











IRAN



CHINA'S
DANGEROUS EXPORTS

During the 1980s, China secretly supplied nuclear and missile technology to South Asia, South America, South Africa and the Middle East. In the 1990s, this pattern continued with Chinese technology and know-how going to South Asia, the Middle East and Algeria. In each region, China's exports contributed to the success of secret nuclear and missile programs, some of which have resulted in nuclear weapons and the deployment of nuclear-capable missiles. These exports have continued despite U.S. diplomatic efforts to stop them and repeated Chinese pledges to adhere to non-proliferation norms.

	ALGERIA	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	INDIA	IRAQ	ISRAEL	SYRIA	SAUDI ARABIA	SOUTH AFRICA
1980 1984	Secretly agrees to supply a nuclear research	Sells over 60 tons of heavy water		Sells at least 130-150 tons of heavy water	Nuclear bomb design supplied to Pakistan makes its way to Iraq				Supplies 60 tons of
	reactor	Sells uranium concentrate and low-enriched uranium hexafluoride							enriched uranium, undercut- ting U.S. pressure on South Africa
1985 1989	Trains Algerian scientists and technicians; starts building reactor	Sells enriched uranium	Sells enriched uranium Agrees to provide liquid-fuel and guidance technology		Helps make magnets for centrifuges to enrich uranium		Contracts to sell M-9 nuclear capable missiles	Sells CSS-2 medium range, nuclear capable missiles	
	0		for missiles in exchange for solid-fuel technology		"Silkworm" anti-ship missiles	ship	0.11		
1990 1998	Completes reactor and supplies heavy water	reactor and supplies heavy water and uranium fuel		Agrees to supply Tarapur reactors with enriched uranium	Agrees to sell lithium hydride useful for nerve gas, missiles and nuclear weapons	Agrees to	Sells ingredients for missile fuel		
	and uranium fuel					fund Agrees to develop- supply ment of a Syria's first cruise nuclear missile with a range of train 400 nuclear	supply Syria's first		
	Agrees to aid plutonium research				Sells "illegal chemicals" to produce missile fuel		reactor and train		

PAKISTAN

1980-Supplies nuclear bomb design and its fuel 1984 Helps build Hatf missiles Helps with gas centrifuges to enrich uranium 1985-Agrees to sell tritium gas to boost the yield of fission bombs 1989 Ships equipment for M-11 nuclear-capable missiles Starts building a 300 MW nuclear reactor at Chashma in spite of de facto international supply embargo 1990-Provides research and training in remote sensing for uranium exploration 1998 Secretly delivers more M-11 missile components Trains Pakistani nuclear technicians in China Continues to deliver components for M-1 1 missiles Supplies more than 30 M-11 missiles now in crates at Sargodha Air Force Base near Lahore

Helps build a secret 50-70 MW plutonium production reactor at Khusab, and a nearby fuel fabrication or reprocessing plant

Supplies blueprints and equipment for a missile factory near Rawalpindi, now under construction

Supplies ring magnets used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium

Supplies heavy water to Kanupp nuclear reactor

Sells a high-tech furnace and diagnostic equipment with military applications

Ships rocket fuel seized en route in Hong Kong

Agrees to build Chashma-2, a second 300 MW nuclear reactor


Ships major components for the Chashma nuclear reactor

Promises to provide the first uranium core and three reloads for Chashma

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1980- 1984	Sold production capability for the Oghab short range rocket							
1985-	Trains Iranian nuclear technicians in China							
1989	Sells Silkworm anti-ship missiles							
	Supplies a miniature reactor, a subcritical facility, and tributylphosphate useful in plutonium extraction							
	Supplies CSS-8 missiles modified for surface-to-surface missions							
1990- 1994	Supplies a calutron and a copper-vapor laser that could be used for uranium enrichment research							
	Contracts to sell 25-30 MW research reactor							
	Helps prospect for uranium in Iran							
	Contracts to sell nuclear reactor and isotope separator							
	Provides research and training in remote sensing for uranium exploration							
1995- 1998	Supplies a nuclear fusion research facility and scientists and engineers to help install it							
	Delivers poison gas ingredients							
	Delivers missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools							
	Sells virtually complete chemical weapon factories including precursor chemicals and glass-lined vessels							
	Hosts Iranian nuclear specialists to study a uranium hexafluoricle plant for export to Iran							
	Delivers components for missile guidance and ingredients for rocket propellant							
	Supplies 400 tons of poison gas ingredients							
	Agrees to sell gyroscopes, accelerometers and equipment to build and test missile guidance components							

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THE WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control carries out research and public education designed to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/bio logical weapons and long-range missiles. It is a non-profit, non-partisan foundation that operates in Washington, D.C. under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin.

The Project's main goal has been to reduce the risk that exports will be used to make nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The Project has worked to get countries to enforce the export controls contained in international agreements, and to comply with the export restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through its research reports, testimony, articles and work with the press, the Project has influenced the export policies of major supplier countries.

In 1996, the Project began to publish the *Risk Report*, an electronic database which is updated six times per year. The *Risk Report* provides governments and exporters an unclassified list of "suspect" buyers worldwide --- buyers linked to the spread of nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and long-range missile technology.

The Project has been investigating sales of nuclear- and missile-related technology since 1986 and has identified nearly 2,000 companies and projects linked to proliferation. By listing suspect buyers in sensitive emerging markets, the *Risk Report* helps exporters and governments keep dangerous products out of the wrong hands.