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Iran Chemical Weapon Update – 1998

January 1, 1998March 30, 2017

In February 1997, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Iran as among the twenty countries that the CIA suspects of having or developing chemical and biological weapons. In May 1996, the CIA told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Iran’s chemical weapon program was “already among the largest in the Third World, yet has continued to expand and become more diversified.” The CIA testified that Iran was “developing a production capability for the more toxic nerve agents,” and was trying to reduce its dependence on imported raw materials.

The CIA estimated the stockpile of Iran’s chemical weapons at several thousand tons in 1996, with agents including sulfur mustard, phosgene and cyanide. The CIA also stated that Iran has the ability to produce a thousand tons of agent each year. Delivery methods for these chemical agents include artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs and possibly Scud missile warheads. A subsequent CIA report noted that during the second half of 1996, Iran obtained the “bulk of its CW [chemical weapon] equipment from China and India,” and has sought to obtain dual-use biological equipment from Asia and Europe.

Iran’s parliament ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997. As a signatory, Iran is prohibited from developing, producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Iran is also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.

Program history

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported in 1990 that Iran’s offensive chemical weapon program had begun in 1983 “in response to Iraqi use of riot control and toxic chemical agents” during the Iran-Iraq War. According to the DIA, the program began under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with the role of the Ministry of Defense increasing over time. U.S. officials credit Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (Sazeman Sanaye Defa), a part of the Ministry of Defense, with assembling the various elements of Iran’s chemical and biological weapon programs.

In April 1984, the Iranian delegate to the United Nations, Rajai Khorassani, admitted at a London news conference that Iran was “capable of manufacturing chemical weapons … [and would] consider using them.” By 1987, U.S. State Department officials confirmed that Iran had provided chemical weapons to Libya. In December 1987, Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi stated in a parliamentary address that Iran was producing “sophisticated offensive chemical weapons.”

By 1988, Iran reportedly was actively producing phosgene gas and cyanotic agents, and possibly nerve gas. Iran’s indigenous chemical weapon production capability was confirmed in a March 1990 U.S. DIA report which concluded that Iran had created or purchased its own version of sulfur mustard gas, samples of which had been collected by a United Nations team and were shown by independent analysis to be of “different origin than the mustard gas used by Iraq.” The DIA report also stated that a United Nations team had examined Iraqi victims of Iranian chemical attacks who “displayed the effects of exposure to a choking agent … believed to have been phosgene.”

As Iran’s chemical warfare capabilities grew, it became more difficult to determine which side was responsible for chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. In March 1988, the Kurdish town of Halabja in northern Iraq, sandwiched between Iranian and Iraqi forces, was caught in a chemical weapon crossfire. Iranian commanders, believing the village was occupied by Iraqi troops, attacked with cyanide gas bombs and artillery. Iraqi forces replied with mustard gas the next day. Iran charged that Iraq was responsible and turned the catastrophe into a major propaganda event, ferrying journalists to the village to film corpses in the street. However, between 100 and 200 deaths from cyanide gas were confirmed, as many of the victims had blue lips, a common characteristic of cyanide poisoning. In 1990, a Defense Department reconstruction of the last stages of the Iran-Iraq War affirmed that Iranian cyanide gas had been responsible for many of the Kurdish civilian deaths at Halabja.

Chemical warfare production plants have been identified by unofficial sources at Qazum, Al Razi, Bashwir and Damghan. Facilities at Damghan are thought to produce artillery shells and possibly load other weapons with nerve gas. Other reported sites include Marvdasht, near Shiraz, where mustard gas is believed to be produced. A fire reportedly broke out at Marvdasht in 1987, killing 400 persons.

Foreign assistance

Foreign assistance has been vital to Iran’s chemical and biological weapon programs. In recent years China and India have been Iran’s primary sources for chemical weapon equipment and precursor chemicals. Companies in Germany, the United States and Israel have also been involved. In addition, Israel recently voiced concern over Russian assistance.

China

The U.S. State Department has taken steps against Iran’s suppliers by imposing sanctions against both individuals and organizations. In November 1994, Manfred Felber, an Austrian, Gerhard Merz, a German, and Luciano Moscatelli, an Australian, were all sanctioned for engaging in “chemical weapons proliferation activities.” In fact, they all supplied Chinese chemicals to Iran.

In February 1995, the State Department sanctioned three more companies, Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited and Mainway International for chemical weapon proliferation. The U.S. government did not reveal where the companies were based or what they had done, but all the companies had used offices in Hong Kong to send poison gas ingredients from China to Iran. That same month, the companies were denied the right to do business in Hong Kong.

In March 1996, the Washington Post reported that companies in China were providing Iran with “virtually complete factories” suited for making chemical weapons. In May 1997, the State Department sanctioned one Hong Kong company, two Chinese companies and five Chinese individuals for providing Iran with chemical weapon technology. Nanjing Chemical Industries Group (NCI) and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import-Export Corporation, both Chinese concerns, and Cheong Lee Limited, a Hong Kong company were all prohibited from doing business with the United States for one year. The sanctioned Chinese individuals were Liao Minglong, Tian Yi, Chen Qingchang (aka Q.C. Chen), Pan Yongming, and Shao Xingsheng.

In January 1997, Rex International Development, a Hong Kong-based company owned by NORINCO (a huge Chinese state-run arms manufacturing conglomerate), reportedly handled a shipment of high-grade seamless steel pipes suitable for use in chemical or explosives manufacturing. The shipment went from Spain through Hong Kong to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, and then on to an Iranian chemical weapon plant. Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) reportedly was the consignee for the deal. Rex International was ordered closed down by the British colonial government shortly before the Chinese takeover of Hong Kong in June 1997 and volunteered to cease business under a settlement with the new Chinese government in July 1997.

India

In January 1995, the Washington Times reported that, according to a highly classified German intelligence report, Iran was “only months away from completing a secret poison-gas complex.” According to the report, Indian companies had been involved in the construction of the plant, which was intended for the production of the nerve gases sarin and tabun. The article claimed that equipment, including corrosion-resistant enamel reactors, pipes and pumps, were all being sought by Indian firms from German companies. The Indian companies seeking the goods were identified as Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India.

Germany

In June 1989, the West German trading company Rheineisen Chemical Products acknowledged that it had arranged the sale of 257 tons of thionyl chloride, a mustard gas precursor, from a chemical company in India to Iran. Rheineisen, which was owned by an Iranian family, cancelled the contract but denied that the transaction was a violation of West German export law. U.S. officials believed Rheineisen, which had been purchased from its original German owners in 1988, was a front company for Iranian chemical procurement efforts.

The Indian supplier, Transpek Private Ltd., denied that it had any contract with either Rheineisen Chemical Products or Iran, but later admitted that it had sold 60 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran in March 1989 through the government-controlled Indian State Trading Corporation. A Transpek official acknowledged that the contract for the planned 257-ton sale brokered by Rheineisen had been signed in June 1989.

United States

In January 1989, a U.S. Customs Service investigation revealed that an Iranian diplomat posted in West Germany, Seyed Kharim Ali Sobhani, had brokered three shipments of thiodiglycol, a precursor of mustard gas and a controlled commodity, from the United States to Iran in 1987 and 1988 through a West German company. The Iranian agent had instructed the German firm Chemco GmbH to purchase the chemical from Alcolac International of Baltimore, and shipments were routed through third countries (30 tons through Greece in March 1987 and 60 tons through Singapore in June 1987) to conceal their final destinations.

The Customs Service intercepted a third Alcolac shipment of 120 tons in April 1988, substituted water for the chemicals, and tracked the shipment through Singapore and Pakistan to a Tehran firm M/S Ray Textile Industries, that U.S. officials said was a front company for chemical purchases. The responsible officer at Chemco GmbH was arrested and pleaded guilty to violating U.S. export law, but subsequently jumped bond and fled to West Germany, where he could not be extradited or prosecuted under German law. The West German government, under pressure from the United States, forced Tehran to withdraw the Iranian diplomat from its embassy in Bonn.

Alcolac pleaded guilty to a single count of violating U.S. export law for manipulation of documents by its export manager, Leslie Hinkelman, to conceal the fact that the 120-ton shipment of thiodiglycol was destined for Iran. It was later revealed that Alcolac exported four other shipments of thiodiglycol totaling more than 400 tons through Nu Kraft Mercantile Corporation of New York, which were ultimately diverted via Jordan to Iraq.

In January 1997, the Los Angeles Times reported that two business partners, Henry Joseph Trojack and Abdol Hamid Rashidian, had been arrested on charges of conspiring to ship Iran impregnated alumina, a chemical that could be used to make VX and sarin nerve gas. The case is still pending.

Israel

In July 1994, Nahum Manbar, an Israeli citizen, and his companies Mana International Investments in Poland, and Europol Holding, Ltd. in the United Kingdom, were sanctioned by the State Department for engaging in “chemical weapons proliferation activities.” While Manbar admitted to the Israeli press only that he had sold anti-chemical and anti-biological suits to Iran, a senior U.S. official stated in June 1995 that Manbar “provided knowing and material support to a BW [biological weapon] or CW [chemical weapon] program of a country on our terrorist list,” that country being Iran. In May 1997, Manbar was arrested and charged in Israel with “assisting the enemy in its war against Israel, providing information to an outside enemy with the intent of harming state security, and providing Iran with the means to manufacture chemical weapons in exchange for 16m [million] dollars.” The case against Manbar is still pending.

Biological weapons

In 1996, the CIA told Congress that Iran had possessed a biological weapons program since the early 1980s. The CIA said that Iran held some stocks of BW agents and weapons, but that the program was mostly in the “research and development stage.” Delivery of biological agents could be accomplished by the same systems that Iran has for chemical weapons, namely artillery shells and aerial bombs. The CIA also stated that Iran had the “technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little foreign assistance,” and noted that Iran had “top-notch” biomedical research institutes that conduct legitimate research, which could support a biological weapon program. The CIA concluded that “because of the dual-use nature of biomedical technology, Iran’s ability to produce a number of both human and veterinary vaccines also gives it the capability for large-scale BW agent production.” In June 1997 the CIA reported that Europe and Asia were potential sources of dual-use biotech equipment.

In its 1996 Annual Report to Congress, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) said Iran has produced BW agents and “apparently” has weaponized some. Facilities at Damghan and Karaj have been reported as possible biological weapon development sites.

China: Promises on Nonproliferation – 1981-1997

January 1, 1998March 27, 2017

Adapted from a statement by Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) on November 5, 1997, during the House floor debate on China sanctions legislation.

“The question of assurance does not exist. China and Iran currently do not have any nuclear cooperation . . . We do not sell nuclear weapons to any country or transfer related technology. This is our long-standing position, this policy is targeted at all countries.”
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, Los Angeles, 11/2/97, Reuters, 11/3/97.

“We don”t have to take it on faith . . . We received clear-cut, specific assurances.”
— Senior US official, AFP, 10/31/97 (referring to China”s vow not to commence new nuclear cooperation with Iran.)

China will . . . not help other countries develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, China also holds that prevention of nuclear proliferation should not affect international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The U.S. administration is clear on this point and so is the international community.”
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang, Beijing, 10/30/97, Ta Kung Pao, 10/31/97 (emphasis added).

“President Jiang and I agreed that the United States and China share a strong interest in stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weaponry in unstable regions and rogue states; notably, Iran. I welcome the steps China has taken and the clear assurances it has given today to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology.”
— President Bill Clinton, press conference, Washington, D.C., 10/29/97.

“In May 1996, China committed not to provide [unsafeguarded nuclear] assistance to . . . Pakistan or anywhere else. We have monitored this pledge very carefully over the course of the last 16, 18 months, and the Chinese appear to be taking their pledge very seriously. We have no basis to conclude that they have acted inconsistently with this May 1996 commitment. Also, the Chinese have provided assurances with respect to nuclear cooperation with Iran. What they have
assured us is that they . . . are not going to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and that they will complete a few existing projects, and these are projects which are not of proliferation concern. They [will] complete them within a relatively short period of time . . . the assurances we received are . . . sufficiently specific and clear to meet the requirements of our law and to advance our national security interests, and they are in the form of writing. They’re written, confidential communications . . . I would call them authoritative, written communications . . . Today was when the final exchange took place . . . We will make [them] available to members of Congress in confidence, because these are confidential diplomatic communications, an opportunity to read and judge for themselves these written assurances that we’ve been given . . . [Q] assurances specifically–different countries, specifically, say, Iran, Pakistan? . . . [A] Yes, just Iran . . . they have safeguarded peaceful nuclear cooperation with both Pakistan and India, and they told that at this particular point, they”re not prepared to suspend those projects . . . The President made very clear to him that this was an essential requirement; we needed to have this assurance on Iran, or there could be no certification . . . [Q] Who is the assurance addressed to? [A] We’re not going to discuss the . . . specifics of the issue. [Q] Is it in a letter, though, that’s addressed to someone in particular in the U.S. government? [A] It”s an authoritative, written communication.”
— Senior Administration Official, press briefing, The White House, 10/29/97, emphasis added.

