atomic bombs.

In February, during the visit of Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary to Beijing, Westinghouse signed an agreement to provide two 650-megawatt steam turbines for China’s future Qinshan nuclear power plants. The turbines, which are considered a “non-nuclear” portion of the facility, will be produced in a joint venture with China’s Harbin Turbine Company.

U.S. nuclear exports to China are limited by the absence of a U.S.-China agreement for nuclear cooperation. Such an agreement was signed in 1985 on the strength of a now famous toast in the White House by Premier Zhao Ziyang, who declared that China does not “engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.”

The accord was never put into effect because of reports that China was giving secret help to Pakistan’s nuclear bomb effort. China has therefore never been eligible for important U.S. nuclear exports such as reactor pressure vessels, control rod systems or primary coolant pumps, all of which are licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). For China to become eligible, the President must certify to Congress that China has not, among other things, helped non-nuclear weapon states acquire materials that would have “direct significance” for the production of “nuclear explosive devices.”

In addition, the U.S. Congress imposed a second ban on exports to China in 1990 as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident. Congress barred a broad range of nuclear exports to China until the President can certify that China has given “clear and unequivocal assurances to the United States that it is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the materials and components for such devices….”

NRC has interpreted the Tiananmen sanctions as barring any export under its licensing jurisdiction that would have a nuclear end-use. The Commerce Department has interpreted the sanctions as requiring a denial of any dual-use item under its jurisdiction going to a nuclear end-use or end-user if the item requires an individual validated license for nonproliferation reasons. Commerce can, however, approve dual-use exports to non-nuclear end-users in China. In fact, it approved the export of nearly $1 billion in dual-use nuclear commodities to China in 1994.

In March, Westinghouse announced that it was expanding its contract with China to include steam generators and reactor coolant pumps for Qinshan. According to the trade journal Nucleonics Week, Westinghouse arranged for these items to be manufactured abroad by its licensees because the components could not be exported from the United States under current law.

The question for the future is whether U.S. nuclear trade with China can increase while China makes questionable nuclear deals with other countries. In 1989, China broke the de facto nuclear supply embargo against Pakistan when it agreed to sell Islamabad a nuclear power reactor. This deal was followed by one with Iran for a 300-megawatt power reactor. In addition, there has been talk of a Chinese research reactor for Iran of roughly the same size that India and Israel have used to produce plutonium for atomic bombs. Beijing is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 31-nation consortium that has agreed to control nuclear-related exports to proliferant countries.

In late September, the Clinton administration announced that China had cancelled its power reactor deal with Iran, but the Chinese Foreign Minister promptly termed the report inaccurate and said that the sale was only suspended. There is serious doubt whether China can manufacture critical components of the reactor, and whether Iran could pay for a reactor from China after going through with its planned reactor purchases from Russia.

China: Can it Build Power Reactors on its Own?

China, like the United States and other nuclear weapon states, is using its experience with military production reactors to launch a civilian power program. China has still not proved, however, that it can build nuclear power stations without foreign help.

China’s first power reactor at Qinshan in Zhejiang province experienced a series of technical problems before it started to produce electricity in 1993. “For years, the Chinese have said that the Qinshan reactors were made entirely in China, which is a lie,” says a U.S. government expert who tracks China’s nuclear progress. The first Qinshan reactor includes a pressure vessel forged in Japan and primary coolant pumps supplied by a German firm, he says.

China is openly importing all its other reactors. The French nuclear giant, Framatome, has been building two large units at Daya Bay in Guangdong province, with the first starting operation in early 1994. Russia has agreed to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors near Wafangdian as part of a 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement, and the Russian firm Zarubeshatomenergostroy may also help China build a commercial centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. The plant would apparently produce low-enriched fuel for the Qinshan power reactors, and perhaps for the French reactors at Daya Bay.

The second reactor at Qinshan will use equipment from Framatome and the American firm Westinghouse, and the third Qinshan reactor will rely on French, Canadian and Japanese technology, according to official Chinese press reports. “The recent press statements are an open admission that China can’t build these reactors entirely on its own,” says the U.S. expert.

