News

Pakistan: The Path to High-Enriched Uranium

In the early 1970s, Pakistan began shopping for the equipment needed to convert the uranium found in nature to nuclear weapon grade, a process known as enrichment.

By using imports from Western Europe, Pakistan was able to construct enough gas centrifuges to enrich hundreds of pounds of uranium, sufficient for a small nuclear arsenal.

The key manufacturing steps are shown below.

Uranium ore is mined at Baghalchar and Qubul Khel and milled at Dera Ghazi Khan and at Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Minerals Center in Lahore.

Uranium is purified and converted to hexafluoride gas at Dera Ghazi Khan, which can produce 200 metric tons of hexafluoride gas per year.

Uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) is enriched in high-speed centrifuges to nuclear weapon grade at the Kahuta gas centrifuge plant near Islamabad. Pakistan also runs a pilot-scale centrifuge plant at Sihala, and may be building a facility at Golra.

High-enriched uranium is fabricated into nuclear weapon parts by Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense and the A. Q. Khan research facilities.

India and Pakistan: New Missiles Increase the Risk of Nuclear War

In May, Pakistan’s President Farooq Leghari blamed India for starting a new arms race in South Asia that would “endanger peace in the region.” He warned that Islamabad would not sit idle while India mass-produced nuclear missiles that could threaten Pakistan’s cities. And in an exclusive article for the Risk Report, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi says, “A hair-trigger situation has already been created by India’s ambitious program to manufacture and develop the Prithvi short-range missile, the Agni intermediate-range missile and intercontinental ballistic missiles. None of these missiles makes any sense without a nuclear warhead.”

These warnings underline the risks posed by the festering border dispute over Kashmir. As long as India and Pakistan cannot resolve their differences, South Asia will remain the most likely place on earth for a nuclear war.

America has had only limited success in stopping nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The new tensions over missiles could make any further progress impossible. “Missiles are the political motor now,” says a senior U.S. official. “This is where diplomatic energy is being expended in South Asia. A missile race is a real possibility, and it will be destabilizing.” The official says it could also distract from the more urgent nuclear challenge getting India and Pakistan to stop making A-bomb material.

A U.S. official told the Risk Report in February that “the difference in size between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals is not strategically significant.” Pakistan may have made up to a dozen bombs, while India probably has closer to twenty. So far, neither country is committed to capping its arsenal. Pakistan promised in 1993 to stop production of high-enriched uranium, the bomb fuel that destroyed Hiroshima. But if India continues to stockpile uninspected plutonium, the material that destroyed Nagasaki, Pakistan will probably renew its uranium production efforts. Pakistan has tried to follow India’s nuclear progress step by step.

Pakistan’s quest for the bomb began after its humiliating defeat in the 1971 war with India. After India tested a bomb in 1974, Pakistan mounted a worldwide campaign to acquire nuclear bomb components and production equipment through both open and clandestine means. Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s words on the subject have become famous: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.” And Pakistan succeeded by turning to foreign suppliers, especially China. China’s shocking contribution to Pakistan’s effort was uncovered by U.S. intelligence in the early 1980s: China had supplied Pakistan with the complete design of a tested nuclear weapon. Indignant, U.S. officials made a model of the bomb about the size of a soccer ball and with detonators around its surface and showed it to Pakistani diplomats. Computer modeling of the weapon by U.S. experts showed it to be reliable.

U.S. officials also say China gave Pakistan weapon-grade uranium for bomb fuel. If, as reported, the design was the same as China’s fourth test device, it could yield the equivalent of 20 to 25 thousand tons of TNT, twice the power of the Hiroshima bomb. Pakistan has since improved the Chinese design, tested the parts one by one, and tested the whole design with a dummy fuel core. The most reliable current estimate is that Pakistan can build a workable warhead weighing just 400 pounds, using about 15 kilograms of high-enriched uranium.

Though Pakistan has done most of its nuclear shopping in China, Western firms also supplied crucial equipment, often in violation of export control laws. According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Western suppliers were more than eager to sell: “They begged us to purchase their goods,” he wrote in 1986.