“We have received assurances from the Chinese that they will not engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and that the existing cooperation–there are two projects in particular–will end. That is the assurance we have received. As to the form of that assurance, we will be discussing that with Congress . . .”
— Sandy Berger, National Security Advisory, press conference, 10/29/97

“The United States and China reiterate their commitment not to provide any assistance unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear explosion programs.”
— Joint U.S.-China Statement, The White House, 10/29/97.

“China has taken new, concrete steps to prevent nuclear proliferation that threaten the interests of both countries. China has . . . Provided assurances addressing U.S. concerns about nuclear cooperation with Iran . . .”
— White House Fact Sheet, “Accomplishments of US/China Summit. 10/29/97.

“. . . I think we have reached a point where we’re satisfied that we have the assurances that we need to have that China is not engaging, will not engage in assistance to states developing nuclear weapons, which would enable the President to go forward with the Peaceful Nuclear Energy Agreement of 1985.”
— Senior White House official, press conference, Washington, D.C., 10/29/97.

“China adopts a cautious and responsible attitude toward nuclear exports. It has never transferred nuclear weapons or relevant technology to any other country. China”s stand against nuclear weapons proliferation is consistent with clear-cut; that is, China has consistently opposed nuclear weapons proliferation. It does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear weapons proliferation, nor has it helped other countries develop nuclear weapons. In the meantime, China takes the view that the fight against nuclear weapons proliferation should not affect international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The American side is well aware of the Chinese position on that.”
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang, Beijing Central Peoples Radio, 10/28/97

“I wish to emphasize once again China has never transferred nuclear weapons or relevant technology to other countries, including Iran . . . China has never done it in the past, we do not do it now, nor will be do it in the future.”
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, Kyodo, 10/21/97.

“. . . China adheres to the policy that it does not advocate, encourage or engage in proliferation of nuclear weapons nor assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons. For many years the Chinese Government has exercised strict and effective control over nuclear and nuclear-related export, including exchanges of personnel and information, and has abided by the following three principles: (1) serving peaceful purposes only; (2) accepting IAEA safeguards; (3) forbidding transfer to any third country without China’s consent. With regard to any nuclear export, the recipient government is always requested to provide to the Chinese side an assurance in writing to acknowledge the above three principles and the export can proceed only after approval by relevant Chinese authorities . . . [regulations] strictly prohibit any exchange of nuclear weapons related technology and information with other countries . . . No [Chinese] agency or company is allowed to conduct cooperation or exchange of personnel and technological data with nuclear facilities not under IAEA safeguards . . . [these] regulations are applicable . . . also to all activities related to nuclear explosive devices . . . the Chinese side wishes to emphasize that the prevention of nuclear proliferation should in no way affect or hinder the normal nuclear cooperation for peaceful uses among countries, let along be used as an excuse for discrimination and even application of willful sanctions against developing countries. The prevention of nuclear proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitute the two sides of one coin . . . this is the consistent policy of China.”
— Ambassador Li Changhe, Statement at Meeting of Zangger Committee, Vienna, 10/16/97.

“China”s position on nuclear proliferation is very clear . . . It does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation, nor does it assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons. It always undertakes its international legal obligations of preventing nuclear proliferation . . . China has always been cautious and responsible in handling its nuclear exports and exports of materials and facilities that might lead to nuclear proliferation.
— Statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai, Beijing, Xinhua, 9/15/97.

“The state highly controls nuclear exports and strictly performs the international obligation on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons it has undertaken. The state does not advocate, encourage and engage in proliferation of nuclear weapons, and does not help other countries develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear exports are used only for peaceful purposes and are subjected to International Atomic Energy Agency”s guarantee and supervision . . . The state prohibits assistance to nuclear facilities not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency”s guarantee and supervision, and does not engage in nuclear exports or personnel and technological exchanges and cooperation with them.
— Regulations of the PRC on Control of Nuclear Exports, Xinhua, 9/11/97.

Our country . . . has followed the policy of not advocating, not encouraging, and not engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and not helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons . . . all relevant agencies and units engaged in the activities of foreign economic trade must thoroughly implement our country’s policy on nuclear exports; that is, not advocating, encouraging, or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not helping other countries develop nuclear weapons; only using nuclear export items for peaceful purposes, accepting the International Atomic Energy Agency”s safeguards and supervision, and not allowing the transfer of such items to third countries without our country”s permission; and not giving assistance to the nuclear facilities of those countries that have not accepted the safeguards and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency . . . Nuclear material, nuclear installations and related technology, non-nuclear material used for reactors, and nuclear-related dual-use installations, material, and related technology . . . may not be supplied to or used by nuclear facilities that have not accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency”s safeguards and supervision. No unit or corporation is allowed to cooperate with nuclear installations that have not accepted the system of safeguards and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, nor are they allowed to engage in exchanges of professional scientific and technical personnel and technological information . . .”
— Chinese State Council Circular No. 17, Beijing, 5/27/97.

“. . . we have absolutely binding assurances from the Chinese, which we consider a commitment on their part not to export ring magnets or any other technologies to unsafeguarded facilities . . . The negotiating record is made up primarily of conversations, which were detailed and recorded, between US and Chinese officials.”
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, congressional testimony, 5/16/96.

“Last week, we reached an understanding with China that it will no longer provide assistance to unsafeguarded programs . . . senior Chinese officials have explicitly confirmed our understanding the Chinese policy of not assisting unsafeguarded nuclear facilities would prevent future sales, future transfers of ring magnets.”
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, congressional testimony, 5/15/96.

“Being a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, China strictly abides by its treaty commitments and has never engaged in any activities in violation of its commitments. China”s position of opposing nuclear weapons proliferation is constant and unambiguous. China will, as usual, continue to honor its international commitments and play a positive role in maintaining regional and world peace and stability.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai, Zhonggwo Ximven She, 5/15/96.

“China strictly observes its obligations under the treaty and is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons. The nuclear cooperation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively for peaceful purposes. China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded and unsupervised Chinese nuclear facilities.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman, Xinhua, 5/11/96.

“Shen Guofang is an official press officer of the Chinese government and he has said several times that China is not exporting nuclear arms material nor spreading nuclear arms. The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, the CIA, has accorded to Shen made several mistakes. The claim that China is exporting so-called ring magnets to Pakistan is one of the CIA”s mistakes, according to Shen.
— Interview with Chinese Shen Guofang, YLE Radio, Helsinki, 4/5/96.

“China has never transferred or sold any nuclear technology or equipment to Pakistan . . . We therefore hope the U.S. Government will not base its policy-making on hearsay.
— Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary Shen Guofang, Hong Kong AFP, 3/26/96.

“China, a responsible state, has never transferred equipment or technology for producing nuclear weapons to any other country. Nor, as a responsible state, will China do so in the future.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman, Xinhua, 2/15/96.

“China is a responsible country. We have not transferred, nor will we transfer to any country, equipment or technologies used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty, China scrupulously abides by the treaty concerning international legal obligations toward the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, and it does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation. While engaging in cooperation with other countries for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, China strictly abides by China”s three principles on nuclear exports and accepts the safeguards and supervision of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofung, Xinhua, 2/15/96.

“Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang today denied reports that China has transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan. He said that China carries out normal international cooperation with Pakistan and some other countries on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The legitimate rights and interests of all countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy should also be respected. China has constantly adopted a prudent and responsible toward the export of nuclear energy. It is totally groundless to say that China has transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, as reported in Ta Kung Pao, 2/9/96
(follows 2/8/96 Washington Times story about China”s transfer of ring magnets to Pakistan”s unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant).

“China has constantly stood for . . . pursuing a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and assisting any other country in the development of such weapons . . . Since 1992 when [China] became a party to the [nuclear Non-Proliferation] treaty, it has strictly fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty, including the obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA in safeguard application. China follows three principles regarding nuclear exports: exports serving peaceful purposes only, accepting IAEA safeguards . . . Only specialized government-designated companies can handle nuclear exports and in each instance they must apply for approval from relevant governmental departments. All exports of nuclear materials and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguard. China has never exported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production.
— Information Office of the State Council of the PRC White Paper: “China: Arms Control and Disarmament”, Beijing Review, 11/27/95.

“. . . there isn”t any nuclear cooperation between China and Iran that is not under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian, Xinhua, 9/26/95.

“. . . China as a State Party and particularly as a developing country with considerable nuclear industrial capabilities, strictly abides by the relevant provisions of the NPT to ensure the exclusive use [of such capabilities] for peaceful purposes . . .”
— Ambassador Sha Zukang, NPT Extension Conference, at UN, 1/23/95.

“China does not engage in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . .
— Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, AP newswire, 10/4/94.

“China is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We do not support or encourage nuclear proliferation, this has been a consistent position.
— Premier Li Peng, Beijing Central Television Program One, 3/22/94.

“[T]he Chinese government has consistently supported and participated in the international communities efforts for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
— Ambassador Hou Zhitong, address to the U.N. General Assembly, 10/21/92.

“[China] supports non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
— Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, 8/17/92.

“The reports carried by some Western newspapers and magazines alleging that China has provided Iran with materials, equipment, and technology that can be used to produce nuclear weapons are utterly groundless.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman, Xinhua, 11/4/91.

“China has always stood for nuclear nonproliferation, neither encouraging nor engaging in nuclear proliferation.
— Premier Li Peng, Xinhua, 8/10/91.

“The Chinese Government has made it clear that it adheres to a nuclear nonproliferation policy. This means that China does not support, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation. We said so and have done so, too.
— Premier Li Peng, interview with Iranian and Chinese journalists, Renmin Ribao, 7/10/91.

“China has struck no nuclear deals with Iran . . . This inference is preposterous.
— Chinese embassy official Chen Guoqing, rebutting a claim that China had sold nuclear technology to Iran, letter to Washington Post, 7/2/91.

“The report claiming that China provides medium-range missiles for Pakistan is absolutely groundless. China does not stand for, encourage, or engage itself in nuclear proliferation and does not aid other countries in developing nuclear weapons.
— Foreign ministry spokesman Wu Janmin, Zhongguo Ximwen She, 4/25/91.

“China”s position is clear cut, that is, China won”t practice nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any other country.
. .”. Premier Li Peng, Xinhua, 4/1/91.

“. . . the Chinese Government has consistently supported and participated in the international community”s efforts for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
— Ambassador Hou Zhitong, Xinhua, 10/24/90.

“China seeks a policy of not encouraging or engaging in nuclear proliferation and not helping any country develop the deadly weapons.
— Ambassador Hou Zhitong, Xinhua, 9/12/90.

“China has adopted a responsible attitude [on nuclear cooperation], requiring the recipient countries of its nuclear exports to accept IAEA safeguards and ensuring that its own nuclear import is for peaceful purposes.
— Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Xinhua, 2/27/90.

“China does not advocate, or encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation and would only cooperate with other countries in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.
— Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Renmin Ribao, 9/15/89.

“China, though not a [NPT] signatory, has repeatedly stated that it abides by the principles of nuclear nonproliferation.
— Xinhua, 5/9/89.

“As everyone knows, China does not advocate nor encourage nuclear proliferation. China does not engage in developing or assisting other countries to develop nuclear weapons.
— Foreign Ministry spokesman, Beijing radio, 5/4/89.

“The cooperation between China and Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear energy [is] entirely for peaceful purposes. The relevant agreements signed between the two countries consist of specific provisions guaranteeing safety. The allegations that China has been assisting Pakistan in the field of nuclear weapons . . . are completely groundless . . .”
— Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Zhaoxing, Beijing Radio, 1/19/89.

“[Secretary of Defense Frank] Carlucci said Chinese leaders emphasized that they would never sell nuclear weapons to foreign nations. . .”. Washington Post, 9/8/88.

“China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons.
— Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Beijing Review, 3/30/87.

“The State Department and its allies insist that the negotiators made no such concessions. They argue that despite the text of the [US/China nuclear] agreement, they have obtained private assurances from the Chinese that Beijing will cooperate with unwritten American expectations. In particular, the chief American negotiator, Special Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy, has prepared a classified “Summary of Discussions,” in which he asserts that the Chinese have provided further pledges to reform their nuclear export policies. Touting these unwritten, unofficial assurances, he claims that the China pact would not compromise our vigilance against the spread of nuclear weapons.
— The New Republic, 11/25/85, p. 9.

“Since that time [1983], we have received assurances from them [the Chinese government] and we have seen nothing, and there is no evidence, that indicates that they are not abiding by the assurances that they have provided us.
— Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James R. Lilley, congressional testimony, 11/13/85.

“The People”s Republic of China has clearly indicated that it shares our concerns about any nuclear weapons proliferation. . .”
— Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington, congressional testimony, 10/9/85.

“The Chinese made it clear to us that when they say they will not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons, this also applies to all nuclear explosives . . . We are satisfied that the [nonproliferation] policies they have adopted are consistent with our own basic views.
— Ambassador Richard Kennedy, Department of State, congressional testimony, 10/9/85.

“The Chinese have also made a number of high-level policy statements, and I would emphasize that these were high-level policy statements and not mere toasts tossed off in haste and casually. These clearly set forth their position that they are opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons and do not assist or encourage others to develop weapons.
— Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, congressional testimony, 10/9/85.

