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India Missile Update – May 2014

May 1, 2014March 26, 2021 By Jonathan McLaughlin

India continues to enhance its land-based ballistic missile arsenal with a robust development and testing regime. The solid-fueled Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which has a range of over 5,000 km, has undergone two successful test flights. The 4,000 km Agni-IV ballistic missile will soon be ready for induction into the armed forces. At the same time, India is developing its maritime strategic forces; for instance, the nuclear reactor for the INS Arihant nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) recently achieved criticality. When this submarine, which was developed with Russian assistance, becomes operational and is equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), India will have a complete triad of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles as well as heavy bombers. India also continues to engage in cruise missile development, particularly the BrahMos hypersonic missile, which is also produced with Russian assistance. The Indian Ministry of Defense’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) oversees these multifaceted efforts. India appears to have attained a considerable degree of domestic capability regarding ballistic missile development, while it continues to rely on foreign support in other areas, such as cruise missiles, submarines, and ballistic missile defense.

Missile Systems

Land-based Ballistic Missiles

Agni Systems: the Agni I, II, and III solid-fueled ballistic missiles are in service. Each variant underwent testing in 2013. The Agni-I is reported to have successfully undergone its first night-time test in April 2014 from Wheeler Island, one of India’s main missile test sites. The Agni-IV underwent its third consecutive successful launch in January 2014, also from Wheeler Island. With this test, which was conducted jointly by the DRDO and the Strategic Forces Command, DRDO Director General Avinash Chander announced that the Agni-IV is ready for induction into the armed forces.

The Agni-V missile was successfully flight-tested for the first time in April 2012, followed by a second successful test in September 2013. The road-mobile Agni-V, which is capable of reaching most of northern China, including Beijing, is understood to be India’s attempt to maintain its deterrent against China’s nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and IRBMs, particularly variants of the Dong-Feng IRBM. The DRDO plans to have the Agni-V ready for induction by 2015, reportedly after a canister-based launch and several more tests. The Ministry of Defense has also announced that the DRDO will soon test a 6,000 km ICBM called the Agni-VI, although it is not clear how far along development is on this system, or if it is even underway.

Prithvi Systems: The Prithvi-I (P-I) and Prithvi-II (P-II) ballistic missiles are in service, but the Praahar tactical missile will reportedly replace the P-I, which will be upgraded for use in longer ranges. The 350-km nuclear-capable P-II was reportedly test-fired successfully in salvo mode from a mobile launcher at the Integrated Test Range (ITR) in March 2014.

Other Ballistic Missile Systems: India is developing a number of tactical ballistic missiles which will serve conventional missions. The 150 km Prahaar will operate as battlefield support for the Indian army. The single stage, solid-fueled missile will have a 200 kg payload capacity. Analysts view the Prahaar, which will reportedly replace the P-I, as India’s response to Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons, and as a potential weapon against enemy headquarters and communications infrastructure during an armed conflict. The last known test was conducted in July 2011. Last year, India also unveiled the Pragati tactical ballistic missile, which will reportedly have a 200 kg payload capacity and have a range of 60-170 km. The Pragati is reportedly very similar to the Prahaar, even sharing the same missile canister and transporter erector launcher (TEL). It is not clear when either system will be ready for induction.

Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles

K-15 (a.k.a.B-05) System: In January 2013, the DRDO successfully test-fired the K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a pontoon in the Bay of Bengal. This test marked the completion of the developmental phase of the missile, which has been cleared for production. Once it enters service and is deployed on the Arihant SSBN, India will have a complete nuclear triad. The K-15 is reported to be a solid-fueled, nuclear-capable missile with two stages and a range of 750 km. Development of this system reportedly goes back to at least 2004, with four tests of the fully-integrated system conducted beginning in 2010. Further tests of the K-15 are planned for this year. Its deployment is dependent on the induction of the Arihant. Arihant sea trials are scheduled to begin in September 2014.

Dhanush System: The naval version of the P-II, the Dhanush, is operational, having reportedly entered service in 2004. The nuclear-capable missile has a 350 km range and is designed for launches from surface vessels. It was reportedly test-fired successfully in November 2013 from a naval ship in the Bay of Bengal.

K-4: In addition to the K-15 and the Dhanush, DRDO Director General Chander told reporters in February 2014 that India is also developing an SLBM known as the K-4. This missile will reportedly have a 3,500 km range. According to Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, the Arihant SSBN will contain four universal launcher tubes capable of holding either 3 K-15 missiles or one K-4. In March 2014, India reportedly tested an SLBM in the Bay of Bengal. Most sources indicate that this missile was not the K-15 and that it had a range of over 2,000 km, suggesting that this may have been a test of the K-4.

Cruise Missiles

BrahMos System: India continues to deploy the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile across the various branches of its armed forces, and on multiple platforms. The BrahMos is a two-stage missile with a solid-fueled first stage and a liquid “ramjet” second stage. The missile has a 290 km range, a 200-300 kg payload capacity, and can travel at speeds of up to Mach 2.8. It carries conventional warheads. It was jointly developed by the DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia. The missile was first deployed on the INS Rajput surface vessel in 2005. This was the BrahMos N1 version. Since then, the BrahMos Block I (BI) and Block II (BII) variants have been deployed into the Indian Army. In February 2014, the BrahMos was fired from the INS Trikand vessel in salvo mode for the first time, and an advanced version of the missile was reportedly tested in April 2014. India plans to deploy an air-launched variant (ALCM) and submarine-launched variant (SLCM) of the BrahMos. In March 2013, the SLCM was successfully test-fired for the first time from a submerged platform in the Bay of Bengal. Tests for the ALCM are scheduled to begin in 2014. It is not clear when either BrahMos variant will be ready for induction.

Multilateral Regimes and Regime Restrictions

Missile-related export controls against India have been relaxed in recent years, especially by the United States. Most Indian entities have been removed from the “Entity List” maintained by the Department of Commerce, thus removing heightened export license requirements for these entities. The DRDO was removed from the list in 2001 and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was removed in 2004. In 2011, all remaining DRDO and ISRO subsidiaries (in addition to Bharat Dynamics Limited, or BDL) were removed from the list. The list no longer includes any Indian entities involved in missile or missile-related work. These measures have made it easier for India to access U.S. aerospace technology. Ties have grown particularly strong between ISRO and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The two now cooperate under the Joint Working Group on Civil Space in areas such as space science, earth observation, and satellite navigation, and have established a scientific personnel exchange.

India still faces considerable international restrictions with regard to missile-related procurement. It remains outside of most export-control arrangements, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary association of countries with common export control policies aimed at stemming the proliferation of WMD-delivery vehicle technology. The MTCR guidelines hinder the transfer of most ballistic-missile related equipment and technology to India from participating states, a group that includes France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These states have agreed to maintain a “strong presumption” of denial of transfers of the MTCR’s “Category I” items, which are deemed the most sensitive. Included in this category are ballistic missile, cruise missile, and Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) systems with capabilities exceeding a 300 km range and a 500 kg payload, as well as sub-systems, facilities, and technology that support these systems. Category II items include rocket systems not listed as Category I with a maximum range of equal to or greater than 300 km. While participating states have greater flexibility regarding transfers of Category II items, under MTCR guidelines the states are still called upon to require confirmation that all listed items are to be used only for their stated purpose prior to authorizing export, and also to require confirmation that all non-listed items are not to be used in connection with WMD delivery vehicles prior to authorizing export. The MTCR remains an important obstacle to direct cooperation in ballistic missile development between India and the majority of the states which have advanced ballistic missile programs. While the regime’s provisions are non-binding, they still create a set of “best practices” that work against the proliferation of WMD delivery vehicles.

Satellite Launch Vehicles

ISRO currently maintains two main satellite launch vehicle (SLV) systems, which it uses to send various satellites, both domestic and foreign, into space: the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV).

The PSLV is a four stage rocket using both liquid and solid propulsion. It can launch a 1,600 kg satellite in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and a 1,050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit. It has had 24 successful launches, most recently in November 2013.

The GSLV Mark I&II is a three stage rocket with a solid-fueled first stage (and four liquid (L 40) strap ons), a liquid-fueled second stage, and a cryogenic third stage. It is capable of placing a 2-2.5 ton satellite into geo-synchronous orbit. Its success rate has been much lower than the PSLV, with five successful launches and three unsuccessful launches. The last successful launch took place in January 2014. ISRO is also developing another GSLV, the GSLV Mark III, for heavier satellites. This will be a three stage rocket with a solid-fueled first stage, a liquid-fueled second stage, and a cryogenic third stage. It is not clear when this rocket will be ready for testing.

In 2006, ISRO successfully conducted a ground test of a supersonic combustion ramjet engine, or scramjet. The organization continues to conduct research and development into scramjets.
Scramjets do not carry their own oxidizer and therefore enable vehicles to be smaller and lighter or carry heavier payloads. ISRO is developing scramjets and other air-breathing engines primarily as a means of increasing SLV payloads and reducing the cost of launches. Scramjets also can be used in missiles. BrahMos Aerospace plans to equip the BrahMos II hypersonic cruise missile with scramjets.

Major Contributors

The DRDO oversees India’s ballistic and cruise missile development and production while ISRO is responsible for the space launch program. Combined, these government organizations oversee India’s aerospace network. Numerous DRDO and ISRO labs, as well as public sector undertakings and private companies are part of this network. Below is a list of some major contributors:

Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL- DRDO): Reportedly designs and builds all Agni missile systems, including the Agni-V; developed technologies for increased range and payload capacity of the Agni-V; designs and develops composite rocket motors, composite rocket motor casings, flex nozzle controls, and thermal protection systems for Agni missiles.

Baba Technocrats and Manufacturers, Pvt. Ltd.: Manufactures systems and subsystems for the Agni, Prithvi, and BrahMos systems.

Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL): DRDO’s missile production agency; has been involved in the Prithvi, Agni, and Dhanush missiles systems; received unauthorized shipments of U.S.-origin controlled items applicable to missile guidance and firing systems while it was on the U.S. Entity List.

Defense Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL): Contributes to the development of liquid propellant rocket engines and reaction control systems for Prithvi and Agni missiles; involved in the development of the BrahMos and of an SLBM for the Arihant.

National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL): Conducts aerodynamic tests on many of India’s missiles and satellite launchers at its wind tunnel facility, including the Prithvi and Agni missiles, and the PSLV and GSLV.

Research and Development Establishment (Engineers): Develops mobile launchers for the Prithvi, Agni, and BrahMos missile systems.