One of Pakistan’s first big purchases was from Germany in the late 1970s. In violation of German law, exporter Albrecht Migule sold an entire plant to convert natural uranium to gaseous form, an essential step in enriching it to weapon grade. To finally produce nuclear weapon material, Pakistan bought special steel, electronics and processing vessels. To make the internals of the bomb, Pakistan imported high-precision milling machines and special “isostatic” presses. All this equipment was on the “international list” of export items that Germany, like Japan and most NATO countries, had agreed to restrict for strategic purposes.

Smuggling has been the hallmark of Pakistan’s program. In 1982 and 1983, Pakistan illegally acquired U.S. oscilloscopes, which process data from nuclear weapon tests, and high-speed computers with nuclear weapon applications. At the same time, Pakistan bought nine flash X-ray machines from Sweden. These machines photograph the implosive shock waves used to detonate the fission reaction in the core of an atomic bomb. In June 1984, a Pakistani was arrested while attempting to smuggle out of the United States 50 krytrons, high-speed electronic switches used to detonate nuclear weapons. Documents linked the buyer directly to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). In July 1985, ABC News reported that according to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), Pakistan had successfully smuggled American-made krytrons, and that it had detonated a triggering package for a nuclear device in June 1985.

Climbing up the nuclear ladder, Pakistan revealed its interest in building more powerful bombs when it tried to buy beryllium and imported a tritium purification plant from Germany. These materials can be used to boost the yield of fission bombs. To prevent Germany from selling beryllium to Pakistan, the U.S. government told Germany unequivocally that the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was conducting research on the use of beryllium “in nuclear explosives, with the aim of incorporating [beryllium] into a future nuclear weapons design.”

Then in 1987, Arshad Z. Pervez, a Canadian citizen born in Pakistan, was convicted of trying to illegally export beryllium and maraging steel from the United States. Maraging steel is a super-hardened metal used to make centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Pervez’s papers contained evidence that he was acting as an agent of the Pakistani government.

The same year, several reports said Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold. Then-President Zia told Time magazine, “Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes,” and Britain’s Secret Service reportedly confirmed that Pakistan had “its own small” nuclear weapons. By early 1989, reports citing U.S. intelligence estimates said Pakistan had the components for four bombs. It also had the technology to machine enriched uranium into weapon parts, and might have built the needed fusing devices and weapon casings. By 1990, Pakistan had built a small arsenal and had begun work on a second generation of weapons, according to intelligence reports. The reports stated that Pakistan had “cold-tested” its first nuclear bomb in 1988 and was building a reactor to make plutonium for smaller atomic bombs.

Pakistan’s shopping has not stopped despite Western efforts to block sensitive equipment going to nuclear projects. Last year, German officials seized about 1,000 unfinished components for gas centrifuges destined for Pakistan.

India’s Chemical Exports Worry U.S. Officials

Indian companies are still a chemical proliferation threat, U.S. officials say, despite the Indian government’s effort to rein them in.

The threat was demonstrated graphically in April, when a U.S. intelligence official displayed two sales brochures from an Indian company called Transpek Private Ltd. to a gathering of American exporters. The first brochure, published sometime before India began tightening its export control laws in 1990, frankly advertised dual-use chemicals for mustard gas. A later brochure omitted mention of mustard gas precursors, but offered procurement services. While India now controls more than 30 poison gas ingredients, Indian companies may still be contributing to proliferation by obtaining chemicals outside the country and brokering deals not covered by Indian export law, the official said. “This is a trend we are seeing in many cases.”

India has made incremental progress in controlling dual-use chemicals. In 1990, India controlled only three chemicals useful for poison gas, which were produced in India and also exported. In mid-1992, under U.S. pressure, it added two more chemicals to its control list. Shortly before signing the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993, India began to control the export of all CWC-listed chemicals. The export of some chemicals, such as mustard gas and the nerve gases Sarin and Tabun, is prohibited. The export of other dual-use “precursor” chemicals used in the final stages of poison gas production requires a license.

Although U.S. officials view these controls as a positive step, one senior official complains that they “fall short of where we would like them to go.” The United States wants India to require licenses for the export of all 54 chemicals listed by the Australia Group, a consortium of 25 countries that have agreed to combat chemical weapon proliferation. The Australia Group controls about 20 more chemicals than the Chemical Weapons Convention.