“Since negotiations began on the proposed agreement, China has made significant new statements on its nonproliferation policy . . . These statements show that China is opposed to the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries.
— Ambassador Richard Kennedy, Department of State, congressional testimony, 9/12/85.

“The People”s Republic of China has clearly indicated that it shares our concerns about any nuclear weapons proliferation . . .
— Assistant Secretary of Energy George Bradley, congressional testimony, 9/12/85.

“The Chinese know that nuclear cooperation with us rests on their strict adherence to basic nonproliferation practices discussed and clarified at such great length.”
— ACDA Assistant Director Norman A. Wulf, congressional testimony, 9/12/85.

“Our contacts with the Chinese . . . have demonstrated clearly that they appreciate the importance we attach to nonproliferation. We are satisfied that the policies they have adopted are consistent with our own basic views.
— Ambassador-At-Large Richard Kennedy, congressional testimony, 7/31/85.

“Over these past two years, the Chinese Government has taken a number of important nonproliferation steps. First, it made a pledge that it does “not engage in nuclear proliferation
— nor does it “help other countries develop nuclear weapons”. The substance of this pledge has been reaffirmed several times by Chinese officials both abroad and within China. In fact, China”s Sixth National People”s Congress made this policy a directive to all agencies of that large and complex government. As such, it constitutes a historic and positive change in China”s policies.
— ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman, congressional testimony, 7/31/85.

“Energy Department sources said a key part of the administration”s presentation to Congress would be a classified summary of a meeting between Li Peng and special US ambassador and nuclear negotiator Richard T. Kennedy in Peking in June. Kennedy was said to have “nailed down Chinese assurances that they will work to halt the spread of atomic weapons and will abide by all US safeguard requirements. The sources said Kennedy wrote the summary and “showed it to the Chinese, and they said it’s consistent with the way they view their policies.
— Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) said he was promised that written assurances of the Chinese position would be included in the nuclear agreement package.
— “US and China Sign Nuclear-Power Pact, Washington Post, 7/24/85.

“A long-dormant nuclear cooperation agreement with China apparently has been rejuvenated by new written assurances from China on its commitment to control the spread of nuclear weapons, accorting to Senate and administration officials.
— “US-China Nuclear Pact Near: New Assurances Said Received on Control of Weapons, Washington Post, 7/22/85.

“Discussions with China that have taken place since the initialling of the proposed [nuclear] Agreement have contributed significantly to a shared understanding with China on what it means not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives, and in facilitating China”s steps to put all these new policies into place. Thus, ACDA believes that the statements of policy by senior Chinese officials, as clarified by these discussions, represent a clear commitment not to assist a non-nuclear-weapon state in the acquisition of nuclear explosives.
— ACDA, “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, submitted to Congress on 7/24/85 with
the US/China Agreement for Cooperation, 7/19/85.

“China is not a party to the NPT, but its stance on the question is clear-cut and above-board . . . it stands for nuclear disarmament and disapproves of nuclear proliferation . . . In recent years, the Chinese Government has more and more, time and again reiterated that China neither advocates nor encourages nuclear proliferation, and its cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field is only for peaceful purposes”.
— Ambassador He Qian Jiadong, speech given at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 6/27/85 (quoted by Amb. Richard Kennedy in congressional testimony, 7/31/85).

“I wish to reiterate that China has no intention, either at the present or in the future, to help non-nuclear countries develop nuclear weapons . . . China”s nuclear cooperation with other countries, either at present or in the future, is confined to peaceful purposes alone.
— Vice Premier Li Peng, Xinhua, 1/18/85.

“We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.
— Premier Zhao Ziyang, White House state dinner on 1/10/84, Xinhua, 1/11/84 (note: a US official later said that “These were solemn assurances with in fact the force of law, AP, 6/15/84).

“China does not encourage or support nuclear proliferation.
— Vice Premier Li Peng, Xinhua, 10/18/83.

“Like many other peace-loving countries, China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, and we are emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel.
— Yu Peiwen, head of Chinese delegation to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Xinhua, 8/4/81.

Israeli Buyers Get Nuclear-related Goods from the United States

January 1, 1998March 31, 2017

Israeli buyers have had little trouble importing sensitive nuclear equipment from the United States. Less than one percent of U.S. applications to export nuclear dual-use equipment to Israel were denied from 1988-1992, according to a 1994 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office. Approximately 90 percent were approved, and the rest were returned without action, still pending, cancelled or suspended, the report said.

The GAO report found that during this period the United States approved 238 licenses for computers to Israeli end-users linked to Israel’s unsafeguarded nuclear program. The computers that were aproved were more powerful than any exported to sensitive end-users in other countries of proliferation concern. They were also more powerful than those used to develop many of the weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. For 62 of the 238 licenses, the United States received government-to-government assurances against nuclear use of the computers, but U.S. officials have not verified compliance.

Israel has not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not a member of the international agreements to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Most U.S. exports of nuclear, chemical/biological or missile-related equipment or technology require a license for sale to Israeli buyers. Israel appears on all the Commerce Department control lists which name countries and projects of concern for nuclear, missile and chemical/biological proliferation.

The table below shows the types of nuclear-related goods Israel imported from the United States between 1988-1992:

Computers, electronic/digital, related

License applications: 618
Dollar value: $234,373,453
License approvals: 518
Dollar Value: $168,352,727

Fibrous/filamentary materials

License applications: 73
Dollar value: $11,269,921
License approvals: 72
Dollar Value: $11,269,921

Cathode ray oscilloscopes and components

License applications: 49
Dollar value: $1,214,747
License approvals: 41
Dollar Value: $1,127,033

Lasers/optical equipment

License applications: 42
Dollar value: $1,401,797
License approvals: 35
Dollar Value: $1,201,728

Specially designed pressure measuring instruments

License applications: 34
Dollar value: $570,403
License approvals: 29
Dollar Value: $507,870

Electronic devices/components

License applications: 28
Dollar value: $742,986
License approvals: 18
Dollar Value: $697,892

Measuring/calibrating/testing equipment

License applications: 17
Dollar value: $194,444
License approvals: 17
Dollar Value: $194,444

Switching devices/triggered spark gaps/thyratrons

License applications: 16
Dollar value: $218,631
License approvals: 9
Dollar Value: $118,117

Telecommunication transmission equipment/systems

License applications: 6
Dollar value: $359,239
License approvals: 6
Dollar Value: $359,239

Photosensitive components

License applications: 5
Dollar value: $46,321
License approvals: 5
Dollar Value: $46,321

Numerical control equipment

License applications: 3
Dollar value: $126,268
License approvals: 3
Dollar Value: $126,268

Vibration testing equipment (specified)

License applications: 3
Dollar value: $234,088
License approvals: 2
Dollar Value: $171,088

Streak cameras, shutters

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $243,300
License approvals: 2
Dollar Value: $243,300

Flatbed microdensitometers

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $37,000
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $37,000

Thermoelectric materials/devices

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $532
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $352

Cryogenic equipment/materials

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $245,642
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $3,930

Pipings/fittings/valves made/lined with named alloys

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $904
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $896

Inverters/converters/frequency changers/generators

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $21,288
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $20,500

Zirconium/nickel/lithium/hafnium/beryllium

License applications: 6
Dollar value: $92,412
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $1,730

Cylindrical disks

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $216,000
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $216,000

Electron tubes and specially designed components

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $14,000
License approvals: 1
Dollar Value: $14,000

Filament winding machines

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $190,000
License approvals: 0
Dollar Value: $0

Capacitors (specified)

License applications: 3
Dollar value: $9,848
License approvals: 0
Dollar Value: $0

Nuclear reactor/nuclear power plant-related equipment

License applications: 2
Dollar value: $7,433
License approvals: 0
Dollar Value: $0

Sensing equipment, corrosion-resistant

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $1,410
License approvals: 0
Dollar Value: $0

Helium, enriched in isotope-3

License applications: 1
Dollar value: $1,225
License approvals: 0
Dollar Value: $0

Nuclear Referral List Items Subtotal:

License applications: 921
Dollar value: $251,833,232
License approvals: 765
Dollar Value: $184,710,356

Non-Nuclear Referral List Items Subtotal:

License applications: 154
Dollar value: $9,433,674
License approvals: 115
Dollar Value: $8,662,671

Total:

License applications: 1,075
Dollar value: $261,266,906
License approvals: 880
Dollar Value: $193,373,027

New U.S. Controls on Supercomputers

January 1, 1998April 3, 2017

Computers performing more than two billion operations per second (2,000 MTOPS) are subject to new export controls. On November 18, President Clinton signed the National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 105-85, Sections 1211 through 1215), which obliges exporters to notify the U.S. government before shipping or reexporting any such computer to a list of countries including China, India, Israel, Pakistan and Russia.

The requirement is a roll-back of the President’s decision in late 1995 to loosen export controls on supercomputers–the first such roll-back in recent history. Under previous law, computers operating between 2,000 and 7,000 MTOPS could be shipped without an export license as long as a civilian use and a civilian user were claimed. IBM and Silicon Graphics, Inc., are under federal investigation for allegedly shipping computers within this range to nuclear weapon design sites in Russia and China.

Under the new law, exporters are required to notify the Secretary of Commerce in writing before shipment. The Commerce Department must then transmit the notification within 24 hours to the Departments of Defense, Energy, State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. These agencies have ten days to object in writing. If any does so, the exporter must apply formally for an export license.

In a November 20 interview with the Risk Report, William Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, stated that the Commerce Department does not view the new law as self-executing. Mr. Reinsch said that Commerce hopes to issue regulations within the next few weeks, after clearing them with other federal agencies.

The new provision originated with a recommendation by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on National Security. In April the Wisconsin Project recommended that all computers performing more than 2,000 MTOPS be licensed before shipment to countries falling within “Computer Tier 3,” a list of countries judged to be risky recipients of American computer technology.

The full Committee then wrote a bipartisan amendment into the defense bill to accomplish that end. The amendment passed by a large margin in the House, but failed by a large margin in the Senate. The current language emerged as a compromise from the House-Senate conference.

Both the computer industry and the Clinton Administration fought the provision in Congress. Vice President Al Gore, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Samuel Berger and Director of the Office of Management and Budget Franklin Raines all contacted key members of Congress. Despite the defeat, however, the Administration is now gearing up to comply. “We didn’t support it, but we will implement it faithfully,” Mr. Reinsch told the Risk Report. He also argued, however, that the provision was unwise in view of the rapid increases he expects to see in computing power. “The absurdity of this provision will become obvious within a short period of time,” he said.

The new law allows the President to adjust the performance level of computers that trigger the notification process, but the change cannot take effect for 180 days after the President submits a report to Congress justifying a new level. According to Reinsch the 180 day period, which he has said is too lengthy, “will create an incentive to do something sooner rather than later.” The Administration had argued for a period of 30 to 60 days.

The President can also remove countries from the Tier 3 list, but cannot remove China or Russia, which are overt nuclear weapon states, or remove India, Israel or Pakistan, which have refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In addition, no decision to remove a country can take effect for 120 days after the President submits a report to Congress justifying the removal.

Within 60 days of enactment of the new law, the President must also report to Congress all American exports of computers performing more than 2,000 MTOPS to all countries since January 25, 1996. The report must name the exporter, the manufacturer, the speed, and the destinee. And for exports to Tier 3 countries, the President must indicate whether the destinee is engaged in military or mass destruction weapon activities.

Tier 3 country exports will also require post-shipment checks for all computers faster than 2,000 MTOPS shipped after the date of enactment. The President must report to Congress annually the results of these checks, and in cases where no check was made, explain why none was done. This requirement is expected to present a challenge concerning China, which now refuses all post-shipment checks. According to Mr. Reinsch, the law will require that post-shipment checks be done “in perpetuity” for computers over 2,000 MTOPS. He said that this provision would create a “significant resource problem” in the years ahead.

Mr. Berger argued in October that the 10-day notice provision would “tax sorely the resources of our export control agencies and the intelligence community,” and “could create a bureaucratic logjam.” According to Congressional testimony in April by Mr. Reinsch, however, American companies are now exporting an average of only two computers per week that would be subject to the provision. That would only result in two notifications per week to the export control agencies.

Appendix: National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 105-85), signed by President Clinton, November 18, 1997.

Sec. 1211. Export Approvals for High Performance Computers

(a) PRIOR APPROVAL OF EXPORTS AND REEXPORTS- The President shall require that no digital computer with a composite theoretical performance level of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) or with such other composite theoretical performance level as may be established subsequently by the President under subsection (d), may be exported or reexported without a license to a country specified in subsection (b) if the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency objects, in writing, to such export or reexport. Any person proposing to export or reexport such a digital computer shall so notify the Secretary of Commerce, who, within 24 hours after receiving the notification, shall transmit the notification to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(b) COVERED COUNTRIES- For purposes of subsection (a), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as “Computer Tier 3” eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to modification by the President under subsection (e).

(c) TIME LIMIT- Written objections under subsection (a) to an export or reexport shall be raised within 10 days after the notification is received under subsection (a). If such a written objection to the export or reexport of a computer is raised, the computer may be exported or reexported only pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations of the Department of Commerce, without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise authorized under section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997. If no objection is raised within the 10-day period, the export or reexport is authorized.

