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Iran Chemical Milestones - 1929-2004
The Risk Report
Volume 11 Number 4 (July-August 2005)
November 1929: Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
September 1980: The Iran-Iraq War begins.
November 1983: In a communication to the United Nations, Iran alleges that Iraq is using chemical weapons.
1983: According to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency study, Iran’s offensive chemical weapon program begins in response to Iraq’s use of chemical agents on the battlefield. The D.I.A. believes that the program began under the auspices of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with some assistance from the Ministry of Defense.
April 1984: The U.N. Security Council releases a report confirming that aerial bombs with mustard gas and tabun, a nerve agent, have been used against targets in Iran.
1985: The Australia Group forms in reaction to the U.N. documented use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Member states pledge to harmonize export licensing for chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.
July 1987: The United States imposes controls on the export of eight chemicals, useful in the production of chemical weapons, to Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
1987: Iran is able to deploy limited quantities of mustard gas and cyanide against Iraqi troops using artillery shells, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.
March 1988: 5,000 civilians are killed in an attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja. Iraqi forces are accused of using chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and VX. According to media reports citing U.S. government studies, Iran is believed to have used cyanide gas to attack the town.
May 1988: U.N. Security Council Resolution 612 is unanimously adopted, condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and calling on both sides to adhere to the Geneva Protocol.
August 1988: Iran-Iraq war ends in a stalemate.
1989: Media reports reveal that an Iranian diplomat arranged for a West German firm to purchase 210 tons of thiodiglycol from a supplier in the United States and then ship it to Iran in three installments, from March 1987 to April 1988. Reportedly two shipments totaling 90 tons successfully made it to Iran, while the third 120 ton shipment was intercepted by U.S. Customs agents. Thiodiglycol is a chemical weapon (blister agent) precursor.
March 1989: Iran allegedly acquires 60 tons of thionyl chloride from India’s government-run State Trading Corporation. Thionyl chloride is a chemical weapon (nerve agent) precursor.
March 1990: A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report confirms Iran’s indigenous chemical weapon production capability, including sulfur mustard gas.
October 1992: The U.S. passes the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act. This act opposes the “transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology… [that] could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”
January 1993: Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.
November 1994: The U.S. State Department sanctions one Austrian, one Australian, and one German citizen under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, allegedly for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran.
February 1995: The U.S. State Department sanctions three entities operating in the Asia-Pacific region for chemical weapon proliferation under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, allegedly for supplying Chinese chemicals to Iran.
January 1995: Iran is months away from completing a gas complex with assistance from Indian firms that could be used to produce the nerve gases sarin and tabun, according to a German intelligence reported cited by the Washington Times.
February 1996: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Iran has one of the largest chemical warfare programs in the developing world. Its arsenal of several thousand tons of chemical agents includes sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide, which can be delivered using artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs and perhaps Scud warheads. The C.I.A. also estimates that Iran is capable of producing an additional 1,000 tons of chemical agent each year.
January 1997: A Hong Kong company reportedly brokered a deal for the shipment of high grade seamless steel pipes suitable for use in chemical or explosives manufacturing to an Iranian chemical weapon plant.
May 1997: The U.S. imposes sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong entity under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, for “knowingly and materially” contributing to Iran’s chemical weapon program.
1997: In its report to Congress on worldwide proliferation, the Central Intelligence Agency says Iran has “manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them,” and was continuing to import “material related to chemical warfare” from China.
May 1998: At the Third Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the government of Iran acknowledges for the first time that it had a chemical weapon program during the Iran-Iraq war, but claims that the program was terminated after the war. The U.S. Department of State assesses that Iran has not submitted an accurate declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 and claims that Iran is attempting to “retain and modernize key elements of its CW program.”
June 2001: The U.S. imposes sanctions on a Chinese entity under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, reportedly for assisting in the construction of a facility in Iran which manufactures dual-use equipment that can be used to produce chemical weapons.
September 2001: Pars Company Inc. of Cary, North Carolina, pleads guilty to exporting two STX gas monitors from the United States to the United Arab Emirates and transshipping the monitors to Iran. The monitors are controlled for export by the U.S. Department of Commerce because of their possible use in the development or production of chemical and biological weapons.
May 2002: The U.S. imposes sanctions on two Armenian, eight Chinese, and two Moldovan entities under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for transferring to Iran technology controlled under multilateral export control lists. Reportedly, four of these companies were sanctioned for providing chemical weapon materials.
April 2003: At the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the U.S. accuses Iran of continuing “to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from abroad” for a chemical weapons program. The U.S. says it believes Iran has stockpiled blister, blood, choking and perhaps nerve agents.
July 2003: The U.S. imposes sanctions on five Chinese and one North Korean entity under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for transferring to Iran technology controlled under multilateral export control lists. Reportedly, some of the companies were sanctioned for selling chemicals and equipment that could be used in chemical weapons production.
October 2003: The head of the Iranian delegation to the Eighth Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention states that Iran has submitted all declarations and information required by the CWC and criticizes the continued application of Australia Group export controls to members of the CWC.
December 2004: An exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), claims that Iran is developing nuclear and chemical warheads and long range missiles capable of reaching Europe.