To help pay for all this, China needs to sell its nuclear wares abroad. China has agreed to build a Qinshan-style reactor in Pakistan, but U.S. officials question whether China can complete the reactor without incorporating Western technology. Japan and Germany say they will not sell significant nuclear equipment to Pakistan until Islamabad opens all its facilities to international inspection. In September 1992, China also agreed to supply Qinshan-style reactors to Iran, but the status of the deal is uncertain.

The China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation, a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), was formed in 1980 to market Chinese uranium and enrichment services worldwide. In January, China sold enriched reactor fuel to India. CNNC aims to produce and export a family of 600-, 900- and 1,200-megawatt power reactors. But to do so, China must expand its technological base, largely through imports. According to Zhoa Ren-kai, Vice President of the Commission of Science and Technology at CNNC, China’s new generation of reactors will include several joint ventures with foreign companies.

China: The Paths to Weapon-Grade Uranium and Plutonium

In the 1950s, China began to build an array of nuclear facilities to produce both high-enriched uranium and plutonium for atomic bombs. Within 15 years, China had mastered each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle from mining uranium to testing weapons. Beijing tested its first bomb in 1964, and now has the fourth largest arsenal in the world, with an estimated 450 warheads. In addition, China possesses large stockpiles of plutonium and high-enriched uranium free from international controls and available for military use. The key steps on the path to China’s arsenal are shown below.

Uranium path:
Uranium ore is mined at several sites, including Anshun, Chongyi, Daladi, Dongkeng, Fuzhou, Lanhe, Mengqikur, Quzhou, and Tenchong, and milled at Hengyang and Shangrao.

Uranium is purified at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant and at the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Element Plant and converted to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex and a plant in Sichuan Province (either Guangyuan or Yibin).

Uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) is enriched in gaseous diffusion plants at the Lanzhou and Heping facilities.

Plutonium path:
Uranium is fabricated into fuel bundles at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant and the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Element Plant.

Uranium fuel generates plutonium in the graphite-moderated reactors at Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex and at Guangyuan.

Plutonium is extracted from irradiated fuel at the Jiuquan Complex and the Guangyuan reprocessing plant. An additional extraction plant is under construction at the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the Gobi desert.

High-enriched uranium and plutonium are machined into bomb cores and assembled into warheads at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex Nuclear Component Manufacturing Plant and Assembly Workshop, and at the Guangyuan nuclear weapon assembly facility.

Thermonuclear fuels (lithium deuteride and tritium) are manufactured at the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant, and possibly at Yibin.

Nuclear warheads are tested at the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base.

China: U.S. Companies Sell Dual-Use Nuclear Equipment

American companies are not allowed to build reactors and other specialized nuclear facilities in China because Washington has never ratified its 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement with Beijing. U.S. exporters, however, are permitted to sell dual-use nuclear equipment and materials to Chinese buyers. Though nuclear trade with China is growing, exporters must pay close attention to the end-uses of their products to determine whether an export license is needed.

Last year, the Commerce Department announced a new general license, the GLX, that decontrolled many exports to China, including high-speed computers, telecommunications equipment and electronics. Exporters must keep in mind, however, that the GLX cannot be used to export controlled nuclear dual-use items or missile technology. Nor can it be used for sales to military buyers or to help build nuclear weapons.

The top U.S. exports to China in 1994 were digital computers, assemblies and related equipment. According to a U.S. government analyst who tracks China’s nuclear program, American firms are “selling high-speed oscilloscopes to China by the boat load.” Oscilloscopes can be used to record the brief events at the heart of an atomic bomb before it flies apart, but they are also widely used to research, test and develop high-speed electronics such as computers, radar and communications equipment. Oscilloscopes are controlled for export because of their nuclear applications, but they are also needed to develop guidance, control and tracking systems for missiles.

U.S. export controls require that an exporter obtain a validated license when he or she “knows or has reason to know” that an export will be used for nuclear explosive activities, uninspected nuclear activities, or for activities related to the processing of fissile materials or the production of heavy water. This is true regardless of who the importer is.