(d) ADJUSTMENT OF COMPOSITE THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE- The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may establish a new composite theoretical performance level for purposes of subsection (a). Such new level shall not take effect until 180 days after the President submits to the congressional committees designated in section 1215 a report setting forth the new composite theoretical performance level and the justification for such new level. Each report shall, at a minimum–

(1) address the extent to which high performance computers of a composite theoretical level between the level established in subsection (a) or such level as has been previously adjusted pursuant to this section and the new level, are available from other countries;

(2) address all potential uses of military significance to which high performance computers at the new level could be applied; and

(3) assess the impact of such uses on the national security interests of the United States.

(e) ADJUSTMENT OF COVERED COUNTRIES-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may add a country to or remove a country from the list of covered countries in subsection (b), except that a country may be removed from the list only in accordance with paragraph (2).

(2) DELETIONS FROM LIST OF COVERED COUNTRIES- The removal of a country from the list of covered countries under subsection (b) shall not take effect until 120 days after the President submits to the congressional committees designated in section 1215 a report setting forth the justification for the deletion.

(3) EXCLUDED COUNTRIES- A country may not be removed from the list of covered countries under subsection (b) if–

(A) the country is a “nuclear-weapon state” (as defined by Article IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or

(B) the country is not a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the country is listed on Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

(f) CLASSIFICATION- Each report under subsections (d) and (e) shall be submitted in an unclassified form and may, if necessary, have a classified supplement.

SEC. 1212. REPORT ON EXPORTS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.

(a) REPORT- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 a report identifying all exports of digital computers with a composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to all countries since January 25, 1996. For each export, the report shall identify–

(1) whether an export license was applied for and whether one was granted;

(2) the date of the transfer of the computer;

(3) the United States manufacturer and exporter of the computer;

(4) the MTOPS level of the computer; and

(5) the recipient country and end user.

(b) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON EXPORTS TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES- In the case of exports to countries specified in subsection (c), the report under subsection (a) shall identify the intended end use for the exported computer and the assessment by the executive branch of whether the end user is a military end user or an end user involved in activities relating to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile technology. Information provided under this subsection may be submitted in classified form if necessary.

(1) the countries listed as “Computer Tier 3” eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997; and

(2) the countries listed in section 740.7(e) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.

SEC. 1213. POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION OF EXPORT OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.

(a) REQUIRED POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION- The Secretary of Commerce shall conduct post-shipment verification of each digital computer with a composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) that is exported from the United States, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to a country specified in subsection (b).

(b) COVERED COUNTRIES- For purposes of subsection (a), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as “Computer Tier 3” eligible countries in section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to modification by the President under section 1211(e).

(c) ANNUAL REPORT- The Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 an annual report on the results of post-shipment verifications conducted under this section during the preceding year. Each such report shall include a list of all such items exported from the United States to such countries during the previous year and, with respect to each such export, the following:

(1) The destination country.

(2) The date of export.

(3) The intended end use and intended end user.

(4) The results of the post-shipment verification.

(d) EXPLANATION WHEN VERIFICATION NOT CONDUCTED- If a post-shipment verification has not been conducted in accordance with subsection (a) with respect to any such export during the period covered by a report, the Secretary shall include in the report for that period a detailed explanation of the reasons why such a post-shipment verification was not conducted.

SEC. 1214. GAO STUDY ON CERTAIN COMPUTERS; END USER INFORMATION ASSISTANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL- The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 a study of the national security risks relating to the sale of computers with a composite theoretical performance of between 2,000 and 7,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to end users in countries specified in subsection (c). The study shall also analyze any foreign availability of computers described in the preceding sentence and the impact of such sales on United States exporters.

(b) END USER INFORMATION ASSISTANCE TO EXPORTERS- The Secretary of Commerce shall establish a procedure by which exporters may seek information on questionable end users in countries specified in subsection (c) who are seeking to obtain computers described in subsection (a).

(c) COVERED COUNTRIES- For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as “Computer Tier 3” eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.

SEC. 1215. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

For purposes of sections 1211(d), 1212(a), 1213(c), and 1214(a) the congressional committees specified in those sections are the following:

(1) The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) The Committee on International Relations and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.

Brazil’s Rockets

January 1, 1998April 5, 2017

The following are the most recent technical specifications of Brazil’s rockets.

Sonda II

The Sonda II is a small single stage sounding rocket used to launch payloads under 70 kg to altitudes of 50 to 100 km. This rocket is under production and used to test thermal coatings, solid propellant grain configurations and onboard instrumentation.

Technical specifications:

Length: 4.534 m
Diameter: .3 m
Structural weight: 95 kg
Propellant weight: 237 kg
Burning time: 18 secs.
Thrust: 32 kN
Status: Operational

Sonda III

The Sonda III is a two-stage sounding rocket used to launch payloads from 50 to 150 kg to altitudes of 200 to 650 kms. The Sonda III features an instrumentation system for payload guidance, the separation of stages, and the ability to destroy the vehicle in the event of malfunction, and other instrumentation improvements.

Technical specifications:

Length (m)
1st stage: 3.793
2nd stage: 3.192
Vehicle: 6.985

Diameter (m)
1st stage: .557
2nd stage: .3
Vehicle: —

Structural weight (kg)
1st stage: 348
2nd stage: 95
Vehicle: 443

Propellant weight (kg)
1st stage: 864
2nd stage: 237
Vehicle: 1.101

Burning time (s)
1st stage:29
2nd stage: 22
Vehicle: —

Thrust (kN)
1st stage: 95
2nd stage: 32
Vehicle: —

Status: Operational

Sonda IV

The Sonda IV is a two-stage solid propellant rocket featuring technology used as a basis for Brazil’s satellite launcher vehicle, the VLS (Veiculo Lancador de Satelites). The Sonda IV can launch payloads from 300 to 500 kg to altitudes of 700 to 1000 kms.

Technical specifications:

Length (m)
1st stage: 5.348
2nd stage: 3.837
Vehicle: 9.185

Diameter (m)
1st stage: 1.007
2nd stage: .557
Vehicle: —

Structural weight (kg)
1st stage: 1.308
2nd stage: 348
Vehicle: 1.656

Propellant weight (kg)
1st stage: 4.271
2nd stage: 864
Vehicle: 5.135

Burning time (s)
1st stage: 43
2nd stage: 21
Vehicle: —

Thrust (kN)
1st stage: 234
2nd stage: 95
Vehicle: —

Range as a missile: 1,000 – 1,800 km
Payload: 500 kg
Status: Operational

VLS (Veiculo Lancador de Satelites)

The VLS is a four-stage launch vehicle comprised of a core rocket and four strap-on motors. The first, or booster stage, has four S-43 solid fuel motors strapped to the center second stage core motor. The strap-on motors and two of the three core stages of the VLS are derived from the first stage of the Sonda-IV. Rocket attitude control is achieved by movable nozzles in the first, second and third stages, with a spin stabilized fourth stage. The vehicle contains telemetry, tracking and rocket destruction systems. The guidance and control module contains an inertial platform, onboard computer, embedded software and input control devices to maneuver the vehicle.

Technical specifications:

Range as a missile (km): 3,600
Number of stages: 4
Stage diameters (m): 1
Total length (m): 19.8
Total weight (t): 50
Propellant weight (t): 41
Payload: 200 kg
Eq. circular orbit (km): 750
Status: Failed first launch, November 1997; second scheduled for late 1998.

Could Iraq Have the Atomic Bomb?

November 19, 1997March 29, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
November 19, 1997, p. A39

While the United States, Russia and other countries search for diplomatic solutions to the crisis in Iraq, the risk grows that the weapons inspectors will never again be able to do their jobs effectively. Last night, for example, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, proposed that in return for allowing the inspectors to go back to work, their efforts would have to be brought to a quick conclusion.

If the weapons inspections are at all compromised, however, the world could face the prospect of an Iraqi atomic bomb in three to five years.

Ever since the Persian Gulf war, Iraq’s nuclear weapon team has been busy designing a bomb. The latest blueprint, according to United Nations inspectors, is of a sphere measuring 32 to 35 inches in diameter with 32 detonators. The bomb would weigh less than a ton and fit on a Scud missile, the weapon Mr. Hussein used in the war to hit Israel and kill American troops.

Iraq has already successfully tested the bomb, using a “dummy” nonnuclear core. To complete it, Iraq needs only nuclear fuel, and the latest design requires a mere 35 pounds of highly enriched uranium. Inspectors believe they have destroyed almost all the equipment needed to produce such uranium, but the Iraqis know how to build or import what they need. Indeed, Iraqi scientists have made great strides in developing centrifuges, which can convert natural uranium to nuclear weapon grade. A few thousand centrifuges can produce enough high-grade uranium to fuel a few bombs per year.

Easily hidden inside an underground garage, these centrifuges would be invisible to U-2 spy planes monitoring Iraqi weapons development. Only inspectors on the ground have any hope of finding them.

Even under ideal conditions, putting a complete stop to weapons research is impossible; inspectors can’t arrest scientists or read their minds. But inspectors can detect the special manufacturing needed to create fuel for nuclear weapons.

Since inspectors have been in Iraq, they have sampled soil, air and water, “swiping” surfaces to detect suspect atomic elements and flying helicopters at low altitudes to sniff out undeclared nuclear activity.

All this work gave inspectors a good chance of detecting any bombs under construction. So long as short-notice inspections were allowed, there was a good chance, too, of seizing and destroying any and all manufacturing equipment before it could be moved.

But if inspections don’t resume, or are watered down, the Iraqis can reconstitute their efforts to build a nuclear bomb. In fact, they have already moved important equipment outside the range of monitoring cameras. Even if the inspection teams were to return to Iraq next week, they would have to retrieve hundreds of pieces of monitored equipment and then restart the accounting process. If Iraq resumes its weapons production, it will sink the international efforts to stop arms proliferation.

Despite these dangers, France and Russia have tried to rule out military action and to broker a compromise. Indeed, France, in its eagerness to placate Mr. Hussein, has proposed to close the books on new inspections and to rely mainly on monitoring the biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that have already been found.

But keeping track of what has already been found would not amount to a serious inspection effort — it would be “faking it,” in the words of one inspector. It would surrender all hope of finding the secret manufacturing operations — nuclear, chemical and biological — that remain the greatest threat posed by Iraq. There is no substitute for aggressive long-term inspections. The United States must insure that they continue.

Testimony: Supercomputer Export Controls – 1997

November 13, 1997April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the House Committee on National Security

November 13, 1997

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished Committee to discuss supercomputer export controls. I am a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, and I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research project here in Washington that is devoted to tracking and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

Recent sales and their impact

In April, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, I described the recent sale by Silicon Graphics, Inc., which shipped four American supercomputers to Chelyabinsk-70, the second most famous nuclear weapon laboratory in Russia, without obtaining the required U.S. export licenses. Chelyabinsk claims to have developed the world’s most powerful hydrogen bomb and is roughly equivalent to our Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Silicon Graphics delivered the computers in the autumn of 1996, at virtually the same time that the White House was turning down requests from IBM and Hewlett Packard to sell computers of equal power to Chelyabinsk.

These machines multiplied by a factor of roughly ten the computing power available to the Russians. They will allow Russia to design nuclear warheads cheaper and faster through simulations and to design more accurate long-range missiles. Russia can also use the machines to do encryption, or to design advanced conventional weapons. Because the machines were shipped without an export license, and are located at a site that is closed to the outside world, Russia can put them to any use it wants. In effect, Russia will continue the nuclear arms race on computers made in America.

We have recently learned more details about another sale of American supercomputers. Russia’s leading nuclear weapon laboratory, Arzamas-16, secretly bought supercomputers from IBM. Arzamas is the Russian equivalent of our Los Alamos National Laboratory. It too is closed to the outside world. According to a report in the New York Times, Arzamas acquired a series of sixteen IBM processing units that each operate at around 275 million operations per second (MTOPS) and together will perform roughly 3.3 billion operations per second. Russia also appears to have received a second IBM machine, called the SP-2, that may operate even faster. These computers too were delivered without the required export licenses, apparently in violation of U.S. export laws. So the Russians can now design weapons of mass destruction at two different sites with supercomputers imported illegally from the United States.

In April I also pointed out that Silicon Graphics sold an even more powerful supercomputer to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The computer was shipped in the spring of 1996, also without an export license. The computer was about twice as powerful as the ones sold to Russia. It performs approximately six billion operations per second.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences oversees institutes that perform missile and military research as well as research related to nuclear weapons. The Academy helped develop the DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. It has also developed advanced rocket propellant, guidance for torpedos, sonar for nuclear submarines, separation membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion, and its Institute of Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions.

The new computer is available through a network, so any Chinese organization that is designing nuclear weapons or long-range missiles can have access. In effect, Chinese weapon designers can use the Silicon Graphics machines to design lighter nuclear warheads to fit on longer-range and more accurate missiles capable of reaching U.S. cities.

Under investigation, or under the rug?