Research Centre, Imarat: Involved in the development of guidance systems for the Agni and the Prithvi and of antennae for the Prithvi, Agni-II, and K-15; also involved in the development of the Dhanush.

Shiva Engineering Works: Involved in the design, production, and commissioning of mobile shelters for the Agni, Prithvi, Brahmos, and K-15 missile systems; involved in the development of handling equipment for Agni missiles, K-15 tube assembly fixtures, and Prithvi warhead containers.

Terminal Ballistic Research Laboratory: Involved in the development of nuclear warheads for the Agni, the Prithvi, and submarine platforms.

Satish Dhawan Space Center: Launches ISRO rockets; manufactures and tests rocket components, including solid propellant rocket motors; houses liquid and cryogenic propellants and prepares liquid and cryogenic stages of rockets for launch.

Vikram Sarabhai Space Center: Conducts research and development on launch vehicle design, propellants, solid propulsion technology, polymers and composites, and guidance; received illegal shipments of U.S.-origin items applicable to the research and development of launch vehicles and missiles while it was on the U.S. Entity List.

Walchandnagar Industries Limited: Manufactures motor casings and launchers for the Agni and air booster casings for the K-15; also manufactures components for the INS Arihant, and for satellite launch vehicles.

Suppliers

India’s missile and aerospace programs have also benefitted from a number of suppliers who provide components for its missile and rocket systems, often procured illegally from abroad. Below is a brief list of several suppliers of note:

Cirrus Electronics: Operates in the United States, Singapore, and India; knowingly supplied U.S.-origin controlled items to Indian organizations on the U.S. Entity List without the required export license, including semiconductors and capacitors, which can be used in missile guidance and firing systems, and static random access memory computer chips.

Enterysys Corporation: Operates in the United States and India; exported U.S.-origin controlled electronic equipment to BDL without the required licenses when it was on the U.S. Entity List.

NPO Mashinostroyenia: Russian firm that co-develops the BrahMos cruise missile in cooperation with the DRDO; co-founded the BrahMos Aerospace Joint Venture with the DRDO.

Rajaram Engineering Corporation: Accused by the U.S. Department of Commerce of illegally supplying an Indian space center with U.S.-origin equipment and technology related to the research and development of launching systems, including missile delivery systems.

A Peaceful Nuclear Iran?

March 3, 2014April 5, 2017 By Valerie Lincy

Presentation at the 2014 AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C.

Last week, my organization received a call from a staff member on Capitol Hill who had an interesting question: how much nuclear energy could Iran produce with its current stockpile of enriched uranium? The staff member, like most journalists and even the public, was under the impression that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium might be sufficient for the generation of nuclear power. That is not surprising; we have heard it said in many places that Iran could have a small enrichment program sufficient for nuclear power but not big enough to pose a weapon threat.

Unfortunately, that is not true. It is impossible to have an enrichment program for power that is smaller than an enrichment program for bombs.

Let’s consider what Iran has done. Over the eight years that Iran has been enriching uranium, it has accumulated only enough to fuel a standard-size nuclear reactor for less than three months. That is inconsequential from a nuclear energy perspective. But that same stockpile could fuel seven nuclear weapons. The truth is, Iran’s enrichment program today is far too small to be part of an energy program, but is perfectly adequate for making bombs.

To repeat: you can’t have a small enrichment program for nuclear energy. Such a thing does not exist. An enrichment program for power is by its nature many times bigger than an enrichment program for bombs. I will explain why in more detail in just a moment.

But first, what is the status of Iran’s nuclear program under the interim deal made last November?

Iran has enough low-enriched uranium now to fuel 7 bombs, assuming the uranium is enriched the rest of the way to weapon-grade. It is already two thirds of the way. Iran will keep this material under the deal. It would probably take Iran at least 3 months to prepare a first bomb’s worth of enriched uranium using this material, plus additional time to process it for placement in a weapon. Of course, these numbers are only estimates.

Iran is still enriching uranium by operating approximately 9,000 first-generation centrifuges under the interim accord. It has installed some 18,000, including about 1,000 advanced centrifuges that are probably two to three times more powerful than its first-generation machines.

Although Iran has agreed not to manufacture, install, or operate any new centrifuges – including its more advanced models – as long as the interim deal remains in effect, it continues to research and develop improved machines.

Iran also has a stockpile of higher-enriched uranium, which is already about nine-tenths of the way to weapons-grade. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that Iran has ceased production of this material and is converting its existing stocks to an oxide form that is difficult, but not impossible, to quickly prepare for use in a nuclear weapon. Iran’s suspension of higher-enriched uranium production represents the only real roll-back achieved by the interim deal.

Besides enriched uranium, the other fissile material that can be used in a nuclear weapon is plutonium. Iran could eventually produce plutonium by extracting it from the spent fuel of its Arak heavy water reactor, which is still under construction. However, the interim nuclear deal bars Iran from installing any additional major components at the Arak site.

Under the interim accord, IAEA inspectors have gained access to some additional facilities, such as centrifuge workshops, and continue to visit Iran’s other declared nuclear sites.

So, overall, we can see that the interim deal largely maintains the status quo. It is not a roll-back.

Second, how likely are we to strike a final deal with Iran during this interim period?

The current talks are premised on the notion of “putting more time on the clock” – scaling back Iran’s enrichment program so Iran would need 6 months or a year to make a dash for a bomb, rather than 3 months or less. This would give the United States and its allies more time to act if Iran is discovered to be “breaking out” toward nuclear weapons.

But achieving this objective requires Iran to give up not only the further expansion of its nuclear program, but to leave idle or dismantle much of what it has already built.

What are the options?

A first option would be to require Iran to eliminate its entire enriched uranium stockpile. This would force Tehran to use natural uranium if it decided to break out, which would take more than twice as long to fuel one bomb as starting with enriched material. Iran could keep running its 9,000 centrifuges, but would have to dismantle or keep dormant an additional 9,000 machines it has installed. Any enriched uranium product would need to be shipped out of the country.

A second option would allow Iran to retain its enriched uranium stockpile, but would cut the number of its operating centrifuges to about 3,000 in order to maintain adequate break out time. In this scenario, even more centrifuges – 15,000 or so – would have to be dismantled or kept dormant.

Either option would require Iran to permanently halt its development of advanced centrifuges and give up plans for additional nuclear sites. The Arak heavy water reactor would need to be modified or dismantled, and Iran would have to agree to intrusive inspections both to ensure compliance with these restrictions and to guard against secret sites.

Either option would also mean that Iran would never be able to fuel a power reactor. Its enrichment program would be only a token, a face-saver.

Why? The answer is simple – a small enrichment program for nuclear power doesn’t exist, as I stated above. Let’s look a little deeper to see why. At its present capacity, it would take Iran more than a decade to accumulate enough uranium to fuel its Bushehr reactor for one year. Or, put another way, to have enough enrichment power to fuel its power reactor, Iran would have to increase its enrichment capacity by a factor of ten. The United States could never agree to this. If Iran had such enrichment power, it could fuel 25 nuclear weapons per year. “Small” enrichment programs such as Iran’s are not built by countries that seek nuclear energy; they are built by countries that aspire to nuclear weapons. If Iran’s enrichment program were truly large enough to supply a nuclear energy program, we would be looking at a tremendous bomb potential.

It is thus no surprise that Iran appears committed to retaining its enrichment capacity under any final accord, not to winding it down. As Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif recently commented, “Iran’s nuclear program will remain intact. We will not close any program.”

Iran’s apparent unwillingness to accept limits on its enrichment program does not bode well for a final agreement. The two sides are simply too far apart. Neither side wants a confrontation, so both Iran and the P5+1 will likely extend the interim period for another six months in July. The end of the year will be “crunch time” as both parties try to salvage something. But if present conditions hold, it is difficult to see the path forward to a final settlement.

Where will that leave Iran’s program in January 2015, after the negotiating period ends?

Iran will have amassed enough low-enriched uranium during the negotiating period to fuel an additional two nuclear weapons. Iran is supposed to convert this extra product into oxide form, yet it is unclear when this process will begin; Iran must first build a suitable conversion plant. Thus, if there is no long-term deal, Iran could be left with two more bombs’ worth of low-enriched uranium.

Although Iran’s higher-enriched uranium will have been diluted or converted to a form more difficult to process for use in weapons, all of this material will remain in Iran and can be reconverted. Iran’s approximately 18,000 installed first-generation centrifuges, plus advanced models, will remain intact, and additional components for the Arak heavy water reactor – which Iran is not prohibited from manufacturing under the interim accord – could be ready to install. The Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants will remain open, and Tehran’s research and development of next-generation centrifuges could position it to resume enrichment at an unprecedented pace.

Finally, what does all of this mean for our goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran?

Iran could be in a good position if the P5+1 fails to reach a long-term deal by the end of the interim period. Iran will have suffered some delays in its nuclear progress, but there will be no serious roadblocks to expanding its program. Its uranium enrichment activities will have gained a degree of legitimacy that will undo years of work at the United Nations and contradict a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment effort. The text of the current interim agreement already concedes that Iran’s enrichment effort is a legitimate part of a peaceful nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the relaxation of sanctions may have provided much-needed relief to the Iranian economy and will reduce pressure on the leadership in Tehran. It took ten years to bring international sanctions to the point where they are now affecting the regime, and it may be difficult to regain the global consensus required to enforce these measures should they prove necessary again. The Islamic Republic will also have shed its status an economic pariah as the international business community eagerly pursues new trade and investment opportunities.

In sum, the Iranian regime could emerge from the talks with its nuclear program intact, an economy spurred on by sanctions relief, a weakened international consensus on future restrictions, and reduced pressure on the Iranian leadership to negotiate for fear of domestic unrest.

How can we avoid such an outcome? Iran must be convinced that the cost of failing to reach a final deal that includes restrictions on its enrichment program would be high. “Zero enrichment” isn’t necessary; Iran can retain a token enrichment capability, but nothing more. We must also break the association between Iran’s enrichment program and nuclear energy, because any program large enough to fuel nuclear reactors would also give Iran an unacceptable nuclear break out capability. Until we achieve these goals, we won’t have removed the threat of an Iranian bomb.

Syria Chemical Weapons Update: Front Companies for Procurement – 2013

October 2, 2013April 5, 2017 By Jonathan McLaughlin

Syria’s chemical weapon stockpile is reported to be one of the largest in the Middle East. According to a study prepared by French intelligence agencies, Damascus is understood to possess over 1,000 tons of chemical agents and precursors. This stockpile is thought to include several tens of tons of VX, several hundred tons of mustard agents, and several hundred tons of sarin. The Washington Post reports that the majority of the initial substances for Syria’s VX and sarin are stored separately, not in their mixed, final form.