The table below shows the most important nuclear-related sales approved by the U.S. Commerce Department last year for Chinese buyers. All of the exports are dual-use, meaning they can be used for nuclear weapon development as well as civilian purposes. The Commerce Department does not publish the names of the buyers or the sellers, or list the specifications of the equipment licensed. The information is derived from Commerce Department’s Export Administration Annual Report 1994.

Top 25 U.S. exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment to China in 1994

Nuclear-related equipment (Commerce Control List number) Value

1) Digital computers/assemblies and related equipment (4A03) $ $921,793,659

2) Numerical control units/motion control boards (2B01) $11,537,050

3) Vacuum/controlled environment furnaces (1B50) $3,673,188

4) Dimensional inspection/measuring systems or equipment (2B06) $2,654,331

5) Cathode ray oscilloscopes and components (3A52) $1,137,550

6) Cameras (6A03) $1,117,458

7) Isostatic presses (2B44) $750,000

8) Electronic devices/components (3A01) $630,378

9) Isostatic presses not controlled by 2B04A (2B24) $408,423

10) Mass spectrometers (3A51) $349,429

11) Piping/fittings/valves made/lined with named alloy (2A51) $297,774

12) Specially designed pressure measuring instruments (1B51) $220,640

13) Optical equipment lasers (6A05) $209,954

14) Filament winding machines (1B41) $177,770

15) Hybrid computers/assemblies (4A02) $110,000

16) Commodities on the International Atomic Energy list (2A19) $102,000

17) Vibration test equipment using digital control technology (9B26) $91,000

18) Technology for the “use” of hot isostatic presses (3A01) $80,000

19) Fibrous/filamentary materials used in matrix structures (1C10) $73,800

20) Switching devices (3A43) $39,850

21) Crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals (1A44) $34,220

22) Items on the International Atomic Agency list (1C19) $27,930

23) Helium isotopically enriched in the Helium-3 isotope (1C55) $25,997

24) Cameras/components/photographic media not controlled (6A43) $23,625

25) Ruggedized electronic computers/related equipment (4A01) $19,585

China’s Stockpile of Bomb Fuel

China enriched the uranium for its first atomic bomb in 1964 at the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant in Gansu province. In the 1970s, a second, much larger, plant was built in Sichuan province. According to conservative U.S. estimates, the two enrichment plants could have produced over 20,000 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium since 1964. This is enough fissile material to fuel more than 1,000 nuclear warheads.

China made its first plutonium for bombs in 1967 at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, the present-day hub of China’s nuclear weapon material production. The first Chinese bomb believed to incorporate plutonium was a thermonuclear warhead tested in late 1968. China built a second plutonium production reactor in Guangyuan in 1974. Analysts estimate that China’s inventory of weapon-grade plutonium from its two production reactors could be more than 3,500 kilograms, enough for roughly 700 nuclear warheads.

Testimony: China’s Military Growth and Implications for the United States

Testimony of Gary Milhollin
by Gerard White

Assistant Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

October 12, 1995

I am pleased to be able to address this distinguished subcommittee today on the subject of China’s military growth and the implications for Sino-U.S. relations.

I will cover three areas: First, China’s current status as a nuclear power; second, China’s record as a supplier of nuclear, chemical and missile technology to proliferant countries; and third, U.S. export policy toward China.

China’s status as a nuclear power

China is the only country in the world that is still thought to target American cities with nuclear missiles. And until France began its recent series of nuclear tests, China was the only country still testing thermonuclear warheads in order to make them light enough and small enough to fit on new missiles that will fly farther and be more accurate. China has an estimated 300-450 nuclear warheads today, though Chinese nuclear facilities have produced enough weapon-grade uranium and plutonium to build a nuclear arsenal at least three times that size. Chinese nuclear warheads can be delivered by aircraft or a series of medium to long-range missiles. China has been developing these missiles steadily since the 1960s, and is now using them to power its space launchers. China’s space launch program is the direct outgrowth of its missile program and is intimately linked to it. One cannot export to China’s space launcher program without aiding its long-range missile program.