India’s inefficient government and business corruption make it difficult to enforce controls. “It takes some time to stop some of these business people from doing what they have always done,” says one State Department official. So far, no company has been punished for illegal exports under the new law, according to an Indian spokesman in New Delhi. However, he stressed that India is carefully reviewing export license applications to ensure the government is “absolutely certain about the legitimate civilian use of the chemical.” U.S. officials say India seems willing to crack down on violators if shown evidence of illegal sales.

India appears on the U.S. Commerce Department control list (supplement 5 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations) which names countries and projects of concern for chemical and biological proliferation. India has the world’s eighth largest pool of dual-use chemical suppliers, according to Canada’s Chemical Weapons Convention Verification: Handbook on Scheduled Chemicals. India does not control the following chemical precursors that are controlled by members of the Australia Group:

3-Hydroxyl-1-methylpiperidine
Potassium Fluoride
2-Chloroethanol
Dimethylamine
Dimethylamine Hydrochloride
Hydrogen Fluoride
Methyl Benzilate
3-Quinuclidone
Pinacolone
Potassium Cyanide
Potassium Bifluoride
Ammonium Bifluoride
Sodium Bifluoride
Sodium Fluoride
Sodium Cyanide
Phosphorus Pentasulphide
Di-isopropylamine
Sodium Sulphide
Triethanolamine Hydrochloride

Pakistan: U.S. Approves Most Nuclear-Related Exports

Less than 4 percent of U.S. applications to export nuclear dual-use equipment to Pakistan were denied from 1988 to 1992, according to a report published last year by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Approximately 80 percent were approved, and the rest were returned without action, still pending, cancelled or suspended. Three of the licenses were for equipment worth over $2 million to particularly “sensitive end-users.” One was for numerical control equipment, one for computer/electronics-related equipment, and one for cathode ray oscilloscopes and components.

Pakistan has not joined the international agreements to halt proliferation, so most U.S. exports of nuclear, chemical/biological or missile-related goods require a license. Pakistan appears on all the Commerce Department control lists (see supplements 4, 5, & 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations) which name countries and projects of concern for nuclear, missile and chemical/biological proliferation. Under Section 778.3, a company must apply for a license when it “knows or has reason to know” its product will be used for nuclear explosive activities, uninspected nuclear activities, or for activities related to the production of fissile materials.

A small proportion of U.S. license decisions rely on “pre-license checks” to inspect potential end-users. The inspection assesses whether a buyer is likely to divert an export to prohibited nuclear proliferation activities. Some checks are misleading, according to the GAO report. In March 1988, for example, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan was asked to check on a proposed U.S. computer export to an end-user located on the premises of a military facility. Embassy officials did not visit the end-user, citing time and budget constraints, but they still cabled Washington to say the end-user was “a reliable recipient of U.S. technology,” according to the GAO report. Embassy officials made the same finding in 1991 for an oscilloscope export even though the recipient appeared on a Department of Energy nuclear proliferation watch list.

The GAO also cited a 1989 case in which Commerce approved a license to a military end-user in Pakistan for two four-axis grinding machines capable of manufacturing critical nuclear weapon components. According to the Department of Energy’s watch list, the end-user is involved in sensitive nuclear activities, such as the design, manufacture or testing of nuclear weapons or production of special nuclear materials. The license for the machines was approved even though previous, less valuable exports had been denied to the same end-user based on “an unacceptable risk of diversion to nuclear proliferation activities,” the GAO report said.

How Far Can Israel’s Missiles Fly?

On April 5, Israel launched its first spy satellite, the Ofek-3, giving Israel the ability to photograph and gather intelligence data on its neighbors. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin applauded the event as “another great technological achievement for the State of Israel.” Israel is now one of only eight nations able to build and launch satellites.

Critics, however, are concerned about Israel’s military intentions. Configured as a missile, the powerful “Shavit” rocket that launches Israel’s satellites could hit every Arab capital as well as cities in Europe, Russia and China. “The Ofek project is not just about cameras in space; it’s about building missiles that project Israel’s military power outside the Middle East,” says Dr. Meir Steiglitz, an Israeli strategic analyst.

U.S. officials concur: “There is no real difference between large ballistic missiles and satellite launchers,” says one government analyst, who estimates that as a missile the Shavit could fly up to 4,500 kilometers carrying a one-ton payload. Israel’s missile warhead is believed to weigh closer to 350 kilograms, about one-third as much, which would enable the missile to reach targets even farther away.