The U.N. mission that investigated the August 21st chemical attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus concluded that sarin was the nerve agent employed, although it did not indicate who was responsible. The U.S. government has stated flatly that the attack was launched by Syrian government forces.The U.N. mission also found that the attack was made with artillery rockets. The investigators found evidence pointing to a variant of the M14 artillery rocket as well as to the 330 mm caliber artillery rocket.

In addition to artillery rockets, Syria’s arsenal of chemical-capable delivery vehicles includes missiles and aerial bombs. French intelligence agencies report that Syria’s chemical-capable missiles include the SS-21 short-range ballistic missile as well as several variants of the SCUD ballistic missile, including the SCUD-B and the SCUD-C.

The U.S.-Russian Agreed Framework and Syria’s CW Infrastructure

Despite the size of Syria’s stockpile, and its recent use against civilians, developments since the August 21st attack have been encouraging. In September, the United States and Russia jointly developed a framework for destroying the stockpile. The framework calls for eliminating the stockpile “in the first half of 2014,” as well as for the “unfettered right” of inspectors to examine any location in Syria. These points were incorporated into a UN Security Council resolution on Syria adopted on September 27th.

The challenges facing the inspectors will nevertheless be considerable. Inspectors will need to work in the midst of a volatile civil war while trying to determine where throughout the country the weapons have been dispersed. In order to accomplish this task, they will require the close cooperation of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), which built and oversees the stockpile.

According to the U.S. government, the SSRC is responsible for both the development and production of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons, and for their delivery vehicles. According to the Wall Street Journal, the SSRC’s elite Unit 450 has spent months scattering Syria’s CW munitions across the country to as many as 50 sites in an effort to protect them from possible U.S. attack. A report released recently by the Los Angeles Times puts the total number of storage and production sites at roughly 45. While the Syrian government’s cooperation so far has been encouraging, the number of sites underscores the need for vigilance as inspectors carry out their mission. Furthermore, it is still not clear how deep the inspectors will go into the SSRC’s procurement operation, which is discussed below.

Origins of Syria’s CW Program and the Current Procurement Operation

Declassified U.S. intelligence documents indicate that before 1983, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia provided Syria with chemical agents, delivery systems, and relevant training. By the mid-1980s, Syria had begun a quest for self-sufficiency, according to a study by the Congressional Research Service. However, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Syria’s CW effort is still not self-sufficient, and that it relies on “foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals.”

The SSRC is in charge of procuring these elements, using front companies and subsidiaries to do so. Below is a list compiled by the Wisconsin Project of entities reported to be linked to procurements on behalf of the SSRC. The list is not comprehensive:

Expert Partners. Listed by the European Union as a “proxy” for the SSRC; deals in dual-use goods prohibited by the EU to Syria.

Megatrade. Listed by the European Union as a “proxy” for the SSRC; deals in dual-use goods prohibited by the EU to Syria.

Handasieh General Organization Engineering Industries. Listed by the United States as acting on behalf of the SSRC; linked to the SSRC’s efforts to acquire equipment and technology for SCUD missiles.

Business Lab. Listed by the United States as acting on behalf of the SSRC, and as attempting to procure pinacolyl alcohol, which can be used to prepare a nerve agent; listed by the European Union as a front company for the SSRC for the acquisition of sensitive equipment.

Industrial Solutions. Listed by the United States as acting on behalf of the SSRC; listed by the European Union as a front company for the SSRC for the acquisition of sensitive equipment.

Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF). Listed by the United States as acting on behalf of the SSRC, and as acquiring equipment for producing solid propellant for rockets and missiles; listed by the European Union as a front company for the SSRC for the acquisition of sensitive equipment.

Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (HIAST). An SSRC subsidiary, HIAST provides training to SSRC engineers; it has also played a minor role in SSRC procurement in the past.

Environmental Studies Center (ESC). Intended recipient of chemical detection equipment and coats for chemical protection shipped from North Korea; “appears to be linked” to HIAST, according to U.N. experts.

Further investigation of these and other SSRC affiliates will provide important insight into how Syria developed its chemical weapons stockpile.

More on the North Korean Vessel Seized in Panama

July 17, 2013April 4, 2017 By Matthew Godsey

The Chong Chon Gang is not the only North Korean vessel traveling to Latin America

On July 12, authorities in Panama boarded and searched the Chong Chon Gang, a North Korean-flagged cargo vessel returning from Cuba and preparing to transit the Panama Canal. The search is ongoing but so far has revealed military cargo, apparently including components for missile systems, hidden under a load of sugar.

The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control has analyzed the voyage history of the Chong Chon Gang and related vessels over the past decade. According to the data, last month’s visit to Cuba is only the most recent of at least three voyages to Central and South America that the vessel has made. In August 2008, the Chong Chon Gang made another transit of the Panama Canal (from Atlantic to Pacific), and in October 2009 it stopped at a port in Santos, Brazil, before heading through the Mediterranean for stops in Ukraine and Turkey.

The data also show that the Chong Chon Gang is not the only North Korean vessel calling at ports in Latin America. At least two vessels, the O Un Chong Nyon Ho and the Mu Du Bong, docked in Cuba in May 2012 and May 2009, respectively. Both made voyages similar to the one just made by the Chong Chon Gang. Two other vessels, the Ryong Gun Bong and the Ap Rok Gang, have also made recent transits of the Panama Canal.

All of these vessels operate in a classic shell company network. In the case of the Chong Chon Gang, the registered owner is Chongchongang Shipping Co., Ltd., a company that does not appear to hold any other vessels. However, the company of real interest is the vessel’s manager: Pyongyang-based Ocean Maritime Management Co. This company is affiliated with more than a dozen other vessels, including all of those listed above. The pattern is common: a company is set up to act as a vessel’s nominal “owner,” but is in fact controlled by a much larger company. Iran has followed a similar pattern in seeking to evade international sanctions on its shipping sector.

Panama has called in United Nations experts to examine whether the Chong Chon Gang’s cargo constituted a breach of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. This would not be the first time that North Korea is found to be violating U.N. sanctions by shipping arms; but this publicized interdiction in Latin America is a first. It confirms the scope of North Korea’s proliferation reach and the need for global vigilance.

Table of Iran’s Principal Nuclear Facilities

June 11, 2013April 5, 2017

The table below lists information about facilities in Iran’s declared nuclear infrastructure.

Facility	Purpose	Location	Status	Supplier
Uranium Mines	extraction of uranium ore	Saghand Gchine	operational	allegedly China
Yellowcake Production Plants	production of uranium concentrate	Ardakan and Bandar Abbas	operational or under construction
Uranium Conversion Plant (UCF)	uranium conversion	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational	China supplied blueprints
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)	uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges	Natanz	operational	A.Q. Khan network provided centrifuge blueprints and components
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)	uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges	Natanz	partially operational	A.Q. Khan network provided centrifuge blueprints and components
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)	uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges	near Qom	partially operational
Heavy Water Production Plant	production of heavy water; used as a moderator in nuclear reactors	Arak	operational	Russia helped with know-how
Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40) (40 MWt)	production of radioisotopes; by-products include plutonium	Arak	under construction
Light Water Power Reactor (1,000 MWe)	electricity production	Bushehr	completed, not operating	Germany and Russia
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) (5 MWt)	radioisotope production	Tehran Nuclear Research Center	operational	United States
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)	research, including on uranium metal development	Tehran Nuclear Research Center	operational
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)	radioisotope production	Tehran Nuclear Research Center	operational
Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)	manufactures fuel for the Arak reactor	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational
Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)	manufactures fuel for the TRR	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) (30 kWt)	reportedly for isotope production	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational	China
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor	research	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational	China
Light Water Sub-critical Reactor (LWSCR)	research	Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)	operational	China

India Missile Milestones: 1947-2012

November 1, 2012March 27, 2017

1947: Dr. Vikram Sarabhai establishes the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), which will later become a national center for space research, supported primarily by India’s Department of Space.

1962: The Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), established one year earlier as an extension of the Special Weapon Development Team (SWDT), is moved to Hyderabad to work on missile design and development.

1962: The Indian Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) is established under the auspices of the Department of Atomic Energy.

1963: INCOSPAR establishes the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS).

November 1963: A U.S.-produced, solid-propellant Nike-Apache rocket is launched from Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station. The launch is part of an international effort under the United Nations. It is later followed by 350 U.S. French, Soviet and British rockets launched between 1963 and 1975.

1964: The Centre National d’ Etudes Spatiales (CNES) and India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for CNES to supply four Centaure rockets with payloads for vapor cloud experiments. For its part, DAE will manufacture in India, under license, the Belier and Centaure types of sounding rockets.

1965: India establishes the Space and Technology Center (SSTC) in Thumba.

1967: The Satellite Telecommunication Earth Center is established in Ahmedabad.

1967: India launches its first sounding rocket, Rohini-75.

1969: The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is formed under the Department of Atomic Energy.

1970: India and the Soviet Union sign a MoU on Collaboration in the Organization of Rocket Sounding of the Atmosphere by Soviet Meteorological Rockets at Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station.

1972-1982: DRDL establishes missile-related infrastructure, including aerodynamic, structural and environmental test facilities, liquid and solid propulsion facilities, fabrication engineering facilities, control, guidance, FRP, and computer facilities.

June 1972: The Space Commission and Department of Space are established and ISRO is brought under the Department of Space.

1975: India launches its first satellite, Aryabhata.

1977: India and France sign a Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Space Affairs.

1979: Bharat Dynamics Ltd. becomes India’s guided missile headquarters.

March 1979: A Centaure-2 type rocket is launched from Thumba, as part of an agreement and program begun in 1974. The rocket carries Bulgarian and Indian equipment for exploration and measurement in space of proton and electron fluxes.

1980: India conducts the second experimental launch of its SLV-3 after its failed initial launch in 1979, and succeeds in placing the Rohini satellite into orbit.

1982: The Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC) successfully launches a Centaure rocket under the joint cooperation of India, West Germany, and Austria.

1983: India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) begins, with more than 60 public and private organizations involved.

September-October 1984: A senior Indian delegation led by the Deputy Minister for Electronics, Dr. Sanjeevi Rao, visits the Soviet Union to purchase high-powered computers for India’s defense and nuclear industry. The Soviet Union agrees to supply its latest-generation “Elbrus” computer system to India after 1986.