Attached to my testimony are three pages from the May issue of the Risk Report, a monthly publication by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. These pages contain photographs of China’s main rockets and missiles, together with their ranges, weights and payloads. Two Chinese missiles, the Dong Feng-5 ICBM and a submarine-launched ballistic missile, could hit targets in the United States. And I should add that both of these missiles are scheduled to be replaced with successors that will be more effective. Even the U.S. government analysts who do not believe China poses a direct threat to the United States acknowledge that there is a real possibility that the Chinese are developing their arsenal to keep the United States at bay as they work their will in East Asia.

China’s export record

During the 1980s, China secretly supplied nuclear and missile technology to South Asia, South America, South Africa and the Middle East. These exports persisted despite U.S. diplomatic protests and despite Chinese promises to stop. This secret flow of exports has continued during the 1990s, up to this very moment. In March, the State Department announced that three companies, Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited and Mainway International, had been sanctioned for chemical weapon proliferation. The announcement barred the companies from selling goods in the United States or to the U.S. government but did not reveal where the companies were based or what they had done to merit punishment.

In fact, the companies were sending poison gas ingredients from China to Iran. And in a related case in 1994, an Austrian, a German, and an Australian were sanctioned for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran. In July 1994, an Israeli used front companies in Britain and Poland to supply what U.S. officials strongly suspect were Chinese chemicals to Iran.

Most of the shipments were “precursor chemicals” used to produce mustard gas or nerve gas. All the chemicals are on export control lists maintained by the Australia Group, a consortium of countries that is trying to control the spread of chemical and biological weapons, but China is not a member of the group.

The pattern is the same with missile exports. Chinese companies were first caught secretly selling Pakistan M-11 missile components in 1991. The Bush administration banned U.S. missile-tech exports to the two offending Chinese entities and to Pakistan’s space agency SUPARCO. The punishment was imposed for at least two years, but the penalties against China were waived less than a year later in March 1992, after China promised it would abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

But by December 1992, the press was reporting that China had just shipped roughly two dozen M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The debate over what Pakistan got in late 1992 went on until August 1993, when the Clinton administration determined that China had shipped M-11 equipment and technology, but not necessarily complete missiles. The Administration banned the sale of U.S. missile-related technology to Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense and to ten Chinese companies.

The sanctions were to remain in force for two years. But in October 1994, China pledged once again to stop its missile sales. For the first time, China agreed that the MTCR covered missiles with an “inherent capability” to deliver a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers, which would include the M-I 1 missile. In exchange for these pledges, the United States lifted its sanctions against the ten Chinese companies.

The missile exports to Pakistan are, nevertheless, still going on. U.S. officials say that there is a continuous stream of compelling evidence to warrant the conclusion that M-11 missiles have been transferred. During the past year, satellites and human intelligence have watched Chinese and Pakistani missile technicians travel back and forth between Beijing and Islamabad and have revealed ongoing transfers of missile-related equipment. In the words of one U.S. official: “You haven’t got a confession, but you have so much evidence that reasonable people can judge that the missiles have been transferred.”

U.S. law provides ample room for President Clinton to penalize China for the sales. He can impose two-year trade sanctions on any foreign party that “conspires or attempts to engage in” the export of M-11- size missiles or the transfer of equipment or technology that “contributes to the design, development or production of missiles” in a country such as Pakistan. It doesn’t matter whether entire missiles have been shipped. If China has conspired to ship them–and many officials acknowledge that it has–Washington can take steps to penalize the exporters.

Officials from the U.S. intelligence services and other U.S. agencies are convinced there is enough evidence to impose penalties, but the White House and State Department are resisting. The reason seems to be a fear of offending Beijing. The State Department seems to be demanding a level of proof that is nearly impossible to provide. It seems to be holding out for an actual photo showing a Chinese rocket in Pakistan marked “M-11 .” In the nuclear field, China continues to supply sensitive nuclear equipment to countries of proliferation concern, most notably Pakistan and Iran. In 1989, China broke the de facto nuclear supply embargo against Pakistan when it agreed to sell Islamabad a nuclear power reactor. This deal was followed by one with Iran for a 300-megawatt power reactor. In addition, there has been talk of a Chinese research reactor for Iran of roughly the same size that India and Israel have used to produce plutonium for atomic bombs.