The Commerce Department has responded to these three cases only by saying that they are “under investigation.” But what, exactly, is there to investigate? The Silicon Graphics sale to Russia came to light almost nine months ago and the violation was clear. The computers required an export license if they operated faster than 2,000 MTOPS–which they did–and if they were sold to a military or nuclear site–which Chelyabinsk obviously is. Silicon Graphics had a duty to apply for an export license unless Silicon Graphics had affirmatively determined that the site was not military and was not nuclear, which Silicon Graphics did not do. Silicon Graphics thus violated the law, pure and simple. The Silicon Graphics sale to China was similar. The computer operated above 2,000 MTOPS and went directly to a buyer engaged in nuclear, missile and military work. It too needed an export license and did not have one.

The IBM system, like the ones sold by Silicon Graphics, operated above 2,000 MTOPS; thus, it required an export license if shipped to a military or nuclear site. Arzamas, like Chelyabinsk, is both military and nuclear. IBM, like Silicon Graphics, was required to ascertain whether the buyer was non-military and non-nuclear before making the shipment without a license, which IBM failed to do. IBM too seems to have violated the law.

There is no reason why the details of these cases should not be made public. The Russians know precisely what they got. Only the Congress and the American people are still in the dark. Given the gravity of the violations, and the flagrant way in which they occurred, this Committee should ask the Commerce Department to answer the following questions:

How many computers were shipped to Russia and China in these three cases and what were their operating speeds?
Were the computers installed by, or installed under the direction of, Silicon Graphics and/or IBM, as reported?
Is either Silicon Graphics or IBM still servicing these computers?
Does the Commerce Department think that these shipments did not require an export license?
Why haven’t the investigations been completed?
When will they be completed?

In my testimony in April, I pointed out that under the U.S. Export Administration Regulations, the burden is on the exporter to find out enough about the buyer to determine whether an exception to the license requirement is available. Silicon Graphics admits that it didn’t find out, but claimed the exception anyway. Its defense is that it didn’t ask enough questions. But that is no defense when you have an obligation to ask enough questions. Silicon Graphics either knew that its buyers were nuclear, missile or military sites, or it didn’t bother to find out. Either way, Silicon Graphics broke the law.

I have discussed this view of the export control regulations with career-level experts at the Commerce, Defense and Energy Departments. They all agree that it is correct, and that it is the basis upon which they presently administer export controls.

So why the delay? Why is nothing happening? Doesn’t the executive branch want to enforce the law? Or is the executive branch confused about what the law is? The phrase “under investigation” is beginning to mean “under the rug.”

To these cases one must add the now-celebrated McDonnell Douglas case. In that case, China deliberately diverted U.S. machine tools to a military aircraft and missile plant in 1994, and the case has been under investigation since then. When will that investigation end?

And on July 1, the press reported that yet another supercomputer had been diverted in China. A supercomputer manufactured by Sun Microsystems of Mountain View, California had wound up at China’s National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. The University, which is run by the People’s Liberation Army, does research and training in advanced weapons systems. It specializes in missile design, detonation physics, supercomputer development, and automatic target recognition. Scientists at Changsha planned to develop the next generation of Chinese weapons with American equipment.

In September, our government announced that China had agreed to return the supercomputer. The Commerce Department claimed the result was a victory for the safeguards system that the United States has in place for preventing diversions.

In fact, the United States has no such system. China’s diversion was a defeat for the Administration, and the decision to return the supercomputer was a victory for this Committee.

The diversion of the Sun supercomputer was discovered only after this Committee demanded an investigation to find out what had happened to the many American supercomputers that had been exported since early 1996, when the Administration slashed export controls. To satisfy Congress, the Commerce Department asked Sun Microsystems about its exports. Only then did Sun disclose the diversion. If Congress had not forced the Commerce Department to conduct an investigation, the Sun supercomputer would still be in China, helping to design advanced weapons.

Apparently, this case too is still “under investigation.”

I recommend that this Committee request a briefing on the status of all five of these cases. I also recommend that the Committee ask the General Accounting Office to evaluate the adequacy of the enforcement effort devoted to them and to a list of other recent cases that I have attached to my testimony. These are cases in which serious violations seem to have resulted in only a small fine, which an exporting company can simply consider a cost of doing business. If the executive branch lacks the will to investigate and prosecute export control violations, that fact should be established. If the executive branch lacks the personnel or the legal authority, then more resources should be committed and the laws should be strengthened.

Fixing a broken policy

The present policy on supercomputer exports is broken and needs to be fixed. In April, I recommended a change in the policy to the Subcommittee on Military Procurement. I am pleased that the full Committee concurred with my recommendation and amended the Defense Authorization Act. The amendment is now on President Clinton’s desk. If the President signs it, the amendment will help exporters and at the same time help slow the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The amendment is a boon to exporting companies. The burden is low and the benefit is high. The exporter need only notify the government of the name of the prospective buyer before exporting a computer performing more than 2,000 MTOPS. Then the government has ten days to determine whether the buyer is suspect. In exchange for this minimal effort, the seller has the benefit of keeping its product out of the wrong hands. Only in the few cases where the buyer appears suspect will an export license be required.

The amendment is also a bargain for the government. Without processing license applications, the government can keep track of the foreign companies that are importing U.S. supercomputers. If a foreign buyer is suspect, the government can get more information on the sale simply by requiring a license application. If the buyer proves too dangerous, the sale can be denied.

The amendment applies only to tier three countries, so the number of inquiries will be small. According to Commerce Department records, only 91 computers operating above 2,000 MTOPS were sold to tier three countries from early 1996 to the spring of this year. That is an average of only two per week. This would not create anything remotely like the “bureaucratic logjam” claimed by the White House in its October 20 letter to this Committee. Surely the Commerce Department can handle two inquiries per week in order to stop American supercomputers from contributing to arms proliferation. Because the Commerce Department is only processing one tenth as many licensing applications now as it did before the end of the cold war, there should still be sufficient staff to do the job.

The next step

Our export control system has broken down. After slashing export controls to the bone, the Commerce Department is now ignoring or minimizing violations of the few controls that remain. We are facing either a lack of will or ability to prosecute what appear to be clear and flagrant violations of present law. With judicial remedies lacking, other avenues must be considered or there will be no sanction at all for violations.

Given the present circumstances, I urge this Committee to consider additional sanctions through legislation. The general principle should be this: No American company willing to undermine U.S. security by contributing illegally to foreign weapon programs should be allowed to contract with similar programs in the United States.

If Silicon Graphics and IBM illegally help Russia and China maintain their nuclear arsenals, these companies should not be allowed to help us maintain ours. Exclusion from the U.S. stockpile maintenance program should be part of the punishment for illicit exports by an American computer company. This Committee has ample power to accomplish that change. I don’t have specific legislative language in mind, but I’m confident that the Committee’s able staff could come up with a way to implement this general principle. Our national security is at stake. It is vitally important that the laws protecting it be enforced. If the executive branch won’t enforce the law, Congress should.

Appendix One to TestimonyThere have been recent reports of what appear to be excessively lenient penalties imposed by the Department of Commerce for serious export control violations. To determine whether United States export laws are being adequately enforced, the General Accounting Office should evaluate the enforcement effort devoted to the recent actions against the following companies:

Allvac
New World Transtechnology
Doornbos GmbH
RMI Titanium
DATRAC AG
William A. Roessl
I.G.G. Corporation
Yuchai America Corporation
Sigma Chemical Company
Lansing Technologies Corporation
Dell Computer Corporation
Digital Creations Corporation
AAT Communications
Lasertechnics, Inc.
Advanced Vacuum Systems, Inc.

Syria Chemical Weapon Update – 1997

November 1, 1997April 5, 2017

In February 1997, CIA Director George Tenet had little trouble telling Congress that Syria was among those countries that “have or are actively developing chemical and biological weapons.” Syria is considered to have one of the most advanced chemical weapon programs in the Arab world. Mated with its fleet of ‘Scud’ ballistic missiles, Syria’s chemical weapons have become a significant threat to Israel.

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Syria began developing an offensive chemical warfare program in the early 1970s “as a result of a perceived Israeli threat.” Syria reportedly received its first chemical weapons from Egypt before the 1973 October War. Then, according to the CIA, Syria mounted its own chemical warfare program in the mid-1980s. Syria’s efforts have been located at the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS) in Damascus.

In 1990, the DIA reported that Syria had developed the nerve agent Sarin for use in 500kg aerial bombs and Scud B missile warheads. And in 1993, the DIA reported that Syria had developed aerial bombs and missile warheads for chemical agents and that there were two known chemical weapon depots: The Khan Abu Shamat Depot and the Furqlus Depot. In its most recent annual report to Congress, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that “it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability.”

Syria’s chemical arms have set off alarms in Israel, which has accused Syria recently of producing lethal VX nerve gas. In November 1996, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai told the press: “We know Syria [has] increased its production capacity, particularly that of VX….” Mordechai repeated the charge in May 1997, when he confirmed newspaper reports that he had discussed the matter with U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen.

Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has signed but not ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Foreign assistance

Syria’s chemical weapon effort has relied heavily on foreign help. Former CIA Director William Webster testified in 1989 that “West European firms were instrumental in supplying the required precursor chemicals and equipment. Without the provision of these key elements, Damascus would not have been able to produce chemical weapons.” In the mid 1980s, the German firm Schott Glasswerke sold corrosion-resistant glass laboratory equipment to a Damascus research institute/production plant. While Schott officials insisted they did not know the purpose of the equipment, U.S. officials believe that it was destined to be used in the production of sarin nerve gas.

In 1993, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) determined that the Soviet Union had played an instrumental role in developing Syria’s chemical weapon defensive capability but had provided no direct assistance to Syria’s offensive program. However, in 1996, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the DIA, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that a high Russian official, Anatoli Kuntsevich, “was implicated in a program to sell chemical weapons-related chemicals to Syria.” Kuntsevich was formerly in charge of the destruction of the Soviet chemical weapon production complex, but was sacked by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in April 1994 for “numerous and gross violations.” Hughes also noted that “it is unclear whether [Kuntsevich was removed]…..due to his proliferation activities.”

In November 1995, the U.S. Department of State determined that Kuntsevich had “engaged in chemical weapons proliferation activities” and imposed sanctions, prohibiting him from conducting business with the United States for at least one year. Kuntsevich has reportedly admitted that “shipments of small amounts” to Syria did occur, but he stressed that they were approved by the Russian government. The Russian foreign ministry has denied involvement in the sale of chemical weapons to Syria.

In late 1996, Defense News reported that Israeli officials at the December 1996 meeting of the U.S.-Israeli joint Political Military Group claimed that Russian scientists were helping Syria with the production of chemical and biological weapons, including sarin and VX nerve gases and anthrax. The Jerusalem Post reported that Israel has received intelligence reports for over two years that Syria had obtained the Russian version of VX.

In its 1993 report on Syria’s chemical weapon program, the DIA concluded that Syria would continue to produce chemical weapons, and that it would continue to require outside sources for equipment and precursor chemicals. Recent events and statements by Syrian officials indicate that this trend is continuing with no sign of abating.

Testimony: China’s WMD Exports

October 8, 1997April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

October 8, 1997

I am pleased to appear today before this distinguished Committee. I will direct my remarks to three subjects: First, China’s exports to countries that are trying to make weapons of mass destruction, second, the strategic impact of American exports to China, and third, nuclear cooperation between the United States and China.

China’s exports to proliferant countries

Today, China’s exports are the most serious proliferation threat in the world. They have been so for the past decade and a half. Since 1980, China has supplied billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile technology to South Asia, South Africa, South America and the Middle East. It has done so in the teeth of U.S. protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on, and while they do, they make it impossible for the United States and its allies to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I have attached tables to my testimony that list China’s exports of nuclear, chemical and missile technology since 1980. The tables reveal that China has consistently undermined U.S. nonproliferation efforts for nearly two decades and is still doing so today.

Missiles

In the early 1990s, Chinese companies were caught selling Pakistan M-11 missile components. The M-11 is an accurate, solid-fuel missile that can carry a nuclear warhead about 300 kilometers. In June 1991, the Bush administration sanctioned the two offending Chinese sellers. The sanctions were supposed to last for at least two years, but they were waived less than a year later, in March 1992, when China promised to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multinational agreement to restrict missile sales.

But the sales continued and in August 1993, the Clinton administration applied sanctions again for two years, after determining that China had violated the U.S. missile sanctions law a second time. Then in October 1994, the United States lifted the sanctions early again, when China pledged once more to stop its missile sales and comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Since 1994, the stream of missile exports has continued. U.S. satellites and human intelligence have watched missile technicians travel back and forth between Beijing and Islamabad and have watched steady transfers of missile-related equipment. U.S. officials say that China’s missile exports have continued up until the present moment, unabated.

In fact, our officials have learned that they were duped in 1992 and 1994. China was not promising what we thought it was. Our officials now realize that China interprets its promises in 1992 and 1994 so narrowly as to make them practically meaningless. It is clear that China has not complied with the Missile Technology Control Regime in the past, that it is not complying now, and that it probably never will comply unless something happens to change China’s attitude on this question.

In addition to its sales to Pakistan, China has also sold Saudi Arabia medium-range, nuclear-capable missiles, and sold Iran missile guidance components. The intelligence community has completed an air-tight finding of fact that the missile sale to Iran happened. All the legal and factual analysis necessary to apply sanctions has been finished since last year, but the findings have lain dormant since then. The State Department has chosen not to complete the administrative process because if it did, it would have to apply sanctions and give up its engagement policy. The sanctions law is not achieving either deterrence or punishment, as Congress intended.