1986: India’s Scientific Advisor to the Defense Minister Dr. V.S. Arunachalam announces that scientists at DRDL have successfully developed and tested a high-thrust, liquid-fueled rocket engine that generates a thrust of 30 tons and is capable of lifting a payload to a height of 600 km into space.

February 1988: India conducts the first test flight of its surface-to-surface Prithvi ballistic missile, under a program headed by the DRDL.

March 1988: India launches its first operational remote sensing satellite, IRS-1A.

April 1988: ISRO signs a cooperation agreement with the European Space Agency.

1989: India conducts a test launch of its first medium-range ballistic missile, called the Agni. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi states “The Agni is an R&D vehicle, not a weapons system. However, the technologies proved in Agni are deeply significant for evolving national security options.”

1991: ISRO and Russia’s Glavkosmos reach an agreement for the supply of engines and cryogenic technologies to India. Under U.S. pressure and sanctions imposed on ISRO in 1992, the agreement will be limited to the sale of seven KhimMach KVD-1 engines, each of which produces 7.5 metric tons of thrust.

1992: India acquires the ability to manufacture liquid hydrogen.

May 1992: India conducts a successful test of the third-stage motor for its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), ignited under simulated high-altitude conditions. The PSLV is a four stage vehicle that uses solid and liquid propulsion alternately.

May 1992: India stages its first successful launch of the four-stage ASLV, carrying its SROSS-C satellite into orbit, following two failed attempts in 1987 and 1988.

1994: The periodical Flight International reports that India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) has for the past two years been engaged in designing a ramjet-powered, submarine-launched missile dubbed the Sagarika.

1995-1996: India suspends development of the Agni missile project.

January 1996: India conducts the first test flight of the Prithvi-II surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of between 250 km-350 km, far enough to reach Islamabad.

March 1996: India successfully conducts its third and final developmental launch of the four-stage PSLV, deploying a 1-ton Indian satellite into 500-mile polar orbit.

May 1997: India completes development of two variants of the Prithvi ballistic missile. A 150-kilometer range version with a heavier warhead is ready for introduction into the Army, while the 250-kilometer version with a lighter warhead destined for the air force is ready for user trials.

June 1997: Fewer than a dozen Prithvi missiles are moved close to the Pakistani border.

August 1997: The Agni missile program is revived in response to Pakistan’s test of the Hatf-III missile in July.

September 1997: India conducts the first operational launch of its PSLV-C1, deploying a 1200-kilogram Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS-1D) into orbit. In reaching 817 km circular polar sun-synchronous orbit, the PSLV was powered by four stages of alternating solid and liquid propellant.

1998: India conducts five underground nuclear tests at Pokhran, ranging in yield from less than 1 kiloton to about 45 kilotons. Defense Minister George Fernandes reportedly says that India will “inevitably” arm itself with nuclear warheads. The United States proceeds to implement sanctions, in place by November 1998, on a large number of research, development, and production entities relating to space and missile technology.

February 1999: Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif meet in Lahore, Pakistan. They agree to exchange strategic information about their nuclear arsenals, to give each other advance notice of ballistic missile tests, and to increase efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue.

April 1999: India conducts its first test of the nuclear-capable Agni-II missile. The two-stage solid fuel missile, which can carry a 1,000 kg payload, was successfully fired to a range of 2,000 kilometers.

May 1999: India launches a PSLV and successfully deploys an Indian remote sensing satellite and two other payloads.

July 1999: India successfully tests the Nishant, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of battlefields.

October 1999: Scientists from the DRDO announce they are developing the Surya, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers.

April 2000: India tests the medium-range Dhanush missile, a naval version of the Prithvi. It has a range of 350 km and is nuclear-capable.

August 2000: India’s Agni-II missile reportedly reaches the operational stage. India’s Defense Minister, George Fernandes, states that re-entry, guidance, and maneuverability have been tested.

February 2001: Dr. Vasudev Aatre, head of India’s DRDO and scientific adviser to the Indian Minister of Defense, announces that India is developing the Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The Agni-III is anticipated to have a range of 3,500 km, improving upon the “range and capability” of the 2,100 km-range Agni-II.

March 2001: India’s Defense Minister, George Fernandes, announces that the Agni-II ballistic missile is operational and is ready for mass production after its second successful test launch in January. The 2,500 km range missile may be launched from a static launch pad or mobile launcher and offers India a nuclear second-strike capability.

March 2001: The periodical Defense News reports that India and Russia’s Central Scientific and Research Institute of Automatics and Hydraulics (TsNIIAG) are negotiating the sale of a variant of an electro-optical guided missile warhead originally developed for Scud-B ballistic missiles, which could drastically improve the accuracy of India’s ballistic missiles.

March 2001: India aborts the first attempt to launch its Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), when computers detect that one of its four liquid-fueled strap-on booster engines is not generating the required 90 percent thrust.

April 2001: After tracing the March 2001 malfunction to a defective oxidizer line, India’s GSLV successfully launches, setting the 3,000 lb experimental GSAT-1 communication satellite into orbit. This was the first successful launch of the GSLV-Mark I and Mark II series. GSLV-Mark I and II are three stage vehicles with a combination of liquid and solid propellants. They are 49 meters tall, weigh 414 tons at the time of lift off, and have a maximum diameter of 3.4 m at the payload fairing. They can place satellites weighing between 2000-2500 kg into geosynchronous transfer orbit.

June 2001: According to the periodical Defense News, India successfully launches the PJ-10, also known as the BrahMos cruise missile, developed by DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostryenia (NPOM) under a secret 1998 Indo-Russian accord. The missile has a range of 280 kilometers and may be fired from Indian and Russian mobile launchers, ships, submarines and aircraft.

July 2001: India and France reportedly sign a MoU to co-develop and co-produce battlefield surveillance radars and ballistic missiles, and for India to domestically build Scorpene submarines.

August 2001: According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Indian Army is to create a second missile regiment, the Strategic Rocket Regiment, to induct the Agni-II intermediate-range ballistic missile.

September 2001: U.S. President George Bush lifts sanctions against India and Pakistan imposed under the Arms Export Control Act.

December 2001: An unclassified summary of the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) National Intelligence Estimate claims most components required for an ICBM are found in India’s indigenous space program. India could “convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year or two of a decision to do so.” However, the report cautions that while India is striving for self-sufficiency, it still relies “heavily” on foreign assistance. The NIC also states that India will probably not deploy its Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile until 2010 or later.

December 2001: India successfully test-fires a 250 km extended-range version of the Prithvi missile, developed for the Indian Air Force. The indigenously developed surface-to-surface missile is one of the five missiles being developed under the IGMDP. The earlier version of the Prithvi is already in service with India’s Army.

March 2002: India’s Ministry of Defense announces that the Agni-II ballistic missile has entered into production phase and will soon be inducted into the Army.

March 2002: Scientists at India’s LPSC successfully fire an upper-stage cryogenic engine for 12 minutes, the duration it will fire during actual flight. On the same day, ISRO successfully tests an improved variant of the two-meter diameter solid-propellant motor that powers the third stage of the PSLV. Improvements include “optimization of the motor case and nozzle and increased propellant loading.”

April 2002: Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that, according to U.S. intelligence sources and contrary to the claims of Indian officials, the first test of a single-stage variant of the Agni was a failure. The missile flew its anticipated range of 700 km, but the warhead failed to separate.

June 2002: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions states that India “still lacks engineering or production expertise in some key missile technologies.” The report adds that during 2001 Russia and Western Europe remained the main sources of missile-related and dual-use technology to fill these gaps.

July 2002: According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, Indian defense officials claim that India has acquired two Green Pine radar systems from Israel, but say they have had little success in developing a missile defense capability against a possible Pakistani attack.

December 2002: The CIA in its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions states that India was among the countries supplying assistance to Libya’s ballistic missile program.

January 2003: India has allocated $1 billion to the DRDO for the development of hypersonic missile systems, powered by an indigenously developed cryogenic engine fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.

January 2003: The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approves the creation of a Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to manage and administer all nuclear and strategic forces. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), comprised of a Political Council and an Executive Council, will be responsible for India’s nuclear arsenal.

January 2003: India reportedly places under its SFC two operational missile groups of the Indian Army, which possess the 150-250 km-range Prithvi and the 2,500 km-range Agni nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

May 2003: India conducts the second launch of its GSLV, lifting a 1,800 kg experimental communications satellite. Unlike the first flight, when the GSLV’s Russian-made cryogenic upper stage burned out four seconds too soon, this launch occurred without incident. ISRO announces that once declared operational, the GSLV will “make the Indian space program a self reliant one.” This was part of the GSLV-Mark I and Mark II series.

May 2003: The Indian periodical Vayu announces that with the lifting of “restrictions imposed by collaborators,” India’s Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) has been cleared for missile exports. BDL manufactures a variety of missiles including the Prithvi-I and Prithvi-II surface-to-surface missiles.

August 2003: R. N. Agarwal, the former Director of the Agni missile project and currently the Director of the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), states that the carbon composite content of the new Agni variants will be increased from 35 to 80 percent making them lighter and able travel longer distances. Agarwal says that the Agni’s re-entry heat shield is entirely made up of carbon composite.

October 2003: India clears the short-range Agni-I and medium-range Agni-II surface-to-surface missiles for the Army.

December 2003: Indian Defense sources indicate that the BrahMos cruise missile has been configured for launch from submarines. Submarine-to-surface launch is one of the four BrahMos designs, which are anticipated to include air-to-surface, ship-to-surface, and surface-to-surface. The missile was launched successfully from a surface ship and travelled 290 km to its target.

January 2004: India and the United States agree under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India (NSSP) to expand cooperation in civilian nuclear programs, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade, including expanded dialogue on missile defense. This agreement initiates three major steps: removal of ISRO from the Department of Commerce Entity List, removal of export license requirements for items subject to Export Administration Regulations EAR99, and establishment of a presumption of approval for all items not controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons.

March 2004: India successfully test-fires an “improved” version of its Prithvi-II surface-to-surface ballistic missile with an extended-range of 250 km and “much higher accuracy,” according to a defense ministry official.

September 2004: India conducts the first operational flight of its GSLV, lifting a 1,950 kg spacecraft. This was part of the GSLV-Mark I and II series.

October 2004: India conducts a launch of its single-stage, Prithvi-III missile.

November 2004: India successfully test-fires the 350 km-range Dhanush missile, marking the induction of the system into the Navy.

December 2004: The Russian Federal Space Agency says that it will continue cooperation with India in the development of an oxygen-hydrogen booster for space rockets.