Beijing is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 31-member consortium that has agreed to control nuclear-related exports to proliferant countries.

Last month, the Clinton administration announced that China had canceled its power reactor deal with Iran, but the Chinese Foreign Minister promptly termed the report inaccurate and said that the sale was only suspended.

U.S. Exports to China

In light of China’s strategic military buildup, and its ongoing nuclear, missile and chemical exports, it would be imprudent for the United States to actually help China advance its nuclear or rocket capability. Yet, this is exactly what seems to be happening. In 1994, the U.S. Commerce Department approved roughly one billion dollars’ worth of sensitive nuclear dual-use exports to China. I have attached a list of the most important exports to my testimony. They include items such as vacuum furnaces and isostatic presses, which can be used for nuclear weapon-making. Iraq diverted this type of equipment to bomb-making before the Gulf War. Also on the list are “crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals,” items which seem to be specially designed to make nuclear weapons.

Under the Tiananmen Square sanctions imposed by Congress in 1990, China is not supposed to receive dual-use items for nuclear end-uses. It is possible that the end-uses for the equipment on this list are non-nuclear, and thus possible that the licenses were properly granted. However, China’s promises of nonproliferation cannot be trusted any more than China’s promises not to export missiles. Therefore, I recommend that this subcommittee request that the Commerce Department provide the actual export licenses, including the application files, for the items listed, so that Congress can be confident that the Tiananmen sanctions are being complied with. The data from the Commerce Department should include a full description of the end-use and end-user for each export.

In addition, I am attaching a list of the top 25 contributors to China’s rocket and missile program, which was published in the May issue of the Risk Report. In November, we will publish a list of China’s top nuclear end-users. To ensure that American products are not helping China build nuclear weapons and missiles that could be aimed at U.S. targets or sold to proliferant countries, Congress should periodically review U.S. dual-use exports to China and compare them to the list of end-users that I have attached. This oversight should reveal whether U.S. exports are going to suspect end-users and thus may be diverted to purposes that undermine U.S. national security.

Top 25 U.S. exports of nuclear dual-use equipment to China in 1994

The table below shows the most important nuclear-related sales approved by the U.S. Commerce Department last year for Chinese buyers. All of the exports are dual-use, meaning they can be used for nuclear weapon development as well as civilian purposes. The Commerce Department does not publish the names of the buyers or the sellers, or list the specifications of the equipment licensed. The information is derived from Commerce Department’s Export Administration Annual Report 1994.

Nuclear-related equipment (Commerce Control List #) Value
l) Digital computers/assemblies and related equipment (4A03) $921,793,659
2) Numerical control units/motion control boards (2B01) 11,537,050
3) Vacuum/controlled environment furnaces (1B50) 3,673,188
4) Dimensional inspection/measuring systems or equipment (2B06) 2,654,331
5) Cathode ray oscilloscopes and components (3A52) 1,137,550
6) Cameras (6A03) 1,117,458
7) Isostatic presses (2B44) 750,000
8) Electronic devices/components (3A01) 630,378
9) Isostatic presses not controlled by 2B04A (2B24) 408,423
10) Mass spectrometers (3A51) 349,429
11 ) Piping/fittings/valves made/lined with named alloy (2A51 ) 297,774
12) Specially designed pressure measuring instruments (1B51) 220,640
13) Optical equipment–lasers (6A05) 209,954
14) Filament winding machines (1B41) 177,770
15) Hybrid computers/assemblies (4A02) 110,000
16) Commodities on the International Atomic Energy list (2A19) 102,000
17) Vibration test equipment using digital control technology (9B26) 91,000
18) Technology for the “use” of hot isostatic presses (3A01) 80,000
19) Fibrous/filamentary materials used in matrix structures (1C10) 73,800
20) Switching devices (3A43) 39,850
21) Crucibles resistant to liquid fissile metals (1A44) 34,220
22) Items on the International Atomic Agency list (1C19) 27,930
23) Helium isotopically enriched in the Helium-3 isotope (1C55) 25,997
24) Cameras/components/photographic media not controlled (6A43) 23,625
25) Ruggedized electronic computers/related equipment (4A01 ) 19,585