Asked about the current missile ranges or military potential of the Shavit rocket, Israeli officials are silent. “The Shavit only flies vertically; it’s not a missile,” says one Israeli defense analyst. But current and former U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that the first two stages of the Shavit consist of Israel’s two-stage Jericho-II nuclear missile. “The Jericho-II is a Shavit minus the upper stage, which is replaced by a warhead,” one official says. Other officials confirm this, and add that the Jericho missile and the Shavit launcher use the same family of rocket motors.

The interdependency of the Shavit launcher and the Jericho missile reflects the blurry line between civilian and military development in Israel. The same high-tech companies that conduct civilian space research also work on sensitive military projects, including nuclear and missile development. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), the main contractor for the Shavit space rocket, also builds offensive and defensive missiles. One clue the Shavit is derived from military rather than civilian technologies is the Shavit’s launching pad. The rocket is launched from a transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL, a platform more often used for mobile missiles than for satellite launches.

Israel’s quest for nuclear-capable missiles started in the early 1960s when it ordered a surface-to-surface missile from Marcel Dassault, the French arms-maker. The missile was reported to fly 500 kilometers carrying a payload big enough for a nuclear warhead. France is thought to have shipped about 14 of these missiles, which the West called the “Jericho,” before France imposed an arms embargo in the late 1960s. After the embargo, Israel began producing the missile on its own.

The story of Israel’s missile development is a tale of “a tentative, opportunistic program driven by fragile alliances and coincidences,” says a U.S. analyst familiar with the Israeli program. Progress was achieved by linking military and civilian objectives in an alliance of interests behind “spy satellites, civilian space, generic technological development, prestige, and finally … improved missile ranges.” Although the missile program received enough money to stay afloat, the analyst says, it “received nothing like the steady, well-funded, support that the nuclear weapon program did.”

Yet, Israel’s missile and nuclear efforts have always been linked. During the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, Israel reportedly readied Jericho missiles with nuclear warheads. And in 1974, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) cited the Jericho as evidence that Israel had made nuclear weapons the CIA said the Jericho made little sense as a conventional missile and was “designed to accommodate nuclear warheads.”

In the 1970s, Israel began work on a longer-range missile, the Jericho-II. By 1985, it was reported to be deployed on railway cars in bedrock caves in the Negev, and on trucks concealed in the Golan Heights. The yield of the missile’s warhead can be assumed to be in the hundreds of kilotons, a blast big enough to erase any Arab capital. The Jericho-II’s inertial guidance system was apparently developed with the help of components smuggled out of the United States, as were elements of the solid fuel propellant and the shell of the missile itself.

In May 1987, Israel tested an improved version of the Jericho-II that flew more than 800 kilometers. The missile’s second test was in September 1988 and its third in September 1989, when it flew nearly 1,300 kilometers, far enough to reach the southern border of Russia and targets in Iran. The same year, the Soviets told Israel that its Jericho missile was “a threat to…the oil fields in Baku,” and said the missile could bring Israel “consequences that it could not possibly handle.” Israel replied that it “had no intention of taking any action toward the Soviet Union.”

In October 1989, NBC News reported that South Africa had tested a Jericho-II the previous July. U.S. officials quickly confirmed that Israel was working with South Africa on development and testing of a missile that resembled Israel’s Jericho-II. They cited as evidence the similarity of the rocket plume of the missile tested in South Africa to that of the Jericho, as well as the similarity of the South African testing equipment and launch site to those the Israelis had used. NBC reported that a CIA document said the South African missile flew 1,450 kilometers southeast toward the Prince Edward Islands.

“It’s safe to assume the missile hasn’t been tested to full range,” says a former Pentagon official familiar with Israel’s program. One constraint has been Israel’s desire to avoid flying over enemy territory. But if the Jericho-II engines are powerful enough to launch satellites aboard the Shavit launcher, as U.S. analysts say, then the Jericho itself should be able to fly much farther than the 1,500-kilometer tests indicate. Judging from the power of the Shavit, a Jericho-II consisting of the Shavit’s first two stages should be able to fly 4,500 kilometers with a one-ton payload.