December 2004: India and Russia sign 10 agreements on space, defense, and aviation, including an agreement to jointly cooperate on satellite manufacture and launch under the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). Russia’s Federal Space Agency head, Anatoly Perminov, states that India’s military use of the GLONASS system, which could help improve the accuracy of Indian missiles, has not been ruled out.

February 2005: President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam states before Parliament that the BrahMos missile “has been successfully tested … and is ready for induction” into India’s military.

May 2005: ISRO’s four-stage solid and liquid propellant PSLV-C6 successfully propelled two satellites into polar sun synchronous orbit. The Spacecraft Control Centre of ISTRAC at Bangalore will continuously monitor the CARTOSAT-1, which is a cartographic satellite mounted with two cameras with 2.5 meter spatial resolution and 30 km coverage, and the HAMSAT, which is a micro-satellite intended for radio transmission.

May 2005: India’s Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, passes the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill, which bans proliferation of mass destruction weapon and missile technology.

May 2005: India has reportedly added the short-range Agni-I and intermediate-range Agni-II to its Strategic Forces Command arsenal.

May 2005: Agni program director, Dr. R. N. Agarwal says that the Agni-III, India’s long-range ballistic missile designed to be capable of hitting targets 3,000 to 3,500 km away, will be ready for flight testing by the end of 2005.

June 2005: The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill receives presidential assent.

June 2005: India’s VSSC, which is run by ISRO, has begun work on its first hypersonic wind tunnel (HWT).

July 2005: A joint venture between Russia’s Mashinostroenie Scientific Industrial Association and India’s DRDO has begun mass production of the BrahMos cruise missile. The Indian Navy has placed the first order for the missile, which is also anticipated to be fielded by the Russian Navy. The baseline version is an anti-ship missile, which also may be fired from air platforms.

August 2005: India’s Defense Secretary Yogendera Narain states that India has acquired a Green Pine radar from Israel for “advanced research,” after three to four years of discussions.

August 2005: The U.S. Department of Commerce removes from the Entity List ISRO subordinates: ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC), ISRO Intertial Systems Unit (IISU), and Space Applications Center.

October 2005: India and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretaries sign a formalized agreement on notification at least 72 hours ahead of ballistic missile tests. Contained within the agreement is a bilateral pledge not to set up any missile test launch site within 40 km of the Line of Control or the international border.

January 2006: ISRO successfully tests a prototype of the Supersonic Combustion Ramjet (SCRAMJET) engine at VSSC at Thiruvananthapuram. SCRAMJET is an air- breathing rocket system which uses the atmospheric oxygen from its surroundings to burn the stored on-board fuel to produce forward thrust.

July 2006: India reportedly conducts an unsuccessful test of its nuclear-capable Agni-III ballistic missile from the Wheeler Island facility off the coast of Orissa. The missile crashed into the Bay of Bengal, falling 1,000 km short of its target.

July 2006: India conducts the second operational flight of the GSLV (GSLV-F02) from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC) SHAR, but its satellite fails to reach orbit. This was part of the GSLV-Mark I and II series.

November 2006: The BrahMos cruise missile is inducted into the Indian Defense forces.

January 2007: ISRO successfully launches two Indian satellites, the Cartosat-2 and Space Capsule Recovery Experiment (SRE-1), along with an Indonesian satellite and an Argentinian satellite, using its PSLV-C7. The combined payload of the four satellites is 1,292 kg.

April 2007: India successfully test-fires the nuclear-capable Agni-III ballistic missile from Wheeler Island. This was its first successful test.

July 2007: According to the Calcutta Telegraph, Advanced Systems Laboratories, a DRDO lab, is developing a new cruise missile named the Nirbhay (the fearless). The Nirbhay is expected to have the capability to be launched from land-based, sea-based, and air-based platforms.

July 2007: India reveals that it has successfully tested the Sagarika submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM). According to DRDO sources, the Sagarika has a range of 1,000 km and has been accepted for induction by the Indian navy.

March 2008: Parthasarathy Sudarshan, the owner of Cirrus Electronics, pleads guilty to illegally exporting 500 controlled microprocessors and other electronic components from the United States to Indian government entities involved in India’s strategic weapons programs. Recipients included VSSC and Bharat Dynamics Ltd., two Indian entities involved in ballistic missile production, and the Aeronautical Development Establishment.

May 2008: India successfully tests the Prithvi-II ballistic missile from ITR at Chandipur as part of an army training exercise. The missile is launched with an improved inertial navigation system.

September 2008: Siddabasappa Suresh, an Indian national, and Rajaram Engineering Corporation, an Indian corporation, are charged in a U.S. court for the illegal export of over 100 controlled goods from the United States to Indian government entities involved with India’s ballistic missile program from 2001-2003. The exports have an estimated value of $136,000. Included in the indictment are six shipments to VSSC of instruments used in the development of missile delivery systems.

September 2008: India and Russia agree to begin joint development of a follow-on to the BrahMos cruise missile, the BrahMos-II. The BrahMos- II will be a hypersonic missile able to fly at speeds of over Mach 5.

October 2008: The Chandrayaan-1 spacecraft is successfully launched from Shriharikota using the PSLV-C11.

November 2008: India successfully tests the nuclear-capable surface-to-surface Shourya missile from ITR. The Shourya is a two-stage solid propellant missile with a range of 700 km. It is 10 meters long with a 74 cm diameter, weighs 6.2 tons, and is road-mobile. This was its first successful test.

December 2008: India successfully tests the BrahMos cruise missile from a naval warship in the Bay of Bengal. This was the first time that the BrahMos was launched from a sea-based universal vertical launcher.

March 2009: India successfully conducts two tests of the BrahMos Block-II cruise missile, both from a mobile launcher at the Pokhran ranges. The new version is equipped with a homing device for greater accuracy. With these successes the BrahMos Block-II is declared ready for induction.

April 2009: According to Agence France Presse, India successfully tests an improved version of the Prithvi-II ballistic missile from ITR at Chandipur.

November 2009: India conducts a night-time test of the Agni-II ballistic missile from ITR on Wheeler Island. The test fails when the missile falters just before second stage separation and deviates from the intended trajectory.

February 2010: India successfully tests the Agni-III ballistic missile from Wheeler Island in the Bay of Bengal. With this fourth successful test, the Agni-III is declared to be ready for induction into the Indian armed forces.

March 2010: India successfully test-fires a vertically launched version of the BrahMos cruise missile. The BrahMos is cleared for induction into the Indian Air Force (IAF).

March 2010: An Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV-D01) developed by ISRO and equipped with a scramjet engine combustor module is successfully launched from SDSC, SHAR.

April 2010: The GSLV-D3 is launched with the GSAT-4 satellite on board, but does not reach orbit as a result of a failure in the vehicle’s cryogenic stage.

August 2010: The DRDO announces that Russian-built Global Navigation Satellite System (Glonass) receivers have successfully been used to enhance the accuracy of the BrahMos cruise missile.

December 2010: India successfully tests an upgraded BrahMos cruise missile, the Block III, from ITR at Chandipur. The upgraded version is equipped with improved guidance and upgraded software. This was the first successful test of the BrahMos Block III.

December 2010: According to the Hindu, India conducts an unsuccessful test of the Agni-II Prime (Agni-II P) ballistic missile from ITR at Wheeler Island. The missile deviated from its path soon after lift-off and crashed into the sea. The Agni-II P reportedly has a range of 3,000 km, up from the 2,000 km range of the Agni-II.

January 2011: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removes nine entities from its Entity List that are connected with India’s space and missile programs. The entities are Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Defence Research and Development Lab (DRDL), Missile Research and Development Complex, Solid State Physics Laboratory, Liquid Propulsion Systems Center, Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB), SHAR, and VSSC.

March 2011: According to the Press Trust of India, Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony announces that India is developing a variant of the Agni missile with a range of 5,000 km known as the Agni-V.

July 2011: India successfully tests its newest surface-to-surface missile, the Prahaar, from a road mobile launcher at ITR at Chandipur. The Prahaar is a tactical missile with a range of 150 km. It is 7.3 meters long and has a diameter of 420 mm, and can carry a payload of up to 200 kg. This was the Prahaar’s first test.

November 2011: India successfully tests the Agni-IV missile from Wheeler Island. The Agni-IV is a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a range of 4,000 km. This was its first successful test. It was previously known as the Agni-II Prime.

March 2012: India successfully tests the nuclear-capable K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from an underwater launching platform off the Visakhapatnam coast. The K-15 has a range of 700 km and can carry a payload of up to 500 kg.

April 2012: India successfully tests the Agni-V ballistic missile from Wheeler Island. The Agni-V is a three-stage missile equipped with a ring laser gyro based inertial navigation system (RINS) and a micro navigation system (MINS). It has a range of 5,000 km. This was the Agni-V’s first test.

July 2012: India conducts an unsuccessful test of the BrahMos cruise missile. This was a developmental test with new components and subsystems produced in India in place of Russian parts.

September 2012: ISRO successfully launches French and Japanese satellites from Shriharikota using the PSLV-C21. This was India’s 100th space mission.

October 2012: India successfully tests the Prithvi-II ballistic missile from the test range at Chandipur. With this test India has tested all variants of the Prithvi and Agni missiles in operational conditions.

Table of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal

May 1, 2012March 30, 2017

The table below sets forth what is publicly known about the size and capability of Iran’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Name	Range	Payload	Propulsion	Source	CEP	Status
Scud B (Shahab-1)	up to 300 km	770-1,000 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	Libya, North Korea	~1 km	deployed
Scud C (Shahab-2)	~500 km	~700 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	North Korea		deployed
Shahab-3	1,300 km	~750 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	Russia, North Korea	~3 km	deployed
Shahab-3 variants	up to 2,000 km	750-1,000 kg	liquid fuel, single stage			tested successfully
(Qadr, Ghadr)
BM-25	2,500 km		liquid fuel, single stage	North Korea		limited number delivered
Safir	2,000 km (estimated if used as a missile)	1,000 kg	liquid fuel, two stage			operational
(space launcher)
Sejil	up to 2,500 km	1,000 kg	solid fuel, two stage			tested

A History of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program

May 1, 2012April 5, 2017

Iran’s ballistic arsenal is one of the largest in the Middle East, and, according to the Director of National Intelligence, many of Iran’s missiles are “inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.” Iran has made important technical strides in recent years with regard to missile development: it has successfully placed three satellites into low earth orbit using its own two-stage launch vehicle; it has built and successfully tested multi-stage missiles; it has improved missile guidance; and it has improved and diversified the fuel used to propel its missiles. These developments allow Iran to extend the range of its missiles and to deploy and fire them more quickly. Iran has also worked to ensure survivability of its missiles: they can be mounted on mobile launchers and deployed to newly built silos.