In its latest venture, China is helping to build a plant to produce M-11 missiles in Pakistan. U.S. officials say that activity at the plant is “very high.” If the Chinese continue to help at their present rate, the plant could be ready for missile production within a year. This activity, combined with the State Department’s refusal to apply sanctions to China, means that the United States is now giving a green light to one of the most dangerous missile plants in the world.

Poison gas

In addition to missiles, China has been selling the means to make poison gas. In 1995 I discovered, and wrote in the New York Times, that the United States had caught China exporting poison gas ingredients to Iran, and that the sales had been going on for at least three years. In 1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for mixing precursor chemicals. The shipments also included 400 tons of chemicals useful for making nerve agents.

The result is that by now, in 1997, China has been outfitting Iran with ingredients and equipment to make poison gas for at least five years. U.S. officials say that the poison gas sales are continuing despite our government’s decision in May 1997 to sanction five Chinese individuals and two companies for contributing to Iran’s chemical weapons program.

Nuclear weapons

China has also been the leading proliferator of nuclear weapon technology in the world. China gave Pakistan nearly everything it needed to make its first atomic bomb. In the early 1980s, China gave Pakistan a tested nuclear weapon design and enough high-enriched uranium to fuel it. This has to be one of the most egregious acts of nuclear proliferation in history. Then, China helped Pakistan produce high-enriched uranium with gas centrifuges. More recently, it has helped Pakistan build a reactor to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons, and has helped Pakistan increase the number of its centrifuges so it can boost its production of high-enriched uranium.

China’s most recent export was of specialized ring magnets, which are used in the suspension bearings of gas centrifuge rotors. The sale was revealed in early 1996. The magnets were shipped directly to a secret nuclear weapon production site in Pakistan, and were sent without requiring international inspection. The seller was a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation, an arm of the Chinese government. In my opinion, this export violated China’s pledge under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it joined in 1992. Article III of the Treaty forbids the sale of such items without requiring international inspection. The sale also violated China’s pledge under the Article I of the Treaty not to help other countries make nuclear weapons. Yet, the State Department has not sanctioned China for this sale, or even complained about it publicly.

There is also concern within the U.S. government that Pakistani scientists may be receiving nuclear weapon related information through their visits to the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. The Academy designs China’s nuclear weapons.

Iran is the next candidate for China’s nuclear help. The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) has been helping Iran prospect for uranium. Attached to my testimony is a picture of this Institute’s personnel prospecting in Iran. Any uranium it finds is likely to go directly into Iran’s nuclear weapon program. This Institute is part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). I have also included a picture of the Deputy Chief of the China National Nuclear Corporation posing with Reza Amrollahi, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. China has apparently promised to stop this activity, but this promise, like China’s other promises, must be treated with skepticism.

China has also been talking to Iran about selling a 25 to 30 megawatt nuclear reactor, which is an ideal size for making a few nuclear weapons per year. Also on the horizon is a plant to produce uranium hexafluoride from uranium concentrate, a step necessary to enrich uranium for use in atomic bombs.

These latter two sales are being held over our heads like swords. If we don’t start cooperating more with China in the nuclear area, then China will complete these two dangerous export deals with Iran. This amounts to nuclear blackmail.

The conclusion has to be that our engagement policy toward China has failed. The policy is not producing any change in China’s behavior, nor even producing engagement. The negotiation process is effectively dead. The Chinese are not even talking to us about their chemical and missile exports. We are simply watching the Chinese shipments go out, without any hope of stopping them. All our present policy has produced is a new missile factory in Pakistan, an upgraded nuclear weapon factory in Pakistan and new chemical weapon plants in Iran. In time, it will probably produce a nuclear weapon factory in Iran.

This failure will be compounded if the United States begins nuclear trade with China without stopping these exports. If we sell China nuclear reactors while China is still selling missiles and poison gas ingredients to Iran and Pakistan, what will we be saying to the world? The message will be that no matter how bad China’s exports are, we still can’t resist making a buck from our own exports. No wonder China doesn’t take us seriously. The United States should not begin exporting nuclear technology to China until China stops exporting mass destruction technology to other countries. It would be folly to “de-link” nuclear proliferation from other forms of proliferation.

Buying from America and exporting to Iran

There is considerable evidence that American technology may be fueling some of these dangerous Chinese exports. I have listed two cases where this appears to have happened. There are undoubtedly others.

Case #1: The C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles

Iran recently bought these new anti-ship missiles from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC). Admiral John Redd, our naval commander in the Persian Gulf, took the unusual step of complaining publicly about the sale. Iran appears to have up to 60 of these missiles so far, plus fast attack boats to carry them. The missiles are a threat to our ships and sailors in the Gulf and they are also a threat to commercial shipping.

It seems quite likely that these missiles were built with help from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed the sensitive, controlled equipment that the U.S. Commerce Department approved for export to China Precision Machinery from 1989 to 1993. It includes computer workstations for the simulation of wind effects, analyzers and computer equipment. The ability to simulate wind effects is something the designer of an anti-ship missile could find quite useful. I would like to emphasize that all of this equipment was deemed so sensitive that it required an individual validated export license to leave the United States.

I have attached a print-out from the database that my Project publishes. It is called the Risk Report. It lists the companies around the world that are suspected of contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It includes China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which was sanctioned in 1993 by the United States for exporting missile components to Pakistan.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build anti-ship missiles to threaten our sailors? The answer may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

Case #2: Air surveillance radar

Iran recently imported a powerful surveillance radar from the China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. The radar is now part of Iran’s air defense system, and it can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away. If the United States ever comes to blows with Iran, American pilots will have to contend with it.

This radar too seems to have been built with help from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed the sensitive, controlled equipment that the U.S. Commerce Department approved for export to China National Electronics from 1989 to 1993. It totals $9.7 million. It includes things like equipment for microwave research, a very large scale integrated system for testing integrated circuits, equipment for making semiconductors, and a shipment of computer gear worth $4.3 million. All of this equipment appears highly useful for developing radar, and all of it was deemed so sensitive that it required an individual validated export license to leave the United States.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build air defenses? The answer may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

I would like to point out that in these two cases, the exports were approved under the Bush Administration. I urge the Committee to obtain and study the exports approved under the Clinton Administration. The generally pro-export stance of the Clinton Administration leads one to suspect that China is importing even more sensitive high-technology from the United States today. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for effective Congressional oversight of our export licensing process. The lack of Congressional oversight was one of the main reasons why the Commerce Department approved so many sensitive American exports to Iraq before the Gulf War.

In addition to these two cases, other Chinese organizations involved in military or nuclear weapon work have either received sensitive American products or may do so soon.

A fusion reactor

In 1993-94, the Institute of Plasma Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences transferred a nuclear fusion research reactor to the Azad University in Tehran. The reactor is a training device ostensibly used for peaceful purposes. Despite this help to Iran, and despite being a well-known contributor to China’s nuclear and missile programs, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer from Silicon Graphics, Inc.

So if the question is: what happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran do nuclear research? The answer is: It can import an American supercomputer.

Uranium exploration

I have mentioned above the uranium prospecting in Iran by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches uranium for nuclear weapons, and it is also involved in the development of Pakistan’s secret nuclear reactor at Khusab. A CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at Chashma. CNNC would be the key player in any nuclear cooperation agreement that might be implemented between the United States and China. Right now, our government, under pressure from Westinghouse, is planning to revive the cooperation agreement that has been stalled since 1984 because of China’s bad proliferation behavior.

If the question is: What happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran prospect for uranium and helps Pakistan make nuclear weapons? The answer is: the United States government tries to find a way to sell it American nuclear technology.

None of these Chinese missile, nuclear and military organizations is on the Commerce Department’s list of dangerous buyers. American exporters are free to sell these companies sensitive dual use equipment as long as the equipment is not on the small list of items that are still controlled for export. These organizations could get a high-speed American computer–performing up to two billion operations per second–without an export license, or in some cases up to seven billion if the exporter could claim that it did not know what the buyer was up to.

The names of these four organizations should be added to the Commerce Department’s list immediately. So should several others such as China North Industries Corporation (Norinco). Its Hong Kong subsidiary was shut down in July by the Hong Kong government for smuggling materials to make poison gas to Iran, and in 1996 its employees were indicted for conspiring to import 2,000 automatic weapons into California for street gangs.

I urge this Committee to ask the U.S. intelligence agencies why these companies have not been listed. I am convinced that our government–and in particular our intelligence agencies–should be doing more to help exporters avoid dangerous sales.

Diverting American equipment

On July 1, the press reported that yet another sensitive American export had been diverted in China. A supercomputer manufactured by Sun Microsystems of Mountain View, California had wound up at China’s National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. The University, which is run by the People’s Liberation Army, does research and training in advanced weapons systems. It specializes in missile design, detonation physics, supercomputer development, and automatic target recognition. Scientists at Changsha plan to develop the next generation of Chinese weapons with American equipment.

Last month, our government announced that China had agreed to return the supercomputer. The Commerce Department claimed that this result was a victory, and that it was due to a safeguards system that the United States has in place for preventing diversions.

In fact, the United States has no such system. China’s diversion was a defeat for the Administration, and the decision to return the supercomputer was a victory for Congress.

The diversion of the Sun supercomputer was discovered only after Congress demanded an investigation to find out what had happened to the many American supercomputers that had been exported since early 1996, when the Administration slashed export controls. To satisfy Congress, the Commerce Department asked Sun Microsystems about its exports. Only then did Sun disclose the diversion. If Congress had not forced the Commerce Department to conduct an investigation, the Sun supercomputer would still be in China, helping to design advanced weapons.

The Sun diversion is not an isolated case. In 1994, China wanted to import sensitive American machine tools that had been used to build the B-1 strategic bomber. To do so, China promised the U.S. government that the machines would be used to make civilian aircraft in Beijing. Instead, the machines were diverted immediately to a missile and military aircraft factory in Nanchang. Satellite photos have since revealed that at the very time the Chinese were promising to use the machines in Beijing, the Chinese were constructing a special building in Nanchang to house one of the largest ones, a stretch press. China intentionally committed fraud to get the equipment.

The Commerce Department now admits that China has imported at least 47 American supercomputers since early 1996 without export licenses. The press reports that the real figure is much higher. These imports were made possible by the Clinton Administration’s decision in late 1995 to slash export controls. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, which helps develop China’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, bought a supercomputer from Silicon Graphics, Inc. that performs approximately six billion operations per second.

According to Chinese government publications, the Academy of Sciences oversees institutes that perform missile and military research as well as research related to nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, the Academy helped develop the flight computer for the DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy’s Mechanics Institute has developed advanced rocket propellant and helped develop the shield for the warhead of China’s first ICBM. The Academy’s Institute of Electronics has built synthetic aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3 torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.

In the nuclear field, the Academy has developed separation membranes to enrich uranium by gaseous diffusion, and its Institute of Mechanics has studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions. It has also studied the stability of plasma in controlled nuclear fusion. Its Institute of Electronics has developed various kinds of lasers used in atomic isotope separation.

According to information published by Silicon Graphics, the supercomputer it sold to the Academy is now the “most powerful SMP supercomputer in China,” and provides China “computational power previously unknown.” According to information that I have received from industry sources, the most powerful computers previously sold to China operated at approximately 1.5 billion operations per second. If this information is accurate, the Silicon Graphics machine is roughly four times more powerful than anything China had before.

The new computer, which was financed by a loan from the World Bank, has become the centerpiece of the Academy’s new Computer Network Information Center. According to the Academy, the computer is now available to “all the major scientific and technological institutes across China.” This means that any Chinese organization that is designing nuclear weapons or long-range missiles has access to it. In effect, Chinese weapon designers can use the Silicon Graphics machines to design lighter nuclear warheads to fit on longer-range and more accurate missiles capable of reaching U.S. cities. This is a giant loss for U.S. security.

Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and China

Chinese President Jiang Zemin is scheduled to visit the United States at the end of this month. In preparation for this event, the Clinton Administration is planning to certify that China has stopped helping other countries develop nuclear weapons. This certification, which no other American President has been willing to make for the past 12 years, would open the door for U.S. companies such as Westinghouse to sell China nuclear reactors.

The certification is based on a statement on May 11, 1996, by an unidentified spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry in response to a reporter’s question. The spokesman said that “China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” The Administration contends that China has not broken that promise for the past 16 months, and therefore, China has stopped helping other countries develop nuclear weapons.

First, there is the factual question: Is this true? I recommend that the Committee get a briefing from the intelligence agencies describing all of China’s nuclear aid to other countries since May 1996. The briefing should include information on whether China is still helping Iran prospect for uranium, and whether Pakistani scientists are receiving nuclear weapon related technology through visits to Chinese nuclear weapon sites.

Second, is the promise adequate? China is only promising not to aid facilities; it will remain free to aid programs. Pakistan’s program has unsafeguarded facilities that are producing nuclear weapons. China will continue to aid that program, and China’s aid will inevitably spill over into bomb-making. An atom cannot tell whether it is military or civilian.