The question is whether Israel needs or will deploy such a long-range nuclear-strike force. “We are not aware they have any intentions of deploying such capability, or what the application would be even if they did,” says a U.S. official. “They already have the missile capability to strike any target of interest to them in the region.”

Israel’s Jericho missiles can already reach Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh and Teheran. To reach Tripoli, Israel has U.S.-supplied F-15 fighter aircraft which can make the roundtrip over the Mediterranean. If it wanted to, Israel could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile within ten years. Israel is now working on an improvement of the Shavit called the “NEXT” launcher. With each improved launcher, Israel will increase the potential range of its missiles.

Israeli Cited for Chemical Weapon Proliferation

In its May issue, the Risk Report revealed that an individual named Nahum Manbar, cited last year by the U.S. government for chemical weapon proliferation, was an Israeli citizen. It turns out that Manbar is a prominent businessman who, according to the Israeli press, sponsors an Israeli basketball team, owns an Israeli syringe factory, and has steel and real estate interests in France.

After the New York Times printed an op-ed based on the Risk Report’s story, Manbar admitted to the Israeli press that he had sold anti-biological and anti-chemical protective suits to Iran, but claimed he stopped doing business with the Iranians when they asked for “chemical material.”

U.S. government sources, however, say Manbar’s involvement in chemical weapon proliferation was more substantial. “He provided knowing and material support to a BW [biological weapon] or CW [chemical weapon] program of a country on our terrorist list,” a senior U.S. official told the Risk Report. Material support, says a second official, means contributing more than protective suits.

“You don’t get on the sanctions list for selling masks and suits,” says a third official.

According to the U.S. Commerce Department, anti-biological suits are controlled by the Australia Group, a consortium of countries trying to stop the spread of chemical weapons by limiting exports. However, anti-chemical suits, which are widely available and have a variety of uses, are not controlled.

Manbar’s name first appeared in connection with chemical weapons in July 1994, when he and two of his companies, Europol Holding Ltd. of Poland, and Mana International Investments of the United Kingdom, were named by the U.S. State Department in the Federal Register. The State Department was required to let American companies know Manbar and his firms were being punished for “chemical weapons proliferation activities” and were denied the right to sell goods to the United States or the U.S. government for at least a year. But Manbar’s nationality was unknown until the Risk Report revealed it in a list of U.S. sanctions against entities caught sending poison gas ingredients and equipment to Iran and Libya.

On April 28, Manbar told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz that “all the authorized elements in Israel were aware of my doings. This is about selling the Iranians anti-biological and chemical suits” to prepare for an Iraqi offensive, he said. “All the dealings with Iran were made through companies in Poland … I am forbidden from elaborating on the issue.”

Reached at his home in France, Manbar told the Risk Report on May 9 he did not sell ingredients for poison gas to Iran. He suggested that U.S. authorities may have been confused because “some of the people who buy equipment for defense are the same people who buy for chemical attack.” But Manbar said when the nature of Iran’s orders changed from chemical defense to attack, he reported the matter to Israeli authorities and severed relations with Iran. “We met with them. When they came in, we took the information. Then we took it to the right people [in Israel] and the answer was nyet — no.”

Manbar denied that his sales to Iran from 1988 to 1992 were for anything beyond defensive equipment. “I have a policy on Israel,” he said. “I will not do something that is against Israel.” Manbar admitted, however, that his Polish firm was a “short-term” company and no longer in business. According to Polish commercial records, Europol was incorporated in Warsaw in 1990 with business in fruits, vegetables and dairy products, and import and export of agricultural products. Manbar also told Israeli newspapers that he “had dealings with” American companies, but told the Risk Report that he did not have any business with American companies.

Manbar’s case is only one in a series of incidents for which the United States has imposed punishments. Fifteen foreign companies and individuals have been cited since early 1994. While punishments are mandatory when the State Department finds a “knowing” and “material” contribution to a chemical weapon program in a terrorist country, punishments also can be imposed at the State Department’s discretion when the contribution is to a country not on the terrorist list. More sanctions are inevitable, a U.S. official says, because “there’s no question that foreign CBW programs are obtaining support overseas.”