Iran’s arsenal of liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles has grown steadily. The Shahab-3 ballistic missile has been deployed for several years. Iran is believed to have fielded several hundred, which have a range of about 1,300 km, and to developed variants of the Shahab-3 with an extended range. Iran has also displayed and successfully tested the solid-fueled Sejil, a two-stage ballistic missile with an estimated range of over 2,000 km. These missiles could be adapted to carry a nuclear warhead.

Iran’s rapid growth in missile prowess has led to increased concern about the country’s intentions. According to Israeli engineer Uzi Rubin, (see interview with Iran Watch) Iran could be building a fleet of long-range missiles that, armed with conventional warheads, might serve a “saturation” strategy. A salvo of such conventionally-armed missiles against an Israeli city, for example, could substitute for Iran’s skeletal air force. Given that many of Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of carrying nuclear payloads, Iran may also be developing a long-range nuclear weapon delivery system. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is investigating evidence that Iran may have worked on re-designing a missile re-entry vehicle for its Shahab-3 missile to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

This essay traces the history of Iran’s missile effort, explains where Iran managed to find foreign help, and reviews efforts to hinder Iran’s missile progress.

Early Missile Ambitions

Iran’s determination to acquire and produce ballistic missiles grew out of its war with Iraq in the 1980s. Tehran found itself ill-prepared to retaliate against Iraq’s missile attacks on Iranian cities. Tehran decided that, for its own protection, it had to achieve self-reliance in missile production.

Scud B and Scud C

Iran’s first efforts to achieve this aim focused on the import and production of short-range Scud-type missiles. In 1985, the then-head of Iran’s Parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, led a high-level delegation to Libya, Syria, North Korea, and China. As a result of the trip, Iran obtained Scud missiles from Libya and North Korea, and later acquired rocket components and know-how from both North Korea and China.

Iran’s first batch of Scuds (known as Scud Bs) arrived from Libya in 1985. These single-stage, nuclear-capable, Soviet-origin missiles use liquid fuel and can fly about 280-300 km when carrying a 770-1,000 kg warhead. Before long, Iran had depleted its small supply. It then turned to North Korea in hope of finding a new supplier. Tehran offered to help finance Pyongyang’s missile program in exchange for technology transfer and an option to buy North Korean missiles as soon as they came off the production line.

The first batch of North Korean Scud Bs was delivered in July 1987, and it was reported that the delivery took place even before the missiles were available to North Korea’s own army. Over the next seven months, Iran imported 90-100 missiles, most of which were promptly used in combat. According to the U.S. Defense Department, Iran fired nearly 100 Scuds at Iraq between 1985 and 1988.

After the war ended, Tehran continued its missile efforts. By late 1990, Tehran had negotiated to buy North Korea’s newest missile offering, the Scud C. U.S. intelligence began to detect shipments of North Korean Scud C missiles moving to Iran in 1991. The liquid-fuel Scud C is longer and wider than the Scud B, which suggests that the fuel tanks were expanded to hold more propellant. It has an estimated range of more than 500 km when carrying a 700 kg warhead. According to press reports, Iran ordered some 200 Scud Bs and Scud Cs from North Korea in 1991. Iran also succeeded in test-firing what U.S. intelligence identified as a Scud C in 1991.

In early 1993, an additional North Korean shipment of Scud Cs, along with several launching pads, was reported by the Israeli media. According to U.S. intelligence, Pyongyang also supplied Scud production technology. “Iran’s relationship with North Korea follows the usual pattern,” said a U.S. State Department official at the time, “you first buy entire missiles and the kits to assemble missiles, and then you learn to make them on your own – designs and blueprints come with the package.” According to the official, North Korean specialists worked on the ground in Iran to help Iranian scientists master the basic steps of Scud production. In 1993, Iranian Minister of Defense Akbar Torkan announced that “our technological capability is such that if we require similar missiles [to the Scud-B] then we can manufacture them ourselves.”

According to The Middle East Military Balance, an annual survey of military might published by Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Iran was already thought to have acquired or built some 300 Scud B missiles and 100 Scud Cs by 1994. The Central Intelligence Agency, in a report on missile proliferation in 2003, estimated that Iran possessed “a few hundred” short-range ballistic missiles at that time. According to a threat assessment in 2012 by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles has grown to be among the largest in the Middle East.

Liquid Fuel Technology

Shahab-3

In July 1998, Iran first tested its imported version of North Korea’s medium-range No-Dong missile. This single-stage, liquid-fueled, road mobile, nuclear-capable ballistic missile became known as the Shahab-3 in Iran. According to Iranian officials and U.S. and Russian technical experts, the original Shahab-3 could carry a 1,000 kg payload 1,300 km. Iran subjected the missile to at least seven test flights, with mixed results, between July 1998 and July 2003, when Iran declared the missile operational and delivered it to the armed forces. After these initial steps, Iran has continued to test variants of the missile. According to Uzi Rubin, Iran tested a longer-range version of the missile, in 2004, with a much revised baby bottle-shaped reentry vehicle. Variants of the Shahab-3, including the Ghadr (Qadr), have been tested several times since then. Iran claims that these variants have a greater range (up to 2,000 km) and throw weight (750 – 1,000 kg), as well as improved accuracy.

The Shahab-3, like the North Korean No-Dong missile from which it is derived, is a scaled-up version of the Scud B and Scud C missiles, and shares the Scud’s weaknesses. The Scud B is only accurate to within about a kilometer of its target at a range of 300 km. Because accuracy diminishes with range for a given guidance system, the accuracy of the Shahab-3 at a range of 1,300 km has been estimated at no better than three kilometers of its target, making it of little use as a battlefield weapon. With such low accuracy, it could not be counted on to hit troops or even an airfield. Iran is believed to have fielded several hundred 1,300 km Shahab-3 missiles. However, according to a 2009 assessment by the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Iran has fewer than fifty launchers for all variants of the Shahab-3.

BM-25

In November 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that North Korea had sold Iran a missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers. This appeared to confirm earlier press reports that Iran had acquired the BM-25, a modified version of the Soviet SS-N-6, which is a single-stage, liquid-fueled, submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 2,400 to 3,000 km and the ability to carry a nuclear warhead.

Space Launch Vehicle

In October 2005, Russia launched Iran’s first satellite, the Sina-1, on a Russian rocket. From that point, Iran began to pursue the technology needed to launch a satellite into space on its own. February 2008 saw the inauguration of an Iranian space center in Semnan Province, marked by the test launch of Iran’s Kavoshgar 1 research rocket. Iran’s first space launch vehicle, the Safir, failed during an August 2008 flight test, but the following February, Iran demonstrated how rapidly it was progressing by successfully launching the two-stage Safir space rocket, and placing Iran’s first domestically-built satellite, Omid, into low earth orbit.

Iran followed with a second successful satellite launch in June 2011 (the Rasad), and a third in February 2012 (the Navid Elm-o Sanat), in both cases using the Safir. After the first launch, U.S. officials admitted “grave concern” over the achievement and cautioned that the capabilities necessary for the space launch could be applied toward developing long-range ballistic missiles. According to Iranian media reports, the Safir is 22 meters long, has a diameter of 1.25 meters, and weighs 26 tons. This diameter would be able to accommodate a nuclear warhead, although the rocket has so far carried only satellites weighing between 15 and 50 kg into low-earth orbit. In February 2010, Iran unveiled a larger space launch vehicle, called the Simorgh. Iran claims that this carrier could place a 100 kg satellite into a 500 km orbit. And in January 2011, Iran inaugurated ten laboratories for testing space structures and complete rocket systems. These facilities reportedly feature testing rigs for rocket sections a thermal test rig for heat shields, and fixtures for aeroelasticity testing; hey will allow Iran to test ballistic missile systems, as well as space launchers.

As a result of the launches, and of Iran’s expanding missile-relevant infrastructure, international concern over Iran’s ballistic missile program has increased exponentially. According to the findings of a joint assessment by U.S. and Russian technical experts, the successful launch showed that Iran “can exploit low-thrust rocket motors to build a two-stage rocket, and that it has qualified engineers who are able to make good use of the technology that is available to them.” According to the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Iran’s space launch vehicle could “serve as a testbed for long-range ballistic missile technologies.” The U.S.-Russian joint assessment calculated that “the Safir could be modified with a different upper rocket stage so that it could carry a warhead weighing roughly 1,000 kg to a range of about 2,000 km.”

Solid Fuel Technology

In addition to its Scud and Shahab missiles, which rely on liquid fuel technology, Iran has developed solid fuel technology, which is more useful militarily.

Short-range Missiles

One of Iran’s earliest steps in this direction was to produce the “Mushak” short-range surface-to-surface missile. A U.S. official compared this primitive solid-fuel missile to the unguided Soviet Frog missile and to the Pakistani Hatf 1 missile, which flies about 80 km. The first Mushak, also known as the Iran-130, was test-fired in early 1988, and was designed to fly to a maximum range of 130 km. By March 1988, five Mushak missiles had been fired at Iraq during the War of the Cities. And by August 1988, Tehran had test-fired a 160 km-range Mushak and announced that mass production would soon follow. Iran claimed that the Mushak was designed and produced without foreign support, but Chinese assistance was suspected.

Iran also possesses the solid-fueled, Chinese-made, 150 km-range CSS 8 (also called the Tondar 69) and a second solid-fuel missile called the Fateh 110. Both are short-range, tactical missiles. Iran claims to have successfully flight tested the Fateh 110 in September 2002. It is reportedly a single-stage missile with at least a 200 km range. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has served as head of Iran’s Parliament and as President of Iran, asserted that Iran itself produced the solid fuel propellant for the missile. In addition, then-Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced in January 2000 that Iran had commissioned projects to produce the solid fuel ingredients HTPB resin, aluminum powder and potassium chlorite at the Ministry of Defense’s Education and Research Institute. The Aerospace Industries Organization, which reportedly manages a number of missile plants, claims to be capable of producing “many types of liquid and solid propellant.” According to an Iranian media report, the Aerospace Industries Organization opened a plant to mass produce the Fateh 110 in mid-September 2002, after completing a successful test flight. Iran has reported a number of successful tests of the Fateh 110 since then.