Pakistan: American, Chinese or French Planes Would Deliver its Bomb

If nuclear war broke out tomorrow in South Asia, Pakistan would probably rely on foreign-supplied planes to deliver atomic bombs. Pakistan is building M-11 missiles with parts supplied by China and has tested its short-range Hatf missiles. But American F-16 jets, Chinese Q-5 bombers and French-made Mirage fighter planes remain Pakistan’s most reliable nuclear delivery platforms, according to U.S. intelligence sources.

Pakistan has 34 U.S.-made F-16s, but delivery of additional fighters has been held up because of the Pressler Amendment, which prohibits U.S. military aid or the sale of weaponry to Pakistan as long as Islamabad possesses nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has Chinese-supplied Q-5 bombers and scores of French-supplied Mirage aircraft. Islamabad may soon buy used Mirage 2000-C fighters from France. If the sale goes through, France could upgrade the aircraft by installing more advanced avionics.

Pakistan Needs Foreign Help to Develop Missiles

Pakistan’s lack of modern industry makes it greatly dependent on outside sources for its missile program. It must buy rocket propellant, guidance components and design and testing equipment, U.S. officials tell the Risk Report.

“It would be hard to think of countries they have not hit on” for these technologies, says a U.S. official who tracks Pakistan’s program. But the challenge for Islamabad is to circumvent the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose members notify each other whenever they deny a missile-related export, and who have cooperated to deny Pakistan what it needs.

China has been Pakistan’s primary supplier. In the late 1980s, Beijing and Islamabad signed an agreement for defense and scientific cooperation that paved the way for Pakistan to benefit from China’s missile expertise. The two countries have co-developed an anti-aircraft missile, the “Anza-II,” and are working together on an anti-tank missile, the “Green Arrow.”

Despite this help from Beijing, Pakistan still has little ability to produce essential items such as radar, sensors, computers and electronics.

According to a 1992 Pentagon study which ranks countries’ military capabilities, Pakistan needs significant help building aerospace structures and propulsion technology, and lacks capability in the following areas:

  • Computer-aided design and manufacture. High-speed computers are critical to all stages of missile development, but Pakistan has very little indigenous capability.
  • Electronic inspection and testing equipment
  • Specialized precision machine tools. Micro-mechanical devices are required for the production of precision bearings for military hardware, including low torque and extreme precision bearings critical to develop gyroscopes and accelerometers that can measure the location and speed of missiles.
  • Gravity gradiometers. Used to measure gravity magnitudes needed for multi-functional inertial navigation systems.
  • Radar and direction-finding systems. Required for launch support, navigation and guidance.
  • Specialized alloys and composites. Used to manufacture missile structures.

Pentagon Urges Reduction in Controls on Supercomputers

The Defense Department is urging other federal agencies to agree to a sharp reduction in existing controls on the export of supercomputers. The Pentagon’s position is based on a study that has ignited a debate between the Pentagon and other federal agencies, who are concerned that the machines could help develop nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and other advanced weaponry.

The debate was kicked off in July by a secret State Department memo summarizing the study’s conclusions. The study, which was still confidential as the Risk Report went to press, finds that “there is a continuing need to control supercomputers because of applications related to advanced conventional weapons, simulation, visualization, testing and encryption,” according to the memo. In contrast, the study found less reason to control supercomputer exports for nuclear weapon applications “because they can be accomplished effectively with computing power below the controllable level.”

Based on this latter finding, the Pentagon has urged that machines now defined as supercomputers should be free to go to countries such as India, Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and which are widely acknowledged to have active programs to produce nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. The only restriction would be a promise by the buyer to limit the computer to civilian purposes. Under current rules, buyers from these countries cannot import a supercomputer without obtaining an export license and agreeing to a security plan to prevent the machine’s misuse.