Iran and Syria are among the most worrisome programs, the officials add, because the two countries are almost able to make their own ingredients for chemical weapons. Once a country acquires a domestic production capability, it no longer has to rely on imports, virtually all of which are subject to export controls. “Iran has a substantial petrochemical industry,” says one U.S. official. “It’s something that is quite doable for them. That’s one of the unfortunate things about CBW. It’s not that much different from making fertilizer.”

The bulk of poison gas ingredients now going to Iran originate in China, which has a well-developed chemical industry, lax export controls and does not belong to the Australia Group. U.S. government analysts also say proliferators are increasingly using front companies and middlemen to purchase chemicals from a wide variety of sources, sometimes submitting simultaneous orders for the same chemicals in different countries. If those countries belong to the Australia Group, a decision to deny a sale by one country is supposed to be passed on immediately to the others.

Proliferators are also seeking ingredients to make what are known as precursors for poison gas. Precursors are chemicals used in the final stage of the manufacturing process. An oft-cited example is thiodiglycol, a precursor to mustard gas. Thiodiglycol also is used to make the ink in ballpoint pens flow more smoothly. It is controlled for export by the Australia Group, but the two chemicals comprising thiodiglycol are not controlled, which makes them easier to obtain.

Pakistan Needs Help to Make Plutonium and Tritium

Pakistan is building a secret reactor that closely resembles the reactor India used to make its first atomic bomb, a U.S. official says. The former head of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Ahmad Khan, claims the reactor at Khusab is being built by Pakistani scientists without foreign expertise. U.S. officials however say China is helping, and a Pentagon study confirms that Pakistan has “limited capability” to build a reactor on its own.

A senior U.S. official says the reactor’s design has “been around forever.” He believes the reactor will operate at a power of about 40 megawatts, similar to India’s Cirus reactor, which runs on heavy water and natural uranium. Any plutonium made at Khusab would be legally free for atomic bombs but would have to be processed into weapon-ready form. During the 1970s, Pakistan acquired experimental plutonium processing technology from European firms and used French procurement lists and specifications in an attempt to purchase components. Nevertheless, Pakistan has not yet mastered plutonium extraction technology, though it built a small plant called “New Labs” in the mid-1980s.

In addition to making plutonium, the Khusab reactor could help Pakistan produce tritium, an element that can boost the yield of atomic bombs. Pakistan has already experimented with producing tritium by irradiating lithium targets in a small U.S.-supplied research reactor. Pakistan’s interest in tritium research was revealed in the 1980s when it imported components for a tritium purification plant from German firms. Pakistan also tried to buy from Germany 30 tons of aluminum tubing that could be used to clad lithium for irradiation in a reactor to make tritium.

Pakistan is probably shopping for foreign supplies to complete the Khusab reactor. A 1992 U.S. Defense Department study, the Militarily Critical Technology List, found that Pakistan has “limited capability” to build a reactor on its own. The study also found that Pakistan could use help in acquiring or making most important nuclear materials, including beryllium, boron carbide, hafnium, zirconium, lithium, graphite and high-purity bismuth. The study indicates that Pakistan also lacks critical production and testing equipment for nuclear components. Useful items would include vibration test equipment, furnaces, multi-stage light gas guns, transient recorders, oscilloscopes, flash X-ray equipment, capacitors and pulse generators. High-speed computers and sophisticated electronics would also be helpful.

United States is Israel’s Leading Foreign Missile-Tech Supplier

Since the mid-1970s, the United States has openly supplied Lance missiles and missile production technology to Israel. In addition, illicit sales of U.S. technology have helped Israel build the Jericho-II nuclear missile.

Lance: The United States supplied the 130-kilometer-range Lance missile to Israel in 1975. Israel is supposed to use the missile only with conventional warheads, but the missile is a nuclear-capable system. At the time of the transfer, the United States had already deployed Lance missiles in Western Europe with nuclear warheads weighing up to 210 kilograms and having yields from one to 100 kilotons. Ten kilotons almost the power of the Hiroshima bomb is typical. Israel is reported to have a nuclear missile warhead light enough for the Lance to carry.

Popeye: With U.S. help Israel has developed and deployed an air-to-surface, standoff missile called the “Popeye.” The missile was used successfully with conventional warheads against Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1982 and 1983. The U.S. defense contractor Martin Marietta co-produces the Popeye with the Israeli defense firm Rafael. The Popeye’s 365-kilogram warhead is optically-guided by a television camera mounted in the missile’s nose. It is said to have an accuracy of centimeters at ranges up to 80 kilometers. A lighter and longer-range version, the Popeye-2, is under development.