An upgraded version of this missile was allegedly delivered to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Air Force in September 2010. And an anti-ship variant of the Fateh 110, called the Khalij Fars, has also been tested. According to a 2012 report to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence, this missile would allow Iran to threaten military and commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Sejjil

On May 20, 2009, Iran successfully tested the Sejjil-2, a two-stage, solid-fuel, surface-to-surface missile. It appaers to have been successfully tested several times since then. U.S. officials confirmed Iran’s claim that the missile’s range is between 2,000 to 2,500 km. A May 2009 joint threat assessment by U.S. and Russian technical experts estimated the rocket motors for each of the two stages are alike except for their length. The assessment also estimated an overall weight of roughly 21 tons, if the missile were carrying a 1-ton warhead, which the Sejjil “should be able to carryâ€¦to a range of about 2200 km.” Further advances on the Sejjil continue. Iran announced that it test-fired an upgraded version in December 2009. According to an Iranian official, this version boasted a shorter launch time.

Matine Warhead to Missile

In 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that it had been shown documents containing evidence of high explosives testing, and work done to redesign the inner payload chamber of the Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle to accommodate a “nuclear device.” This effort was known as “Project 111.” In November 2011, the Agency reported that Iran may have explored a number of missile warhead designs suitable for delivering a nuclear payload. The Agency said it was “increasingly concerned” about activities in Iran “related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.” Iran has refused the Agency’s request to address these allegations, claiming that they are based on fabricated evidence.

International Sanctions

Apprehensions about the objectives of Iran’s ballistic missile program have given rise to international sanctions. In 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1737, which banned the supply of materials and technology to Iran that might aid nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It also asked countries to freeze the assets of certain companies and individuals. Three subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions, 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010) increased sanctions and designated additional companies and individuals for their involvement with Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.

All together, the resolutions asked countries to freeze the assets of many of Iran’s key missile companies. These included Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), and Fajr Industrial Group (all subordinate entities of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)). Also sanctioned were Ya Mahdi Industries Group (another AIO subordinate) for international purchases of missile equipment; Parchin Chemical Industries (a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization), which produces solid propellant for missiles; Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (a DIO subsidiary), which manufactures power units for Iranian missile systems; Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO), for purchasing equipment for Iran’s missile program on behalf of AIO; and Electro Sanam Company, Ettehad Technical Group, Joza Industrial Co., and Safety Equipment Procurement (all front companies for AIO and linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program).

Sanctions adopted by the European Union and the United States have gone farther, targeting not only dozens of individuals and firms involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program, but also banks and transport companies linked to procurement and financing for this program.

Foreign Suppliers

The success of the Iranian missile program and the speed of its development would not have been possible without extensive foreign assistance, notably from North Korea, Russia, and China. While North Korea furnished the basic hardware for liquid-fueled rocket propulsion, Russia supplied materials, equipment, and training. China supplied help with guidance and solid-fueled rocket propulsion. According to a 2012 report to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence, Iran remained dependent on foreign suppliers for obtaining important missile components.

North Korea

As noted above, North Korea furnished the basic building blocks for Iran’s liquid fuel, Scud-type missile effort. Iran received both complete missiles and the plants to build them. In effect, North Korea served as Iran’s off-shore missile development site. Many of Iran’s missiles, the BM-25, the Shahab-3 and the Scud B and C, have come directly from North Korea, either in the form of components or finished missiles. In May 2011 a U.N. panel of experts reported that Iran and North Korea were suspected of exchanging ballistic missile technology by using regular scheduled Air Koryo and Iran Air flights, in violation of sanctions on both countries.

The U.S. State Department has repeatedly sanctioned the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (also known as Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau or KOMID), North Korea’s main missile exporter. In May 1996, it levied sanctions against Changgwang Sinyong and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Since 2000, Changgwang has been sanctioned continuously for proliferation activities with Iran. Changgwang was also reportedly the source of 12 No-Dong missile engines that arrived in Iran from North Korea on November 21, 1999. The engines were most likely intended for use in the Shahab-3.

China

For years, Beijing has been a major supplier of battlefield and cruise missiles to Iran. In 1987, Iran purchased the Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missile and then acquired the more capable C-802, a Chinese anti-ship missile that Iran test-fired in 1996 from one of its ten Chinese-built “Houdong” patrol boats. During the 1990s, Iran reportedly acquired Chinese CSS 8 surface-to-surface missiles, which can carry a 190 kg warhead up to 150 km.

China has also outfitted Iran with solid fuel missile technology. Beijing’s help appears to have started in the 1980s, during Iran’s work on the Mushak missile, described above. In 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld Commission after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld) reported that China had already “carried out extensive transfers to Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missile program.”

In addition, Iran has received missile testing and guidance assistance from China. In June 1996, the chairman of a Congressional hearing cited U.S. intelligence findings that China had already “delivered dozens, perhaps hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized tools to Iran.”

In response to such transfers, the U.S. State Department has sanctioned a number of Chinese firms for engaging in proliferation activities with Iran. In June 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list, freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction, for the sale of goods controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). CPMIEC markets the “M-family” missile, liquid and solid rocket motors, precision machinery, and a variety of tactical missiles; it supplied C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. . The firm, like a number of other Chinese firms, is a repeat offender.

A number of other Chinese firms engaged in missile-related work have also been punished by the United States for proliferation activities with Iran, including the China Shipbuilding Trading Company; Beijing Alite Technologies Company; and LIMMT Metallurgy and Minerals Company Ltd.

The Chinese government has pledged to improve its proliferation posture, notably by committing not to assist any country in the development of a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, and by adopting a set of export control laws. In 2004, China also began talks with officials from the Missile Technology Control Regime on Beijing’s national export control system and China’s possible membership in the regime. China has since adopted export control legislation similar to the controls of the Missile Technology Control Regime, but the 2012 Director of National Intelligence report to Congress found that “Chinese entities – primarily private companies and individuals – continue to supply a variety of missile-related items to multiple customers, including recent exports to Iran and Pakistan.”

Russia

Despite Russia’s adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime since 1995, Russian entities have continued to help Iran develop missiles. In October 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that Russian assistance had “helped Iran save years in its development of the Shahab-3.” And in its report covering missile proliferation during the first half of 2003, the CIA observed that Russian assistance was also supporting “Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile production.”

In July 1998, the State Department imposed sanctions on seven Russian entities for “proliferation activities related to Iran’s missile programs.” They were the INOR Scientific Center, Grafit Research Institute, Polyus Scientific Production Association, Glavkosmos, MOSO Company, Baltic State Technical University, and Europalace 2000.

Reportedly, INOR contracted in September 1997 to supply special alloys for long-range missiles, including steel for missile casings and foil to shield missile guidance components. In addition, Russia’s arms exporting agency, Rosoboronexport, was allegedly involved in Iran’s Shahab program. Rosoboronexport also reportedly helped to construct a wind tunnel, in 1997, which can be used to design and test missile components. Russian assistance to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) was thought to include solid rocket fuel technology and the design of guidance and propulsion systems. Europalace 2000 reportedly was caught shipping Iran 22 tons of stainless steel that could have been used to make fuel tanks for Scuds, while Polyus was suspected of supplying navigation and guidance technology. Grafit was said to make material used to coat missile warheads, and U.S. officials reportedly suspected that Iranians were being trained in missile guidance and propulsion at Baltic State Technical University and through a joint missile education center called Persepolis. These suspicions culminated in the Russian investigations and the U.S. sanctions. The United States imposed additional sanctions on Rosoboronexport for proliferation activities in 2006 and 2008.

How Close Is Iran to Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and What Has the World Done to Slow Iran’s Progress?

March 5, 2012April 5, 2017 By Valerie Lincy

Remarks at the AIPAC Policy Conference

I’ve been asked to address two questions:

I. How close is Iran to acquiring nuclear weapons?

II. What has the world done to slow Iran’s progress?

I. How close is Iran to acquiring nuclear weapons? An equally important question is how close is Iran to acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, because at that point all that will remain between Iran and nuclear weapons is a decision by Iran’s leaders and a bit of time.

The assessment of my organization is that Iran will have limited nuclear weapon “breakout” capability by the end of this year, meaning the ability to produce fuel for one or more nuclear weapons in a short time.
To be clear, this doesn’t mean a nuclear arsenal by the end of the year – more work would be necessary. Rather, the basic requirements for constituting the arsenal should be in place, including material and infrastructure.
- By May, we estimate that Iran will have enough uranium enriched to the level of 20 percent for one weapon if the fuel is enriched further to weapon grade
- By end of this year, we estimate that Iran may have enough of this 20 percent material for a second weapon if further enriched.
- The assumptions we use to establish these predictions are described on Iranwatch.org and are available from the homepage.
In both cases, further enrichment to bring the uranium stockpile from 20 percent to weapon grade would be required. But numbers are misleading. Enrichment to 20 percent accomplishes 90 percent of the work necessary to bring natural uranium to weapon grade. Little additional time is required.
Iran’s work to build a stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has no real purpose in Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program. But a stockpile of several hundred kg of this material, which could be brought to weapon grade quickly, is essential for establishing the ability to “breakout” and make nuclear weapons whenever desired.
To constitute this stockpile, Iran is using as feed the low-enriched uranium (power reactor-grade, enriched to the level of 3.5%) that it has accumulated at Natanz. Iran now has over 5,000 kg of this material. And the Natanz plant continues to produce more of this reactor-grade uranium, at a rate of about 5.2 kg each day.
The bulk of this work is being done at the Fordow plant, which should be fully operational by the end of this year.
- Fordow now has about 700 centrifuges and will have nearly 3,000 centrifuges by end of this year, all of which will be devoted to making 20 percent material.
Once Fordow is fully equipped, and assuming that the rate of enrichment there mirrors that at Natanz, Iran could have enough 20 percent material for 4-5 weapons by the end of 2013.
Fordow is a troubling and telling choice for this work.
- It is a series of chambers built into a mountain.
- The plant was built secretly and its existence was only revealed by President Obama in 2009.
Iran began enriching uranium at Fordow late last year. Fordow has allowed Iran to triple its production of 20 percent material and this development explains why there is so much attention on Iran right now.

Making weapon-grade fuel is widely accepted to be the most difficult component of a nuclear weapon program; about 90 percent of the work needed to make nuclear weapons is devoted to making the fuel. The other two components, weaponizing the fuel and delivering the weapon, are generally expected to be ready and waiting. Let’s look at where Iran is on these latter two components.