China, in fact, is the only nuclear supplier country that refuses to require full-scope safeguards on its exports. Full-scope means requiring that all of a country’s facilities be under international inspection, which would bar aid to countries like Pakistan. In effect, China is trying to reap the benefits of nuclear trade without shouldering the burdens. With one hand, China wants to import American nuclear technology. With the other, it wants to help Pakistan’s nuclear bomb program. China should be required to make a choice. If China wants nuclear trade with the United States, it can give up nuclear trade with Pakistan. That is the only deal the United States should be willing to make.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN SUPPLIERS TO IRANCase #1

Product: C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles
Supplier: China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC)

Comments:
Iran has been steadily increasing its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and according to Admiral John Redd, Commander of U.S. naval forces attached to the Central Command, has tested a ship borne C-802 anti-ship cruise missile in January 1996. These missiles are deployed on Hudong Fast Attack Craft also supplied by China in 1994. Iran is believed to have obtained about 60 of the missiles, which are capable of destroying a warship, and could also pose a significant threat to commercial shipping in the Gulf. Iran reportedly tested a shore-launched C-802 in December 1995.

The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) manufactures and markets the C-802. It is a long range, sea-skimming, multi-purpose anti-ship missile, powered by a turbojet engine. It can be deployed on warships, coastal bases, and aircraft. It can carry a warhead at high subsonic speed (Mach 0.9) to a range of 120 kilometers (75 miles) and is considered to be more sophisticated than the older Silkworm.

Iran has also obtained and deployed the C-801 anti-ship missile from CPMIEC. The smaller C-801 has a range of 40 kilometers and can also travel at high subsonic (Mach 0.9) speeds.

China Precision Machinery was sanctioned by the U.S. government in August 1993 for missile proliferation activities.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CPMIEC from 1989 to 1993:

modems for data transmission – $32,628
modems for data transmission – $6,630
cables and adapters for a macroware system – $45,834
computer workstation for simulation of wind effects – $43,700
analyzers – $4,876
computer equipment – $7,707Total: 141,375

Case #2

Product: JY-14 three-dimensional tactical air surveillance radar
Supplier: China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC)

Comments:
According to U.S. Naval Intelligence, Iran recently acquired this tactical air surveillance radar from China. It can provide long-range tactical surveillance as part of an automated tactical air defense system. It can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away and at altitudes up to 75,000 feet, even when subjected to high electronic clutter or jamming. The system also provides automatic tracking and reporting of up to 100 targets. CEIEC also manufactures cryptographic systems, radars, mine detection equipment, fiber and laser optics, and communications technologies and is overseen by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), which is also known as the China Electronics Industry Corporation (CEIC) or Chinatron.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CEIEC from 1989 to 1993:

radio communication service monitor – $21,754
computer equipment and software – $4,375,000
personal computers and processor boards – $1,579,830
protocol tester for telecommunications – $4,100
equipment for basic microwave research – $10,916
traveling wave tube amplifier – $33,600
microwave frequency counter – $6,124
statistical multiplexer systems and accessory boards – $75,632
statistical multiplexers for use in data communications network – $65,120
integrated circuits – $17,326
computer equipment – $46,022
computer equipment – $29,094
equipment for circuit board design – $9,580
computer chips – $1,820
computer software – $105,000
equipment for semiconductor manufacture – $107,000
equipment for sweep generators for resale to Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry – $32,000
equipment for semiconductor wafer testing – $82,610
computer equipment – $1,924
computer equipment – $10,457
computer equipment for oil reservoir numerical simulation – $92,916
computer equipment – $32,500
switching exchanges – $1,269,047
phosphorus oxychloride (nerve gas precursor) for transistor manufacture – $7,397
export telephone system – $15,000
circuit design software – $243,160
VLSI system to test integrated circuits – $1,315,000
transistors and amplifiers – $13,648
electronic equipment – $32,610
equipment for electronic component testing – $60,000Total: $9,696,117

Case #3

Product: Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor
Supplier: Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Plasma Physics

Comments:
The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Plasma Physics transferred a HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion research facility to the Azad University in Tehran in 1993-94. The Institute designed and developed the Tokamak in the mid-1980s and successfully operated the unit for 10 years, after which it was transferred to Azad. In 1994, the Institute sent technicians and engineers to Azad to assist in the unit’s installation and debugging, with the understanding that the two sides would continue joint nuclear fusion research in the future.

U.S. Exports: Despite being a well-known contributor to Iran’s nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer. In March 1996, California-based Silicon Graphics Inc., sold the Academy a powerful supercomputer without bothering to obtain a U.S. export license. In addition to supplying Iran, the Academy has helped develop the flight computer for the Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy’s Mechanics Institute has also developed advanced rocket propellant, developed hydrogen- and oxygen-fueled rockets, and helped develop the nose cone for the nuclear warhead of the DF-5. Its Shanghai Institute of Silicate successfully developed the carbon/quartz material used to shield the tip of the DF-5’s reentry vehicle from the heat created by friction with the earth’s atmosphere. The Academy’s Institute of Electronics has built synthetic aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3 torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.

Case #4

Product: Uranium mining exploration
Supplier: Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG)

Comments:
BRIUG conducts scientific exchanges with Iranian and Pakistani nuclear scientists.

As part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), BRIUG carries out research on radio metrical and conventional geophysical uranium prospecting methods and conducts geological interpretations throughout China using satellite images. It develops and designs spectrometers, laser fluorometers for trace uranium analysis, mineral inclusion analyzers, scintillation radon analyzers, scintillation spectrometers, laser analyzers for trace substances, and high and low frequency dielectric separators. BRIUG also conducts research on geological disposal of nuclear waste, and possesses scientific equipment including neutron activation analyzers, electron microscopes, electron microprobes, mass spectrometers, X-ray fluoro-spectrometers, X-ray diffractometers, infrared spectrophotometers, ultraviolet spectrophotometers, atomic absorption spectrophotometers, laser raman spectrophotometers, fluoro-spectrophotometers, gas chromatography analyzers, fluid chromatography analyzers, image processing system and computer and color plotter systems.

BRIUG’s parent, CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches uranium for nuclear weapons. CNNC is also involved in the development of Pakistan’s secret research reactor at Khusab and a CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at Chashma.

Dangerous Exports Table

Testimony: Iran’s WMD Helpers

May 6, 1997April 3, 2017 By Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

May 6, 1997

I am pleased to appear today before this distinguished Subcommittee, which has asked me to discuss the question of who is helping Iran build weapons of mass destruction. The Subcommittee has also asked whether the United States needs to do more to discourage Iran’s helpers.

There is no doubt that Iran is aggressively trying to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. There is also no doubt that Iran has already built chemical weapons. Iran’s progress in all these efforts has depended almost entirely on outside help, and will continue to depend on it in the future.

Specific cases

A great deal is known about who is supplying Iran. I would like to begin by looking at some specific cases. I have listed them in the appendix to my testimony:

Case #1: The C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles.

Iran recently imported this new anti-ship missile from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC). Admiral John Redd, our naval commander in the Persian Gulf, took the unusual step of complaining publicly about the sale. Iran appears to have up to 60 of these missiles so far, plus fast attack boats to carry them. The missiles are a threat to our sailors and to commercial shipping in the Gulf.

Unfortunately, these missiles may have been built with help from the United States. In the appendix to my testimony, I have listed the sensitive equipment that the U.S. Commerce Department approved for export to China Precision Machinery from 1989 to 1993. It includes things like computer workstations for the simulation of wind effects, analyzers and computer equipment. The ability to simulate wind effects is something the designer of an anti-ship missile could find quite useful. I would like to emphasize that all of this equipment was deemed so sensitive that it required an individual validated export license to leave the United States.

I have also attached a print-out from the database that my Project publishes. It is called the Risk Report. It lists the companies around the world that are suspected of contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Includes China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which was sanctioned in 1993 by the United States for exporting missile components to Pakistan. It markets the M-family of nuclear-capable missiles.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build anti-ship missiles to threaten our sailors? The answer may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

Case #2: Air surveillance radar.

If the question is: Who has been helping Iran build air defenses? The answer, again, may well be: The U.S. Commerce Department.

I would like to point out that in these two cases, the exports were all approved under the Bush Administration. I urge the Subcommittee to obtain and study the exports approved under the Clinton Administration. This Subcommittee has the right to obtain all Commerce Department records on export licensing. The generally pro-export stance of the Clinton Administration leads one to suspect that China is importing even more sensitive high-technology from the United States today. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for effective Congressional oversight of our export licensing process. The lack of Congressional oversight was one of the main reasons why so the Commerce Department approved so many sensitive American exports to Iraq before the Gulf War.

Case #3: A fusion reactor.

In 1993-94, the Institute of Plasma Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences transferred a nuclear fusion research reactor to the Azad University in Tehran. The reactor is a training device ostensibly used for peaceful purposes. As we know, however, Iran is using its nuclear knowledge to build nuclear weapons. In addition to supplying Iran, the Academy has helped develop the flight computer and the nose cone for the Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy has also studied the effects of underground nuclear weapon tests and ways to protect against nuclear explosions.

Despite all these activities, and despite being a well-known contributor to Iran’s nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer. In March 1996, California-based Silicon Graphics Inc., sold the Academy a powerful supercomputer without bothering to obtain a U.S. export license. The computer is now part of a network linking all of China’s high-tech institutes and universities, which means the computer is accessible to anyone in China who is designing a nuclear weapon or a strategic missile.

So if the question is: what happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran do nuclear research? The answer is: It can import an American supercomputer.

Case #4: Uranium exploration.

The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) prospects for uranium around the world. Attached to my testimony is a picture of this Institute prospecting in Iran. Any uranium it finds is likely to go directly into Iran’s nuclear weapon program. This Institute is part of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). I have also included a picture of the Deputy Chief of the China National Nuclear Corporation posing with Reza Amrollahi, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

CNNC has been implicated in the sale of ring magnets to the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, which enriches uranium for nuclear weapons. CNNC is also involved in the development of Pakistan’s secret nuclear reactor at Khusab and a CNNC subsidiary is currently constructing a power reactor for Pakistan at Chashma. CNNC would be the key player in any nuclear cooperation agreement that might be implemented between the United States and China. Right now, the Administration, under pressure from Westinghouse, is planning to revive the cooperation agreement that has been stalled since 1984 because of China’s bad proliferation behavior.

If the question is: What happens to a Chinese organization that helps Iran prospect for uranium and helps Pakistan make nuclear weapons? The answer is: Westinghouse and the Clinton Administration try to find a way to sell it American nuclear technology.

Patterns of supply

In addition to these specific cases, there are patterns of supply. These too are well known. In 1995 I discovered, and wrote in the New York Times, that the United States had caught China exporting poison gas ingredients to Iran, and that the sales had been going on for at least three years. The State Department sanctioned the front companies that handled the paperwork, but did nothing to the Chinese sellers for fear of hurting U.S. trade relations.

China’s poison gas shipments have only become worse since then. In 1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for mixing precursor chemicals. The shipments also included 400 tons of chemicals useful for making nerve agents.

The result is that by now, in 1997, China has been outfitting Iran with ingredients and equipment to make poison gas for at least five years. When I spoke to U.S. officials recently, I asked them whether there was any change in China’s export behavior on poison gas. They said that the poison gas sales had continued to the present time, unabated. On April 10, 1997, in testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Einhorn confirmed this fact.

There is no reason to think this pattern will change as long as the United States follows its current policy of “constructive engagement.” Last fall, the executive branch finished a number of studies on China’s missile and chemical exports to Iran and Pakistan. The studies contained all the legal and factual analysis necessary to apply sanctions, but they have lain dormant since then. The State Department has chosen not to complete the administrative process because if it did, it would have to apply sanctions and give up its engagement policy. At present, the sanctions law is not achieving either deterrence or punishment, as Congress intended.

This lack of an American reaction has encouraged China to harden its position. China is now saying, explicitly, that it will not even talk to us about missile and chemical proliferation unless we are willing, at the same time, to discuss restraints on our arms sales to Taiwan. The arms sales, of course, are caused by China’s threat to Taiwan. And to make matters worse, the Chinese are beginning to complain about our policy of providing theater missile defenses to countries like Japan that might be vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks. The Chinese say that this is another form of missile proliferation.

Nuclear blackmail

In addition to poison gas technology, China is also helping Iran in the nuclear domain. China has agreed to sell Iran a 25 to 30 megawatt nuclear reactor, which is an ideal size for making a few nuclear weapons per year. And China has also agreed to sell Iran a plant to produce uranium hexaflouride from uranium concentrate.

The hexaflouride plant is essential to enrich uranium for use in atomic bombs. Bombs fueled by enriched uranium have become the holy grail of developing countries trying to join the nuclear club. Such bombs are easier to make than those fueled by plutonium because uranium is easier to work with, less toxic, and easier to detonate with confidence that a substantial nuclear yield will result. Iraq was close to making a uranium bomb when the Gulf War began. The first bomb ever dropped was a uranium bomb that the United States released over Hiroshima without having to test it.