Since December 1993, a supercomputer has been defined as a machine fast enough to perform 1,500 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second). Previously, the definition was 195 MTOPS. The Pentagon’s new proposal is for a level of 7,000 to 10,000 MTOPS, which would make machines operating below that level now defined as supercomputers available without security plans to many more countries.

In addition, the Pentagon has proposed that many machines now defined as supercomputers should not require individual export licenses, including those destined for countries suspected of making weapons of mass destruction.

The Commerce Department has sided with the Pentagon in the debate, but the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Energy Department are opposed. “These levels are much higher than anything we will accept,” says one U.S. official opposed to the Pentagon’s proposal. ACDA and Energy argue that existing requirements for export licenses should stay in place for countries suspected of making weapons of mass destruction. Under current rules, any machine faster than 500 MTOPS needs an individual validated license for countries suspected of proliferation, even if the buyer promises a civilian use.

The Pentagon’s proposal has also run into opposition from Pentagon staff. Research done for the study revealed that Pentagon is now developing some of its most advanced weapons with computers that would be decontrolled under its proposal. “We are giving away our technological superiority,” says one concerned staffer. An internal Pentagon memorandum incorporating the research has been obtained by the Risk Report.

According to the Pentagon memo, Pentagon designers are using or will need to use machines between 1,000 and 10,000 MTOPS to develop ground radars for theater missile defense, infrared trackers to detect incoming missiles, acoustic detectors, airborne lasers, stealth aircraft, and designs for rocket motors. The Pentagon’s proposal would free many such machines for export without individual licenses.

Once U.S. agencies agree to a control level, it must be negotiated with Japan. The United States and Japan have pledged under a joint agreement to apply the same controls to supercomputers. In its July memo, the State Department proposed ending the agreement unless Japan agrees to an “acceptable” control level. “If the proposed new threshold is so high that the U.S. holds a near monopoly in the marketplace, we should seriously consider whether a continuation of this control regime is warranted,” the State Department wrote in the memo, a copy of which was recently made available to the Risk Report.

State hoped to give an advance copy of the Pentagon study to a Japanese delegation that visited Washington in early August, but the Japanese “arrived before we got our position worked out,” one knowledgeable U.S. official said, “so they were told to stay tuned.” As the Risk Report went to press, final drafts of the study were being reviewed. The overall U.S. negotiating position, however, was still being debated at the White House because of disagreements among federal agencies.

State’s memo also proposed that some twenty eight countries might be dropped from the list to which the most stringent supercomputer controls now apply. Only India, Israel and Pakistan, countries that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and China, Cuba, Egypt, Russia and Syria would still be covered by stringent controls. Washington would continue to bar all supercomputer sales to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, “where it is believed that exports cannot be safeguarded.”

In addition, State advocated cutting back on safeguards plans intended to prevent computers from being diverted to weapon use. Only “minimal safeguards” would be required for buyers in China, India and Pakistan, provided they promised a civilian use. More stringent safeguards, including an assurance by the buyer’s government of non-diversion, would be required for military buyers. This distinction has run into opposition because, in the words of one official, “There is really no difference between civilian and military buyers in countries like China and Russia.”

Officials also say that the debate is complicated by other impending negotiations on export control. In mid-September, the United States and its allies were scheduled to meet in The Hague to discuss the “New Forum,” an export control regime designed to replace Cocom, which served to keep Western military technology away from the East Bloc during the Cold War. The United States hopes the New Forum will deny military technology to countries like Iran.

But a knowledgeable U.S. official tells the Risk Report that the Pentagon’s proposed control level of 7,000 to 10,000 MTOPS is several times higher than the level the members of the New Forum have already agreed to in earlier discussions. “If you say that you aren’t controlling to India below 7,000, then how can you ask the New Forum to control to Iran below 7,000?” asks an industry official close to the debate. The official fears that if the United States adopts the Pentagon’s position, the entire decontrol effort could fail.