Iran’s efforts related to weaponization are as follows:

Iran appears to have had a structured weaponization program through 2003 and a less structured one since then. Much of this work is laboratory scale, which is not easy to detect. An example of the difficulty of detection is the Iraqi site of Al Atheer. This site was unknown to U.S. intelligence and so was not bombed by the United States during the first Gulf War. Following the war, international inspectors discovered it to be a major facility for nuclear weapon development.
According to allegations reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which the IAEA considers credible, Iran has:
- Conducted high explosives testing simulating a nuclear explosion
- Studied and experimented with an initiation system used in nuclear detonation
- Developed specialized detonators used in nuclear weapons
- Worked on making and shaping high-enriched uranium metal components
- Has had access to an implosion bomb design
The IAEA concludes that the only logical application for many of these activities is nuclear weapons.
Concerns arising from these allegations are further heightened by the fact that Iran has refused to explain these allegations, or to work with international inspectors to help resolve questions about alleged military links to its nuclear program.
Just today, the IAEA director general said that his Agency has “serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”

What is Iran’s ability to deliver a nuclear weapon?

Iran has fielded several hundred Shahab 3 liquid-fueled missiles, which have a range of between 1,300 and 2,000 km. This is far enough to reach Israel and U.S. forces in the region.
There are credible allegations that Iran has worked on a warhead design for this missile, which is large enough to accommodate a nuclear payload.
Iran has also tested successfully a solid-fuel missile called Sejil, with a range of about 2,200 km, which is also large enough to accommodate nuclear warhead.
All Iran’s missiles are regularly tested and publicly displayed.
Iran has been working to ensure survivability of its missiles: they can be mounted on mobile launchers and Iran has also built silos.
So, it is safe to assume that if Iran builds a nuclear weapon, a delivery system will be ready and survivable against preemptive strikes.

Thus, when we look at this work on weaponization, this progress on a delivery system, and the nearing ability to fuel one or more warheads, we should not be particularly reassured by the U.S. intelligence assessment that Iran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons. The facts on the ground speak for themselves.

II. What has the world done to slow Iran’s progress? All of Iran’s enrichment work is being done in violation of several binding U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran has also been found in non-compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

What has the world done in response to Iran’s defiance? The response has been a combination of diplomacy and sanctions. So far, this two-track approach has not yielded the desired result. It has not convinced Iran to forgo nuclear weapons, despite the increasing economic and political cost sanctions have imposed.

Diplomatic efforts have been ongoing since 2003:

Britain, France, and Germany (the “EU-3”) managed to negotiate two temporary freezes of enrichment work, in 2003 and 2004. The United States was occupied in Iraq at the time and did not support these efforts, which eventually failed.
P5+1 (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany) then tried to strike grand bargain with Iran, offering political and economic benefits in exchange for a temporary halt to enrichment and other nuclear activities.
Beginning in 2009, President Obama made an effort to reengage with Iran that lasted a year and a half, during which efforts to pressure Iran were suspended. It was all for naught. Iran rejected the olive branch.
There was also a narrower effort to forge agreement in the form of a nuclear fuel swap deal.
Other countries (Brazil and Turkey) have tried to broker limited compromise.
It now appears that Iran and the P5+1 may return to the negotiating table.
Overall, nothing offered during past negotiations has satisfied Iran.

A sanctions regime has been implemented in tandem with diplomacy. These sanctions started out narrowly, being aimed at Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and have been progressively broadened to target Iran’s economy.

One aspect of sanctions has been an asset freeze on entities, and a travel ban on key individuals. Initially, these penalties were targeted at firms and individuals linked to proliferation. More recently, the penalties have targeted banks, insurance companies, shipping companies, oil and gas companies, and entities linked to the Revolutionary Guards. At this point hundreds of entities have been blacklisted by the United States, and also by the European Union, Canada, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Restrictions have also been placed on Iran’s access to sensitive technologies. The list of banned goods has been expanded over time and now includes all nuclear and missile related items, plus advanced conventional weapons.
Most recently, sanctions were broadened to include:
- penalties against firms that invest in new energy development projects in Iran
- penalties against firms that support Iran’s energy sector, including those that facilitate the sale of Iranian oil, or buy oil or petrochemical products from Iran, or are involved in any transaction with an Iranian bank, including the Central Bank and including oil purchases.
- Europe is preparing to implement an embargo on Iranian oil in July.
- Additional measures are under consideration in the U.S. Congress to further isolate Iran from the global economy.

These energy sanctions are causing hardship for Iran’s population, and they are having a crippling effect on Iran’s economy. But given the Iranian regime’s human rights record, it is safe to say that worsening the daily living condition of the population will only be important to the regime if it threatens the regime’s survival.

Sanctions must convince Iran’s leaders that the cost of continuing their illicit nuclear program exceeds its value. But the program has now “grown roots.” It is a symbol of strength for the regime, and the regime may well see a nuclear weapon capability as a lifeline to survival. The program is also close to the finish line. The cost of giving it up is now greater than ever. Therefore, any additional sanctions that could further raise the cost to Iran should be applied now. Once Iran has a breakout capability, the decision to build nuclear weapons will largely be in Iran’s hands.

Iran Chemical Milestones 1929-2011

July 1, 2011April 3, 2017

November 1929: Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

September 1980: The Iran-Iraq War begins.

November 1983: In a communication to the United Nations, Iran alleges that it has been targeted with chemical weapons by Iraq.

1983: According to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency study, Iran’s offensive chemical weapon program begins in response to Iraq’s use of chemical agents on the battlefield. The D.I.A. believes that the program began under the auspices of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with some assistance from the Ministry of Defense.

April 1984: The U.N. Security Council releases a report confirming that aerial bombs with mustard gas and tabun, a nerve agent, have been used against targets in Iran.

1985: The Australia Group forms in reaction to the U.N. documented use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Member states pledge to harmonize export licensing for chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

July 1987: The United States imposes controls on the export of eight chemicals, useful in the production of chemical weapons, to Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

1987: Iran is able to deploy limited quantities of mustard gas and cyanide against Iraqi troops using artillery shells, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.

May 1988: U.N. Security Council Resolution 612 is unanimously adopted, condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and calling on both sides to adhere to the Geneva Protocol.

August 1988: Iran-Iraq war ends in a stalemate.

1989: Media reports reveal that an Iranian diplomat arranged for a West German firm to purchase 210 tons of thiodiglycol from a supplier in the United States and then ship it to Iran in three installments, from March 1987 to April 1988. Reportedly two shipments totaling 90 tons successfully made it to Iran, while the third 120 ton shipment was intercepted by U.S. Customs agents. Thiodiglycol is a chemical weapon (blister agent) precursor.

March 1989: Iran allegedly acquires 60 tons of thionyl chloride from India’s government-run State Trading Corporation. Thionyl chloride is a chemical weapon (nerve agent) precursor.

March 1990: A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report confirms Iran’s indigenous chemical weapon production capability, including sulfur mustard gas.

October 1992: The United States passes the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act. This act opposes the “transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technologyâ€¦ [that] could materially contribute to either country’s acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”

January 1993: Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.

November 1994: The United States sanctions one Austrian, one Australian, and one German citizen under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, allegedly for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran.

February 1995: The United States sanctions three entities operating in the Asia-Pacific region for chemical weapon proliferation under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, allegedly for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran.

February 1996: The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Iran has one of the largest chemical warfare programs in the developing world. Its arsenal of several thousand tons of chemical agents includes sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide, which can be delivered using artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs and perhaps Scud warheads. The C.I.A. also estimates that Iran is capable of producing an additional 1,000 tons of chemical agent each year.

1997: In its report to Congress on worldwide proliferation, the Central Intelligence Agency says Iran has “manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them,” and has continued to import “material related to chemical warfare” from China.

May 1997: The United States imposes sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong entity under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, for “knowingly and materially” contributing to Iran’s chemical weapon program.

November 1997: Iran ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention.

May 1998: At the Third Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran acknowledges for the first time that it had a chemical weapon program during the Iran-Iraq war, but claims that the program was terminated after the war. The U.S. State Department assesses that Iran has not submitted an accurate declaration under the Convention and claims that Iran is attempting to “retain and modernize key elements of its CW program.”

June 2001: The United States imposes sanctions on a Chinese entity under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, reportedly for assisting in the construction of a facility in Iran which manufactures dual-use equipment that can be used to produce chemical weapons.

September 2001: Pars Company Inc. of Cary, North Carolina, pleads guilty to exporting two STX gas monitors from the United States to the United Arab Emirates and transshipping the monitors to Iran. The monitors are controlled for export by the U.S. Department of Commerce because of their possible use in the development or production of chemical and biological weapons.

May 2002: The United States imposes sanctions on two Armenian, eight Chinese, and two Moldovan entities under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for transferring to Iran technology controlled under multilateral export control lists. Reportedly, four of these companies were sanctioned for providing chemical weapon materials.

April 2003: At the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States accuses Iran of continuing “to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from abroad” for a chemical weapon program. The United States believes that Iran has stockpiled blister, blood, choking and perhaps nerve agents.

July 2003: The United States imposes sanctions on five Chinese and one North Korean entity under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for transferring to Iran technology controlled under multilateral export control lists. Reportedly, some of the companies were sanctioned for selling chemicals and equipment that could be used in chemical weapons production.

October 2003: The head of the Iranian delegation to the Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention states that Iran has submitted all declarations and information required by the CWC and criticizes the continued application of Australia Group export controls to CWC States Parties.

December 2005: The United States sanctions two Indian companies under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, reportedly for the export of phosphorus oxychloride and trimethyl phosphite to Iran; both are Schedule 3 chemical precursors, according to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and can be used in the production of nerve agents.

January 2006: According to The Guardian, an intelligence assessment drawing on material gathered by European governments claims that Iran has developed an extensive purchasing network for its biological and chemical weapon programs. Purchase requests and acquisitions are “registered almost daily,” according to the assessment, and target suppliers in Western Europe and the former Soviet Union.

June 2006: The U.S. Treasury Department sanctions four Chinese companies and one U.S. company for having supplied missile-related and dual-use components to Iran’s military for use in chemical weapon-capable missiles. The companies were designated under Executive Order 13382, an authority intended to financially isolate firms that proliferate weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

July 2009: U.S. officials reportedly accuse the Chinese company Zibo Chemet of having supplied technology to manufacture glass-lined chemical reactor vessels to the Iranian firm Shimi Azarjaam.

March 2010: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence reports that “Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems,” that “Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents,” and that Iran “continues to seek dual-use technologies that could advance its capability to produce CW agents.”