Arrow: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is currently developing and testing a defensive missile known as the “Arrow.” Designed to intercept incoming missiles well before they reach their targets, the Arrow can fly five to ten times the speed of sound to a range of 90 kilometers. The United States pledged to help finance the Arrow project in 1986 as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and agreed in 1988 to pay about 80 percent of the research costs. A four-year extension of the program was granted in April 1994. There is strong U.S. support for the Arrow, but there has been some concern over how to ensure U.S. exports to the Arrow are not diverted to other missile projects. “The nonproliferation community scrutinizes very carefully U.S. exports to the Arrow, but it’s easier to track the equipment than the technology,” a U.S. official told the Risk Report. “There are inherent risks in providing things that are fungible like technology.”

Israel Aims to Improve Missile Accuracy

Visiting the United States in 1987, an Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) official didn’t hesitate to answer a question about the accuracy he expected from future Israeli missiles: “A 1,000-kilometer missile should come within 50 meters of its target,” he said. This answer suggests that Israel may be working on “terminal guidance” technology which is similar to that developed for the U.S. Pershing-II missile in the 1970s, says a former U.S. official who was present at the conversation.

The now-mothballed Pershing II was one of the most accurate medium-range missiles in the world, able to fly more than 2,000 kilometers and hit targets with a 45-meter accuracy. Like Israel’s Jericho missile, the Pershing had two stages and ran on solid fuel. “The Pershing is probably more complicated than what the Israelis would go for,” says the former official, “but terminal guidance is a possible goal, using a radar-guided maneuvering re-entry vehicle.”

The U.S. companies that built the Pershing, and others making similar technology, should be aware that Israel may be shopping for technology to improve the Jericho’s guidance system. One industry source says two of the most difficult aspects of engineering terminal guidance are making the gyroscope for the inertial element and inventing software to run the system.

Helpful items for terminal guidance include radar technology, integrated sensors and on-board computer map-reading systems, all of which would require a U.S. export license if destined for the Jericho.

Israel may still lack advanced technology to improve the Jericho’s guidance. A 1992 Defense Department study, the Militarily Critical Technology List, found that Israel lacked a number of specialized devices to make and inspect parts and assemblies for gyroscopes and integrated sensor systems. The study also indicates that Israel lacks critical production equipment for high-precision bearings, useful in inertial guidance and tracking systems.

The recent decontrol of U.S. computers has helped Israel acquire advanced computing ability. Last November, the United States gave permission to an American supercomputer manufacturer to export the largest computer ever sold to Israel. The sale sparked concern in some U.S. agencies that it could be diverted for missile design. Although supercomputers perform many civilian functions, they are a powerful tool for developing both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles because they can simulate the implosive shock waves that detonate a nuclear warhead, or model the forces affecting a missile from launch to impact.

The United States has a history of strong commercial and security relations with Israel, which is not considered a “rogue” or terrorist nation. But missile-related exports to Israel are still controlled because Israel has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is building nuclear- capable missiles. Nevertheless, U.S. export control officials do not seem well-informed on Israeli missile development, says the former Pentagon official.

China’s Missile Shopping List

China has experience in most critical military technologies, but it is continually shopping for better technology, especially American high technology.

“There’s virtually no technology that they don’t have some capability in,” says one senior official. “What they are doing is upgrading, trying to make it world class.”

Advancement in rocket technology accuracy, stealth, fuel efficiency and miniaturization is likely a top priority for the Chinese.

While China can be expected to be shopping for some items off the shelf, it is more likely to seek the materials and technology to produce its own advanced systems. According to the Department of Defense’s Military Critical Technology List, China has “limited capability” in navigation, guidance and vehicle control, gravity gradiometers, integrated circuits and electronic test equipment, and metal matrix composites, carbon-carbon composites, and polymeric materials.

Useful items:
Multi-functional inertial navigation systems:
– Advanced gyroscopes
– Hemisphere resonators
– Accelerometers
– Gravity gradiometers

Advanced electronics:
– Integrated circuits
– Solid state microwave devices
– Frequency synthesizers
– Network analyzers
– Microcircuit emulators