There is no peaceful use for enriched uranium in Iran. Enriched uranium is used to fuel reactors, but the only reactors in Iran that could use such fuel are being supplied by Russia, which is also supplying their fuel. The conclusion has to be that Iran wants to use this plant to make atomic bombs. The fact that China is even considering this deal shows that China is quite ready to put nuclear weapon-making capability into the hands of what the United States regards as a terrorist nation.

These two sales have not been finalized. In effect, they are being held over our heads like swords. If we don’t agree to implement our stalled nuclear cooperation agreement with China, which would allow China access to American nuclear technology, then China will complete these two dangerous export deals with Iran. This is essentially nuclear blackmail.

Russia is Iran’s other main nuclear supplier. In 1995, Russia agreed to supply Iran two light water power reactors plus a string of “sweeteners.” The “sweeteners” are sensitive items that should not in good conscience be exported, but which suppliers throw in to sweeten a larger deal. In this case, the sweeteners were a centrifuge plant to enrich uranium, a 30-50 megawatt research reactor, 2000 tons of natural uranium, and training. The centrifuge plant was canceled; the training is apparently going forward; the status of the research reactor and the uranium is unclear.

This deal too included some blackmail. The enrichment plant would only serve to make nuclear weapons, for the reasons I have already stated, and the same is true of the natural uranium. The research reactor would have been ideal, like the Chinese one, for making a bomb or two per year. Minatom, the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, was quite prepared to supply all of these items. Minatom only agreed to cancel or suspend them in a “compromise” to make the power reactor deal look better. The message from the Russians is clear: If you don’t like the reactor deal, how would you like a centrifuge deal?

Missiles

Both China and Russia are helping Iran make missiles. In June, 1995, the New York Times reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that China had supplied “dozens and perhaps hundreds” of missile guidance systems to Iran, along with computerized machine tools. In July, Jane’s Defense Weeklyreported that U.S. officials had confirmed that China had sold Iran rocket propellant ingredients as well as the guidance components. This case is the subject of one of the studies that is now languishing in the State Department.

In February of this year, the Washington Times reported that Russia had sold Iran plans for building the 1,240-mile range SS-4 missile, together with guidance components, and that U.S. Vice President Al Gore protested the sale during talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. If this report is true, it could help Iran take an important step forward in its nuclear missile program. According to the Nuclear Weapons Databook, the SS-4 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile capable of carrying a one megaton nuclear warhead. Its diameter is 1.65 meters (65 inches), almost twice that of Iran’s existing Scud-B. The larger diameter of the SS-4 would allow Iran to mount a much larger warhead, thus reducing the problem of miniaturization for a first-generation nuclear device.

Realistic export controls

Because the United States has little diplomatic leverage with Iran, export controls are the main vehicle for impeding Iran’s efforts. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration’s decision to slash export controls had made it much easier for Iran to get what it needs.

Dubai is an example. In our database, we have listed 22 Iranian companies operating in Dubai’s free trade zone, the main purpose of which is to handle re-exports, frequently to Iran. These companies are legally off-limits to American exporters because of the U.S. embargo against Iran, but the companies are probably getting U.S. goods anyway because U.S. exporters have no way of knowing the companies are Iranian. The U.S. Commerce Department has never published a list of Iranian companies operating in Dubai. In fact, after the Commerce Department’s recent decontrol of high-speed computers, U.S. companies can now ship powerful supercomputers (operating at up to 7 billion operations per second) to buyers in Dubai without an export license. And because Dubai has no effective export control system, there is nothing to prevent these supercomputers from going on to Iran or anywhere else. Iran now imports more goods through Dubai than through its own ports. The lesson here is that you cannot slash controls on exports to everyone in the world except the “rogue nations” and expect the rogues not to get things through retransfers.

We need a global policy on export controls, but we don’t have one. The United States is following the same policy toward China today that it followed toward Iraq before the Gulf War. It can be summed up as: “Hold your nose and export.” China’s nuclear, chemical and missile exports to Iran and Pakistan have been greeted by the same American silence that greeted Iraq’s effort to smuggle nuclear weapon triggers out of the United States before the Gulf War. Rather than apply sanctions, or even complain publicly about Iraq’s violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the State Department chose “constructive engagement.” It would be better to maintain our influence with Saddam Hussein through trade, the State Department argued. By selling him what he wanted, we would bring Saddam into the mainstream of nations. Sanctions would only hurt American exporters and allow the Europeans and the Japanese to get all the business. It is now clear what that strategy produced. The United States was lucky. If Saddam had not been foolish enough to invade Kuwait, we would be facing a nuclear-armed Iraq with its shadow over most of the world’s oil supply.

America’s European allies are also following this same policy of constructive engagement toward Iran–a policy that the United States officially deplores. The United States now maintains a complete trade embargo against Iran, but our European allies have refused to join. They have refused in part because they want the export earnings, but also because they regard the U.S. position as hypocritical. They justly observe that the Clinton Administration, while giving lip-service to arms control and nonproliferation, routinely subordinates these objectives to commercial interests. The Administration decided at the outset of its tenure to promote U.S. exports as its primary foreign policy objective. But if the United States can hold its nose and trade with China, why can’t the Europeans and the Russians hold their noses and trade with Iran? In fact, most of the countries that worry Washington are interconnected, so the failure to confront proliferation by one usually means there will be a failure to confront proliferation by others.

I believe that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons within the next ten years unless something intervenes to stop the current effort. If the Gulf War had not intervened to stop Iraq, Saddam Hussein would have had nuclear weapons by now. When Iran does get the bomb, the Clinton Administration’s decision to slash export controls will be one of the main reasons for Iran’s success.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN SUPPLIERS TO IRANCase #1

Product: C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles
Supplier: China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC)

Comments: Iran has been steadily increasing its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and according to Admiral John Redd, Commander of U.S. naval forces attached to the Central Command, has tested a ship borne C-802 anti-ship cruise missile in January 1996. These missiles are deployed on Hudong Fast Attack Craft also supplied by China in 1994. Iran is believed to have obtained about 60 of the missiles, which are capable of destroying a warship, and could also pose a significant threat to commercial shipping in the Gulf. Iran reportedly tested a shore-launched C-802 in December 1995.

Iran has also obtained and deployed the C-801 anti-ship missile from CPMIEC. The smaller C-801 has a range of 40 kilometers and can also travel at high subsonic (Mach 0.9) speeds.

China Precision Machinery was sanctioned by the U.S. government in August 1993 for missile proliferation activities.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CPMIEC from 1989 to 1993:

modems for data transmission – $32,628
modems for data transmission – $6,630
cables and adapters for a macroware system – $45,834
computer workstation for simulation of wind effects – $43,700
analyzers – $4,876
computer equipment – $7,707
Total: 141,375

Case #2

Product: JY-14 three-dimensional tactical air surveillance radar
Supplier: China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation (CEIEC)

Comments: According to U.S. Naval Intelligence, Iran recently acquired this tactical air surveillance radar from China. It can provide long-range tactical surveillance as part of an automated tactical air defense system. It can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away and at altitudes up to 75,000 feet, even when subjected to high electronic clutter or jamming. The system also provides automatic tracking and reporting of up to 100 targets. CEIEC also manufactures cryptographic systems, radars, mine detection equipment, fiber and laser optics, and communications technologies and is overseen by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), which is also known as the China Electronics Industry Corporation (CEIC) or Chinatron.

U.S. Exports: U.S. Commerce Departments records show that the following items were approved for export to CEIEC from 1989 to 1993:

radio communication service monitor – $21,754
computer equipment and software – $4,375,000
personal computers and processor boards – $1,579,830
protocol tester for telecommunications – $4,100
equipment for basic microwave research – $10,916
traveling wave tube amplifier – $33,600
microwave frequency counter – $6,124
statistical multiplexer systems and accessory boards – $75,632
statistical multiplexers for use in data communications network – $65,120
integrated circuits – $17,326
computer equipment – $46,022
computer equipment – $29,094
equipment for circuit board design – $9,580
computer chips – $1,820
computer software – $105,000
equipment for semiconductor manufacture – $107,000
equipment for sweep generators for resale to Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry – $32,000
equipment for semiconductor wafer testing – $82,610
computer equipment – $1,924
computer equipment – $10,457
computer equipment for oil reservoir numerical simulation – $92,916
computer equipment – $32,500
switching exchanges – $1,269,047
phosphorus oxychloride (nerve gas precursor) for transistor manufacture – $7,397
export telephone system – $15,000
circuit design software – $243,160
VLSI system to test integrated circuits – $1,315,000
transistors and amplifiers – $13,648
electronic equipment – $32,610
equipment for electronic component testing – $60,000
Total: $9,696,117

Case #3

Product: Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor
Supplier: Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Plasma Physics

Comments: The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Plasma Physics transferred a HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion research facility to the Azad University in Tehran in 1993-94. The Institute designed and developed the Tokamak in the mid-1980s and successfully operated the unit for 10 years, after which it was transferred to Azad. In 1994, the Institute sent technicians and engineers to Azad to assist in the unit’s installation and debugging, with the understanding that the two sides would continue joint nuclear fusion research in the future.

U.S. Exports: Despite being a well-known contributor to Iran’s nuclear program, the Academy of Sciences managed recently to import an American supercomputer. In March 1996, California-based Silicon Graphics Inc., sold the Academy a powerful supercomputer without bothering to obtain a U.S. export license. In addition to supplying Iran, the Academy has helped develop the flight computer for the Chinese DF-5 intercontinental missile, which can target U.S. cities with nuclear warheads. The Academy’s Mechanics Institute has also developed advanced rocket propellant, developed hydrogen- and oxygen-fueled rockets, and helped develop the nose cone for the nuclear warhead of the DF-5. Its Shanghai Institute of Silicate successfully developed the carbon/quartz material used to shield the tip of the DF-5’s reentry vehicle from the heat created by friction with the earth’s atmosphere. The Academy’s Institute of Electronics has built synthetic aperture radar useful in military mapping and surveillance, and its Acoustic Institute has developed a guidance system for the Yu-3 torpedo, together with sonar for nuclear and conventional submarines.

Case #4

Product: Uranium mining exploration
Supplier: Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG)

Comments: BRIUG conducts scientific exchanges with Iranian and Pakistani nuclear scientists.

Case #5

Product: High-grade seamless steel pipes
Supplier: Rex International (Hong Kong)

Comments: Owned by China North Industries (Norinco), Rex is known to have acted as a broker for numerous deals between Norinco and the Middle East. Rex reportedly handled a shipment of high-grade seamless steel pipes, suitable for use in chemical or explosives manufacturing, to an Iranian chemical weapon plant. The consignee was Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a notoriously bad destination. The pipes were reportedly shipped from Spain to Hong Kong and then to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

Rex International Development was founded in 1982 as a joint venture between Hong Kong entrepreneur T. T. Tsui and Norinco. It functioned as a broker for Norinco’s business in commercial high explosives, served as Norinco’s window on the world arms markets and as a link to the international financial system through Hong Kong.

Employees of Norinco were indicted in 1996 by the United States for illegally conspiring to import 2,000 fully automatic AK-47 assault rifles into California intended for street gangs. In addition to AK-47s, Norinco develops and manufactures armored fighting vehicles, howitzers, mortars, rocket launchers, antiaircraft weapons, anti-tank missile systems, small arms, ammunition, radars, sighting and aiming systems, high-performance engines, and nuclear/biological/chemical warfare protection systems, sensor-fuzed cluster bombs, optical-electronic products, explosives and blast materials, light industrial products, fire-fighting equipment, and metal and non-metal materials. Norinco was established in 1980 with the approval of the State Council of China, and is overseen by the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). Norinco subsidiaries in the U.S. include: Beta Chemical, Beta First, Beta Lighting, Beta Unitex, China Sports (California), Forte Lighting, Larin, NIC International (New Jersey).

Case #6

Product: “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles
Supplier: China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation

Comments: Iran has deployed Chinese HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles along the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf, on the island of Abu Musa in the middle of the Persian Gulf, on Qeshm Island and Sirri Island. The missiles are Chinese modifications of the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx missile, and can carry 1000 lb. warheads over a range of 50 miles at high subsonic (Mach 0.85) speeds. They can be equipped with either radar or infrared guidance systems, and thus can threaten U.S. and other ships transiting the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. Iran used Silkworms during its war with Iraq to attack shipping in the Gulf. Iranian forces fired an improved version of the Silkworm missile during military exercises in late November 1996.

U.S. exports: U.S. investigators believe that CATIC (China National Aero-Technology Import-Export Corporation), a powerful state-owned Chinese company, intentionally misled American officials in order to import sensitive American machine tools that were later diverted to forbidden military purposes. CATIC, China National Aero-Technology and China National Supply and Marketing Corporation imported the machines under export licenses issued by the U.S. Commerce Department with the stated purpose of making civilian aircraft. The machines had been used previously to make parts for the B-1 strategic bomber. The machines were shipped to China between September 1994 and March 1995 by the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation and were destined for CATIC’s Beijing Machining Center. The Machining Center, however, did not exist at the time the licenses were granted and was never created. Instead, the tools were illegally sent to other locations, including the China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company, maker of the Silkworms.

The New York Times November 19, 1997, p. A39

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

Testimony of Gary Milhollin

The New York Times
November 19, 1997, p. A39