our achievements

The Wisconsin Project On Nuclear Arms Control has been working to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction since 1986. Among its major accomplishments are the following:

In 1986, the Project revealed that Norway, because of a secret export of nuclear material to Israel, had the right to inspect Israel's nuclear program. The revelation forced Israel to return half of the material to Norway and forced Norway to abandon its dangerous nuclear export business.

In April 1990, the Project revealed in the Washington Post that the U.S. Commerce Department planned to approve the sale of American supercomputers to buyers in Brazil, India and Israel who were designing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. After the Project repeatedly criticized the sales publicly, none was finally approved.

In July 1990, the Project revealed in the Washington Post that the Western countries were dropping export controls on items that Iraq was using to build nuclear weapons and missiles. The Project's revelations triggered steps by the United States and its allies to recontrol many of the items that the Project warned should not be dropped.

In 1991, the Project revealed that the U.S. Commerce Department had licensed millions of dollars' worth of sensitive equipment to Iraqi builders of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and long-range missiles. By working with Congress, the Project pressured the Commerce Department to release the export records which increased public pressure for tighter U.S. controls.

In 1992, the Project warned in the New York Times Magazine that the nuclear inspections in Iraq would fail unless the inspections were more aggressive. The Project renewed this warning in February 1993 in the New Yorker. The articles helped revive the flagging nuclear inspection effort.

In 1993, the Project produced a series of op-eds and graphics for the New York Times depicting the worldwide trade in sensitive nuclear and missile technology, specifically covering sales of dual-use equipment to Iraq. These articles have helped build public support for better export controls.

In 1994, the Project published a full-page graphic in the New York Times "Week in Review" that detailed the chronology of North Korea's nuclear weapon program. In its testimony and media commentary, the Project also warned of the dangers of appeasing North Korea and testified before several Congressional committees on the risks of the U.S.-DPRK accord signed in October.

In 1995, the Project revealed in the New York Times that China was the source of poison gas ingredients being smuggled to Iran and that the Clinton Administration planned to free for export supercomputers that the Pentagon was using to develop the next generation of American weapons.

In 1996, the Project warned in the New York Times that the Clinton Administration was about to allow the export of American supercomputers that Russia would use to design nuclear warheads. The media revelations blocked the export.

In 1997, the Project revealed that a Russian nuclear weapon laboratory had managed to import American supercomputers without the required export license, which led Congress to adopt the Project's recommendation that export controls on supercomputers be strengthened.

In 1998, the U.S. government used the Project's data to restrict U.S. trade with 63 organizations involved in the nuclear and missile programs of India and Pakistan. This restriction is the most important penalty to result from those countries' nuclear weapon tests in May.

In 1999, the Project published a study revealing that the U.S. Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to China from 1989 to 1999. Some of the exports went directly to Chinese companies developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

In the year 2000, the Project launched a joint effort with the Pentagon to improve export controls in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Project trained 65 officials from 29 governmental organizations in Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania.

In 2001, the Project launched Iraq Watch, a comprehensive web site to monitor Iraq's progress in building weapons of mass destruction. At the time of the launch, the Project revealed that Iraq had purchased weapon components from companies in Ukraine, Belarus and Romania in violation of UN sanctions.

In 2002, the Project expanded its program in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In cooperation with the Customs Service and the State and Defense Departments, the Project by the end of the year had trained some 200 export officials in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. Many of these officials use the new web-based version of the Risk Report.

In 2003, the Project turned its attention to the emerging mass destruction weapon threat from Iran. The Project gave three Congressional briefings and published a series of articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal warning that Iran may pursue the bomb while remaining within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 2004, the Project launched the Iran Watch web site, a comprehensive repository of open source information about Iran’s suspected mass destruction weapon programs.

In 2005, the Project, through an editorial in the New York Times and testimony before a Congressional commission, highlighted weaknesses in U.S. sanctions law that allow companies that help spread weapons of mass destruction to go unpunished. The Project’s research was the basis for a bill, introduced in the Senate in November 2005, that would eliminate these loopholes and increase the severity of sanctions against companies that continue to proliferate to Iran.

In 2006, the Project provided Congress with information showing that the United Arab Emirates has long been a transshipment point for the nuclear black market. The Project’s research was widely quoted both in Congress and the media, and made nonproliferation a criterion for deciding whether to allow a company from Dubai to manage a U.S. port.

In 2007, the Project supplied information on Iranian organizations linked to nuclear and missile work that contributed to decisions by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union to freeze the assets of several of these organizations.

In 2008, the Project published a report revealing that the U.S. Commerce Department was cutting controls on the sale of militarily useful American products to China. After the report was published, the Commerce Department stopped cutting the controls.